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Reflections on the Quarter

De Gaulle and the Alliance

IN his press conference of February 21, 1966, President de Gaulle declared that NATO, as presently constituted, was no longer satisfactory to France. The French government would continue to "modify present arrangements until April 4, 1969." On March 8, President de Gaulle announced in his note to the U.S. government that France would sever her ties with the military organization of NATO while remaining a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The note, written in longhand by De Gaulle himself, indicated that France would withdraw the remainder of its military forces from the two integrated commands to which they are presently assigned, and from SHAPE and the Central European Command. Moreover, the French President proclaimed that all NATO and U.S. bases and logistical operations on French soil must be removed or placed under the direct control of France. Although he ruled out multilateral negotiations on the future of the alliance within NATO's existing framework, he nevertheless expressed himself willing to discuss with the United States and Canada the status of their bases, and with other NATO members the terms for the application of the decision.

In subsequent notes the French government announced that France would complete, by July 1, the withdrawal of French military forces and staff members from NATO commands. Finally, De Gaulle asked that U.S. bases and NATO military facilities be removed from French soil by April 1, 1967.

President de Gaulle's action was not unanticipated in other NATO capitals. During the past year the United States has conducted studies designed to assess the implications of French withdrawal from NATO's command structure. But the timing of the French action against "integration" appears to have taken officials in other member-states, and perhaps even in the French government, by surprise. French policy, and particularly De Gaulle's rejection of "integration" in both NATO and the EEC, has left the United States and other NATO countries with no choice but to draw up contingency plans for the relocation of NATO institutions and military facilities in neighboring countries.

The United States responded quickly to De Gaulle's letter of March 8. In its reply, the Administration maintained that the questions raised by De Gaulle called for immediate consultation among NATO countries. Although the French President sought to engage the United States in bilateral discussions, the fourteen members of the alliance issued a joint statement reaffirming the Treaty and the principle of military integration as essential to Western security. Portugal, however, did so with reserva-

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tions. In an interview on March 17, Premier Salazar declared that NATO was totally "inadequate" and had produced "disastrous results" for Portugal. In the future, Salazar announced, Portugal would seek to strengthen her ties with those nations with which Lisbon enjoyed satisfactory relations. In particular, Salazar suggested, Portugal might conclude bilateral pacts with Brazil, France, the German Federal Republic and Spain. Moreover, Portugal would follow a foreign policy designed to obtain the maximum support for her campaign against insurgent groups in Portuguese African territories. Because of Portugal's dissatisfaction with NATO, "automatic cooperation" with the alliance and, especially, the United States should no longer be taken for granted.

While the latest French maneuver is not likely to destroy the alliance, its effects, both immediate and long range, will be far-reaching. In the short run, the fourteen allies are faced with the problem of withdrawing NATO institutions and bases from French soil and shifting their operations to other countries in Western Europe. It is estimated that the cost of relocating NATO installations may exceed $700 million. Alternative sites must be found for the U.S. European Command Headquarters at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which controls U.S. armed force units stationed in Europe; the Army Communications Zone at Orleans; four active and four standby air bases; two supply complexes, one in eastern and one in western France; a pipeline running from the Atlantic coast to the German border; and two Canadian air bases.

It appears likely that many NATO facilities will be moved to Britain. In addition to SHAPE and Allied Forces Central European Headquarters (AFCENT), the NATO Council may be transferred to London. Whatever its disadvantages, the relocation of NATO facilities provides an opportunity for organizational changes. The Military Committee, presently located in Washington, might be transferred to London to be in closer proximity to the Council and other administrative agencies. Although France has exempted the NATO Council from its decision to remove NATO installations from French soil, the relocation of the Council in London might enhance the prospects for military and political coordination within the alliance. The Standing Group, located in Washington, would give way to a new NATO General Staff located in London, which would assume many of SHAPE's planning functions. A smaller SHAPE headquarters responsible to the main headquarters in London could be established in either Belgium or the Netherlands. SHAPE would thus become an operational headquarters. To assuage Italian, Greek and Turkish fears of becoming isolated from the centers of alliance consultation and decision-making, a new co-equal Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Mediterranean might be formed at Naples. Finally, the NATO Defense College could be transferred to Rome. A plan

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embodying features such as the foregoing is to be considered at the NATO ministerial meeting scheduled to be held on June 6.

The question of cost is likely to become an important issue in the relocation of NATO facilities. If France wishes to modify the complex of the alliance unilaterally, while remaining a formal member, other NATO governments insist that France should assume a proportion of the burden. Whatever financial arrangements are worked out, an agreement whereby France maintained on French soil certain facilities formerly under NATO command might ease the task of European defense. The United States and other European countries might work out arrangements for making available facilities for NATO in return for the continuation of Western defense guarantees to France.

One of the most difficult questions posed by the French decision is the future of the French divisions now stationed in the German Federal Republic. In a note of March 12 to other NATO members, President de Gaulle declared that French forces would remain in Germany by virtue of the 1954 Western European Union accords which paved the way for Bonn's entry into NATO. Facilities in France accorded to German troops were to be renegotiated by Bonn and Paris. The Federal Republic is not likely to permit French forces to remain in Germany entirely outside the NATO framework.

The current crisis in the alliance is fraught with important implications for the future of West Germany. As a result of France's decision, the United States is likely to place increasing emphasis on the Federal Republic as its primary ally in Western Europe. More than ever, communications and supply lines located in Germany will become vital to European defense. In all likelihood, Germany will expect to be accorded a major voice in any arrangements for greater European participation in the control of NATO nuclear strategy.

Britain, as a result of French actions, may gain an opportunity to influence decisively the course of European integration as well as the Atlantic Alliance. Britain, over the last generation, did not grasp the lead in Western Europe which might have been hers had she participated fully in European institutions. By proposing the creation of a European defense community, as well as the formation of a European nuclear force linked to NATO, she might yet resume her place as the leading power of Western Europe. A British decision to apply again for Common Market membership, to lead in the formation of a European political community and to create a European defense and technological community, might evoke considerable support in Western Europe.

Britain, in proposing such integrative institutions, would have provided answers to the questions which De Gaulle has posed concerning the place of Western Europe in a world whose leading powers possess resources far in excess of those of the nation-states of

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Western Europe. Such a British proposal might provide not only an impetus to European integration, but might lead to a restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance favorable both to long-range European and U.S. interests.

The British General Election of 1966

THE Labour Government, elected in October 1964, had been in office a few days under seventeen months when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that a General Election would be held on March 31, 1966. One overriding constitutional reason for new elections was the reduction of Labour's slim parliamentary majority of five, obtained in the 1964 election, to a majority of only one. Although this minuscule "majority" had but slight effect upon the outward composure of the Prime Minister, government initiatives deemed essential to the rationalization of Britain's economy could not be put forward in so ambivalent a political environment. The equivocal position of the government added considerably to the distress of the beleaguered pound sterling, and to the difficulties posed by Rhodesia.

In his decision to call a General Election in March 1966, Prime Minister Wilson was influenced by the realization that the death of even one Labour MP in a marginal constituency, together with a subsequent by-election defeat, could wipe out the Labour majority. Such events would be especially calamitous at a time when Labour might command less popular favor than was shown in public opinion polls conducted in late February 1966. Admittedly, all the polls, except for those of February and May to August 1965, had shown Labour with a comfortable lead over the Conservatives. Nevertheless, the possibility remained that Labour might face a series of crucial by-elections at a time when the electorate was less favorably disposed. With the polls showing consistent support for the government, the Prime Minister could not be accused of calling a snap election at a time when the Conservatives were suffering a momentary disadvantage.

Ever since July 1962, when former Prime Minister Macmillan had sacked a third of his cabinet, the Conservatives had been in disarray. Moreover, their selection—under a new system of election by the Parliamentary Conservative Party—of Edward Heath as leader in July 1965, did not unify the party. Shadow Defense Minister Enoch Powell was apparently at odds with Heath and with the rest of the party on the question of whether Britain should retain a presence "east of Suez" or concentrate upon the strengthening of political and economic links with Western Europe. Moreover, the Rhodesian problem aroused divergent reactions among Conservative MP's.

The 1966 British General Election had a number of unusual aspects, one of the most singular being that the political campaign had little effect on the preferences

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of the electorate as expressed before the campaign opened. Surveys made during previous general election campaigns indicated that disparities in voter support for the two major parties tended to equalize during the four to six weeks before election day, so that the party with a formidable lead at the start of the campaign often found its advantage diminished by election time. This was not true in 1966. On election day the polls showed Labour with a lead over the Conservatives that ranged from 8 to 11 per cent. Although the poll findings exceeded to some extent the actual Labour victory by 7 per cent in terms of votes cast, the Conservative campaign clearly failed to dissuade many voters from the shift to the left that had taken place in Britain during the preceding year and a half.

Until the 1966 General Election it was possible to argue that at best Britain had no more than a modified one-party system. For generations the Conservative Party had so dominated British politics that first the Liberal, and then the Labour, party had come to be viewed as transient occupants of governmental power. From 1884 until 1964 the Conservative Party, for three-quarters of the time, had either formed the government or was the leading party in coalition governments. The first Labour Government to be organized without help from the Liberals was formed by Clement Attlee in 1945, but the staying power of Labour became doubtful when the 1950 election reduced the overall majority from 146 to 5. Even this majority was lost in the election of 1951, and there followed thirteen years of Conservative rule.

Considering the performance of the Conservatives in the period between 1962 and 1964, the Labour victory of 1964 was minimal indeed. The election of 1966 was of great importance for Labour. By losing or barely winning it the Labour Party would have reinforced the image of Labour as little more than a temporary and unsatisfactory alternative to the dominant Conservative Party. The failure of Labour to obtain a working majority would have meant another period characterized by frustration and hesitancy. Instead, the impressive gains have dispelled, if not yet banished, the image of Labour as a party capable of holding power only long enough for the Conservatives to regroup and restore themselves.

With the 1966 election the sequence of 1945 and 1950 was reversed; Labour's marginal victory of 1964 was transformed into a substantial majority in the House of Commons. While not approaching the 1945 Labour victory, Prime Minister Wilson's majority of 95 (actually 98, the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means being nonvoting members) is beyond cavil. Not only can Labour look forward to five years of power, but also to the privilege of selecting the election date and, with a modicum of luck, to yet another victory, extending Labour rule into the middle 1970's. Thus,

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Labour's policies and administration may finally be given the fair test of a decade which, if met successfully, would contribute to the strengthening of the two-party system in Britain.

This is not to suggest that the Conservative Party will become the moon to Labour's sun in the British party system. But it is unlikely that, for the foreseeable future, the Tories will resume their virtual monopoly of British politics. Mr. Heath's immediate problem is to maintain his leadership within the party, even though no immediate challenger is in sight. Should Heath respond to defeat as the Conservatives did in 1945 when, led by Lord Woolton and R. A. Butler, they consciously altered the basis of their appeal to the voters, he will face certain problems. Among the Tory casualties in 1966 were a number of MP's, in the Shadow Cabinet or close to it, who were Heath's bright young men. Among the survivors of the election were Tories like Angus Maude and Enoch Powell, whose presence may not ease the task of modernizing the Conservative Party.

The 1966 election campaign was remarkable for its paucity of issues, for Labour was content to run on the momentum of its 1964 campaign and avoid unsettling an electorate already strongly biased in its favor. The theme of Labour spokesmen was that the party had already confronted the economic crisis caused by the huge trade deficit incurred in 1964 before Labour returned to office, and was moving toward a solution of Britain's long-term economic problems. In their campaign strategy, the Conservatives reacted with a general attack on the record of the Labour Party ranging from charges that Labour policies were leading toward national bankruptcy, to the suggestion that the Wilson cabinet might send a token force of British soldiers to Vietnam.

During the campaign the only issue on which there was sustained discussion was British entry into the Common Market. At the conclusion of a meeting of the Western European Union in London on March 16, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart announced that although there had been a softening in France's attitude toward British membership in EEC, many unsolved problems were yet to be faced. Edward Heath described the reaction of the Labour Government as a "paralytic response to a magnificent opportunity," which brought from James Callaghan the comment that Heath was "rushing his fences" just as he had in earlier EEC negotiations. For the ensuing two weeks until election day, the issue of joining the Common Market dominated the Conservative campaign. Wilson devoted one important speech to the topic, but Heath, in at least seven major addresses, dealt with it at length. In retrospect, the Conservative leader seems to have scored no greater success in selecting the Common Market as an important election issue in 1966 than Sir Alec Douglas-Home had in his efforts to make Britain's nuclear deterrent the dominant issue in 1964.

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Despite the Labour victory, there remain doubts about its ability to govern effectively. Harold Wilson demonstrated his skill in controlling the party while Labour's parliamentary majority was slim, but he was assisted by the *Tribune,* the house organ of the Labour Left, which week after week reminded its readers of the need to retain a Labour Government in power—even one which lagged in giving effect to its commitment to renationalize steel and supported the U.S. position in Vietnam. Perhaps the Labour Left will not present problems for Wilson. Labour's voting majority of 95 in Commons may render the left wing's support or dissent irrelevant—just as a majority of four or less sufficed to keep it in check before the election of 1966. However, even two weeks before the opening of the new Parliament, a group of left wing Labour MP's, in an article published in the *New Statesman and Nation,* challenged the Labour Government's defense of U.S. policies in Vietnam. Wilson had opened the debate on defense policy in the closing weeks of the last Parliament by asking the left wing rhetorically why they had not demonstrated before the Chinese Embassy during the December-January bombing lull, and further accused them of wanting not peace in Vietnam but a communist victory. With these statements on record, it is difficult to imagine that Prime Minister Wilson will accommodate Labour's left wing on this issue.

The Cabinet changes announced on April 5 augur no innovations in British foreign policy. Michael Stewart, Denis Healey and Arthur Bottomley continue as Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Commonwealth Relations, respectively. Patrick Gordon Walker's return to the House of Commons gave rise to speculation that a place for him in the Cabinet might be found or created. Walker, it was suggested, might be charged with preparing and negotiating Britain's eventual entry into the European Economic Community. His task would be exceedingly difficult. When the Common Market issue dominated British politics in 1962, it cut across ideological lines in the Labour Party and divided Conservatives as well. Although the right wing of Labour ostensibly was committed to joining and the left wing opposed, many dissidents could be found in both factions. However, there were many more members in the right wing who opposed British entry than there were in the left wing who supported entry. Prime Minister Wilson himself opposed British membership in EEC on the terms being worked out in Brussels, as did Denis Healey and Douglas Jay, who has been a member of the Cabinet since 1964 as President of the Board of Trade.

The Prime Minister has been credited by British political analysts for leading the Labour Party from the shallows of ideological class politics into the mainstream of pragmatic consensus politics. His adeptness was attested by the strong support given Labour in 1966 by young, technically trained,

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middle class voters. The reorientation of the Labour Party's outlook and policies would be considerable if the Wilson Government were to make Common Market membership a priority issue.

The Tri-Continental Conference

BETWEEN January 3 and 15 representatives of the Soviet Union and China, together with delegations from communist groups and parties in more than eighty other countries, met in Havana. The so-called Tri-Continental Conference, held under the official auspices of the Cuban government, had as its objectives to consider strategies and concert efforts for the conduct of "national liberation wars" in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The Soviet Union sent a thirty-four man delegation headed by Sharaf R. Rashidon, First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee of Uzbekistan. In a speech on January 6, Rashidon declared that the Soviet Union and other members of the conference were "participants in a great event in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America." The Soviet Union, he stated, saw the necessity for the "greater coordination of the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism and, above all, American imperialism." Although the Soviet Union favored peaceful coexistence, there could be no "peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors." Hence the Soviet Union would "always support national liberation wars, and lend all possible aid and support to the armed struggle of oppressed peoples."

In particular, Rashidon declared, the struggle against imperialism must be stepped up in Latin America. He pledged Soviet "fraternal solidarity" with communist efforts to seize power in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia and Guatemala. The Soviet delegate devoted a portion of his speech to an attack upon NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, he maintained, had "increased the role of the German Federal Republic which is being converted into a principal ally of the United States in its struggle against world peace." The Soviet Union was able to obtain, in the resolutions adopted at the close of the conference, a condemnation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Finally, Rashidon expressed satisfaction with the struggle being waged by "our brothers" in Vietnam against the United States. Rashidon declared: "In order to enhance the solidarity of the Vietnamese people, the Soviet delegation proposes to mount throughout the world a campaign to give moral and material aid to the struggle in Vietnam, developing a powerful movement of wars of protest against the war being waged by the American imperialists in Vietnam." The Soviet delegate proposed that an international fund be created to support the communist cause.

The Soviet Union appears to have achieved a measure of agreement with Communist China as to

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the support of "national liberation wars." In the final declaration the Soviets agreed to the following statement: "Peaceful coexistence applies only to relations between states with different social and political systems. It cannot apply to relations between social classes, between the exploited and the exploiters within separate countries, or between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors."

The Soviet Union took considerable interest in the Tri-Continental Conference. On December 9, Foreign Minister Gromyko briefed members of the Supreme Soviet on the forthcoming meeting. Brezhnev and Kosygin sent messages of greeting to Havana. The Soviets appeared to assume a position of leadership in the conference itself and in the drafting of the declaration which issued from the deliberations in Havana.

The conferees agreed to "unite, coordinate and press the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism." They passed numerous resolutions designed to assist in the attainment of this objective in specific countries throughout the less developed areas. They called for militant efforts by those "who are fighting with arms in their hands against the forces of domestic oligarchy." It was agreed, moreover, that efforts should be made to expropriate U.S. and other Western investments in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The declaration urged diplomatic recognition of the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine and legal representative of the South Vietnamese people."

The conferees took several steps designed to provide an organizational framework for the achievement of common objectives. It was decided to establish a secretariat containing twelve members—four for each of the three continents—and a secretary general. Captain Osmany Cienfuegos, Chairman of Cuba's Foreign Relations Committee, was designated Secretary General. The secretariat, with its headquarters, temporarily at least, in Havana, was assigned several tasks, including the supervision of a Committee of Assistance and Aid for Liberation Movements and Struggles against Neocolonialism. Moreover, an action group for each continent is to be established. Such groups are to give effect to resolutions adopted by the conference. Conceivably, the organizational framework established as a result of the Tri-Continental Conference will furnish the Soviet Union and, perhaps to a lesser extent, China an organizational device for supporting a variety of parties and groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Although the Tri-Continental Conference received little mention in the U.S. press, it evoked concern in many Latin American capitals. On January 19, Peru called for a special meeting of the OAS Council "to formulate a denunciation on violation of the principle of nonintervention, set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." The OAS itself had been con-

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demned in the Havana deliberations for its role in the Dominican Republic following the uprising of April 1965. The request of the Peruvian government was seconded by Colombia and Venezuela.

In a special meeting held on February 2, the OAS Council passed a resolution condemning "emphatically the policy of intervention and aggression of the communist states and other participating countries and groups, manifested in the discussions and decisions of the so-called conference of solidarity. . . ." The Council decided to "make an urgent study and investigation of the deliberations, conclusions, and projections" of the conference.

Despite its deep-seated economic problems, the Castro regime remains a center for communist revolutionary warfare in Latin America, as well as other less developed areas. The Havana conference revealed that, in the post-Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union's objectives in the less developed areas run counter to those of the United States and most other nations in the Free World. The participants in the Tri-Continental Conference can be expected, in the months to come, to step up their efforts to achieve objectives for which they expressed fervent support in Havana.

The Congressional Debate on Vietnam

HEARINGS on U.S. policy toward Communist China and Vietnam, conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February and March, had as their purpose, according to the Committee's chairman, Senator Fulbright, to inform the American public of the implications of U.S. policy in Vietnam as well as to promote a greater understanding of modern China and the Chinese people. Fulbright expressed fear of what he termed a "fatal expectancy" in Washington and Peking that conflict between the two powers is inevitable. The hearings were designed to "educate" the American public as to the "real" intentions and capabilities of Communist China and thus moderate the U.S. conception of Peking as an implacable foe. Fulbright criticized the Administration for its "open-ended" Vietnam policy which might force Peking into a direct confrontation with the United States. In order to avert this possibility, the Senator and other critics of U.S. policy in Vietnam argued that the Administration should explore new avenues to end the conflict.

Whether or not the hearings have achieved their stated purpose is unclear. The views of Administration officials regarding Communist China's objectives, as well as the Vietnam conflict, differ fundamentally from those expressed by many of the Congressional critics and witnesses who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Administration has attached considerable importance to the goals and strategy of Communist China as set forth in the statement issued in September by Peking's Minister of

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Defense, Lin Piao. According to the analyses of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, the Vietnam conflict conforms to long-standing strategic guidelines laid down by Mao Tse-tung and his comrades since the 1930's and presented anew by General Lin Piao. Vietnam forms a part of the "rural" less developed regions of the globe, control of which is vital to the destruction of the "urban" industrialized West. The Vietnamese conflict demonstrates the ultimate intention of Communist China to gain control over the "rural" areas of the world before tackling the "urban" ones. Peking rather than Moscow, the Administration's witnesses suggested, may confront the United States and its allies with major challenges in the years ahead.

Yet, Communist China, because of its limited capabilities, is unable to achieve the total revolutionary objectives set by its leadership. By contrast, the capabilities of the Soviet Union have grown considerably in recent years. The Soviet Union, not Communist China, possesses the military capacity to inflict great damage upon the United States.

In the hearings, Secretary of State Rusk argued that U.S. failure in the Vietnam conflict would raise serious doubts as to the credibility of U.S. commitments to other allies throughout the world. Secretary of Defense McNamara, in an effort to refute Senator Fulbright's contention that the United States was pursuing an "open-ended" war in Vietnam, contended that "our military operations are facing us with no more of a threat of an open-ended major land war in Asia than was implied in our signing and ratification of the SEATO Treaty or than was expressly recognized by this Committee in its report on the proposed treaty at that time." In response to his critics President Johnson, addressing the Freedom House in New York, declared: "Our purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To any armed attack, we will reply. We have measured the strength—and the weakness—of others and we know our own. We observe in ourselves and we applaud in others—a careful restraint in action."

In contrast to the Administration's analysis of Chinese foreign policy goals and capabilities, several witnesses viewed China's policy in Southeast Asia as a reaction to past injustices perpetrated by Western powers and a desire to achieve her "rightful place" as a major power in the Far East. It was suggested that Communist China could not be contained by U.S. actions in Vietnam. Rather, the United States, according to some witnesses, should seek "accommodation" with Communist China in order to achieve the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia. Thus, instead of increasing its commitment to Saigon, the Administration should be prepared to downgrade its role in Vietnam. Several critics of Administration policy offered suggestions on how the United States could de-escalate the conflict and reduce its commitments.

Lt. General James A. Gavin (USA, Ret.), former U.S. Ambas-

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sador to France, called for the withdrawal of American forces into "enclaves" along the coastal regions of South Vietnam and in the major cities. The countryside would be permitted to fall increasingly into the hands of the Viet Cong. Such a solution, however, would force the United States into a defensive strategy which would make possible at best a holding action. The United States would face rising opposition—at home and across the globe—to its presence in Vietnam as communist power in the countryside increased, and such a posture would hardly create conditions favorable for U.S. negotiators at any peace conference.

Another witness, George F. Kennan, argued that the United States should "liquidate" its interests in Vietnam. Kennan expressed himself fearful that the United States had allowed its interests in Vietnam, "a remote and secondary theater of activity," to hinder the prospects for improving relations with the Soviet Union, which should be a "prime concern" to U.S. policymakers. Yet the Soviet Union continues to pursue policies which run counter to U.S. interests, not only in Vietnam but elsewhere in the world as well. Nor have the Soviets, to judge from their policy pronouncements, attached as great an importance to the development of a *détente* with the West as do some of the more vocal advocates of accommodation in the United States. According to Kennan, U.S. relations with Japan, a nation of greater importance to the United States than South Vietnam, might be adversely affected. Finally, Kennan contended that U.S. interests in Europe should command greater priority than U.S. interests in Vietnam.

Senator Fulbright called for the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia. Washington might find attractive an agreement whereby the United States withdrew its ground forces from Southeast Asia, while maintaining certain air bases and military installations on the Asian mainland. According to the Arkansas Senator, the presence of U.S. military bases near China would continue to pose a credible threat to Peking even in the absence of U.S. troops on the mainland. Fulbright contended that the United States, despite its superior military capabilities, cannot wage a successful struggle on land against the communists in Southeast Asia. Thus, he argued implicitly for a strategy which relies principally upon U.S. air and naval power to balance communist capabilities in this region of the globe. Yet the United States, by its air and naval power alone, has not been able to halt the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia. At best, these elements of U.S. power can deter open aggression by Communist China and damage the economy and supply lines in North Vietnam; they cannot cope with communist guerrilla warfare. The United States, whatever the internal political problems facing South Vietnam, has demonstrated its ability to defeat Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in military encounters. A strategy which relies

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primarily upon air and naval power is not likely to restrain communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Administration officials disagree with the proposals of Senator Fulbright and General Gavin on several grounds. The "enclave" strategy would sacrifice the advantages of mobility which U.S. and South Vietnamese forces presently enjoy over the Viet Cong. Moreover, a U.S. withdrawal into enclaves would place the countryside in permanent Viet Cong control and perhaps cripple the ability of Saigon to maintain control even over certain urban areas.

In the first weeks of 1966, Vice President Humphrey and Senator Robert Kennedy engaged in an exchange of views regarding the acceptability of the so-called National Liberation Front (NLF) as a legitimate party to negotiations over the future of Vietnam. Senator Kennedy proposed that the Administration, in pressing for negotiations on Vietnam, should be willing to recognize the Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, as a participant in peace talks. According to Administration spokesmen, the status of the NLF should be a topic for inclusion on the agenda of any conference to end hostilities. Washington has maintained that the NLF is nothing but a "front" for subversive communist activity, controlled by Hanoi. Only Hanoi retains the ability to halt "external aggression" in South Vietnam. Moreover, U.S. recognition of the NLF before the conclusion of a peace settlement could only aid the NLF in the achievement of its principal objective: domination of the South Vietnamese government. To suggest that the Viet Cong be permitted to participate in a coalition government, either before or after elections, would weaken the resolve of noncommunist South Vietnamese groups. It would also constitute a reward to the communist-dominated Front and its Viet Cong forces for their aggression and terrorism in South Vietnam.

Some members of Congress have viewed with concern the increased power which the Executive has enjoyed in the conduct of foreign policy. Senator Fulbright, who backed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 7, 1964, expressed his regret subsequently in having agreed to grant the President such a broad mandate. While efforts to rescind the Resolution have met with no success, Congress may show a growing disinclination in the future to grant the President such broad powers. Restive over developments in Vietnam but unwilling to challenge the President directly, many Senators have welcomed the hearings because they provided an opportunity for amplifying their voices.

The Administration, for its part, and quite properly, has been concerned lest the domestic debate on Vietnam contribute to Hanoi's conviction that the United States will falter in its resolve. Yet the Administration continues to enjoy a wide margin of Congressional and public support for its Vietnam policies. The Senate hearings appear to have had little effect upon U.S.

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public opinion. Nevertheless, they did reflect the confusion and uncertainty that is widespread in America and other Western countries regarding the nature of communist wars of national subjugation, exemplified by Vietnam, and the appropriate Western response.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam itself, the Johnson Administration was embarrassed by a flare-up of domestic political turmoil and dissension. Buddhist groups, jockeying for political power, brought pressure upon the Ky regime to end military rule and finally forced the Premier to schedule nationwide elections for October. The outcome of these elections is impossible to predict. Under present wartime conditions, Washington would prefer to deal with a stable and enlightened military government, able and willing to carry out social and economic reforms. The Ky regime appeared to be ready to embark on such a program when its attempt to remove a powerful military figure from control of the traditionally independent-minded northern provinces of South Vietnam set off Buddhist demonstrations.

The real causes of this latest round of political turmoil are difficult to pinpoint. Some observers ascribe it to ambitious Buddhist monks who feared the military were becoming too powerful, especially in view of Washington's strong and open support and the incipient program of socio-economic reforms; some trace it to communist infiltration of various youth and other front groups and a communist decision to shift the conflict from the battlefield, where they are losing, to the social-political front, where South Vietnam is disunited and vulnerable; others take a more optimistic view and suggest that, since the tide of conflict seems to be turning against the Viet Cong, South Vietnamese political and religious leaders are anxious to restore civilian rule so that they may enhance their future role in government.

Whatever the underlying reasons, the current political instability hinders the prosecution of the conflict on the military front and virtually eliminates the hope for a vigorous implementation of the ambitious social and economic plans envisaged at the February Honolulu meeting between President Johnson and Premier Ky. Major attention will now be given to preparing for the elections. If the communists are prevented from open participation —as now seems likely—loyal nationalist parties must see to it that they are also prevented from running their candidates under different labels. The NLF may be expected to throw its support, i.e., front groups among students, workers, Buddhists and the like, to friendly or tractable candidates. The communists' major weapon, of course, will be terrorism, and it is difficult to imagine how villagers in Viet Cong-controlled areas can be given enough security to ensure a free vote. As election time draws nearer, we may expect an increase in communist activity, ranging from peace overtures to stepped-up military and terrorist activity.

Americans quite naturally wish that it would be possible for Presi-

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dent Johnson to announce dramatically, and well in advance of the elections, that the future role of the United States in their country will hinge directly upon the upcoming choice of the people of South Vietnam. We would like to be able to make our position clear-cut: if the country's first freely elected government wants us to continue to participate in the defense against communist aggression, we shall gladly do so; if on the other hand it requests us to leave, we shall have no alternative consistent with our own political principles but to comply. It is unlikely that any government, chosen in a genuinely free election following a campaign in which the stakes had been clearly spelled out for the people, would seal its own doom by asking for the evacuation of American military power. Such a step would serve merely to ensure that the first freely elected government would become the last freely elected government in Vietnam.

The United States might well run the risk of stating unambiguously its own conviction with respect to representative government *if* there were reason to believe that the grave issues which hang in the balance could actually be clarified for all the people of South Vietnam within the few months before they go to the polls, and *if* it were deemed possible to conduct a really free election in a country torn asunder by revolutionary warfare. Both conditions at present seem almost impossible of fulfillment. Whether they can be brought sufficiently within reach to justify a striking reaffirmation of the American belief in the value of representative government in Southeast Asia is a matter to be judged carefully by the President.

Instability in the Middle East

SEVERAL events fraught with important implications for international politics have occurred recently in the Middle East. The Arab countries have been engaged in an arms race among themselves and with Israel. Israel, in response to Soviet arms shipments to Egypt, has purchased 200 Patton tanks from the United States and is negotiating a defense agreement with France. The agreement will ease Israel's heavy defense budget of nearly 10 per cent of her gross national product—one of the world's highest—and give her access to French military information. Negotiated by Israel's new Defense Minister, Dr. Zev Dinstein, and the French Defense Minister, Pierre Messmer, the agreement provides for Israeli military purchases in France to be paid for, in part, by defense orders to be placed in Israel by France. Israel would produce certain matériel for the French defense program, including spare parts and electronic devices. Reports preceding the announcement of the agreement stated that Israel had agreed to purchase from France thirty missiles with a 500-mile range.

During 1965 Egypt's President Nasser, for the most part, was remarkably moderate in his statements regarding war with Israel, peace in Yemen and U.S. foreign

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policy. In January 1966 the United States agreed to resume aid to Cairo, accompanied by reassurances to Congress by President Johnson that such a policy served U.S. interests. In February, the speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly, Anwar Sadat, and a six-man parliamentary committee, visited Washington for talks with officials, including President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk. This was the first official visit made by a top member of the Nasser government to Washington since the Egyptian revolution of 1952.

But on Unity Day, February 22, the annual observance of Egypt's short-lived union with Syria and coincidentally the eve of Sadat's meeting with President Johnson, President Nasser unleashed a verbal attack accusing the United States of pursuing a policy antagonistic to Arab interests by supporting Israel. Moreover, Nasser maintained that Washington and London were bent upon the formation of a new alliance system in the Middle East to fill the "vacancy" left by the Baghdad Pact and to frustrate Arab nationalism. (Yet on April 1 it was reported that Cairo had asked for more than one hundred million dollars in U.S. aid for construction of grain silos and power stations.)

President Nasser has also recently accused King Feisal of Saudi Arabia of financing a plot against him during the summer of 1965 and attempting to form an anti-Nasser "Islamic Alliance" with Iran's Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi in order to weaken pan-Arab unity. Egypt has all but ended its six-months-old truce in Yemen. Nasser declared that he would not withdraw his 70,000 troops from Yemen until an acceptable government in San'a is established. In an effort to refute the claim that Egypt cannot continue to bear the expense of the war, estimated at half a million dollars a day, President Nasser declared that Egyptian troops would remain in Yemen several years, if necessary, in order to achieve his objectives.

The United States has sought, without great success, to prod both sides to make peace in Yemen. Nasser's threat to retain the Egyptian military presence there could heighten tensions with the United States, which must seek to guard its interests in Saudi Arabia. The United States has agreed to provide the Saudi government with an air defense system including supersonic fighters and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. The Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan Bin Abdal Aziz, requested further U.S. diplomatic and military support should the war in Yemen be resumed. Saudi Arabia specifically is said to have asked for air support for the defense of towns near the Yemen frontier. A precedent for such aid was set last year when King Feisal, fearful of an Egyptian air attack, appealed for U.S. military support. In response, the United States sent a squadron of F-100 fighters for a month-long joint training exercise with the Saudi Air Force.

Nasser has threatened a "deterrent war" should Israel proceed with the development of atomic weaponry. Although Egypt is ahead

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in numbers of missiles, Israel surpasses her in missile technology and is said to possess a capability to produce at least one nuclear bomb per year. Nasser has requested from the Soviet Union an aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine, as well as equipment to detect any nuclear testing which Israel might undertake. Thus far, however, the Soviet Union has refused Egyptian requests for nuclear arms. Instead, the Soviets have offered to provide a "nuclear umbrella" over Egypt.

In recent months President Nasser has resumed his verbal barrage against President Bourguiba of Tunisia for the latter's statements regarding the desirability of negotiations with Israel. In return Tunis Radio has condemned Egypt for adding "another year of suffering and pain to the years of wretchedness of the people of Palestine" by refusing to negotiate for a settlement of Arab-Israeli problems.

Many explanations have been offered for Nasser's new truculence. In recent years he has experienced considerable frustration in efforts to enhance his international position. The overthrow of his friend President Nkrumah, the coup in Syria, and the increase in unrest in his own country with its ever-present economic difficulties, have not strengthened the Nasser regime. The Egyptian government has indicted 110 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, bringing to 234 the number of "brothers" facing prosecution. Last fall the Egyptian government began to round up some 35,000 members of the organization, as well as other suspects, and started to bring them to trial in the early months of 1966. In early April more than twenty army officers were arrested for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Nasser regime. Unrest in the Egyptian army has been attributed in part to dissatisfaction with Nasser's strategy in the Yemen conflict.

The four-day Arab summit meeting held in Cairo in March reflected the divisive tendencies within the Arab League. President Bourguiba continued to boycott Arab League meetings. Saudi Arabia, because the conference was chaired by Yemen's Republican premier, Hassan Amri, sent an undersecretary. During the meeting, Syria called for reprisals against the United States for the sale of arms to Israel. The final resolution threatened "consequences harmful to Arab-American ties" if U.S. aid to Israel were continued. The twelve governments pledged Arab solidarity as well as nonalignment in world affairs. This session is to be followed by a summit meeting of Arab heads of state to be held next September in Algiers.

In recent weeks the new Syrian government has sought to consolidate its position. On February 23 the ruling Baath party, with the ouster of strongman Amin Hafez, underwent its fifteenth major reshuffling since 1949. The coup grew out of a split between the party's leftist moderates, led by Hafez, and a more leftist revolutionary group of officers led by General Salah Jadid. The former sought closer ties with Egypt while the latter demanded a complete

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break with Cairo. The coup was followed by an intensification of border clashes between Syria and Israel, particularly in the Sea of Galilee where Israeli fishing vessels have been subject to increased attack. Although there has been some speculation concerning the possibility of a counter-coup that would bring the country back toward a more moderate political course, there was little doubt in March that the Syrian army, perhaps the farthest left in ideological outlook of all Arab armies, had gained control in a pivotal state, thereby increasing the instability of the region.

Israeli military leaders have expressed concern over two other recent developments. First, on March 8, King Hussein of Jordan reached an eleven-point agreement with Ahmud Shukairy, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The accord provided for the PLO to operate offices throughout the country, for its officers to set up posts on the Israeli border, raise funds, and establish youth camps for military training. The PLO reportedly is training commando units in three countries, including Jordan. Prior to the accord, Jordan had not made its territory available for the training of the Palestine Liberation Army. Shukairy has visited Communist China and the PLO has established a mission in Peking.

A second problem facing Israel stems from the announcement that Britain by 1968 will abandon her base in Aden. Britain does not plan to conclude a defense treaty with the South Arabian Federation but merely to strengthen its federal army and establish a garrison in the Persian Gulf Sheikhdom of Bahrein. President Nasser considers the announced British withdrawal a victory for his policies in Yemen. Perim, in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, which lie between Ethiopia and Yemen, will also gain its independence in 1968. Israel had hoped that Britain would not cede this strategic island in the Red Sea, which is a vital artery for her shipping especially between Eilat and the Orient.

In his Unity Day speech Nasser ruled out union with Iraq for the next five years, despite the previous agreement for a merger by May 1966. However the Iraqis have been preoccupied with problems posed by Kurdish dissidence. For six years the Kurds, led by Mustafa Barzani, have been in rebellion against Baghdad. Over 20,000 Kurds have reportedly been killed since 1961. In recent months the fighting has taken a considerable toll among government forces. Iraqi troops have crossed into Iran on several occasions in "hot pursuit" of Kurdish guerrillas. The Teheran government, anxious to avoid rebellion among its own population of 3,000,000 Kurds, has not attempted strenuously to police the mountainous border. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ghollam Abbas Aram, early in January, used the border incidents to revive another long-standing dispute between the two neighbors over the use of the Shuttal Arab River, vowing to silence "the voice of Iraqi artillery" and "crush further ag-

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gression." In the near future, the Soviet Union, it is expected, will resume military aid to Iraq, after having suspended it in 1964. The Soviets sent a military delegation to Baghdad in April to discuss new forms of political and military cooperation with Iraq. Iran, on the other hand, is said to have received new jet fighters from the United States.

Arms races and political unrest plague the Middle East. Certainly, this troubled region is in dire need of stability. The Western powers, as well as the Soviet Union, have deplored the tensions rife in the area. In January Ambassador Goldberg, during his visit to London, declared that the United States was prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union on arms control in the Middle East. President de Gaulle has called for the inclusion of the Soviet Union in a new agreement, similar to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which Britain, France and the United States pledged to limit the flow of arms to the area. Prime Minister Wilson, during his visit to Moscow early in 1966, is said to have discussed Middle East arms problems with Premier Kosygin. The Soviet Ambassador to Israel, Dimitri Chunakin, on March 11 called for a halt to the arms race. Soviet spokesmen have suggested the application of the "Tashkent spirit" to Middle East problems.

The dampening of potentially explosive tendencies in the Middle East is related, in no small measure, to the ability of the major Western powers to assure that arms supplied to Arab states and Israel do not have a destabilizing influence. Finally, the future of international relations in the Middle East will be influenced, to a considerable extent, by the policies which the Soviet Union chooses to pursue.

India and Pakistan After Tashkent

IN early January, President Ayub Khan and the late Prime Minister Shastri met—at the invitation of Premier Kosygin—in the central Asian city of Tashkent to discuss differences between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir question. From the week-long deliberations issued, on January 10, a declaration in which the two leaders agreed to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and seek to solve their problems through peaceful means. They recognized that peace in the subcontinent was essential for its welfare and agreed that India and Pakistan should seek to improve their mutual relations.

At Tashkent, Ayub and Shastri agreed that within a period of six weeks they would pull back their troops to positions occupied before the conflict and observe a cease-fire. Future relations between them, it was decided, would be based on the principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Diplomatic relations, disrupted since the conflict began in August 1965, were to be resumed. The means by which economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges might be improved would

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be discussed at a future date. It was agreed that prisoners of war would be repatriated and that the status of refugees would be considered. In order to discuss these and other important problems, further meetings were to be held between Indian and Pakistani representatives. Yet the conferees did not reach accord on the Kashmir question.

In the weeks following the Tashkent meeting, India faced the difficult task of restructuring her government after the sudden death of Prime Minister Shastri. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was selected as Shastri's successor in a manner that differed from the method by which her predecessor was chosen. Then Kumaraswami Kamaraj, president of the Congress Party, had been able to persuade the members of the party to make the choice of Shastri unanimous. Bitter dispute preceded the selection of Shastri's successor. In particular, Morarji Desai, former Finance Minister and a leading member of the Congress Party, opposed the election of Mrs. Gandhi, and, supported by right-wing elements in the party, sought the post of Prime Minister for himself.

In March, the government announced that a Punjabi-speaking state would be established. Before India achieved independence, the Congress Party had passed a resolution to form states on the basis of language. Except in the case of the Punjab, states have been established on the basis of regional languages. While the belated decision to create a Punjabi-speaking state satisfied most Punjabis, it was distasteful to the Hindi-speaking people. Protest demonstrations resulted in considerable violence which spread even to the city of Delhi.

India faced other problems, including a shortage of food. Her food crisis is likely to worsen in the months ahead. Agricultural production has been adversely affected by a severe drought. During the past year rainfall in most parts of the country has been about 50 per cent below normal levels. The drought has damaged crops, in particular grain. In order to provide a subsistence diet for its population, India must produce or import annually about 97 million tons of grain. Because of the drought, domestic production is expected to total only about 76 million tons. Thus India, if it is to avoid starvation for its increasing population, must obtain large quantities of foodstuffs from abroad. Several parties, the communists in particular, sought to exploit the food crisis for their own benefit. Mass demonstrations occurred in Kerala and Bengal. The pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in the Indian Communist Party vied with each other in efforts to foment public protest against the food shortages.

In the midst of these commotions, Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington at the end of March. She received assurances of American aid to assist in India's program of economic development. It was announced that an Indo-American foundation would be set up in In-

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dia with an endowment of $300 million in Indian currency to aid educational programs. This amount represents more than half of the rupee funds held in India by the United States as a result of sales of surplus grains under Public Law 480. If used effectively these "counterpart" funds might make a major contribution to the expansion of India's educational system.

When Ayub Khan returned to Pakistan after signing the agreement at Tashkent he met considerable opposition from his countrymen for having agreed to a withdrawal of forces from India without obtaining a solution to the Kashmir problem favorable to Pakistan. The opposition manifested itself in the form of demonstrations against the Tashkent accord which subsided only when Ayub, in a radio broadcast, declared that Pakistan could never agree to establish truly peaceful relations with India until a satisfactory solution is reached on the Kashmir question.

At the beginning of March the signatories of the Tashkent agreement met at Rawalpindi, as they had agreed in January, to consider further steps designed to improve economic relations. The Indian delegation was headed by Minister for External Affairs Sardar Swaran Singh. Because of the rigidity of the respective Indian-Pakistani positions the talks quickly reached a deadlock. India maintained that the issue of Kashmir was not negotiable, whereas Pakistan insisted upon further talks.

The Tashkent accord and subsequent discussions, however important their short-term effects, did little to resolve the underlying issues that divide India and Pakistan. Both countries have shown little inclination to reach a permanent settlement of the Kashmir question. This issue, together with the pressing problems of agricultural production, economic development, linguistic divisions, and threats from communism, is likely to plague the Indian subcontinent for many years to come.

Political Unrest in Africa South of the Sahara

IN recent months African states have experienced a series of military coups. The diversity of the African continent makes it difficult to generalize as regards the common features of the uprisings. Dissimilarities in colonial experience, political objectives, tribal background and economic resources differentiate many of the new states of Africa. Nevertheless, the military coups in the Congo, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Ghana have had at least one common feature: a desire on the part of the military elites to rid their respective countries of corrupt, tyrannical or inefficient governments.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the coup in Ghana. Under President Nkrumah's rule, Ghana had become a state with many of the trappings of totalitarianism. More than 1,000 Soviet and more than 200 Chinese advisers and experts had been called upon to assist the Nkrumah regime.

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Nkrumah had suppressed opposition political parties, placed the press under censorship, imprisoned many of his critics and forced others into exile. General Ankrah, the new leader of the National Liberation Council which seized power on February 24, charged that Nkrumah's regime had squandered the national resources to such an extent that Ghana faces serious economic difficulties. General Ankrah has requested aid from the United States and other governments, as well as from the International Monetary Fund. Without aid from the West, Ghanaian leaders will find themselves hard pressed to restore even the degree of economic strength that obtained at Ghana's independence in 1957. In order to strengthen his position, Nkrumah had been forced to establish his personal "parallel" political organization, including a military unit for his own protection.

In Nigeria, Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi seized power on January 15-16 in a coup which appears to have been sparked by growing dissatisfaction over the inability of the leaders of the federal government to reconcile their major political and economic differences. Moreover, according to the coup leaders, the objective of the revolt was "to end corruption, nepotism, gangsterism, and violence." Continuing unrest in the Western region following the allegedly rigged elections of October 1965 may also have been a contributing factor. Tribal considerations as well played an important role in the Nigerian coup.

The new rulers charged that the costs of the federal system, with its four regional political structures, represented an unnecessary economic burden. They declared their intention to establish a unitary state with central planning but a decentralized administration. Such a system, they hoped, might contribute to a reduction in regional inequalities and injustices which appear to have intensified the tribal animosity that led to the coup.

In the Congo, Lieutenant-General Joseph Mobutu seized power on November 25, 1965 in order "to save the country from anarchy and chaos." A parliamentary deadlock between supporters of President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombe had resulted in virtual governmental paralysis. The coup appears to have stemmed also from the military's fear that President Kasavubu might reach an agreement with leftist rebel factions. Mobutu sought to prevent the conclusion of an accord which might have heightened the influence in the central government of a faction led by Christophe Gbenye.

In Dahomey, General Christophe Soglo forced the resignations of President Apithy and Vice President Ahomadegbe on November 29, 1965 and later installed Tahirou Congacou as President, pending national elections. The stated objective of General Soglo was "to establish a new style of politics in which people would unite around a program and not around a few personalities." A parliamentary deadlock resulting from disputes between factions loyal to President

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Apithy and former President Hubert Maga, and to Vice President Ahomadegbe may have contributed to this revolt. Moreover, the government's economic policies and corruption appear to have deepened regional cleavages in Dahomey.

Whether or not the new governments established in these and other African states will prove capable of solving major problems facing them is uncertain. These states, like many other developing countries, have turned to military rule after disillusionment with post-independence civilian government. In Western political thought there is a widespread belief that the military should be subordinated to civilian authority. This conception may be inappropriate in the African context. In Africa, as in other developing areas, the army often represents one of the few forces capable of making a major contribution to political and economic modernization. As one of the more modern and strongly nationalist sectors of the societies of less developed countries, the military, in many cases, has lost confidence in civilian authorities who prove unable to achieve the goals set for themselves at independence, Hence, military officers have intervened in order to improve standards of performance, halt corruption and rid a country of some of the worst excesses of authoritarian rule. For example, General Ankrah, in a speech to regional and district administrative officers in Ghana, declared: "It will be a vital part of your duties to promote the public's confidence in defense of freedom which the armed forces and police have regained for this country. . . . The public will expect of you the highest standards of efficiency, integrity, devotion, honesty, and loyalty. . . . In all your acts, you must never forget the rule of law."

Most of the leaders of military coups in Africa have announced their intention to permit a return to constitutional government. Those charged with the preparation of new constitutions are likely to make an effort to reform some features of the old systems which contributed to political instability—for example, the Nigerian political parties based primarily upon regional and tribal loyalties.

While not all governing groups in Africa agreed with Nkrumah's proposals for African unity, the deposed Ghanaian President was widely regarded as a leader of the pan-African movement. Hence his deposition may constitute a setback to the movement. At a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, convened shortly after Nkrumah's ouster, several African states refused to recognize the new regime of General Ankrah, who in some African quarters was regarded as a "reactionary" leader.

At the Addis Ababa meeting, some African leaders had hoped to persuade the OAU to take forceful action to oust the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the resolution passed by the UN Security Council on November 20, 1965 which avoided

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stating specifically whether Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence posed an immediate threat to the peace. Instead, it was suggested that the "continuance of the Smith regime in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security." The UN resolution merely called upon "all states to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime, and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military matériel, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products." Many African leaders would have preferred that the full provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter be brought to bear on the Rhodesian government, including the intervention of a UN force. Given the UN financial crisis, resulting primarily from disagreement about peacekeeping operations, the prospects for a UN force were dim. Instead, the Africans were forced to place their hopes upon economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

An examination of the recent events in Africa south of the Sahara cannot but raise doubts as to the prospects for political stability and economic development in African states. Military coups may erupt elsewhere in Africa. Recently established military regimes may themselves face many of the divisive tendencies that plagued their predecessors. Clearly, the new states of Africa face formidable domestic problems, upon the solution of which may depend their future political orientation, both domestic and international.

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THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

by Joseph S. Clark

FEW Americans would deny that the basic foreign policy objective of our country is a just and lasting peace. We contend that our national posture is not belligerent, that we seek no territorial acquisitions, that we are prepared to give up our foreign bases as part of a general peaceful international settlement and that we stand ready with economic aid to assist the underdeveloped nations of the world in solving their problems of misery and poverty.

We support the United Nations. We are prepared to move forward in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Our contention is that the intransigent aggression of international communism centered in Russia and China is the only deterrent to achieving our peaceful objectives. These belligerent policies of our adversaries, we claim, require us to arm to the teeth, to devote our best brains and a huge share of our Gross National Product to preparing for and actually waging war. We deplore this necessity for the added reason that it requires drastic cutbacks in our domestic programs to build a better America.

We tend to view with suspicion suggestions looking toward a relaxation of the Cold War and the establishment of peaceful coexistence with the communist states on the ground that our enemies are utterly untrustworthy. Agreements reached with them, accordingly, would be both meaningless and damaging to our ability to create and maintain freedom and democracy around the world.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the validity of this viewpoint and to suggest policies and programs which might contribute to the achievement of our basic objective: world peace.

I

Until the Spanish American War of 1898, the United States was a North American continent power with no serious international ambitions other than to be let alone to pursue our domestic Manifest Destiny of building the best and most prosperous nation-state the world had ever known. Then, in the course of a few years, we acquired Puerto Rico, the Philippines and a virtual

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protectorate over Cuba. We snatched Panama away from Colombia and built the Canal. We acquired the Hawaiian Islands. We moved into Guam and Samoa. We practiced "dollar diplomacy" in the Caribbean and South America. The Marines went into Haiti and Vera Cruz. Although we were never willing to admit it, our behavior became indistinguishable from that of the imperialist European powers bent on the acquisition of a colonial empire.

Then came World War I. We went to the defense of England and France to "make the world safe for democracy." Our economic and military strength turned the tide for freedom. Following Kaiser Wilhelm's defeat, President Wilson tried without success to put the United States into the League of Nations as a guarantor of world peace through the processes of international law and diplomacy. But in the end Senator Henry Cabot Lodge prevailed, we turned our back on our international responsibilities, brought the boys home from Europe and retreated into splendid isolation. Nevertheless, we held on to our own little empire.

In the interval between the two world wars, we were willing, generally speaking, to let the rest of the world go by. Unfortunately, the rest of the world refused to go by and insisted from time to time in intruding on our preoccupation with our own affairs. The international monetary and trade crisis in 1933, the Ethiopian and Manchurian Wars of the 1930's are examples. The "phony war" erupted in Europe in 1939. However, it was not until Pearl Harbor that we were forced by outside aggression to admit that the world had become so small and so complex that we had to play our part in keeping it from turning into the kind of community which free men could not tolerate.

So we went to war again. And, again, our military and economic strength turned the tide for freedom. We invented and used the atom bomb. The totalitarians were defeated—with the help of the most totalitarian nation of all, Soviet Russia. The United Nations was formed. We joined it. In 1945 the goal of a just and lasting peace seemed imminent.

But again our fondest hopes were dashed. Aggressive totalitarian fascism and nazism were succeeded by aggressive totalitarian communism. And this time we were unable, even briefly, to retire to splendid isolation. As the only great democratic power untouched by the ravages of World War II, we were compelled to accept the responsibility as leader of the Free World.

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II

The nature of international relations was drastically changed after World War II by reason of an equally drastic change in the methods of warfare. The advent of first the atomic, and later the hydrogen bomb, the dangers to all peoples of radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions, the coupling of the bomb with the rocket to create nuclear ballistic missiles, the development of frightening new methods of chemical, biological and radiological warfare, the beginnings of the exploration of outer space with its espionage and military potentials added new dimensions to war which, for the first time in history, threatened the sudden destruction of civilization. As the possession of nuclear weapons spreads —five nations now have a nuclear potential—so does the danger of a war which would kill hundreds of millions of people.

Grown men skilled in these new scientific techniques of havoc spend their lives in uniform, or under contract with governments, playing games like little children with tin soldiers intended to determine how much force of various kinds should be applied at different times in different places to destroy an enemy or to prevent destruction of one's own nation-state. A series of ever more complicated hypothetical situations confronts them in their efforts to prognosticate how many divisions, how many aircraft, how many missiles and how many bombs State X must concentrate on State Y to prevent State Z from conquering the world.

Surely, to a psychiatrist, the leaders of these nationalist military-industrial complexes must seem to have gone mad.

The result has been to establish, for a time at least, a precarious balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union accompanied by a series of relatively minor upheavals in parts of the world outside the immediate sphere of influence of either great power. In these upheavals the two principal nuclear powers were not at first directly involved. A sort of unwritten ground rule has been established that wherever international controversy erupts into violence the dispute will be fought out by traditional methods of warfare. Korea, Cyprus, the Gaza Strip, the Congo, Yemen and Vietnam are examples. For a few horrible hours the ground rule seemed on its way to being broken in the missile crisis in Cuba, but in the end common sense prevailed.

III

Let us now consider the global position of the United States in

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the midst of this delicate balance of terror. How far have we moved in economic and military expansion since the outbreak of World War II? First, looking eastward from Washington:

(1) We restored Western Europe's economy with the Marshall Plan.

(2) We helped Greece and Turkey fight off communist aggression.

(3) We helped to create the NATO alliance designed to curb Russian military expansion across Western Europe.

(4) We recognized the new state of Israel and committed ourselves to support her against the Arab threat to drive her into the sea.

(5) We constructed a ring of air bases within and around the periphery of Western Europe, thus creating a threat which would further deter Russian aggression westward.

(6) We garrisoned Germany and West Berlin with five Army divisions, nuclear weapons and a substantial Air Force for the same purpose.

(7) We gave massive economic and military aid to Pakistan, Iran and India to enable them to stabilize their societies and resist potential aggression from the communist giants. We organized the CENTO military alliance to contain Russian expansion southward.

Looking westward from Honolulu:

(1) We fought a bloody war resulting in the death and maiming of thousands of young Americans in Korea. The purpose was to prevent North Korea, aided by Communist China, from overrunning the entire Korean peninsula and thus pointing a dagger at the heart of our newly acquired ally and recent enemy, Japan. For the first time, we fought a land war on the ground mass of Asia. To consolidate our position in Korea we left a garrison of two Army divisions and poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the South Korean economy.

(2) We established ourselves with air and naval power on a string of island bases all the way across the Pacific from Hawaii. The Pacific Naval Command of Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp now consists of 600,000 men, 440 ships and 5,200 airplanes. It includes an immense nuclear deterrent. These island bases run from Japan in the north, southward through Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines. Our British allies are responsible for Borneo, Singapore and Malaysia. Australia and New Zealand are backstops for the

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other islands. In the process of doing this we conceived the SEATO and ANZUS pacts.

(3) Not content with this movement of air and sea power across the Pacific, we have now landed well over 200,000 men of our Army in South Vietnam, supported by another 100,000 Air Force and Naval personnel, for the purpose of preventing the extension of communist power into South Vietnam through a Viet Cong victory, aided and directed by Ho Chi Minh and Communist China.

(4) We are deeply engaged in supporting Thailand and Laos against communist subversion.

In short, despite the claims of Secretary of State Rusk to the contrary, there is hardly an area in the great arc sweeping southward from Norway and north again to Japan where we have not become the policeman and good provider of the Free World bent on containing the political and military expansion of Russia and China.

Meanwhile, substantial military and economic aid is going to Latin America and, to a lesser extent, to Africa for the same purpose.

Our total military budget for fiscal 1966 will run around $60 billion. Our economic commitments including hard and soft loans as well as grants amount to $2.6 billion for the same period.

It is the thesis of this article that the rationale behind our fantastic military and economic expansion since World War II is obsolescent and will soon become obsolete. Throughout history, "Holy wars against godless opponents" fought to "total victory," have rarely succeeded. Thus, the age-long struggle initiated with the Crusades by Christian against Mohammedan has ended in stalemate. The religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century settled nothing; neither did the pogroms or the Inquisition. Everybody is now living together, reasonably peacefully, about where they were before the slaughter started. Is it not likely that the same result will follow the fierce struggle between capitalism and communism or, if you prefer, freedom and totalitarianism?

It is time, I suggest, for us to reappraise our political philosophy. If we were to put as much of our national energy into building a world order based on friendship, law and disarmament as we are presently devoting to a belligerent posture toward the communists accompanied by a frenzied arms race in the nuclear,

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chemical, biological, radiological and conventional fields, we might well have a better chance of achieving that peace we all long for.

This is not to suggest that we should throw down our arms unilaterally. Nor is it to contend that world order and disarmament will be easily come by. Neither will it be easy to entice our Russian and Chinese antagonists into following our lead up the path of world law and peace. The Chinese have been particularly bellicose, at least in their propaganda, and the Russians have a traditional fear of so-called foreign espionage which makes them extremely difficult to bargain with. Anyone who has ever had to deal with the Russians across a negotiating table knows how tough and frustrating it can be.

But I do suggest that the efforts by our policymakers to build a peaceful international order should be substantially intensified. Moreover a public opinion should be encouraged which takes a dim view of those "gamesmanship" experts who look at the future as a mere extension of a past built on sterile efforts to outwit and perhaps to destroy an allegedly implacable enemy. In short, this is a plea to stop playing deadly games, to replace a diplomacy based on conflict and suspicion with a diplomacy based on international cooperation.

IV

In a sense American diplomacy has been schizophrenic since 1945. While we were engaged in the military and economic efforts described above, there was always another motif—a countervailing one. Let us review the efforts we and others have made to create the international institutions and to negotiate the treaties which could bring peace and world order under law.

For present purposes we can begin our story with 1945.

(1) At the end of that year the victorious allies created the United Nations, an international institution whose main purpose was to establish and maintain international peace and security.

The UN has had its victories and its defeats. Its charter is clearly inadequate to today's needs. But there are few intelligent men who would wish to destroy it or who would contend it has not served a useful purpose.

(2) One of the preoccupations of the UN has been disarmament. Its members, particularly those from the medium-sized and smaller states, are gravely concerned about the danger which threatens their peoples from the angry confrontation of the great

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powers armed to the teeth with lethal weapons which no longer respect national boundaries.

At the Fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1959, a resolution was unanimously adopted endorsing the "goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control," and calling upon governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem."

(3) In 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter first publicly stated that the foregoing objective of the UN was also the goal of the United States. President Eisenhower told the Fifteenth General Assembly of the UN on September 22: "Thus we see as our goal, not a super state above nations, but a world community embracing them all, rooted in law and justice and enhancing the potentialities and common purposes of all peoples."

(4) On September 20, 1961, the McCloy-Zorin 8 Point Agreement on General and Complete Disarmament was signed by the representatives of our country and the Soviet Union. Three days later, under the leadership of then Senator Hubert Humphrey and at the urging of President Kennedy, Congress created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(5) President Kennedy brought the twin concepts of general disarmament and enforceable world law together at the United Nations on September 25, 1961, when he stated that we must create "worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons."

Russia had announced its support of general and complete disarmament under strict international controls some time before we had. However, in June of 1960 the United States and the Soviet Union produced preliminary proposals for a treaty of general and complete disarmament. Up to that point both sides had been content with generalities. The McCloy-Zorin Agreement significantly narrowed the differences between the two countries, although it still left a wide and, to date, unbridgeable gap on matters of substance.

(6) The United States Plan for a World without War was published in September 1961. It called for achieving, in three stages, general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Implementation could take perhaps twelve years. The Russian plan was similar in broad outline but contemplated only four years to complete and was quite vague in terms of the verification process. It was also faulty in that it rejected as

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"espionage" any inspection of armaments retained during the various stages of the disarmament process. It ignored the specifics for enforceable world law except to the extent the phrase "strict international control" could be construed as meeting the requirement.

As a result of this activity in the fall of 1961, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference was convened in Geneva in the spring of 1962. Elaborate discussions, at which the draft treaties tabled by the USSR and the United States came under scrutiny by all of the states represented at the conference, were initiated and have continued to date without much progress in narrowing the gap between the two documents. In all candor it must be admitted that both draft treaties are totally inadequate as definitive documents capable of achieving their purposes. The conference, stalled on its major objective, has increasingly turned its attention to nibbling away at arms control instead of attacking general disarmament with "barracuda bites."

(7) Nevertheless, President Kennedy, during his lifetime, continued to press forward. On June 10, 1963, in his American University address, perhaps the greatest speech he ever made, he said: "Our primary long-range interest is general and complete disarmament designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms."

And at his last appearance before the United Nations on September 20, 1963, shortly before his death, he called for a revision of the charter of the United Nations to permit the development of that body into "a genuine world security system."

To recapitulate, the heart of the United States and Russian plans for disarmament is a staged reduction and eventual elimination of all armaments down to the level of small police weapons required to maintain internal law and order, accompanied by the simultaneous evolution of international institutions which would create, administer and enforce the international world law of disarmament.

Chief among the international institutions called for in the United States plan are:

(1) An International Disarmament Organization charged with supervising and administering the process of disarmament;

(2) International juridical institutions to decide disputes arising in the disarmament process and also to determine political

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disputes of every nature which, after disarmament, would no longer be resolved by force; and

(3) An International Peace Force to enforce the findings of the IDO and the decrees, judgments, arbitration awards, and the like, of the international judicial institutions.

Although the United States plan makes no mention of the subject, it is clear that substantial international financing would be required to support the activities of these institutions. It is also clear that, under present conditions, the United Nations has no capability for raising the required funds. Perhaps a small tax on international trade possibly aided through annual payments of a part of the surplus of the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development would provide the necessary funds to carry the plan into effect.

The United States Plan for a World without War and the outline of a draft treaty tabled at Geneva are both in effect rather pale adaptations of a much more specific and elaborate plan prepared by Mr. Grenville Clark and Professor Louis B. Sohn of the Harvard University Law School, published in 1958 by the Harvard University Press and since translated into nearly all major foreign languages. Adlai Stevenson, several years ago, presented the Russian translation to Premier Khrushchev.

The authors detailed, article by article, a revision of the charter of the United Nations required to implement the disarmament treaty. Later they drafted and sent to the State Department the disarmament treaty itself.

The deficiencies of the UN as a vehicle for disarmament have become increasingly apparent. Notable among them are: (1) the veto in the Security Council; (2) the one-nation one-vote rule in the General Assembly; (3) the inadequacy of the money-raising capabilities of the UN; and (4) the lack of any adequate executive power.

Concerned with these problems and much influenced by the more recent thinking of Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, I introduced into the United States Senate in April 1965 a revised version of a "Planning for Peace" resolution which, in one form or another, I had been proposing since 1959. Co-sponsored by twenty-five of my colleagues, this resolution calls upon the President

to formulate as speedily as possible specific and detailed proposals for the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of the United States

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regarding the establishment of an international authority to keep the peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament effectively guaranteed by adequate inspection and controls. In formulating such proposals, the President is requested to consider whether the development of effective international machinery for the supervision of disarmament and the maintenance of peace, including (1) an International Disarmament Organization; (2) a permanent World Peace Force; (3) world tribunals for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes not settled by negotiations; (4) other international institutions necessary for the enforcement of world peace under the rule of law; and (5) appropriate and reliable financial arrangements for the support of such peacekeeping machinery, may best be achieved by revision of the Charter of the United Nations, by a new treaty, or by a combination of the two.

Sections 3 and 4 of the resolution call upon the President to make his proposals available to the Congress and to the public generally, and to transmit copies of the resolution to the heads of government of all the nations of the world, urging them to initiate studies of matters germane to the resolution and to formulate recommendations based on such studies.

Two days of hearings on this resolution were held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 1965. It elicited strong support from all the public witnesses save two representing right-wing splinter groups. The testimony of the State Department and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency witnesses was correct but cool.

Nevertheless, the resolution has not been acted on by either the Committee or the Senate.

V

General and complete disarmament under enforceable world law has been stalled both at Geneva and in the United Nations for the past four years, in part because of the deteriorating international situation, in part because neither France nor China has been present at Geneva (France, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, having refused to attend, and China not having been invited nor, indeed, having shown any interest in the project); but also in large part because neither the United States nor the USSR has made any real effort to close the gap between their separate approaches on means for reaching the agreed end of disarmament. Behind this want of progress lurks, of course, the innate suspicion and mistrust that has clouded the relations of these two great giants ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of

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1917. Until this mistrust between the rulers of the two countries is alleviated, there seems little chance of arriving at a just and lasting peace through the goal of disarmament under enforceable world law.

Yet, despite the eruption of the war in Vietnam, there are some hopeful signs. First among them is the successful negotiation and implementation of the limited test ban treaty. The danger of radioactive fallout has been virtually eliminated as a present worry for all mankind. The conclusion of the "hot line" agreement bringing the White House and the Kremlin into instantaneous communication with each other is another. A third is the continuation of the people-to-people cultural and technological exchange programs which have stimulated respect and friendship between the two nations. As this article is written, hope has not been abandoned for conclusion of a treaty eliminating the further proliferation of nuclear capabilities to nations not now having access to nuclear weapons.

Within Russia there are also hopeful signs. Our NATO partners are convinced that the Kremlin is no longer determined to achieve hegemony by force in Western Europe. Not long ago, on March 21, 1966, former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared the "Soviet Union has entered the ranks of the nations that desire peace." The Russian satellites, with the exception of East Germany, have reasserted a measure of independence. They are conducting increasing trade with the West. Jamming of Western broadcasts ceased several years ago. Messrs. Brezhnev and Kosygin appear to be far more cautious in their international diplomacy than their predecessors. The widening breach between China and Russia almost inevitably tends to turn the thoughts of the latter westward to render its European front safe while it deals with its communist neighbor to the east.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, Russia has become a "have" nation. The upgrading of education, improvement in housing, the spread of the amenities, the ever-increasing distribution of consumer goods, all tend to blunt any remaining urge for war which might exist among a less satisfied people. There may be many hawks among the Russian leaders just as there are in our own country. But it seems reasonably clear that in both the United States and the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority of the people are opposed to chauvinism and an aggressive and belligerent foreign policy. Russia has come a long way since

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the Bolshevik Revolution and the days of the Stalinist terror. It is well for us to recognize and take account of this new attitude in our diplomacy.

There remain the problem of American public opinion and the attitude of our government toward Russia and world peace. First, let us deal with the former. There is still vast skepticism among the American people about the possibility of friendly relations with Russia. There is further a widespread feeling that disarmament and world peace are Utopian goals incapable of being realized in the foreseeable future. Despite the earnest efforts of President Kennedy, there is still a big job to be done in bringing public opinion in the United States to the point where meaningful disarmament treaties can be negotiated and ratified by the Senate.

And yet, truculence and belligerence in the United States are, in my judgment, more apparent than real. The military-industrial complex against which General Eisenhower warned in his last speech as President has staunch allies in the press, among the columnists and certain radio and television commentators. Nevertheless, almost every poll of public opinion taken in the recent past ends with some such conclusion as this: We want peace, we want the arms burden lifted off the backs of the taxpayers, we want an end to the threat of our children being killed in war and of bombs dropping on our homes; but history has taught us not to trust the Russians or, for that matter, the Chinese either. We are accordingly both skeptical and fearful of the possibility of arriving at agreements to achieve the goals we so ardently desire.

It is obvious that changes in public opinion must precede the achievement of meaningful international agreements to obtain peace and disarmament. No one who sat through the long debate in the Senate over ratification of the limited test ban treaty could come to any other conclusion.

Yet, in the end, the treaty was ratified by a vote of 81-19 over the strenuous objection of some very able Senators who took the hard line of distrust. And there is presently in this country an on-going peace offensive which is likely to turn the country away from the antics of the "gamesmen" and to support a solid effort to achieve a pragmatic and workable agreement with our adversaries.

In the last twelve months this peace offensive has shown itself in a number of ways, among them:

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(1) The celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco last June. At that meeting U Thant, Secretary General of the UN, asked:

> Is it really only the scourge of war or the lash of terror that can move us to the goal of peace and justice in the world? Can we not make the effort to advance out of our own sense of responsibility and knowledge, rather than be driven like refugees before a storm which may be unleashed by our own inability to take hold of the future?

(2) The Washington Conference on World Peace Through Law, in September 1965, was attended by 3,000 delegates, mainly jurists, presidents of bar associations and lawyers from 115 countries. These molders of world opinion returned to their own countries prepared to secure the cooperation of their governments in advancing the concept of world peace through world law.

(3) The visit of Pope Paul to the United Nations last fall had an immense impact on public opinion all over the world. His dramatic plea for a vigorous and relentless full-scale peace offensive ended with the simple but eloquent statement: "No more war, war never again."

(4) Thirty separate committees reported to the White House Conference on International Cooperation at the end of November on ways and means of increasing cooperation among the peoples of the world.

There can be measured optimism that the trend of public opinion in our country is turning away from belligerence toward support for a peace offensive in which the United States will take the initiative. We may well be closer to a breakthrough for peace than many would think.

VI

World power today is primarily in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. China may some day join them, but her time has not yet come. Despite the war in Vietnam, she has little offensive capability for making mischief outside her borders and has recently sustained a series of humiliating diplomatic defeats, notably in Indonesia.

The other countries of the world are, for the time being, too weak economically and militarily to have more than a peripheral influence on the behavior of the two superpowers.

NATO, having accomplished its primary purpose of restraining the western movement of Russia, has no offensive steam in it,

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although the potential for increased social, economic and political integration is still great. The Warsaw Pact powers, the Scandinavians, the Arab League, the countries of Latin America and Africa, indeed, all the rest of the world, while their views must be respected and while they will unquestionably exercise a temporizing influence on the unrestrained belligerence of both Russia and the United States, are neither capable nor desirous of asserting claims to more than regional power.

The United Nations, hope of the past and perhaps also of the future, is presently incapable because of organizational defects and financial stringency of doing more than supplying help to put out international brush fires as they break out, and providing a useful forum for debate.

There are no major controversies between the United States and Russia incapable of solution by skillful diplomacy. The venom has been drained from both Russian communism and American capitalism. The differing attitudes toward individual freedom, while substantial, are not in themselves a *casus belli*. Fanaticism is out of date in both the Kremlin and the White House, although no doubt it still has its disciples at lower governmental levels in both countries.

What, then, stands in the way of a far-reaching *détente*? Vietnam and Germany.

With respect to the former, one may hope that Hanoi and the Viet Cong can be persuaded that a military victory is impossible for them, that American "hawks" can be turned into "owls," and that a settlement which is honorable without being unrealistic can be obtained at the conference table.

With respect to the latter, the breakup of NATO as a military alliance and the incipient flirtation of General de Gaulle with Moscow, coupled with the recently announced peace offensive of the West German government, may well bring the German problem within the area of a feasible solution in the reasonably near future. Here the preoccupation of our State Department with West Germany is the principal stumbling block. The best example is our stubborn refusal to abandon the proposed Multilateral Force in order to secure a workable nonproliferation treaty with Russia. The recommendations for dealing with the German problem made by the Wiesner Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the White House Conference on International Cooperation may well supply a way to the solution. In broad

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general terms, they called for a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw powers; the inspected withdrawal of Russian, American, French and British troops a suitable distance from Berlin; the stationing of observers at key points to prevent surprise attack on adversary territory; and the encouragement of the West German and East German states to increase their already substantial commercial contacts with a view to achieving a workable *modus vivendi,* perhaps in the form of a loose federation among themselves, without the intervention of either the NATO powers or the USSR.

None of this, of course, will come overnight. We cannot unfreeze the Cold War until we unfreeze our own government's thinking on the problems which separate Russia and the West and bar the path to better relations. Our foreign policy has been hampered by the persistence of fixed attitudes which were formed during the Stalinist era, but which have far less relevance now. Just as there is a "Senate establishment," about which I have commented elsewhere, I believe there is a "foreign policy establishment," both in the State Department and in the universities, which clings to old-fashioned and outmoded ideas and plans long after they have outlived their usefulness. The Multilateral Force, which I referred to earlier, is a prime example, but far from the only one.

Nevertheless, I suggest again that the problem is not beyond the capability of a skillful forward-looking diplomacy emanating from the Kremlin and the White House; and, once the superpowers had achieved a *détente,* the road would be open for persuading—through superior force if necessary—a presently belligerent China to turn its great capabilities inward toward building a Chinese Great Society and joining in the internationalization of world peace through disarmament under world law.

In short the prospects for peace are brighter than many think. What is needed as much as anything else is an aroused public opinion, international as well as American, and leaders in government persuaded that an initiative toward a peaceful settlement of the world's problems is good politics as well as good sense. Cooperation, not conflict, must be the wave of the future.

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SPAIN AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

by Arthur P. Whitaker

ANY proper discussion of the future of the Atlantic Alliance must take Spain into account. If the reasons for including that troublesome country are not already clear to the reader, the following pages will, it is hoped, convince him. It is another question, with NATO now in serious disarray, whether the Atlantic Alliance has a future, or whether such an alliance even exists. Since the question cannot be argued here, it must suffice to say that affirmative answers to both parts of it are a basic assumption of the present article. For a cogent statement of the reasons, the reader is referred to a recent article by Dean Acheson in which he holds that the "Hinge of Fate" for America still lies in Europe, and concludes: "The time to avert a crisis is now—before it arises. The means of averting it is a close coming-together of those key Atlantic allies who can and will inspire collective action on the great issues of the day."[1]

I

Spain has played a significant role in the defense system of the West ever since the conclusion in 1953 of its bases agreement with the United States, which was renewed in 1963 for another five years. Under the terms of this agreement several joint U.S.-Spanish air and naval bases were built on Spanish soil. In recent years the development of ballistic missiles has so greatly diminished the value of the air bases that the United States has begun to withdraw from them, but the big naval base at Rota, on the Bay of Cadiz just east of Gibraltar, has become indispensable as the only Polaris submarine base in Europe outside the British Isles. In view of the vagaries of politics in the Mediterranean area, reliable Rota is also essential for the support of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which is the chief instrument of U.S. power in that area.

In addition to this special relationship with the strongest member of the Atlantic Alliance, Spain in recent years has developed military ties with some of its principal European members, notably with France since General de Gaulle's second coming to

[1] "Europe: Decision or Drift," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966, pp. 198, 205.

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power in 1958, and also with Great Britain until the Labour Party took over the government in 1964. Moreover, Spain has from the start been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, formed in 1960 and comprising most of Western Europe as well as the United States, Canada and Japan.

Yet, if the present prospects of the Atlantic Alliance are uncertain, Spain's relation to the alliance remains ambiguous, as it has always been. Spain is still excluded from NATO, the alliance's embodiment, on the political ground that the Franco regime is incompatible with NATO's attachment "to the principles of democracy, to individual liberties, and to the reign of law," as stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite this political contradiction, realists in NATO, who are a majority, have long favored Spain's admission on military grounds, and, a few years ago, led by De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, they seemed measurably close to obtaining it. But the unanimous consent required for admission to NATO was not forthcoming, and today, with Adenauer in retirement, with De Gaulle's prestige shaken by the narrowness of his victory in the recent presidential election, and with an unfriendly British Labour Party apparently firmly established in office for some years to come, the exclusion of Spain seems likely to be maintained for the duration of the Franco regime—or of NATO, as the case may be.

To be sure, Spanish spokesmen are now saying that their government is "not interested" in joining NATO.[2] Moreover, as if to harden Britain's opposition to its entry, Spain has recently raised the perennial Gibraltar question again in a most provocative way. Although this may be only a case of sour grapes, it is one more sign that Spain under its present masters is out of joint with the existing Atlantic Alliance.

Collateral evidence to the same effect is provided by the failure of Spain's repeated efforts to gain admission to the European Common Market as an associate member.[3] (She does not seek full membership, as her economy will not be able to stand the competition for years to come.) Her failure is germane to the question before us, for while the EEC consists of only six members, all are also members of the Atlantic Alliance and the opposition to Spain's entry even as an associate member is based to a large

[2] *New York Times*, March 6, 1966, dispatch from Madrid by Tad Szulc.
[3] *Le Figaro*, August 12, 1965, dispatch from Madrid by "Notre envoyé spécial permanent."

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extent on the same political ground as in the case of NATO, that is, on the incompatibility of the Franco regime with the kind of political union that this economic arrangement is designed—by some at least—to promote. To give only one more example in this category, Spain's *sindicatos,* which are her nearest approach to labor organizations, are still denied membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The ground is that the *sindicatos* are not free labor unions at all, but regimented unions of labor, management and government, in which the labor representatives are imposed by the government and can be outvoted by the other two groups.

So far we have been speaking of the ambiguity arising from the conflict between Spain's military and political roles in relation to the Atlantic Alliance, but the same trait can be discerned in her policy as well. A case in point is Madrid's policy toward the Cuba of Fidel Castro. Spain's quasi-alliance with the United States commits her to resist communist aggression; the Franco regime not only accepted the commitment gladly but claimed to have pioneered the resistance before the rest of the Western powers awoke to the threat. Yet, since 1962 Spain has, in the face of protests from the United States, become a valued trading partner of Castro's communist regime, which is doing all it can to promote subversion, guerrilla warfare and Yankeephobia in other Latin American countries. At the present time Spanish shipyards are filling Castro's orders for the construction of more than forty ships, which will help him break the shipping boycott imposed on Cuba in July 1964 by the Organization of American States.

This case is relevant to our theme because Castro's anti-American campaign in Latin America is a communist flank attack on the leading member of the Atlantic Alliance—an attack now being intensified by an international communist agency set up in Havana by the Tri-Continental Conference that met in the Cuban capital in January 1966.

The lesson for us is that the Franco regime's constancy in defense of the West wavers when the defense does not coincide with Spain's interests as the regime sees them. The lesson is all the more impressive in view of the fact that the Spanish interests involved in this Cuban case are relatively minor even by Spanish standards. The best one can say of the Franco regime's policy is that it is as ambiguous as Spain's present relations with the Atlantic Alliance.

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How, then, are we to go about estimating the probable future of those relations? The answer is that we must begin by examining the domestic situation in Spain, for that is the core of the problem. This approach is necessary because the remedy for Spain's maladjustment to the Free World lies not abroad, but at home.

True, some recent commentators have not only taken the opposite approach, representing the trouble as lying with foreigners, not Spaniards, but have also attributed the foreigners' antagonism toward the Franco regime to fixed "ideological" or "doctrinaire" conceptions dating from the period of the regime's association with the Axis powers during the Spanish Civil War and World War II. A fair sample is provided by a recent report from Madrid that describes Spain as still "paying for the ideological sins first committed a generation ago" and as "kept out of the Common Market, NATO and the Continent's labor organizations *because Francisco Franco remains anathema to too many Europeans who will not forget the Civil War and the dictatorship it spawned.*"[4]

A more misleading statement than the one just quoted would be hard to contrive within the same word limit. The fact is that Franco remains anathema to many Europeans (and non-Europeans) because he remains a dictator. Politically, as we shall see, his regime has remained substantially unchanged since the 1940's, and the considerable economic liberalization and growth that have taken place in his country since 1959 are still far from qualifying Spain for membership in the Common Market and are largely irrelevant to the question of its membership in NATO or any similar Free World association.

So it is not foreign minds but Spanish conditions that must be changed if Spain is to be brought into a satisfactory relationship with its European neighbors and the rest of the Free World. Those conditions and the prospects for change will be sketched in the next four sections, and only after that will attention be focused on Spain's international relations. The two parts are interconnected, for as we have already suggested, Spain is no exception to the rule that in the world of today domestic affairs and foreign relations cannot be isolated from each other in watertight compartments.

II

Nominally, Spain's present regime has been monarchical ever

[4] *New York Times,* December 19, 1965, "Special" by Tad Szulc, dated Madrid, December 18. (Emphasis added.)

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since Franco's Law of Succession, passed by his obedient Cortes or parliament and ratified by a plebiscite on July 28, 1947, declared it to be a kingdom "in accordance with tradition" and provided for the ultimate designation of a king. But the designation has not yet been made, so that Spain remains a kingdom without a king, and is ruled by the highly personal dictatorship of Francisco Franco. In him are combined the four major functions of Chief of State (confirmed by the Law of Succession for an indefinite period), head of government (he is his own Prime Minister), generalissimo of all the armed forces of Spain, and *caudillo* or chief of the country's only legal party, the Falange (often referred to as "The Movement"). This combination gives him direct control of everything in Spain worth controlling except the Catholic Church, and even over the latter he has considerable influence through his participation in the appointment of bishops under his Concordat of 1953 with the Vatican. Executive power is exercised by a cabinet whose members he appoints and dismisses at will; legislative power, by a Cortes whose membership is determined by him directly in some cases, indirectly in others, and never in a free election, and which has never been known to oppose him. Judicial power is vested largely in a quasi-independent civil judiciary, but it is superseded by military tribunals in cases involving national security—a very broad category in the Spain of General Franco.

In recent years the regime has made much less rigorous use of its extensive powers than a generation ago, and already by the end of the 1950's even Spaniards who had no love for it were saying with wry satisfaction that the *dictadura* or "hard dictatorship" had become a *dictablanda* or "soft dictatorship."[5] There have even been some nominal relaxations of control, political and cultural as well as economic. Yet, on examination these relaxations only underline the fact that, essentially, the character of the regime remains unchanged.

The chief relaxations have related to the press, labor and the university students—areas in which the regime has been under heavy pressure and apparently felt it must make some concessions, whether in the interest of domestic order or to assuage foreign criticism and complete its restoration to good standing in

[5]Arthur P. Whitaker, *Spain and Defense of the West* (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 119. This was a play on words. *Dictadura* means simply "dictatorship" but *dura* means "hard" and *blanda* "soft," so that *dictablanda,* which is not in the dictionary, is a neologism invented for the occasion.

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Europe. The latter purpose seems the more likely, for any informed person—and the Spaniards concerned were better informed than most foreigners—could see that the concessions offered were more apparent than real.

The new press law abolished previous censorship only to replace it with what may be called subsequent censorship since it prohibited publication of criticism of the "basic principles" of the regime as "seditious," provided for the trial of offenders, including writers, editors and publishers, and set heavy penalties for those convicted. At the same time the vague wording of the law discourages any effort to test its meaning.

Similarly, the "relaxations" in favor of labor have left it in a strait jacket. In the lower echelons of the *sindicato* system the workers were granted the right to elect their representatives, but the government still designates the key posts at the top. Although it has recently tolerated—after trying vainly to suppress—a number of work stoppages, the government still denies labor the right to strike. As for the university students, the overwhelming majority of whom come from middle-class families, they have just been put off with a bowdlerized version of the representative, democratically elected student union that they have been demanding in place of the Falange-controlled union, called a *sindicato,* previously imposed upon them. Early in 1965 their demand was supported with massive demonstrations, which were suppressed with considerable police brutality in Madrid. In the ensuing national and international furore the government promised concessions, but the new regulations placed the students in much the same position as the workers, with an effective voice only at the lower level of their union, at which only approved students were eligible for office; ultimate control still rested with the government and the Falange. Most of the students rejected the new plan, and at present writing the controversy still goes on. It has been sharpened by the government's punitive action against five university professors who had supported the student protest. Three of them were suspended for two years and the other two were dismissed and blacklisted. The latter, José Luis Aranguren and Enrique Tierno Galván, are among Spain's leading intellectuals.

The "opening of Spain to the West," including its "Europeanization," has had strong advocates among both supporters and opponents of the regime, and many have hoped that it would lead to the liberalization of Spain's political system. This hope has

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been a factor in the United States military and economic aid to Spain under the Bases Pact of 1953, in the Stabilization Agreement of 1959, which was made possible by the International Monetary Fund and the United States, and in the efforts of many Europeans to promote their countries' ties with Spain, through the Common Market or otherwise.

So far the results have been disappointing. Spain has indeed been "opened up" with a vengeance in some ways. The most striking of these is the extraordinary upsurge of its tourist trade since the Stabilization Agreement of 1959, which devalued the peseta and made Spain the cut-rate playground of Europe. In 1965 the number of foreign tourists visiting Spain reached the impressive total of 14 million—almost half the population of Spain itself. Most of the tourists came from other European countries, France alone accounting for 40 per cent of them. Conversely, Spaniards now travel abroad as never before, at least for many years. In this case the most striking example is the countermovement of Spanish workers to other European countries: by 1965 some 600,000 emigrants from Spain were working in neighboring countries.

How these and many other incidents of Spain's crumbling isolation are affecting the internal situation in that country is difficult to measure, but their impact is unquestionably great. Yet so far they have not brought about the hoped-for liberalization of the political regime. On the other hand, neither have they provoked it to a reactionary course. Instead, it has so far remained the immovable object in the face of the irresistible force of mounting economic, social and psychological change. This has been true not only of its institutions and policies but also of its top personnel. Thus, in July 1965, when the cabinet was extensively reshuffled for the first time in five years, it turned out that this was another case of more of the same. Only about one-third of the cabinet posts were involved, and the new faces represented nothing else new, only the strengthening of two existing features of the regime: one, its commitment to economic development; the other, the influence of the Opus Dei, an elite Catholic association, of which more anon.[6]

The regime's immobility has become both a major source of tension between the regime and its critics, and also probably the

[6] *Le Monde*, July 9, 1965, described these cabinet changes as a "remaniement technique," which left unchanged "l'orientation et l'équilibre des forces du régime" and was apparently made to get rid of unpopular ministers regarded as responsible for the "manifest check" suffered by the regime's economic program.

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chief source of uneasiness among its own supporters. Its immobility has swelled the ranks of its critics, especially among men under forty years of age (two-thirds of the Spanish people are under forty), and above all among the workers and university students. Although many of the students are reported to favor authoritarianism of some kind, they dislike Spain's present kind both because it is static in a now dynamic society, and also because Franco's own description of it in the Civil War terms of crusade and victors-and-vanquished makes it seem an anachronism to this younger generation, which knows the Civil War only by hearsay. The young people probably have no more desire for another civil war than their elders, who are terrified by the very thought of one, but they are becoming increasingly impatient for a change. But no hope for any basic change is held out. On the contrary, Franco has taken steps to make sure that the fundamental laws and principles of his regime are maintained intact by whoever may succeed him. He will not have the last word about this, of course, but no one else will have anything to say about it until he dies or retires, and up to the present there has been no credible sign that either event is in the offing.

Yet, as Franco has reached the advanced age of seventy-three (he was born on December 4, 1893), many of his supporters too are disturbed by the immobility of the regime.[7] This is not because they favor liberalization in the abstract, but because they think it is unavoidable, whether to qualify Spain for full acceptance by her European neighbors, or to placate the domestic opposition, or for some other reason. What worries still more of them is Franco's failure to institutionalize his regime.[8] In the Spanish context institutionalization signifies a clear-cut provision for the personal as well as the institutional sequel to the present regime, for the two things are inseparably united. Franco has indicated clearly enough that his successor will be a king, but he has not announced his choice between the only two serious candidates for the throne.

One of the two is Don Juan de Borbón, commonly referred to as the Count of Barcelona. He has the best claim, as heir to his

[7] *New York Times*, December 27, 1964, dispatch from Madrid by Paul Hoffmann.

[8] *ABC, Edición de Andalucía,* July 18, 1965, p. 58: "En el orden jurídico-político, el problema fundamental conque se enfrenta el nuevo Gabinete es, sín género alguno de dudas, el de la institucionalización." The reference was to the new cabinet appointments referred to above in the text. For a somewhat earlier and very perceptive comment on the problem, see *The Economist,* April 10, 1965, "Decline . . . and fall?"

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father Alfonso XIII, Spain's last king before the Republic and the Civil War, but he is distrusted by Franco and has lived in exile (most of the time at Estoril, Portugal) since the Civil War. The other is Don Juan's son, Don Juan Carlos, whose education was completed, under Franco's auspices and with Don Juan's consent, at the Spanish armed forces' academies and who, now married, lives in Spain.

It is generally believed that if Don Juan became king, there would be a limited, constitutional monarchy that would constitute a sharp break with the present regime, whereas under Juan Carlos Franco's injunction that the regime be continued in its present form would be respected. Understandably, then, Franco seems to be grooming Juan Carlos for the post. Under the Act of Succession, however, he will not be eligible for it until he is thirty, in 1967.

In November 1965, Minister of Information Manuel Fraga Iribarne created a sensation by saying to *The Times* of London (but, perhaps significantly, not to any Spanish newspaper) that young Juan Carlos was obviously going to be Franco's choice. The Generalissimo himself said nothing; he still keeps his own counsel, and, at least until he speaks, uncertainty will continue to prevail. It was intensified by the announcement on February 7, 1966, of the retirement of Franco's Vice Premier and top-ranking military man, Captain General Agustín Muñoz Grandes. At the present writing his successor has not been named and it is not even certain that he will have one in his unique combination of high posts. Because of this combination, Muñoz Grandes had been expected to play an important and perhaps decisive role in determining the successor to Franco, and his reputation for integrity and moderation had seemed the best guarantee that the determination would be a prudent one. Consequently, his retirement added to "speculation on the nation's future."[9]

III

Uncertainty about the future is indeed the dominant feature of all Spanish life today, and instead of serving as a wholesome challenge, it has had a deleterious effect, since freedom to confront the future is lacking. Insofar as this uncertainty relates to the succession and Spain's connection with the Common Market, for example, a writer in a leading Spanish economic journal,

[9] *New York Times,* February 18, 1966.

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Desarrollo, has held it responsible for the failure of Spanish investors to back the ambitious Economic Development Plan launched by the government with great fanfare at the beginning of 1964.[10] But the uncertainty goes much further than that, for there is little faith in, or agreement about, the political future of Spain even after the prior question of the succession has been settled, whether in favor of Don Juan or of his son or in some other way.

The main reason for the uncertainty is not so much that Spain is divided between the Establishment and the Opposition as that each of these is further divided within itself. As I pointed out some years ago,[11] since 1930 increasing mobility—geographical and social, or horizontal and vertical—has made Spain a more homogeneous nation than ever before, but the process is still so far from complete that there are not merely "two Spains," as is so often said, but many Spains. Thus, the Establishment is made up mainly of the armed forces, the Church and the banking-industrial-business community, but there are often tensions among the three, and, particularly of late, between the first two, since important elements in the Church "deserted to the opposition," as the military generally branded their espousal of social reform.

Probably more significant are the rifts within each of these three main pillars. The Church again provides a good example. We have already suggested that it is divided on social questions. There is apparently keen rivalry between Jesuits and Opus Dei in Spain (where both, by the way, originated); and in the recent Vatican Council the supposedly solid phalanx of Spanish bishops was deeply divided over important issues, including religious freedom. There are similar fissures in the secular pillars; those in the regime's chief support, the military, will be discussed below. Finally, in all sectors the regime has its share of sunshine patriots whose loyalty is a function of the political barometer.

As for the opposition forces, these are as numerous and varied, and, in the present circumstances, as ineffectual as ever. They, too, suffer from internal divisions, beginning with the one between the Republican refugees, who still number scores of thousands but are widely scattered over Europe and America, and the far larger opposition in Spain. Accurate figures about the latter are, of course, unobtainable, and even if they were, their size

[10] *Desarrollo,* Special number, July 25, 1965, "La bolsa española en 1965."
[11] *Op. cit.,* pp. 353-355 and Chapter III.

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would depend upon how one defined "opposition." If we take it in the broad sense of insistence upon an early and extensive change in the present system, it would probably include at least half the Spanish people. In this sense it is composed mainly of two groups (the law does not permit them to organize as parties): the Socialists, who are anti-communist, and the Christian Democrats.

The Christian Democrats probably have the largest numbers and the highest potential among the opposition groups, but their division into two wings, right and left, still persists and the respective leaders, José María Gil Robles and Manuel Giménez Fernández, both former cabinet members of the Republic in its semifinal conservative phase, are getting on in years, with no suitable replacements in sight.

In addition, the prestige of Gil Robles, a Madrid lawyer, has recently suffered from the involvement of one of his principal clients, an Italian firm, in a dubious financial operation; and the long-standing suspicion that he is too conservative to oppose the regime effectively has not been removed by the likewise recent hardening of his stand against it. Giménez Fernández, internationally-known professor of canon law at the University of Seville and proponent of agrarian reform under the Republic, is still, despite his age, "robust, articulate and affable, and lively as a cricket," as he was described several years ago.[12]

In June 1965 the groundwork for a new political party, Unión Demócrata Cristiana, was laid by Giménez Fernández and representatives of other opposition groups, including some of Gil Robles' followers. They adopted a platform, *Bases Programáticas,* that on balance was quite moderate.[13] Balance was its most striking feature. It called for the establishment of "political, social, and economic democracy" under a representative, federal system, but also for a plebiscite to determine the form of government (monarchy or republic); for national planning and the nationalization of "entities of excessive economic power," but also for a considerable measure of private enterprise; for international cooperation, especially with European and Iberian countries, and a "total renunciation of war," but also for the maintenance of an "efficacious national defense organization." The platform's

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[13] This summary is based on a copy of the *Bases Programáticas* obtained from a reliable source in Spain in July 1965. *Le Monde,* July 5, 1965, published a summary of this program.

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only explicit reference to the Church was the stipulation that the new regime should be "nonconfessional," but otherwise there was nothing anticlerical about it.

As a basis for compromise, if not a consensus, this platform had much to recommend it. On the vexed question of statism *vs.* free enterprise, it espoused the middle course of a "mixed" system which seems to be favored at the present time in most of the world, especially in the developing countries.[14] On questions relating more particularly to Spain, the platform took positions in accordance with the Union's irenic purpose, stated in the second and third paragraphs, of endeavoring "above all, to overcome the disastrous consequences of the Civil War and to prevent a recurrence of it through a sincere policy of national collaboration and spiritual pacification" and the total rejection of distinction between victors and vanquished.

Yet it seems unlikely that this prescription will be accepted by the principal power groups in the present regime, who will play a major role in determining the character of its successor—except, of course, in the event of a violent upheaval, which also seems unlikely at present. Chief among these groups are the armed forces, and they could not fail to be alienated by the silence of the new party's platform on Spain's relations with the United States. To them this silence must seem ominous in view of the fact that some if not all the founders of the new party are committed to dissolving the tie with the United States by canceling the Bases Pact, by which the armed forces have profited greatly. Such a course might be acceptable to most Spaniards, for the direct benefits to their country from the pact have now been reduced to prestige and military aid; but this aid is still valuable to the armed forces, who will not willingly give it up, and, though they are only a small minority of the Spanish people, their voice is decisive.

Still other grounds of opposition to the new party's plans for post-Franco Spain emerge from the discussion of the country's future that has taken place within the regime itself. That such discussion has been permitted is a sign of the times. For the crisis of uncertainty is so great, and the regime's desire to make a favorable impression abroad is so strong, that some freedom of speech on this paramount national problem had to be permitted. But the discussion, or "dialogue" (*diálogo*), to use the term that

[14]Ralph K. White, "'Socialism' and 'Capitalism': An International Misunderstanding," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1966, pp. 216-228.

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has become fashionable in Spain, has been carried on publicly—we are not speaking of clandestine literature—within narrow limits and with great discretion.

A prime example of this sort is the book *Cartas a un Príncipe* (*Letters to a Prince*), by Emilio Romero. As editor of the Madrid newspaper *Pueblo,* which is the national organ of the *sindicatos,* Romero holds an important post in the regime, and his book was awarded the Francisco Franco prize for the best political book of the year. Discreetly, it dealt not with the present but with the hypothetical future, and the "Prince" of its title remained anonymous and ostensibly was Franco's putative successor, but in fact this was only a veiled way of advising Franco himself about the succession.

"Never," Romero told the Prince in the first letter, "have the Spanish people given more thought to the future than they do now, and this is not because they are expecting you, but because they do not know what to expect." This situation, he warned, gravely imperiled the orderly unfolding of the "constituent process" in Spain. For in their uncertainty, the Spanish people might be torn apart by a conflict between those determined to freeze the status quo and those resolved on precipitate change. The rest of the book was devoted to solving this problem; the solution was found in the political field, and stated with great circumspection. In the long run, said Romero, the republican system will be the best for Spain, but at present it has too few adepts in this country, and so "for the moment" (possibly a long moment) the restoration of the monarchy is indispensable.

This view—that monarchy is essential as a transitional arrangement, but must sooner or later give way to a republic—has gained strong support among members and fellow-travelers of the present regime. The kind of republic most of them have in mind, however, is the one they call "presidential." By this they mean a republic in which the president is dominant, in which there is no separation of powers, with its checks and balances, and which also has a single dominant political party. Such a republic seems to be endorsed by Emilio Romero, and it is explicitly advocated from a quite different sector of the regime by the well-known publicist Rafael Calvo Serer, a member of the Opus Dei, though apparently not of that society's inner group which is playing so important a role in the present government of Spain. As an example of what he has in mind, Calvo Serer has cited Mexico's one-party, presi-

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dential system, under which since 1930 that country has combined rapid development, order and stability with apparently overwhelming popular support for the dominant party and little support for the opposition parties, which are permitted to campaign but not to win elections. De Gaulle's regime, however, is the example most frequently cited to Spaniards, who would rather have their country bracketed with France than with Mexico.

IV

The establishment of some such system—whether under a republic or under a monarchy headed by the "Young Pretender," Don Juan Carlos—is widely believed to be the prescription of the Opus Dei for the post-Franco period. And what is this much-discussed organization, about whose allegedly great political and financial power in present-day Spain so much has been said and so little known for certain? Some of the facts seem clear enough. The Opus Dei was founded in 1928 in Spain, which is still its stronghold and the only country in which it is reputed to be an important force in public affairs. In 1950 it was the first body to be given the status of a "secular institute" (a new type of Catholic organization) by the conservative Pope Pius XII. Under the more liberal Paul VI it has been reclassified as an "association," but this has had no visible effect on it in Spain; neither have the new Pope's rumored remonstrances with its Spanish leaders over their political activities.

The declared aim of Opus Dei is not political but moral and spiritual: it is to promote the observance of Christ's precepts and counsels in everyday life. Most of its members are laymen and after joining they remain "in the world," continuing their accustomed rounds while they carry out their apostolate. In Spain, it is said, they come almost wholly from the upper middle class—principally the professions, business and banking—and constitute a new elite group. But this is one of the many aspects of the Opus Dei we cannot be sure about, for its members, wearing no distinctive habit or insignia, are not easy to identify and the organization's uncommunicativeness about its affairs extends to the number as well as the identity of its members.

The resulting air of secrecy is propitious to rumors, which flourish in all countries where freedom is denied, and particularly in gossipy Spain. Outsiders have, for example, published detailed lists purporting to show that the banking, business and industrial

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holdings of Opus Dei in Spain are extensive, but these cannot be verified. Similarly, reports about the great political significance of the society are difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, several important government posts have been held since 1957 by known members of Opus Dei, notably Alberto Ullastres, Mariano Navarro Rubio and Laureano López Rodó; they have been powerfully supported by a sympathizer in Franco's inner circle, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco; they have exerted a demonstrably important influence on economic policy, particularly in bringing about the adoption of the Stabilization Plan of 1959 and the Development Plan of 1964; and, as already noted, last summer's cabinet changes are generally regarded as having further strengthened Opus Dei influence in the government. In fact, some commentators go so far as to say that the principal political change in Spain in the last decade has been Franco's replacement of the Falange by the Opus Dei as his chosen instrument of government.

On the other hand, Opus Dei's own spokesmen have stoutly and consistently denied that their organization in Spain has any political significance whatever. It adheres strictly to its apostolate, they say, and never takes a corporate position on political questions, but leaves each of its members free to decide these for himself, subject only to the Christian principles on which the society is founded. No one has been able to prove that they are not telling the truth. To be sure, there is some circumstantial evidence against them: in contrast to the strong support some members of Opus Dei have given the regime, none has gone further in opposition to it than to advocate the restoration of the monarchy now instead of later; and none has ever joined in the protests that have been made from time to time against particularly obnoxious acts of the regime, though the protests have generally been couched in moderate terms and have sometimes been signed by supporters of the regime from other sectors than the Opus Dei, including Joaquín Ruiz Jiménez, a leading intellectual who was once a member of Franco's cabinet and subsequently a member of the Cortes.

Yet such evidence is not conclusive. It could be that the members of Opus Dei act alike on political questions, not under the compulsion of party line and party discipline, but because of the homogeneity of Opus Dei's upper middle-class membership, because of its small size (at a guess, not more than 50,000 members in all Spain), and because of the similarity of outlook that drew

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the members of this still young organization together in the first place. The maintenance of a consensus may seem quite un-Spanish even in the case of so small an organization as this. Yet, it may be that the pervasive anxiety about Spain's future is a sufficiently strong binding agent to hold its members together publicly through the current crisis, protracted though that is, for they think of themselves as an elite with a heavy responsibility. The corollary of this proposition is that, once the situation changes so that they can feel free to disagree with one another publicly (as they already do privately), the facade of Opus Dei's political unity will crumble overnight. This was the prospect indicated to me by Rafael Calvo Serer in a conversation in January 1966, and he is probably right; for if the members of Opus Dei in Spain did not disagree with one another, in public and with a vim, when they could do so honorably, they would not be true Spaniards.

What this all adds up to is that the Opus Dei is as unlikely to provide a solid core of political leadership in the post-Franco period as are the Church, the Falange, the *sub rosa* political parties, or the banking community (*la banca*), which dominates the industrial-commercial-business sector in Spain.

V

Where, then, is such a core to be found? If it exists at all, it is provided by Spain's armed forces. Among the many Spaniards who take this view is Mariano Granados, a prominent Republican exile who has lived in Mexico for many years but maintains contacts in Spain and frequently writes about Spanish affairs. As a lawyer and the holder of important judicial posts under the Republic, this civilian can hardly be prejudiced in favor of the armed forces that overthrew it and drove him into exile. Yet, after defining Spain's basic problem as one of "patiently transforming the present dictatorship" into a free, democratic, constitutional regime, and asking to whom this task should be entrusted, he answers, "Only to the army. It is the army that must provide the final solution."[15] His reasoning is, briefly, that the army assumed the "virtual representation" (in Edmund Burke's sense) of the Spanish people when it made Franco dictator in 1936, that it has been the chief prop of his dictatorship all along, and that it is

[15]Mariano Granados, *Cartas a un escritor. El pasado, el presente y el futuro de España* (Mexico City: B. Costa Amic, Editor, 1965), p. 34.

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now obligated to exercise its "virtual representation" again by returning power to the people, to whom it belongs by right. More realistically, he adds that the army is "the only organism" capable of bringing this about.[16]

The Spanish armed forces have given no sign of being in a hurry to transform Franco's dictatorship into a free, constitutional democracy, but neither have they given any reason to doubt that they still preserve the sense of political mission that inspired them to destroy the Republic and set up the dictatorship in the first place. Specifically, that mission is to serve as final arbiter of political disputes in Spain. Their conception of it is stated with admirable clarity in a passage, quoted by Granados, from the pen of one of Spain's top brass from the 1930's to the 1950's, Lieutenant General Alfredo Kindelán. In a book entitled *El ejército y la política* (*The Army and Politics*), Kindelán wrote that "a modern army makes itself the guardian of all the *values and historical constants* of the people to which it belongs, and defends them against all attackers, whether these be foreign enemies or the state itself. . . ."[17] He continued:

> States sometimes desert their essential duties and the army must then take its stand unhesitatingly against the traitorous or errant state, assuming the representation of the national will . . . and taking the responsibility for defending the sovereignty and substance of the country. . . .

If Spain's military have the will to play this role, they also have the power. Besides having a monopoly of physical force, they are numerous, well trained and well led, and an ambitious plan is now under way for further strengthening and modernizing them under a program initiated in connection with the Bases Pact of 1953 with the United States. As described by a British military writer in 1963,[18] the army overshadowed the other two services, with a strength of 350,000 men as compared with 35,000 each in the air force and the navy. Although the great bulk of the army was made up of conscripted men, it had a core of long-service noncommissioned officers and about 15,000 officers. Since the prestige of an officer was high, there was "no difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of candidates of the right caliber despite the comparatively poor rate of pay." Their initial training was conventional but sound, and for the higher ranks there were

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[17] As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 34. (Italics in original.)
[18] Edgar O'Ballance, "The Strength of Spain," *Military Review*, July 1963, pp. 37-44. The author was a major in the British Territorial Army.

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a staff college which was permeated by "U.S. influence" and a senior officers' school. In these the instruction was "enlightened and thorough," though discussion by students was "more limited than at similar Western establishments." In general, the officers were "keen, enthusiastic, hard working, and anxious to keep abreast with current doctrine and tactics," and the average soldier was "sturdy, tough and [accepted] conscription as a matter of course and duty." They were organized in seventeen divisions, of which one was mechanized cavalry, one armored, and three motorized, and four were mountain divisions, "the pride of the Spanish Army," which were supplied with U.S. arms and equipment. There was a so-called Foreign Legion, which served in Spanish Africa, but it was made up almost entirely of Spaniards, and there were no longer any Moorish troops in the Spanish Army. The army's specialty was guerrilla warfare (the term originated in Spain), to which 20 per cent or more of training time was allocated.

On the other hand, the writer noted that Spain's air force and navy were relatively weak, and that the whole defense establishment was too dependent on imports of petroleum and heavy armaments and was handicapped by "the flux of a reorganization and modernization program, lack of technical personnel . . . and poor internal communications." Nevertheless, he concluded with a favorable overall estimate: "The war potential of Spain is considerable. . . . Whether by continuing bilateral agreements or by closer association with NATO, in the future Spain will become an increasingly valuable ally in the defense of the West."[19]

By 1965 Spain's value as an ally in terms of her war potential had been substantially increased with the aid of bilateral arrangements. These were still mainly with the United States, but they included France too, and would have included Great Britain but for the Labour Party's critical attitude toward the Franco regime; in the summer of 1964 the Labourites had helped to wreck plans for the building of several Spanish frigates in British shipyards. Though still receiving military aid from the United States, Spain expected to finance her expanded program mainly from her own resources, thanks to her mounting reserves of gold and foreign currency and her favorable credit rating.

The armed forces buildup continued in 1965. By the end of the year, with aid from the United States, the army had almost

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

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completed a reorganization that greatly increased its flexibility and firepower. This included the replacement of nine conventional divisions with specialized brigades composed of mechanized troops; the equipment of the artillery with anti-aircraft planes and ground-to-air missiles; and an increase in the number of helicopters.[20] The air force, too, was on the move. On January 1, 1965, it took over all responsibility for the radar and fighter defense of air space, which it had previously shared with U.S. technicians. Ten days later the government announced that it was purchasing seventy Northrop F-5 supersonic jet fighters and was soon to receive a squadron of Lockheed interceptors under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP).[21]

Most striking of all was the expansion program of the Spanish Navy. Announced in January 1965, this called for the construction or purchase over a ten-year period, at an estimated cost of more than one billion dollars, of two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, eight destroyers, twelve frigates, eight submarines, sixty minesweepers and 100 auxiliary vessels, besides a substantial number of helicopters, submarine chasers and naval aircraft.[22]

Commenting on this "spectacular reinforcement" of the navy, the friendly *Figaro* of Paris said that, if all went well, it would give Spain by 1975 "one of the most important fleets in the Mediterranean." In answer to its own question, "Why this sudden will to power on the part of the Spanish Admiralty?," *Figaro* replied that, if one could believe "serious sources," Spain had not taken the decision alone but with strong encouragement from abroad. Those who encouraged it stressed the importance of Spain's geographical position at the crossroads of four continents —Europe, America, Africa and the Middle East—and insisted that if Spain wished to play the role to which she could soon legitimately aspire, she must have a strong navy, well trained and articulated with the other navies of the West.[23]

Spain also pressed forward in 1965 with space research. Her special organization for this purpose, the National Institute of Aerospacial Technique (INTA), planned the construction in 1966 of a launching and testing field at Cape Ortega, on the northern coast of Spain. There was already a space-vehicle tracking

[20] *Le Figaro,* December 22, 1965.
[21] *Christian Science Monitor,* January 19, 1965, report by Richard Mowrer, Madrid.
[22] *Le Figaro,* February 18, 1965.
[23] *Ibid.*

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station at Maspalomas in the Canary Islands, and this played an "important role" in cooperating with the United States in the Gemini flight program, for which Secretary of State Rusk thanked the Spanish people on his visit to Madrid in December 1965. INTA's research program, also scheduled to get fully underway in 1966, was concentrated on rockets. The agency's spokesmen pointed out that the chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn Seaborg, had recently included Spain among the twelve countries capable of producing the A-bomb; but, said the spokesmen, Spanish research in the nuclear and space fields will have exclusively scientific objectives and Spaniards expect in due course to participate in the European program of space research for peaceful purposes. The INTA rockets to be fired in 1966, it might be added, were to have an altitude range of twenty-five miles; in a later phase the range would rise to between 110 and 180 miles.[24]

As even an exclusively scientific and civilian rocket program has a military aura, this one added something to the stature of Spain's armed forces, which has now become quite considerable in terms of prestige and power. But there remains the crucial question whether they have the requisite political capability to fill the role of final arbiter or moderating power. No one can be sure of the answer until their capability is tested when Franco fades. Some serious doubts about it are raised in a recent book by Benjamin Welles, the able correspondent of the *New York Times* in Madrid for several years in the 1950's and early 1960's. One doubt is whether they have political talent; another, whether they can agree among themselves how to use such talent if they have it. In the latter connection, Welles quotes an unnamed "ranking army general" as saying in 1962 that when Franco passes, "the army will be unable to rule. There will be divisions among us."[25] Later on, Welles gives a rough idea of the nature and extent of these divisions by summarizing the results of a private poll conducted that same year by members of Opus Dei. The poll showed that a monarchist restoration was favored by a great majority of the navy and air force officers and of the army generals and colonels, but opposed by many lieutenant colonels and majors and by almost all the captains and lieutenants, who "strongly

[24] *Washington Post,* November 1, 1965, dispatch from David Darrah, Madrid.
[25] Benjamin Welles, *Spain: The Gentle Anarchy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 44-45.

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favored a republic."[26] If the poll had gone on to determine what kind of monarchy or republic the officers desired, the divisions among them would unquestionably have been multiplied.

But the most serious doubt of all about the value of the armed forces as final arbiter or moderating power in the post-Franco period arises from the fact that, as far as can be learned, the only point on which there is general agreement among officers of all ranks is that the armed forces should not exercise power themselves, but turn it over to someone else, i.e., to some civilian group or groups, or to the whole body of the citizenry. However laudable that might be in the abstract, it would not solve the problem we have been considering, for, as we have been at some pains to show, the civilians themselves are deeply divided about the succession.

And so Spain's political future remains clouded in uncertainty. All things considered, it seems most likely that there will be some form of *continuismo,* or continuation of the present regime, under a somewhat limited monarchy and with a very limited representation of the people. It will be dominated by the armed forces, for, when confronted by an actual instead of a hypothetical situation, the officers will probably decide after all to use their power to call the shots. Under their control, administration will be entrusted to much the same elements as now, including members of the Opus Dei, under whom Spain has prospered in recent years. But such a regime cannot succeed unless the prosperity continues; and the longer it continues, the greater will become the pressure for a radical alteration of the political system to match the radical changes in Spanish society that are being produced by development, modernization, and the opening of Spain's doors to the West.

The first, transitional regime after Franco might last one year or five or even ten, but hardly longer, and what will follow it does not appear in this writer's crystal ball. Of one thing, however, we can be reasonably sure: In the years ahead, Spain will no longer possess the political stability that was a consequence of its dictatorship and that has differentiated it sharply from other large European countries—France, Italy, Germany—in the past quarter-century. Spain's stability has hardened into an immobilism that cannot much longer resist the new forces at work in the nation, and when stability is lost, she will be a less dependable

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

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partner in the Atlantic Alliance, though quite possibly a more welcome one to those who value an ally for its freedom rather than for its dependability.

VI

Since Spain's own political future is so uncertain, her future role in the Atlantic world can only be a matter of speculation. While she is almost certain to remain with the West in a general sense, she might, for example, either confine the tie to bilateral agreements, as the Franco regime now says it prefers; or under another regime she might become a full-fledged member of an Atlantic alliance; or else she might opt for an independent foreign policy verging on nonalignment, as the left-wing Christian Democrats apparently prefer; and there are other alternatives. As for the communist world, one may speculate that Spain's relations with it will become closer but not intimate. She may well continue to cultivate commercial and cultural relations with the Soviet bloc, as the Franco regime is already doing,[27] but the potential of the Communist Party in Spain is very low and no communist regime could exist there without massive support from Moscow or Peking. As matters now stand, such support is most unlikely to be forthcoming from either source. Peking is unable to provide it, and one cannot imagine the present Soviet regime undertaking the hazardous venture of turning Spain into a European Cuba.

Rather than pursue such idle speculations as these, it will be more profitable to survey the present state and direction of Spain's relations with her Atlantic associates. This will enable us to identify the factors on which any thought about future developments must be based. Once the survey has been made, each reader can speculate about the future in his own way, but he should remember that the most important factor of all is the highly variable one of political developments in Spain itself, in a future that can hardly be remote.

Spain would seem made to order for partnership in an Atlantic alliance if the only test were possession of vital interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Politically and militarily, Spain's Bases Pact with the United States has top priority in her foreign policy, but in her economic relations Western Europe comes first by a wide margin. Her European neighbors account for the great bulk not

[27] *New York Times*, January 13, 1965, dispatch from Madrid by Paul Hoffmann.

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only of Spain's foreign trade but also of the two principal factors in her financial success story of recent years: the millions of tourists who spend money in Spain and the hundreds of thousands of Spanish emigrants who send their savings home. The United States ranks much lower in the first two categories—trade and tourists—and near the bottom of all principal countries in the third. Under the original Bases Pact of 1953 the United States furnished Spain with substantial economic aid in various forms for several years, and this swelled its share of Spain's foreign trade,[28] but when the pact was renewed in 1963, economic aid was greatly reduced and trade between the two countries fell back to what seems to be its normal low level. Similarly, U.S. private investments in Spain grew rapidly for a time after 1959 under the encouragement of the latter's stabilization and development plans, but then tapered off until by the end of 1965 Spain's main reliance in this field, too, was on her European neighbors.

Yet by virtue of the Bases Pact alone the United States has been the most important country in the world to Spain. In both foreign and domestic affairs the pact was of inestimable value to the Franco regime. Abroad it did more than anything else to promote acceptance of the regime and the restoration of normal relations between Spain and the rest of the Atlantic world—a difficult process which, as we have noted, is not yet complete. At home, if we are to believe Spanish opponents of both Franco and the pact, the latter propped up the Caudillo's dictatorship just as it was about to collapse or be overthrown. Even if it was not that decisive, the bases arrangement with the United States helped Franco and his regime enormously at a critical time. It stimulated Spain's battered economy; it braced up the loyalty of the armed forces, who were the chief beneficiaries of the pact and the strongest prop of the regime; and it gave Franco prestige that he had never enjoyed before. Finally, the combined foreign and domestic effects of the pact made possible what supporters of the regime like to call "the Spanish miracle"—Spain's rapid economic growth since 1959.

Today, Spain is less dependent on her tie with the United States than was the case in the 1950's. Yet, as recently as 1963 Franco gave striking proof that the United States still held first place in his diplomacy. This was clear from the circumstances of the renegotiation of the Bases Pact in 1963 and the terms arrived

[28]For details, see Whitaker, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-249.

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at. Franco began by demanding a high price for the renewal: $500 million in military aid, substantial economic aid, and the conversion of the "tenant-landlord" relationship of the original pact into a formal alliance. His bargaining position seemed stronger than that of the United States. Things were going well for him at home and abroad, the bases were his, and, it was intimated, if the United States did not meet his terms, he would shift his business to General de Gaulle—as, in fact, some of his advisers urged him to do. The United States, on the other hand, had become more dependent on Spain through the loss of its Moroccan air bases and the evacuation of its rocket bases in Turkey and Italy; and Rota was indispensable to it as the only base available in that part of the world for its nuclear Polaris submarines, first launched in 1962 and at once recognized as one of its strongest weapons.

Yet in the end Spain settled for far less than the original asking price. By the new agreement signed in New York on September 26, 1963, extending the bases arrangement for five years, the United States' military aid was cut to $100 million, Spain was to buy another $50 million worth of arms, and there was to be no economic aid except in the form of Export-Import Bank loans up to a total of $100 million, at 5.75 per cent interest, which was no bargain rate. Also, the agreement made no mention of an alliance and was not given the dignity of treaty form—like the original pact, it was still only an executive agreement. It did not even commit the United States to consult with Spain before making any major change in weapons or strategy, though Spain had tried hard to get such a stipulation and one was contained in the United States' treaty with Japan. On this point all Spain got was a gentleman's agreement to consult. Its other gains were provisions for the establishment of a joint technical committee, which was to meet once a month or oftener for the discussion of mutual defense problems, and on which the United States was to be represented by the chief of its military assistance group (JUSMAG) in Spain; the provision that either government could summon a special consultative meeting of "foreign or other ministers, or other high officials";[29] a commitment by the United States to uphold the "security and integrity" of Spain; and statements by both governments that they considered it necessary and

[29]So far, this summary of the terms follows the one in Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307.

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appropriate that their agreement should form part of "the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas."

Estimates of the significance of the new agreement varied widely. The *Washington Post,* for example, thought it had given Franco a "new degree of international prestige" by making him a "virtual ally" of the United States,[30] whereas according to the London *Economist* the new pact would only "improve slightly Spain's standing on the fringes of the Western camp" and its stipulations in favor of Spain contained "nothing . . . that could not be found in—or read into—the 1953 agreement."[31]

Whichever estimate one adopts (*The Economist's* is my choice), a more interesting question is why the Franco regime gave up so much of what it wanted, for by doing so it clearly revealed its sense of values. The answer, which must be based largely on inference, seems to be that when unexpectedly stout resistance from the United States to Spain's terms threatened the negotiation with collapse, the new and very able Spanish ambassador in Washington, Antonio Garrigues, saved it by inducing his own government to make the necessary concessions. The personality of Garrigues and the arguments he used (if we are correctly informed about them), are of the greatest interest to the student of Spanish affairs, domestic as well as foreign.

When Garrigues came to Washington as ambassador in 1962, he had never held any kind of diplomatic or political post in the Franco regime, and had devoted himself wholly, and with great success, to his profession, the law. But among his clients had been important American firms and the American Embassy in Madrid, and this, together with his freedom from previous political involvement with the Franco regime, is believed to explain why he was chosen to represent Spain in Washington during the critical period of the negotiation. Yet, while not a practicing politician, he held—and holds—strong views about Spain's political problems. A liberal monarchist, he insists that Spain must be liberalized politically as well as economically, and to this end he favors its progressive Europeanization and, in a broader sense, its Westernization.

Garrigues's advice to Franco on the bases negotiation accorded with these views. When an impasse seemed to have been reached in March 1963, he recommended a "completely new approach."

[30]Quoted in *ibid.,* p. 308.
[31]*The Economist,* October 3, 1963, p. 33.

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Spain's hat-in-hand attitude should be abandoned and her emphasis shifted from aid to an alliance or at least guarantees, in the hope that aid might follow. In any case, he himself should be given full responsibility, to the exclusion of the Spanish military and with carte blanche to get the best terms he could. Most interesting of all are the assumptions on which he proposed to negotiate: "Only in step with the United States could Spain continue her recovery, insure her internal stability, and restore her civil liberties. Only in concert with the United States and other Western powers could Spain avoid the risk of a savage [domestic] power struggle when Franco died."[32]

Overriding objections from his military and Opus Dei advisers, Franco permitted Garrigues to complete the negotiation along these lines, with the results already noted. These seem to have been satisfactory to his chief, and he shared the honor of signing the new agreement with Foreign Minister Fernando María Castiella, another "Westerner" (Secretary of State Dean Rusk signed for the United States). Then, in 1964, his Washington mission accomplished, Garrigues was transferred to another of Spain's major diplomatic posts, as ambassador to the Vatican, where a meeting of special interest to Spain, the Ecumenical Council, was in progress.

Relations between the two governments under the new agreement seem to be proceeding satisfactorily. Washington has been unhappy over Spain's dealings with Castro Cuba,[33] but technically, these do not come within its scope. In January 1966, Spain on its part was so disturbed by the crash of a U.S. B-52 bomber, armed with nuclear weapons, on its southern coast that it prohibited the use of its air space by such planes in the future. Asked how the ban would affect American use of the joint bases in Spain, officials in Washington were reported as replying that "the bases were not involved because they have not been used by nuclear-armed bombers."[34] The reply shows how times have changed, for it was precisely for use by U.S. nuclear-armed bombers of the B-47 type that these joint bases were constructed in the first place; they have simply been outmoded for that purpose by missiles. The Rota base, as we have seen, is used by U.S. sub-

[32]Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-303.
[33]See above, p. 44.
[34]*Philadelphia Bulletin*, January 30, 1966, Associated Press dispatch. Actually, the bases were involved in the sense that the crash resulted from a collision between the B-52 and a U.S. refueling plane from the joint U.S.-Spanish base at Morón, near Seville.

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marines carrying nuclear weapons, but that was apparently not affected by Spain's ban, which applied to her air space, not her coastal waters. Nevertheless, the quick and vigorous reaction of Spain to the B-52 incident shows a sensitiveness on the question of nuclear weapons that could upset the even tenor of her relations with the United States in case of a Polaris mishap at Rota; for Rota is the apple of Washington's eye.

VII

Collectively, Spain's European neighbors count for a great deal with the Franco regime; indeed, "Europeanization" is the watchword of Franco's most influential advisers in recent years. Individually, however, these neighbors count for much less than the United States.

France has held first place among them since General de Gaulle took over there in 1958. The reasons are many. To begin with, General Franco feels that the French general's regime resembles, justifies and shores up his own. Flattered by De Gaulle's publicly expressed "admiration" for him, and pleased by the Frenchman's efforts to get Spain into NATO and the Common Market, Franco has responded by endorsing De Gaulle's concept of *l'Europe des patries* and by cultivating collaboration with France. At the end of a visit by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to Madrid late in May 1964, a joint communiqué was issued that announced "economic, technical, commercial, and industrial cooperation" between the two countries, "especially in oil and nuclear affairs." It also stressed Spain's "growing part in everything connected with the economic development and the defence of Europe."[35] Franco-Spanish cooperation has been particularly active in military matters. In this connection, the French military chief, General Charles Ailleret, conferred in Madrid in February 1963 with his Spanish counterpart, Chief of Staff and Vice Premier Muñoz Grandes;[36] and in a cabinet meeting in August of that year a last-ditch effort was made to block the new bases agreement with the United States and replace it by an alliance with France.

To go on to more permanent reasons, there are ties, both new and old, between Spain and France that will probably continue after the two generals are gone. France is one of Spain's principal

[35] *The Economist*, June 6, 1964, p. 1085.
[36] *Washington Post*, February 7, 1963.

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trading partners, provides much the largest share (40 per cent) of Spain's valuable tourist trade, and is one of the chief employers of Spain's emigrant workers. In North Africa and Latin America, France and Spain have frequently clashed since the late nineteenth century, but they have also cooperated, mainly in North Africa, and cooperation seems to be gaining ground. Last but not least, France's cultural prestige is still high in Spain. Frenchmen and Spaniards and their government will always have something to quarrel about, even if it is only their common frontier, but now and for some time to come the forces that bring them together may be expected to prevail. If Frenchmen are beginning to move away from De Gaulle, and Spaniards from Franco, the two lines are more likely to meet than to diverge.

Great Britain and Spain have long had common interests, mainly economic, but have also been of two minds about each other, for a variety of political, religious and other reasons. Since World War II, Spain's need to rehabilitate herself internationally has inclined her to avoid embroilment with Western powers whenever possible. This consideration had special weight in the case of Great Britain because the latter ranked high not only among Western powers but also among Spain's trading partners, and headed, from its start in the mid-1950's, the European Free Trade Association, Spain's only possible alternative connection with a European trading group if the door to the Common Market remained closed. In this situation, any serious disturbance to Anglo-Spanish relations was almost bound to come from the British side. None came during the long tenure of power, from 1951 to 1964, of the Conservative Party, which generally cooperated with the United States, Spain's virtual ally after 1953, and was not deterred from promoting British interests in Spain by considerations about the past record and present character of the Franco regime.

Such considerations did deter Britain's Labour Party, and when it took over the government in 1964 it lost no time in demonstrating again, as it had done on a similar occasion in 1945, its dislike for Franco and his system. A foretaste was given when on June 16, 1964, no less a person than the prospective Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, blasted Franco in the House of Commons. Denouncing a negotiation on foot that would have involved the sale of plans of minor British warships to Spain, Wilson branded this as giving aid to "a fascist country." This was a particularly

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bad time for giving it, he urged, for there were encouraging signs of impending change in Spain, and Franco should be kept at arm's length until democracy took over there, "which cannot be long delayed."[37] Franco promptly dropped the deal and took his business elsewhere. Undeterred, the Labour Government, as soon as it took office in October, canceled arrangements for joint naval maneuvers with Spain.

The Labour Party's Spanish policy met with domestic criticism that was not confined to Conservative circles,[38] but Franco came to the party's aid—unintentionally, of course—by reviving the perennial Gibraltar question in a way that outraged not only British pride but common sense. Already simmering in the summer of 1964, the question was brought to a boil in September when in an election the Gibraltarians approved a British plan giving that colony local self-government. Spain thereupon denounced the arrangement as "false decolonization" and a violation of her rights and appealed to the United Nations General Assembly. She indicated her willingness to let Britain retain a military base at Gibraltar, but only under Spanish sovereignty and (as was made quite clear later) not as a NATO base. If this arrangement were carried out, Gibraltar's status would be similar to that of the joint U.S.-Spanish bases in Spain, though presumably without the same time limit.

Spain's case boiled down to two allegations: first, that Britain's change in the status of Gibraltar violated the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, in which she had undertaken never to give up the Rock without first offering to return it to Spain; and second, that the present inhabitants of Gibraltar had no right to determine its status, since they were intruders and the "true" people of Gibraltar were the descendants of the Spaniards driven out when the British captured it in 1704. Britain's spokesmen demolished both charges, pointing out that she was not transferring Gibraltar to a third power and that, whatever may have happened in 1704, the present people of Gibraltar had as much right to local self-

[37] *The Economist,* July 4, 1964, p. 21.

[38] The prestigious *Economist,* never friendly to Franco, was critical of Mr. Wilson's views on Spain. The question, it said, was "whether one should try to coax Spain out of the dictatorship tree, or shake it out." *The Economist* favored coaxing, for the encouraging signs of change in Spain noted by Mr. Wilson himself were "too numerous to brush aside" and had their "main source" in the new program of "commercial liberalization." "In the circumstances," it concluded, "it is hard to see what sense there is in giving General Franco a chance to bolster his regime by appeals to outraged national pride. Spain has changed enough to be worth dealing with differently."

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government as the people of any other colony. In an effort to bolster their case, the Spaniards charged that Britain had made Gibraltar an intolerable trial to Spain by converting it into a center of "smuggler gangsterism" (*gangsterismo contrabandista*), but Spain had managed to live with the trial for so many generations that no one was much impressed by this argument.

The General Assembly referred the complaint to its Special Committee on Colonies, which gave Spain cold comfort. Even its Soviet member did not support her, for he charged that her real aim was to convert Gibraltar into a joint Anglo-Spanish base, whereas his own government wanted it demilitarized. The Tunisian member suggested that Spain had the more limited objective of diverting attention from her own "Gibraltars" in Morocco—Ceuta, Melilla, and Ifni. In the end, on October 17, 1964, the Committee invited Britain and Spain to try to negotiate a settlement.

Spain immediately embarked on a policy of coercion by imposing restrictions on trade and travel through La Línea, her frontier town on the mile-wide ribbon of land that connects Gibraltar with the mainland. Only after a month had passed did Spain offer to begin negotiations with Britain. The British government refused to negotiate under coercion and, when this continued, announced its determination to "take whatever measures may be necessary to defend and sustain" its fortress and the now autonomous colony at Gibraltar. Spain gave the screw of coercion another turn by shutting off most of Gibraltar's supply of foodstuffs. When this was replaced by imports from Morocco, she threatened to force the evacuation of Gibraltar's airfield, which lies in the neutral zone between La Línea and Gibraltar.

The chief casualty of this partial "blockade" was the once thriving tourist trade of Gibraltar, for many of the tourists had come there only on their way to or from Spain. The Gibraltarians suffered most from the decline, for the tourist trade is their only means of livelihood aside from the base itself. The British government had to tide them over with a subsidy. Spain, too, suffered from the blockade, which in 1965 kept an estimated 150,000 tourists out of Spain. Spanish officials shrug this off as a negligible loss. According to them, most Gibraltar tourists are bargain-hunters who spend only one night, and very little money, in Spain, and the country is now so thronged with tourists from other sources that it can hardly provide accommodations for

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them. This official view, we may note, is too optimistic, for as any informed unofficial person in that part of Spain will tell you, the loss of Gibraltar's tourists as well as of its market for Spanish produce is felt and resented there.

At the end of 1965, the impasse still continued, and Spain threatened to break it by the drastic measure of closing the frontier at La Línea completely.[39] That would certainly hurt Gibraltar, for normally between eight and ten thousand Spaniards work there by day, returning home at night, and most of them cross the border at La Línea. But the closing of the border would also hurt Spain and increase resentment in this part of it, for these commuting workers, who have many thousands of dependents, would be deprived of their means of livelihood. Adjustments could of course be made. For example, it would still be physically possible for these workers to reach Gibraltar by water from Algeciras, but the trip from their homes near La Línea to Algeciras would be long and expensive, even if suitable transportation facilities were provided. Other alternatives are re-employment and public relief; but in any case the cost to the Spanish government would be high, in both money and good will, and the fact that it even suggested taking this drastic measure is an indication of the strength of its emotional commitment to the recovery of Gibraltar.

The year 1965 produced a British White Paper on Gibraltar and an answering Spanish Red Book, but no evidence of progress toward a solution. Then, unexpectedly, it was announced on February 28, 1966, in both London and Madrid, that the two governments would begin talks on Gibraltar in London in April.[40] This means, of course, that the British have given up their refusal to negotiate under coercion, for the partial blockade of Gibraltar is still in effect. Why they did so is not entirely clear. Officially it was explained as a compliance with a resolution of the UN General Assembly calling on the two parties to negotiate without conditions; but the resolution had been adopted more than two months earlier (December 16, 1965), and there must have been more to it than that. One explanation may have been the approach of the British parliamentary election held on March 31: Prime Minister Wilson's Spanish policy had provoked criticism in Britain itself, as we have seen, and he may have hoped

[39] *New York Times*, December 5, 1965, report by Tad Szulc, Madrid.
[40] *Ibid.*, March 1, 1966.

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to gain votes by relaxing it a little, but not too much—after all, his only commitment was to negotiate, and the negotiation was not to begin until after the election. Another reason may have been pressure from various quarters to do something to check the rapidly mounting disarray of Western Europe.

Although the Anglo-Spanish talks may be over by the time this article appears, it does not seem foolhardy to risk the prediction that they will not result in a permanent settlement satisfactory to all three sides—three including the Gibraltarians, whose vital interest in the settlement has been recognized by the UN Special Committee as well as by the British government. For Gibraltar is one of those problems that are exceptionally refractory because each contestant not only is deeply committed but also has right on his side. However faulty the Spaniards' presentation of their case may have been, they have a natural right to claim Gibraltar as geographically a part of Spain, and politically a part of it until the British conquest in 1704. On the other hand, Britain's treaty right to Gibraltar is clear; and if possession counts, Britain has held it longer than Spain, which acquired it only in 1492—also by conquest—from the Moors, who had held it for more than 700 years. And the people of Gibraltar, who are overwhelmingly non-Spanish, have a right to maintain their connection with Britain and reject annexation by Spain, as they have clearly shown they wish to do.

The Gibraltarians' resistance to passing under Spanish rule is based in considerable measure on the character of the Franco regime. So also is Britain's refusal to return Gibraltar to Spain at this time. Whether strategic and other considerations would permit it to do so in any case is a question we cannot go into here, but it is difficult to see how, as matters now stand, either Madrid or London could surrender the strong and mutually irreconcilable positions to which they have publicly committed themselves since the opening of the present phase of the ancient Gibraltar question in 1964.

Whatever may come of the London talks, Gibraltar is not the only cause of friction in Anglo-Spanish relations. A much more important cause is the Labour Government's antagonism toward Spain's whole present system, which it condemns as "fascist." Its feeling on the subject is apparently so strong that it will never accept Spain as a partner in an Atlantic or any other alliance so

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long as that country is ruled by the Franco regime or any similar regime that may succeed it.

To be sure, the Labour Government will fall some day, but that day seems fairly remote, and when the Conservatives do return to power they will probably still have the Gibraltar problem to cope with. It has been suggested that the problem could be solved by converting Gibraltar into a NATO base, but, as we have noted above, Spain has already rejected that solution.[41]

We conclude, then, that so far as Britain is concerned, Spain's prospects in an Atlantic alliance are dim indeed. They would be much brighter if her current economic liberalization were followed up with a thoroughgoing political liberalization, and if, as seems quite possible in that case, she relaxed her pressure on Gibraltar. But, as we have shown above, the first condition, which is basic, is not likely to be fulfilled any time soon.

VIII

Spain's other European neighbors call for less comment because they carry much less weight in the aggregate of Spain's foreign relations. Germany's importance to her is mainly economic, as a trading partner and a source of capital investments. Germany is also important politically as a supporter of Spain's NATO aspirations, but these are opposed by the strongest German minority party, the Social Democrat, which shares the antagonism of the British Labour Party and Continental liberals and socialists toward the Franco regime. The two governments have to be wary of any political connection with a military tinge. Thus, when news leaked out in 1960 of a project to give Germany certain military facilities in Spain, there was such a hue and cry over this "Bonn-Madrid axis" that the project was hastily dropped. Germany got her facilities in Portugal, which had a better record than Spain in World War II and is generally regarded as too weak to be feared.

Italy is a substantial though minor trading partner of Spain and the omnipresent Seat automobiles in Spain are offspring of the Italian Fiat. On the whole, however, the economies of the

[41] *Spanish Newsletter,* December 31, 1965, quotes Foreign Minister Castiella as saying to the Cortes, "Gibraltar today cannot be considered as a base of the NATO." The passage, which contains no reference to Spain's exclusion from NATO, occurs in his speech presenting the Red Book on Gibraltar. This *Newsletter* describes itself as "published and distributed on behalf of the Government of Spain" and is distributed in the United States by the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

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two countries are more competitive than complementary and for this reason Italy has helped manfully to keep Spain out of the Common Market. Politically, the Franco faithful regard Italy with aversion because of its instability, strikes, freedom of speech and political parties, including the strongest communist party in Europe, and because it is a chief European source of denigration of the Franco regime.

Several of the smaller European countries—Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway—are of some importance to Spain, mainly because they are members of international organizations that Spain has sought, or is seeking, or may soon seek, to join. All five are members of NATO, Belgium and the Netherlands of the Common Market, and the other three of the European Free Trade Association. Their relations with Spain differ widely. Portugal is Spain's only full and formal ally, and Dictator Salazar has been Franco's loyal friend ever since Spanish Civil War days and urged Spain's admission to NATO from the start. In mid-March 1966, however, Salazar aired some strongly-held opinions[42] that may affect his government's relations with Spain in opposite ways. On the one hand, he moved closer to Franco's present position by downgrading NATO as "inadequate" and a source of "disastrous results." On the other hand, he accused Washington of undermining Portugal's worldwide position and made it seem problematical whether he would let the United States continue to use air and naval bases in the Azores. His antagonism toward Spain's North American ally may eventually strain his relations with Franco, but that does not necessarily follow. In any event, only rarely have relations between the two Iberian rulers been ruffled in the last thirty years.

With almost equal constancy the other four European countries in this group have cold-shouldered the Franco regime. Belgium and the Netherlands are internally divided about it, but the anti-Franco forces have prevailed to the extent that both governments have resolutely opposed Spain's efforts to gain associate membership in the Common Market. Apparently they are somewhat less firm as regards NATO, but in this case the anti-Franco torch is held high by Denmark and Norway. The stand of these two Scandinavian states is generally attributed to a combination of political and religious antipathies: of strong liberal and socialist elements against the "fascism" of the Franco

[42] *New York Times,* March 24, 1966, dispatch by Tad Szulc, Lisbon, March 17.

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regime, and of the preponderant Protestant element against that regime's identification with the kind of Catholicism represented by the Church in Spain. The changes now at work in Spain have not gone far enough to disarm antipathy on either ground in these two countries, and since their stake in Spain's expanding economy is too small to provide a countervailing force, they may be expected to maintain their stand on the NATO question. In short, there is no prospect of a substantial improvement in the Franco regime's relations with these five European neighbors. The only one disposed to accept it as a partner is the Portugal of Salazar, who, as we have seen, has recently voiced great dissatisfaction with his own partnership in NATO.

IX

In view of all the foregoing, what are we to conclude about Spain's future role in the Atlantic world? The question must be considered on two alternative assumptions: one, that NATO will continue in substantially its present form; the other, that it will be replaced by some other international arrangement or arrangements.

In the former case, there is every prospect that Spain will continue to be excluded from NATO, for the opposition to it from some of the smaller members is unremitting and has been reinforced since 1964 by Great Britain, under a Labour Government. In these circumstances it is idle to speculate about curing NATO's ills by replacing the dissident France of General de Gaulle with the cooperative Spain of General Franco, and to scold the opposition to Spain's admission as an "ideological" echo of a remote past. Ideological or not, it is a fact of life that must be faced, and name-calling will not make it go away, for it is based not only on the past but also on the present character of the Franco regime. It would go away if Spain's current economic liberalization should lead to genuine political liberalization, as many have hoped; but that necessarily slow process has so far produced no substantial change in the system. Consequently, as matters stand, Spain's admission to NATO would require a diplomatic revolution in several European countries, and a prerequisite of this would be something like a political revolution in those countries, which is not in sight.

Certain changes in NATO might make Spain's admission possible. If, for example, the present requirement of unanimous con-

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sent were done away with, a majority in favor of Spain could probably be mustered, though not a two-thirds majority. It is not likely that any member, least of all those now opposed to Spain's admission, would surrender its *liberum veto* on proposals for membership. Again, since the opposition to Spain is based largely on political grounds, another bar might be lowered by deleting from NATO's charter the commitment to defend free, democratic institutions. But this change, too, is unlikely to prosper. If it did, what purpose would NATO serve? In view of the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, the weight of European opinion now holds that NATO is needed less for military than for political defense; from which it would follow that this is no time to deprive NATO of political purpose.

In this connection, it may be significant that Spanish officialdom takes the opposite view of the defense needs of the West. Thus, Ambassador Antonio Garrigues, explaining to an American audience in April 1963 why Spain insisted on renegotiating the bases agreement, gave as the first reason the growth of the Soviet Union's military strength in the last ten years, "which obviously implies a risk for the [Iberian] Peninsula much greater than in 1953"—so much greater as to require "a re-evaluation of Spain's role in the defense of the West, particularly in relation to the Atlantic Alliance."[43]

Since NATO remains closed to the Spain of General Franco, alternative solutions for the problem posed by Garrigues must be considered. One possibility is suggested by Franco's endorsement of De Gaulle's concept of *l'Europe des patries* and the current zeal of many of his supporters for Europeanization. Yet, on examination, this turns out to be no solution at all. In his annual year-end address to the Spanish people in December 1965, Franco advocated bilateral treaties as against European union,[44] and we can be reasonably sure that if such a union were created, Spain as at present constituted would be kept out of it by the same European countries that are keeping her out of NATO and the Common Market. Most of these countries lie outside the area covered by another possible arrangement that has been discussed from time to time in the last decade, namely, a Mediterranean pact or alliance. But even if the disaccords between Franco Spain and Italy were not a bar to such an alliance, it is open to so many

[43] *Spanish Newsletter,* May 15, 1963, p. 2.
[44] *Iberica,* January 15, 1966, p. 11.

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other practical objections that the proposal has never got off the ground. For similar reasons there seems to be no future for proposals of a Latin Union or an Iberian Union, which would include all or part of Latin America as well as Latin or Iberian Europe.

Still another arrangement, a triple alliance or league of Great Britain, Spain and the United States, was suggested to me in 1959 by an official of the British Foreign Office, on the ground that these three powers have a community of interest arising from their important interests overseas that set them apart from the European system north of the Pyrenees, despite their ties with it. At that time, the idea seemed to have some merit, but that has been canceled by the tension that has developed between London and Madrid since the British Labour Party returned to power.

In short, we conclude that Spain under the Franco regime cannot look forward to forming any multilateral security arrangement of consequence. From this it follows that she must rely on bilateral arrangements such as her only two military alliances (as Foreign Minister Castiella calls them), those with Portugal and the United States, and her more recent *rapprochement* with France. Of all these, by far the most important to Spain is the Bases Pact with the United States. General Franco's decision to renew the pact in 1963 despite the fact that he had to slash his asking price in the process would seem to indicate that his estimate of Spain's present international situation is similar to the one offered in these pages. What he really thinks about Spain's future prospects, we cannot be sure, for he keeps his own counsel better than most.

Our own estimate is that the improvement of Spain's international situation will depend upon political improvement at home. This in turn will depend to a considerable extent upon the state of the Spanish economy, which, though unsound in some respects, has on the whole prospered greatly since 1959.[45] But, as Spain's record in this period shows, economic growth and political improvement do not necessarily go hand in hand.

[45]This was brought out by reports in mid-1965 on the Spanish economy by the OECD as well as the Banco de España, and a sampling of Spanish discussion of these reports, provided by *La Vanguardia Española,* August 12, 1965, and *Desarrollo,* August 15, 1965.

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THE WORLD WITHOUT NATO

by Robert Strausz-Hupé

NATO, like all social institutions, can be easily defined in the abstract; its workaday concreteness is not readily perceptible to the senses. The men and weapons assigned to NATO are "real"; according to reliable evidence, they exist. But their effective role as instruments of the Western alliance can be inferred only from events which confirmed or failed to confirm a hypothesis, namely, that the Soviets meant to conquer Western Europe and that the Western alliance could thwart Soviet intentions. Empirically, this hypothesis is unprovable. This does not mean, however, that it is not meaningful. It shares this distinction with all hypotheses about existential conditions. The functional effectiveness of NATO as a military alliance can be deduced only from a non-happening: the Soviets did not attack. But is that alliance which deters rather than fights aggression not the most effective kind of alliance? If this proposition holds, then NATO accomplished its mission. Conceived as a military alliance, it wrought political changes that its founders may not have intended and, certainly, did not foresee. On all counts, NATO has been as effective as any alliance organization has ever been.

It is idle to debate whether the communists, because they have not invaded Europe, have never intended to invade it, or whether, had NATO never existed, the communist threat could have been met by other devices, or might have waned because of restraints other than the counterpoise of the Western alliance. The fact is that the Western peoples perceived the communist threat as real, and that NATO provided that climate of security and confidence in which Europe achieved political stability and economic prosperity. Hence, trying to envisage the world without NATO is, in the first place, an essay in conjecture about the West European peoples' perception of their security requirements and about the attitudes of the Soviets toward a Western Europe no longer bound to the United States by a treaty of mutual defense. Then, the conjectural alternatives of the West European-Soviet relationship might provide the basis for designing hypotheses about the global consequences which would flow from the demise of NATO.

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I

Here, one assumption should be stated explicitly: the United States will seek to perpetuate NATO since it deems NATO of lasting value to its own and the West's defense, or a means of maintaining its control over the policies of the West European states, or a useful bargaining tool in its dealings with the Soviets, or an outlet for its universalist emotions. In the light of the past, this seems a reasonable assumption. The assumption that NATO will just fade away is explicitly rejected. No alliance has gone out of business of its own accord. Always, one or several parties have pushed what was falling. Thus, the departure of NATO from the world scene will have been prompted and, certainly, speeded by the initiative of one or several European states.

What are the perceptions of the world and their own place in it which could induce European statesmen and their peoples to quit NATO? There is the widely held idea of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate, or rather, its enduring, static nature. If this idea reflects an accurate evaluation of the military-technological environment, then the leaders of America and the Soviet Union, generally presumed to be rational, will eschew a mutually suicidal war. They will, as a matter of course, refrain from those provocative moves in Europe, where they confront one another directly, that could trigger general nuclear war. Thus, the very purpose for which NATO was created, namely, defense against Soviet aggression against Europe, no longer need be served. The security needs of the individual European states are met by the bilateral nuclear stalemate and, therefore, do not require their individual contributions to collective defense.

True enough, no European statesman sees matters quite so simply or avows that he does. Each may well have his reservations as to how stable is the stability of mutual deterrence. Each might envisage contingencies which, arising somewhere in the world, might upset the so-called balance of terror. Nevertheless, this idea—each of the two giants immobilized by the other—inspires the new maneuverability of European diplomacy, especially French and British and, albeit less ostentatiously, Italian. It is not farfetched to assume that this diplomacy would gladly trade in NATO for a permanent guarantee of the nuclear stalemate—if such a guarantee could be gotten in the shape of either some version or other of the Rapacki Plan, or universal arms reduction and control agreements.

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What is past is prologue. President de Gaulle has supplied the model of the new maneuverable diplomacy of a West European state which has emancipated itself from NATO. For demonstration purposes, it does not matter that, on the whole, De Gaulle has stuck to the letter of the Alliance treaty and has continued to collect the revenue from NATO-leased real estate in France. In his diplomatic dealings he behaves as if NATO does not exist. The flamboyancy of his style diverts the attention of the American public from the fact that, on not a few occasions, other European NATO members, too, have broken ranks and behaved as if they felt no longer bound by the spirit, or the letter, of the Alliance treaty. On issues such as, for example, trade with the communist bloc, the policies of Britain have been about as ambiguous as those of France. A case study of Italian meanderings between commitments to NATO and diverse postures approximating neutralism would afford some interesting insights into both the objective conditions of NATO and the unchanging pattern of Italian policy from Salandra to Fanfani.

II

Of course, Germany is a special case. The *Bundesrepublik* is as sovereign a state as any NATO member. It is, however, also a NATO province. It owes its sovereignty to its simultaneous accession to the Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. It is effectively garrisoned by U.S. and British forces; its own military forces are unreservedly placed at the disposition of NATO, thus constituting the one and only "no strings attached" NATO force. Furthermore, the German leadership expects—or, at least, has said for a long time that it expects—NATO to do for Germany what NATO need not do for any other member, namely, restore national unity. The Alliance treaty provides no warrant whatsoever for this expectation. Nonetheless, it is a fact that Chancellor Adenauer won his people's allegiance to the alliance by linking NATO with German unity, and that, at that time, his Western sponsors did nothing to disavow this implicit promise.

Here and now, among all the peoples of the Western alliance, the people of West Germany are the people least able to imagine a world without NATO. The *Bundesrepublik* is a part of NATO, and NATO is a part of it. For a good many years, the Western alliance has been represented to the German public as a stepping-

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stone toward national reunification, and the combined power of the West as a lever which, over time, would pry loose the communist grip from East Germany.[1] The disappearance of NATO would confront the West Germans with a task of reorientation, if not re-education, about as formidable as that accomplished, in the postwar years, under the stern gaze of the victors.

West German diplomacy, too, might accommodate itself successfully to an international environment without NATO. As a matter of fact, Germany is well placed historically and geographically to emulate the new maneuverable diplomacy which her West European neighbors now so proudly pursue. In a world without NATO, the Soviet Union has much to give to the Germans, much that it now ostensibly withholds because of the very existence of NATO. With the greatest of ease, the Soviet Union can give back to Germany her national unity, and in a NATO-less world, the Germans will be free to receive this gift under any and all conditions they choose to accept.

III

The case of Germany is unique. Yet, some of the ambiguities of the German condition—embedded between East and West, constrained by extra-European power, but free enough to choose between alternatives of accommodation to the competing systems—are reflected in a state of mind which the psychologist calls cognitive dissonance.[2] For obvious reasons, it would be rash to deduce from the German case generalizations about all of Western Europe. The conflict of perceptions, however, tends to blur the outlook upon international politics of all Europeans.

There is a resolution of this kind of conflict, though not one recommended by most experts. It is possible, at least for a while, to expunge from the conscious mind all those perceptions of reality which are disturbing. By this method, Europeans can persuade themselves to reason as follows: If the nuclear stalemate exists, it will continue to exist. Its existence forecloses the possibility of an escalating conflict in Europe—and what prospect could be more cheering? Then, does it not follow that, sooner or later, the two principal parties to the nuclear stalemate, too,

[1]See the statement of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to the German Bundestag on May 27, 1955, in *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages* (Bonn, 1955), Vol. 24, p. 4599.

[2]Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954).

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will perceive the real state of affairs, adjust their conduct accordingly and institutionalize the mutuality of their interest in keeping the nuclear balance from slipping? Not so surprisingly, some Europeans have found that this rationalization of the situation provides the easiest, the most pleasant resolution of cognitive dissonance. Thus, Europeans can feel both secure and guiltless about doing nothing to ensure their security. To indulge with good conscience in this feeling, reasonable West Europeans and, especially, their political leaders, need theories which explain why the nuclear stalemate exists, why it cannot be broken, and why both the United States and the Soviet Union will settle down to peaceful coexistence.

Several theories, not all of them necessarily contradictory, are available. In a world without NATO, these theories would form the intellectual basis of European statecraft. They can be summed up as follows: First, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons has reached an absolute limit beyond which the acquisition of additional weaponry does not ensure added military advantage—an explanation which, incidentally, is being advanced by some American scientists and advocates of U.S.-Soviet reciprocal disarmament measures. Second, the Soviet power elite, having cooled to communist ideology, is turning to domestic works of peace and putting Russia's national interest ahead of that of the communist world revolution. Third, the Russian people, beginning to enjoy the affluence of a status society, prefer prosperous safety at home to risky conquest abroad, and popular pressures will compel the new generation of Soviet leaders to heed the average Russian's wishes. Fourth, in the United States, too, ideological fervor has abated. The anticommunist crusade is flagging, and political leadership will be progressively more reluctant to stake the survival of the Great Society on the defense of any foreign territory, nonallied or allied, courting the risk of nuclear retaliation against America.

Any one of these theories chips away at the rational foundation of NATO. Together, they bring it down. At one time or another, De Gaulle has circumlocuted each of them. More or less forthrightly, British leaders have expressed themselves in accord with all except the last. In fact, a Europe without NATO needs to embrace all of these assumptions in order to live at ease with the rest of the world and with itself.

There is a fifth theory which explains why the present balance

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of nuclear forces precludes nuclear war in or over Europe, and why the United States and the Soviet Union can be kept frozen in nuclear immobility: West European states, either singly or collectively, are capable of developing a nuclear deterrent of their own. This nuclear force will dissuade the Soviets from launching a nuclear attack against Europe, for the Soviets are loath either to trade their cities for West European cities or to touch off a "catalytic" war, i.e., a war into which the United States might be drawn.

IV

On the grounds of scientific-technological development and economic resources, there is no reason why Western Europe could not develop its own credible nuclear deterrent. Politically, there is every reason to assume that it will not. According to De Gaulle's somewhat tenebrous pronouncements, annotated more explicitly by Generals Beaufre and Gallois, a national nuclear deterrent serves one purpose only: to deter a nuclear attack against the nation that possesses it.

Only two West European powers possess a nuclear deterrent of sorts, namely, France and Great Britain. The economic resources of neither country suffice to maintain that scientific-technological establishment which the immensely expensive development of an independent national deterrent requires and which even the two nuclear superpowers barely manage to support. De Gaulle has hinted, again in his umbrageous way, at a Franco-British merger. Even if the British were willing, De Gaulle's obsession with undiluted national sovereignty poses formidable problems of command and control: exactly who would have the finger on the trigger and the safety catch? Would either the British or the French find these problems easier to solve among themselves than does the United States in relation to its European allies? Let us assume that France and Britain are capable of this staggering feat of national self-abnegation: Will their joint nuclear deterrent then suffice to deter a Soviet attack against any West European country except France and Great Britain? Of course, it would not.

Neither France nor Great Britain find it now possible to meet their quota of conventional forces which they are supposed to make available to NATO. Certainly they cannot be expected to substitute their own levies for the American divisions in Germany were these to be withdrawn upon the dissolution of NATO.

The dissolution of NATO's conventional force structure would

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preclude the graduated defense of any European country from Scandinavia to the Bosporus. Conceivably, the inclusion of the *Bundesrepublik* in the French-British merger would supply that critical increment of scientific-technological and manpower resources that would make a European deterrent credible—credible this side of any strategic option except all-out suicidal response. Yet, neither the French nor the British are prepared to go nuclear shares with the Germans. It is not realistic to assume that the Germans will content themselves with supplying an Anglo-French nuclear force with technological gadgetry while fielding the foot soldiery of the alliance. More likely than not, the Germans, confronted with this uninviting prospect, would bethink themselves of other strategic and political alternatives.

A Swedish observer pondering the consequences that would flow from the dissolution of NATO has this to say about the effectiveness of a European deterrent as regards the defense of his own country and, for that matter, any other West European country.

> The Soviet leaders would certainly regard the possibility of Western interventions subsequent to an attack on Sweden as far less of a drawback than if the United States were still committed to defend Western Europe. . . . It may be asserted that the Western European states, or some of them, have greater interests than the United States in preventing a Soviet invasion of Sweden from being successful and, hence, should be more willing to take risks with this aim than the United States. In all probability, however, the available resources, both on a short and long term basis, would not allow military intervention but would rather compel a greater caution than at present. The immediate result of the United States' withdrawal from Europe would be a sizeable weakening of the West's resources for conducting a European conventional war. . . . If the United States were to withdraw from Europe, the Western European countries would probably find it necessary to allocate more resources to nuclear arms than now in order to compensate for the absence of the American guarantee.[3]

Neither France nor Great Britain singly nor a Franco-British nuclear consortium can furnish a credible guarantee of the defense of any other West European country. Conceivably, a post-Gaullist France might abandon the quaint concept of a Europe of the Fatherlands. Even then, a Western Europe deprived of the NATO shelter could not achieve that level of armament and military integration that could supply the basis for a Third Force in world politics.

[3]Kjell Goldmann, "An 'Isolated' Attack against Sweden," *Cooperation & Conflict*, II, 1965, pp. 16-38.

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V

By now, it should be clear that Western Europe's progress upon the road of economic integration has led nowhere politically. It can now be seen that the miscarriage of the European Defense Community project diverted Europe from the political highroad to integration to economic-functional byways. The latter have led to unprecedented prosperity. Prosperity has not strengthened the will to political integration; it has deadened it. For example, the European Community, having knuckled under to De Gaulle's demands, has quietly buried the high hopes for political integration which, once upon a time, its members pinned upon the Treaty of Rome. The hopes of European federalists for a strengthening of the Commission of the European Community have been damped. France has insisted that the Community be developed without using the qualified majority vote against the "very important interests" of one or more members. The Six agreed in January 1966 to a four-point document that appeared to meet French objections.[4] Henceforth, the Commission, representative of the Community viewpoint, will be more reluctant than in the past to press for the strengthening of its authority at the expense of the Council of Ministers, whose members are the spokesmen for the national governments.

More likely than not, a Europe without NATO would seek to perpetuate its enjoyment of commercial advantages accruing from cooperative trade arrangements. There is no empirical evidence whatsoever supporting the contention that an international trading consortium transforms itself, as a matter of course, into a political union.

A Europe without NATO will be a divided and not a united Europe. It would be the divided Europe of 1939 with one difference: it would be weak militarily. Such a Balkanized Europe would invite piecemeal aggression—the very salami tactics that

[4]The four points are: (1) When in the case of decisions which could be taken by a majority vote on proposals by the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the members of the Council will try to achieve within a reasonable period solutions which can be adopted by all the members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. (2) As regards the preceding paragraph the French delegation considers that when it is a question of very important interests, the discussion must continue until a unanimous agreement has been reached. (3) The six delegations note that a divergence of views persists about what should be done in the cases where conciliation cannot be completely achieved. (4) The six delegations nevertheless consider that this divergence of views does not prevent the work of the Community from being begun again according to normal procedures. *European Community Bulletin,* No. 89 (February 1966), pp. 1-2.

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the communists have advanced to such a high state of perfection. It is difficult to see how the smaller states of Europe, especially those in the vicinity of the communist bloc, could resist the temptation to ensure their survival by making compromise deals, Finland-style, with the Soviets. Even under present circumstances, some of the citizens of the smaller countries do not fully credit the American guarantee of European security, enshrined in the Atlantic Pact and betokened by the American physical presence. They would have an easy time convincing their more trusting fellow citizens that a Europe without NATO and without the Americans is not the right place for standing up to the "reasonable" demands of the Soviets. What demands are not reasonable when one has no other choice but to accept them?

VI

Throughout the last two decades, Europeans, for the first time in their history, have become aware of themselves as Europeans. Their ancient rivalries have abated, and, to their own and everybody else's surprise, the ancient and jealous nation-states of Europe have engaged in great common undertakings. This miracle unfolded under the umbrella of NATO. Once that umbrella is removed, the whole of Europe will be exposed to forces from without vastly more powerful than its own. Whatever might be the European purposes of the Soviet Union—be she ideologically zestful, or be she ideologically quiescent and merely bent upon the pursuit of her national interests—she can hardly be expected to smile upon the unification of Europe, except under her own domination. If the postwar years can be said to have taught one categoric lesson, it is that economic and political development are variables that depend on one and the same factor, namely, security against direct or indirect aggression from without. The dissolution of NATO will reverse Europe's economic and political development from the 1940's to date.

By definition, the dissolution of NATO will cancel out all the gains that have been made in the direction of Atlantic cooperation, economic, political and military. This reversal will take place at a time when the resources of all the Atlantic peoples are strained to the breaking point by the revolutionary transformation of the non-Western world. At present, the greatest single shortcoming of NATO is the poor coordination which it provides for the policies of its members confronted by crisis

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situations outside the nominal region of the alliance. Yet the NATO machinery, rickety as it is, has served as a coordinator of a kind, keeping the West from flying apart at critical moments in various hours-of-truth such as the several postwar crises in the Middle East and the Far East and the Cuban missile crisis. Certainly, the machinery needs improving. Were it dismantled, its absence would increase the already crushing burden that weighs on the United States, the most widely committed member of the alliance.

Strategically minded critics of NATO, notably De Gaulle, have argued that bilateral security agreements should be substituted for the collective security pledge of the Atlantic Pact. Since neither France nor Britain, not to speak of Italy or the Benelux countries, is prepared to put muscle into the concept of "graduated" response to a Soviet military challenge, the *casus foederis* of such bilateral military alliances would place the United States before the choice of launching an all-out nuclear attack against the Soviet Union—or of doing nothing. Contrariwise, were the United States attacked, it would have to forgo, for sufficient geopolitical and military-technological reasons, the support of its particular European ally. No member of the U.S. Senate, not even the most eccentric one, could be expected to cast his vote for so absurd an arrangement.

It is rumored that some American strategic critics of NATO deem the *Bundesrepublik* the one and only effective ally of the United States in Europe. Leaving aside the question of how effective an ally the *Bundesrepublik* is now or will be in the future, I must demur at the practicality of an American-German alliance. In a Europe without NATO, the West German citadel would be accessible to the succor of American power only by air or via a couple of North Sea ports. This seems to raise massive logistical problems. More important still, a good many Americans would view an exclusive American-German alliance as a travesty of Atlantic partnership—a cynical power-political arrangement that mocks the ideal of the open, the multiracial and the multicultural community of the Western peoples. For the Germans, a Washington-Bonn axis would be a blind alley. It would set them apart from their Western neighbors. It would annul the *rapprochement* with France. It would convert Germany into an American *place d'armes*. It might ensure West Germany's bare physical security; it would not bring Germany one step nearer to

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the goal of national reunification. The great majority of the Germans, especially German youth, would reject it.

In sum, a world without NATO would be a dangerous world for all the ex-members of NATO. For everybody else, it would be a world less stable than it is now. A Europe without NATO would be an indefensible Europe. The withdrawal of American power from Europe would create a vacuum which, we are told, nature abhors. That vacuum cannot be filled by bilateral alliances between European states and America. Hence, it would irresistibly attract the intervention of that great and proximate power which, in the past, has shown itself willing to fill it, i.e., the USSR.

For the United States, a world without NATO would signify the devaluation of a concept which, for a generation, has informed U.S. policy: America's interest in Europe ranks first among all her interests abroad. The words spoken by President Kennedy on July 4, 1962, at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, need or, rather, should never have been spoken.

Some American nonstrategic critics of NATO suggest that the United States should shift from NATO partnership with Western Europe to collaboration with the Soviet Union. This prescription is based upon the two superpowers' alleged common interest in the prevention of mutually destructive nuclear war and of international nuclear proliferation. The available evidence does not provide a basis for concluding that the Soviets see the situation quite that way. Be that as it may, in a world without NATO, it is difficult to see why the Soviets should collaborate with the United States in any but the most trivial undertakings. The United States would have lost its European allies; the Soviets would still keep theirs, for the states of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe are not free to terminate, of their own accord, the Warsaw Pact, or, rather, the strategic and ideological dominance of the Soviet Union. In brief, the Soviet Union would grow relatively stronger, the United States relatively weaker. For a certainty, the liquidation of NATO would reduce the United States' bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Not even the Soviets, eager as they are to break up NATO and adept as they are at dialectic rhetoric, have cared to argue that the dissolution of NATO will strengthen rather than weaken the United States. Wisely, they have left it to America's own critics of NATO to advance this stupendous argument.

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VII

It is possible to design all kinds of hypotheses for the state of a world without NATO. Among these, one seems most likely and ominous: the United States would be more isolated from the world than had been envisaged by the hardiest isolationists of the pre-World War II era. Of course, great progress has been made in image-making and the manipulation of public opinion. Those who will hail the collapse of NATO as a positive good will couch their arguments in the semantics of internationalism. There always has been a world order; it is likely that there will be one in a NATO-less future. Americans as well as Europeans would have to make considerable adjustments so that they would be able to live in it and with themselves.

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CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

by Arthur Lall

PRIME Minister Jawaharlal Nehru died in May 1964. Not long before he died India was involved in a sharp clash with a major power, China, and suffered a quick military reverse. During Lal Bahadur Shastri's relatively brief tenure as Prime Minister India was engaged in another military conflict. This time India was not defeated, but aspects of the fighting brought out the inadequacy of her largely antiquated defensive posture compared with the attack capabilities of more modern military equipment. These practical factors and the accumulation by India of general experience in international affairs have encouraged the belief that Delhi's outlook on world affairs has been changing recently, and might well be entering a new phase.

I

This view must be carefully assayed in the light of the main factors that influence and mold India's approaches to international affairs. In view of the length and the largely unrevolutionized character of the Indian tradition, probably the best point of departure in this endeavor is what might be described as the intuitive factor. This is the factor that gives expression to inchoate tendencies and spontaneous attitudes springing from deeply ingrained elements in the Indian scene. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this brief study to delve into this point for a full exploration. Nevertheless, it is necessary to remind ourselves that in dealing with India we are concerned with a society that has endured over the course of several millennia and developed, in this long process, a strong tendency to synthesize and assimilate rather than to espouse or reject.

It would be an oversimplification to say that India never makes an about turn in its attitudes, but it would be safe to say that hitherto Indian history and its movements have not developed along such lines. Therefore, at any given moment of time in India the conditioning of a very long past is a powerful factor in the formulation of policy, more powerful perhaps than in most

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other countries. Note, for example, the fact that in his first official broadcast to the Indian peoples, on September 7, 1946—a few days after he had taken office as Vice President of the Executive Council of the Viceroy of India and almost a year prior to the attainment of independence by India—Nehru, who at that time had had no official experience in foreign affairs, not even in a parliamentary opposition party, stated in remarkably full outline the foreign policy which he was to implement for the next seventeen and one-half years.[1] It was all there: nonalignment but an active foreign policy of full participation in world affairs, anticolonialism and opposition to racist policies, international cooperation to create one world, the continuance of good relations with the Commonwealth always saving India's opposition to the policies of South Africa (at that time a member of the Commonwealth), acknowledgment of the great international responsibilities placed on the United States and the Soviet Union, and India's special relations with the vast Asian world. In this last category fell India's relations with the USSR and China. Regarding the former, he said: "They are our neighbours in Asia and inevitably we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other." China (not yet taken over by the communists) he described as "our neighbour which has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow."[2]

How was it that, although he had had no official experience in foreign affairs or government, Nehru could outline a policy which has continued to shape India's external posture for the last twenty years? Of course, he was a keen student of world affairs, and his training had been cosmopolitan, but these personal factors do not explain the sureness of touch that we see in his first pronouncement on foreign policy. Deeper still was another impelling factor that persuasively directed Nehru's thinking. This was India's long practice over the millennia of the arts of synthesis and assimilation. It is in the stream of that long practice that there is room for India's friendship both with an anticommunist West and a communist Russia, for remaining within the Commonwealth while opposing the colonial policies of London in the years when the United Kingdom was still an important colonial power (and now, too, in regard to British policies in and around Aden and

[1]Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), pp. 1-3.
[2]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

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in certain parts of Africa), and for constant support for disarmament and other steps to reduce tension or neutralize trouble spots.

II

It is of primary importance to understand that this way of thinking that lay at the root of Nehru's first broadcast remains strongly operative in India. The severest test of India's nonalignment came when the Chinese forces penetrated into the country in 1962. The test was all the more severe because Nehru was somewhat behind rather than in front of the march of events, and, therefore, when the clash came the shock to him was all the greater. He could not believe that relations with China could or would deteriorate as they did in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. As late as December 1958, some time after it had become known in Delhi that the Chinese had established a number of posts in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, Nehru, true to the intuitive approach to foreign affairs which derives from India's long history, said in the Indian Parliament: "The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else."[3] And six months later, speaking directly on India-China relations, Nehru told Parliament: "I do not think war will come. I do not think any country is foolish enough to jump over the precipice into war."[4] When Chou En-lai was in Delhi in 1960 Nehru said at the banquet in honor of the Chinese Prime Minister: "We have opposed not only war but what is called the cold war because this represented the approach of hatred and violence. We have endeavoured to follow, in our limited and imperfect way, the teachings of two great sons of India, the Buddha and Gandhi."[5] The implication was that India was very far from thinking in terms of war.

The immediate effect of the Chinese-Indian war of 1962, however, was to call into question the basic pillars of India's foreign policy. Criticism was strong in the country and in Parliament. Nehru himself said that India had been living in an unreal world,

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 359.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

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and that "we are growing too soft and taking things for granted."[6] But he clung tenaciously to the old lines of policy: "We are not going to give up our basic principles because of our present difficulty."[7]

His successors have not only reaffirmed their resolve to cling to old lines of policy,[8] but have moved in a measure—albeit still tentatively—toward negotiation with China. Nehru maintained that India could not sit down to negotiate until there was acceptance by China of all the provisions of the proposals offered as a basis of negotiation by the six Colombo Powers. Recently there have been indications that India would be willing to consider negotiations if there were some intimation by Peking of a readiness to negotiate. As long ago as December 1964 Prime Minister Shastri said that India was prepared for talks with China consistent with her self respect.[9] He was saying, in other words, that if the intention of China was really to arrive at a settlement and if Peking would not put forward at the negotiating table claims to large areas of territory with threats to take them by force, then there could be negotiations between the two countries. A year later, Shastri, referring specifically to India's relations with China (as well as those with Pakistan), said a day would come when the countries of Asia would have to sit down together and reach accord on a path to peace.[10]

Under the new regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, talk of negotiation with China has increased. Jayaprakash Narayan, whose name means much in India although he is not now active in politics, said at a public meeting on February 2, 1966, that the Colombo proposals were now "dead." He called for fresh efforts to solve Sino-Indian disputes and suggested that the head of a state such as the UAR, Rumania or Tanzania should play a role toward this end.[11] On February 16, 1966, speaking in Parliament after the Defense Minister of India had made a statement on border incursions by the Chinese, Mrs. Gandhi said that India was prepared to talk with China "should proper conditions arise."[12]

[6] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Volume IV (New Delhi: Government of India, 1964), p. 230.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] See reports of Shastri's speech on August 15, 1964 (*Indiagram*, No. 135, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C., August 17, 1964) and Mrs. Gandhi's speech of January 25, 1966 (*ibid.*, No. 15, January 27, 1966).
[9] *Ibid.*, No. 217, December 22, 1964, p. 2.
[10] *Ibid.*, No. 207, December 13, 1965, p. 2.
[11] *Times of India* (Bombay), February 3, 1966.
[12] *Indiagram*, No. 26, February 16, 1966, p. 3.

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The very vagueness of this phrase places it in the category of a diplomatic feeler; although there is not yet any indication from Peking of a response, it is not unlikely that in the near future we will see that steps toward negotiation are being taken by both sides. In any event, these tentative moves by India may be regarded as some evidence of a return toward what one might call the normalcy of Indian foreign policy, the policy which Nehru said went back to roots some 2,500 years old.

There are some in India who are impatient with the tradition and would like to see some radical shifts in Indian policy. But even in regard to China, where the reasons for such a shift are prima facie very strong, I believe it has not in fact occurred. Should there be further significant military ventures on the border and should China rebuff the tentative indications of readiness to negotiate, we might still come to see some real changes in Indian policies, but it is wholly premature to predict such a development. In this connection it is relevant that India's President, though his constitutional position is closely analogous to that of a constitutional monarch, exercises his considerable influence in favor of the search for a way to honorable negotiations with China.

For its part, perhaps, Communist China might be inhibited from responding to the current Indian overtures because she has apparently convinced herself that India is joining a "U.S.-dominated anti-China front."[13] On the other hand Chinese leaders are probably aware that Prime Minister Gandhi, speaking in Parliament on March 1, 1966, rejected suggestions that India should enter pacts for containing the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Mrs. Gandhi was of the view that such pacts were not conducive to peace, and might in fact increase tension and impinge on India's independence of policy.[14] It cannot be ruled out that China might see negotiations with India as a strategy of averting or neutralizing any adoption by India of a posture opposed to Chinese interests. It must be remembered that even membership by Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO has not prevented the development of close relations between that country and China. These considerations are brought into focus not to develop a prognostication, one way or the other, regarding future Chinese moves, but because they are germane to a fuller understanding of

[13] *Peking Review*, February 11, 1966, p. 17.
[14] *Indiagram*, No. 34, March 1, 1966, p. 1.

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Indian policy toward China at this time. If, in spite of the continuing aftermath of the border dispute—mainly in the form of exchanges of sharp diplomatic notes and other expressions of mutual suspicion—responsible voices can be raised in India in favor of negotiations with China, then we must admit the strength of the intuitive and traditional attitudes that influence the formulation of India's approaches to foreign policy.

III

Nehru's seminal broadcast of September 1946 did not touch on Indo-Pakistani relations for the simple reason that Pakistan did not come into being until almost a year later. Despite his reluctance to accept the division of the old India—this solution was by no means his first choice for the subcontinent's problems—his basic approach was to regard Pakistan as a fraternal state with which India must develop familial relations.

Had British imperial policies on the subcontinent for several generations before yielding power not been directed to maximizing, in every way possible, the difference between Hindus and Moslems, and had Britain been farsighted enough to encourage good relations between the two communities, they, together with other groups in India, would almost certainly have worked out a viable system satisfactory to all elements, as the great Akbar had done in the sixteenth century. With British farsightedness, the Indian subcontinent would have remained the natural balancing factor in Asia against the other mammoth state in the region, and it could have cultivated relations with that state on terms of equality. There is no question but that the division of the subcontinent has created fundamental problems of power imbalance in Asia and has established a situation in which outside powers are able to exploit the division in their own interests. This preliminary statement is necessary for an appreciation of the complexities which confront Indian foreign policy in much of Asia.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Chou En-lai, although at the time apparently friendly with Indian leaders, could not but notice sharp exchanges between them and the Pakistani leaders. Consequently, he took Prime Minister Mohammad Ali aside and said to him that although Pakistan was a member of SEATO China still regarded it as a friend. This was encouraging news for Pakistan, but for India it meant that in the Asian hinter-

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land she was confronted with the possibility of a wide arc of hostility. In these circumstances, no Indian government could take seriously the view that the solution of the Kashmir issue would bring about permanent good relations with Pakistan if such a solution were based on the ceding of any more territory in North India to its neighbor. Supposing India agreed to an arrangement which gave the Kashmir valley or a substantial part of it to Pakistan, the strategic implication would be that China and Pakistan could join forces easily over the head of India. In this connection Indians cannot forget that there has been some sentiment in Pakistan in favor of the view that the latter's frontiers should be pushed farther down into the Punjab—perhaps even to Delhi. Any solution of the Kashmir problem which ceded territory would be regarded in India as giving encouragement to these sentiments.

What, then, are the practical options open to India in respect of policies toward Pakistan? I rule out the continuance of armed mutual hostility, not only because there is now the Tashkent Declaration but because there has been a war on that basis. To continue with such an unstable and provocative posture is not a policy but rather a *pis aller* while a policy is being worked out. The fact of Tashkent supports this view and helps to clear the way for the formulation of a viable policy. One conceivable option is to make some small territorial adjustments of such a character that both sides could save face. If the recent war has had a really sobering effect on both countries a mutual accommodation on these lines—rather than a solution, a word that generally carries overtones of a tidy settlement—is conceivable. It should not stand alone. With it should go other developments to improve relations between the two countries, without in any way diminishing the separate sovereignties of India and Pakistan.

It would be naive and wholly impracticable to suggest any undoing of the partition of the subcontinent. But it would be almost equally naive to read into the future of the subcontinent and the surrounding areas an era of peace unless both India and Pakistan recognize frankly that, while remaining separate entities and states, they must both accept a primacy of relationship *inter se*. If either continues to put before its relations with the other its relations with a third or more countries there will be the constant prospect of the intrusion into the subcontinent of outside adventurism to the detriment of the peace of the area.

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The Tashkent Declaration makes possible the gradual construction of elements of the primacy of relations that is required on the subcontinent. It states: "Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken."[15] Use of this clause could result in the building of institutional arrangements by the two countries such as intergovernmental bodies on trade, communications, joint developmental schemes, joint development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and consultative committees on foreign affairs and in the field of defense. It would be logical to top off such arrangements with a small summit level Indo-Pakistani committee consisting of the two heads of government and their chief advisers. I have already proposed elsewhere that the chairmanship of this body should alternate between the two heads of government, and that for the first year or two the President of Pakistan should hold this office.[16] I believe that developments somewhat along these lines are a *sine qua non* of a stable peace in South Asia. They would, moreover, create in time the conditions in which remaining problems between India and Pakistan could be resolved to mutual benefit.

Together with these developments there could be an arms control agreement on the subcontinent, to be verified through a continuing system of mutual inspection assisted by personnel deputed under a United Nations resolution. Such a step would lead to the release from so-called defense expenditures of considerable resources badly needed for projects designed to raise the deplorably low living standards in both countries.

In short, the best alternative for relations between India and Pakistan can be worked out only if both countries start from an agreed premise of wide cooperation. If they do not so act it is likely that relations will again slip downhill to the narrow valley of mutual hatred and violence.

IV

It is sometimes said that India has moved toward greater friendliness with the Soviet Union as her confrontation with China has developed. I do not think this view corresponds with the facts.

[15]See text in *New York Times*, January 11, 1966.
[16]"India & Pakistan: A Policy for Peace," *The Observer* (London), June 13, 1965.

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In his policy broadcast of 1946, Nehru suggested that India and the Soviet Union would inevitably have to undertake many common tasks and would have much to do with each other. This has remained a constant pivot of Indian policy. In one's vicinage one must have meaningful friendships: this is true for all states. India and the Soviet Union, in spite of the differences between their political and economic systems, have sought and developed mutually friendly relations. Differences with other neighbors may have, from time to time, highlighted their friendship, but it is not true that those differences have caused the two to come together: that *rapprochement* has been determined by broad common interests in the peace of the area and of the world, by the requirements of India's economic plans, and also by India's desire to render such assistance as it could to improve relations between the West and the USSR. This last endeavor could not have been implemented at all if India had been cold or hostile toward the Soviet Union.

In the "pristinity" of Nehru's policy there is no reason why India should not be as friendly with the USSR as with the Western world, and particularly with the United States. This of course does not mean that in all matters India should try to equate the actions and policies of the two superpowers. It does mean, however, that in each situation, be it Vietnam or the Dominican Republic on the one hand, or Hungary on the other, India should bring to bear an equal degree of understanding. India's reticence in 1956 with regard to the Soviet Union's action in Hungary was widely criticized, but not generally known were the very considerable efforts being made by India at the United Nations, Moscow, Budapest and elsewhere to counsel restraint on all those concerned. Not an exact parallel, but in some ways analogous, is the striking fact that in his statement in the general debate at the Twentieth Session of the UN General Assembly, on October 12, 1965, Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister, was unique among the representatives of the more important countries in not mentioning the Vietnamese situation.[17] Since it is a well established tradition that the general debate statements of foreign ministers or other senior representatives of governments made at the General Assembly constitute overall statements of foreign policy, the omission was, of course, deliberate and was explained solely by India's desire not to cause embarrassment to

[17]See UN General Assembly Records, A/PV 1358, October 12, 1965.

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those directly involved in Vietnam. India's reticence over issues such as Hungary or India's support for the Soviet Union in certain matters (e.g., some aspects of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament) are remarked upon in the Western press and in some sections of the Indian press and thus become obtrusive. On the other hand, the reticence of India in regard to issues that trouble her Western friends often goes unnoticed and is thus consigned to public oblivion.

One aspect of Indo-Soviet relations which should be noted is the responsiveness of Moscow, on occasion, to Indian initiatives. For instance, in December 1955 the United Nations was plunged into a sudden deadlock over the admission of new members because the understanding among the great powers to facilitate the entry of eighteen states had been frustrated first by the veto of Nationalist China in regard to the application of Mongolia and then by the veto of the Soviets in regard to certain other applicants. At that very time Bulganin and Khrushchev were in India. The Indian delegation at the United Nations sent Prime Minister Nehru a telegram, suggesting that perhaps a way out could be found if the Soviets, in return for Mongolia's nonadmission, were to prevent the admission of one noncommunist state, but permit the rest of the sixteen applicants to gain membership. Nehru took up this suggestion with the Soviet leaders, and they immediately acceded to the proposal. The next morning Yakov Malik received instructions from the Soviet chiefs reversing the previous Soviet position. That day the United Nations gained sixteen new members.

Again, there was the quick acceptance by the Soviets, as the basis for negotiation, of the plan proposed in April 1962[18] to end the deadlock in the negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The document, although the handiwork of all eight nonaligned delegations at the conference, bore the imprint of many crucial ideas advanced by the Indian delegation. The Soviet delegate objected strenuously to the plan before it was introduced at the conference. He informed the Indian delegate (the author) that the proposals were completely unacceptable to his delegation. However, the proposals were tabled, and three days later the Soviet delegation received instructions from Moscow to support them as the basis of negotiations for a test ban treaty.[19]

[18]Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, ENDC/28, April 16, 1962.
[19]ENDC/32, April 19, 1962.

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Recently, encouraged in part by indications that Pakistan's relations with the West are not as staunch as they have been, Moscow has shown more receptiveness to Pakistani overtures. This development is not detrimental to India's interests. On the contrary, it made it possible for Premier Kosygin to invite President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri to Tashkent last January to what turned out to be a significant conference on Indo-Pakistani relations. The USSR's widening interest in the affairs of the subcontinent has been welcomed by India. Thus, the address of the President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, to the Indian Parliament when it reconvened on February 14, 1966, referred to Kosygin's role at the Tashkent talks as follows: "He [the late Prime Minister Shastri] had the satisfaction of signing the Tashkent Declaration with President Ayub Khan in the presence of Soviet Premier Kosygin, whose good offices and friendly approach, more than anything else, made the agreement possible."[20]

V

In some of the foregoing remarks we have touched on India's outlook toward the United States. Again, the first statement of attitude by Nehru on September 7, 1946, remains true of Indian policy today. He said: "We send our greetings to the people of the United States of America to whom destiny has given a major role in international affairs. We trust that this tremendous responsibility will be utilised for the furtherance of peace and human freedom everywhere."[21] Central to this Indian attitude is the acknowledgment that the United States has vast and onerous world responsibilities. If at times there have been differences of opinion as to how these responsibilities might best be expressed and discharged, particularly in relation to India, its neighbors and other states of Asia, this is no negation of the general recognition by India of Washington's responsibilities. In this connection it is relevant that India, as the initiator and major formulator of the post-World War II policy of nonalignment at a time when alignment against Soviet communism was an essential credential for acceptance in certain Western circles, faced a difficult task in the conduct of its relations with the United States through most of the 1950's. However, since the commencement of the Kennedy Administration there has been a much greater degree of accept-

[20] *Indiagram*, No. 24, February 14, 1966, p. 2.
[21] *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, op. cit.*, p. 3.

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ance of nonalignment—which is by now the official posture in world affairs of some sixty countries.

Other elements in India's attitude toward the United States include recognition that, although great hazards accompany the possession of great power, the United States has wielded its power in such a manner that the world has avoided major conflicts. India is also unqualifiedly grateful for the large measure of economic assistance provided by the United States, especially in times of crisis such as the present food shortage. In regard to this assistance, President Radhakrishnan stated in his address of February 14, 1966: "In particular we would like to thank the President of the United States and his Administration for their generous help at this time of need."[22] On the matter of assistance generally, India will carefully observe U.S. policy in regard to arms deliveries to Pakistan, which ceased during the short Indo-Pakistani war last year, as did deliveries to India. Perhaps here is an opportunity which should be seized by India and Pakistan to limit their respective defense establishments, under the control arrangements mentioned earlier. Then, if supplies were made to the two countries within mutually agreed limits, suspicion on the subcontinent would be considerably allayed and criticism of U.S. policies in this field would diminish.

On the question of Vietnam the same Presidential address to the opening of the budget session of the Indian Parliament on February 14, 1966, stated: "We are deeply concerned about the present situation in Vietnam. Any effort to resolve this conflict by peaceful methods will receive our support." Following Vice President Humphrey's visit to India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave a more precise description of the Indian position when, in response to a question in Parliament, she confirmed that the Vice President had asked for India's support for the U.S. solution of the Vietnam problem. According to reports, Mrs. Gandhi replied that she explained to the American Vice President India's commitment to a policy of nonalignment and its "special responsibilities as chairman of the International Control Commission."[23] It seems clear that India will not abandon her policy of nonalignment even in her quest for good relations with the great powers. At the same time it is only fair to remember that India's leaders are convinced that nonalignment does not inhibit,

[22] *Indiagram*, No. 24, February 14, 1966, p. 3.
[23] *Times of India* (Bombay), February 23, 1966.

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much less preclude, the development of good relations with the United States and other states.

VI

At no time has India claimed leadership of the nonaligned world. But it is a plain matter of record that through the 1950's and the early 1960's her leaders did, in fact, enjoy by common consent a position of some pre-eminence among their nonaligned colleagues. This was in a measure a reflection of the personal stature of the late Jawaharlal Nehru, who nevertheless was always anxious to make it clear that he regarded others, particularly Tito and Nasser, as in every respect equally important. During Nehru's lifetime two developments occurred which inevitably affected India's position. The first of these was the very success of nonalignment as an international posture. Nearly all African states professed to adopt it, and enshrined it as an integral part of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Because of their understanding of nonalignment, many of these African states were of the view that they could not take sides against China when her forces attacked India in 1962. The spread of nonalignment has made a degree of polycentrism inevitable.

The second factor which adversely affected India's stature in the nonaligned world was the rapid success of the Chinese in their armed attack against India in 1962. Power is respected in the international community. It had been assumed that big India was reasonably strong. China was, of course, assumed to be powerful, and it was thought that in a military confrontation between the two there would be a meeting of two Asian giants. It turned out to be quite otherwise, and this could not but affect India's prestige. But the result of that episode was not just the humiliation of India. It split Asia and caused wide repercussions. Nehru had hoped that Asia would be an area of low tensions, but this hope dimmed as it became more fragmented politically. Cambodia, which had hitherto shown regard for both India and China, now shifted to closer relations with China. Sukarno was impressed with China's power, especially when Peking started to explode nuclear devices—which for initial devices were found to be rather sophisticated. Forgetting his erstwhile nonaligned friends, he turned to closer relations with the more ebullient men of Asia: Chou En-lai, Sihanouk and Ayub Khan, thus giving full rein to his self-proclaimed romanticism.

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VII

Though there have been these and other loosenings of the texture of nonalignment, it cannot be precluded that India will return to a position of some consequence internationally. She has certain obvious advantages and assets, and the buffets of international events have convinced her that she must build a strong economy and strengthen her armed forces, while at the same time she rediscovers the moral strength that has been part of the Gandhian heritage, which is also a manifestation of her long tradition. It was in keeping with that heritage that Lal Bahadur Shastri worked so hard for the Tashkent agreement; and the recent tentative feelers toward negotiation with Peking are also in keeping with that heritage.

What India seems to lack now, in comparison with the greater part of the Nehru period when she was in the forefront of those states that contributed proposals for the bridging of differences between the main protagonists, is the capacity to demonstrate leadership in the world community. This is to be explained partly by the fact that India's leaders are preoccupied now with the deployment of national capacities for dealing with basic economic tasks such as food production, communications and transport. Added to this is the feeling that in her state of exposed general power debility she must first build her own overall strength.

How far will the design for a strengthened India go? Will India build the atomic bomb? Speaking in the Indian Parliament on March 1, 1966, Mrs. Gandhi again rejected the suggestion that India should manufacture the bomb.[24] On the other hand, India and other nonaligned countries have repeatedly stated in the past year or two that, if there is to be a meaningful nonproliferation agreement, the present nuclear powers must simultaneously agree to take steps to achieve a degree of nuclear disarmament and to make the nuclear test ban treaty comprehensive and universal.[25] What if these conditions remain unfulfilled—a most likely eventuality? In this connection, Indians are apprehensive about several facts, including Pakistan's nonadherence (a position shared only by Guinea, Rumania, Mali, Cuba and France) to the resolution at the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.[26] Indian leaders feel strongly

[24] *Indiagram*, No. 34, March 1, 1966, p. 1.
[25] ENDC/PV. 240, February 15, 1966, pp. 14-20, 23-30.
[26] A/RES/ 2028 (XX), November 23, 1965.

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that they should have pressed harder for disarmament agreements which might have precluded the development of the Chinese bomb; now they are concerned that if India sits back while Pakistan, Indonesia and others develop such weapons it would be more than any Indian government could justify to its peoples. This indicates the seriousness and urgency of making worldwide arrangements to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons, which requires, *inter alia,* bringing China into the councils of the world community and instituting more purposeful talks on disarmament and arms control than those now in train at Geneva in the absence of France and China.

The pressures which India strives to create for a nonproliferation agreement to be accompanied by a degree of nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive and universal test ban treaty do not include the use of threats that she might break loose from her self-imposed restraint (India and Japan are the only countries in Asia that are known to be exercising genuine restraints in this regard) on the development of nuclear weapons. India fears, however, that if the great powers do not accept some form of nuclear disarmament there will almost certainly be untoward consequences.

India herself is psychologically unprepared for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The old foreign policy of India basically remains intact, and though subjected to various distorting forces it shows a strong tendency to continue in the channels foreseen for it by Nehru in 1946. It is most unlikely that India will be the next country to enter the nuclear club, but if and when there is another entrant she will feel obliged, though reluctant, to follow suit. Then, unfortunately, we will have reached that phase of international precariousness to which President Kennedy referred in his press conference on August 29, 1962, when he said: "Those who oppose an agreement [on the banning of nuclear tests which would frustrate the designs of countries to become nuclear powers] should consider what our security will look like at the end of this decade if we do not have the agreement and we have the possibility of 10 or 15 countries having these weapons . . . when one goes off, it may mean they all go off."[27]

[27]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1962,* Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 832.

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THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN REBUILDING THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM

by James Robert Huntley

TWENTY-ONE years after VE Day, Atlantic statesmen can look back on their international community-building with justifiable pride. Immediate postwar goals, conceived in dire emergency, have largely been achieved and ingenious new regional institutions, bridging the gap between nation-state and a universal political order as yet unattainable, have been constructed.

Yet in 1966 there is great malaise on both sides of the Atlantic. The new institutions, for all their novelty and efficaciousness, are not solving our emerging problems. Some, such as the Common Market, had their future courses well planned yet now stand frustrated. The future of other institutions, such as NATO, could not be foreseen at the outset and now is most uncertain. Largely because of the success of the West's grand design of the late 1940's, the threat from the East has receded. Because the danger has apparently lessened, because we enjoy unprecedented prosperity, and perhaps because peoples and nations cannot sustain bursts of creative political energy indefinitely, we are backsliding into older, more comfortable patterns of international behavior.

The Atlantic community is no fiction; it existed for at least two centuries prior to 1945, based on certain common beliefs, historical experiences and vital interests. For most of these years and to most Europeans and Americans, this community was imperceptible, yet it was a reality. The United States became a great continental power under the protection of the British fleet. The forces that shaped the industrial, social and political revolutions of the nineteenth century flowed back and forth across the Atlantic in a steady stream. The United States engaged itself twice in our century to protect this yet-shadowy Atlantic system. But despite the historic continuity of the Atlantic relationship and its late emergence into our consciousness, there is no assurance that its rudimentary post-1945 institutions will last.

The trend toward a new kind of regional government is in dan-

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ger of reversing itself and America and Europe may once again be entering a period of estrangement. Were this to happen, the consequences this time might be grave, far-reaching and long-lasting; history might not give the Atlantic community a second chance. In this nuclear era when the existence of the world is at stake, we must design a viable world system to prevent major conflict. It is an underlying assumption of this paper that such a system is impossible unless it is based upon a strong, cohesive Atlantic core.

Much of our contemporary drift and malaise seems due to widespread uncertainty as to the meaning of the common Western experience. This is illustrated by two quotations: General de Gaulle, speaking in Strasbourg in November 1964, avowed that the United States is a friendly power, "but it is a power situated in a different world, and its destiny, by nature and by history, cannot be identified with that of Europe." In 1943, Walter Lippmann wrote: "The Atlantic Ocean is not the frontier between Europe and the Americas. It is the inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history, and vital necessity."

What is our "destiny?" Is there such a thing as "Europe?" Or an "Atlantic community?" Are Americans really Americans first and Western men only second? Is the Western experience losing its integral meaning as a world culture? Should we aspire to a "Great Society" for America alone, or can we think in terms of a "great Atlantic civilization," as President Johnson has suggested?

Serious frictions are engendered by American investment and business activity in Europe; the Europeans resent their comparative technological backwardness; American diplomacy tends increasingly to "go it alone" out of frustration and impatience with Europe; Europeans have a nagging fear that the U.S. security pledge is not as valid for them as for the American continent; some Europeans vitriolically resent and others resignedly accept the so-called Americanization of their ancient cultures—the catalogue of complaints is endless. But such issues are only the supersurface of the Atlantic iceberg. The much larger mass, lost in depths that may be accessible only to the student of *Kulturgeschichte,* is the substance we must somehow come to terms with. What can we, Europeans and Americans, do to strike at the roots of our imperception and our discord?

There are limits to what the United States can accomplish, in

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Europe or elsewhere, through the application of its power. Our arms are indispensable, but not a substitute for effective coalition diplomacy. The geometric growth of our economic power continues to awe allies and confound enemies, yet does little to smooth the way for our interests. The impact of our culture may be pervasive and in some ways profound, yet its global dissemination is an unguided process that may bring more harm than good in its wake. We must learn to develop new forms of power and to use power in new ways. We must also, perhaps, learn to use power in concert with others, particularly with our Atlantic allies. Many have sought for new ways of "harmonizing and concerting policy" with the Europeans and especially for new institutional frameworks for common Atlantic causes. But, by and large, those who would have to take the decisions to go forward in any meaningful Atlantic construction not only disagree as to what must be done; they seem not even to agree that *anything* must be done. There are objections on every side when one European power in particular exercises a negative sort of leadership; there are strong criticisms when the United States attempts timid steps forward, even louder criticisms when it does nothing. An analysis of the past suggests that much of our difficulty revolves around the problem of how to develop and exercise leadership—at every level—attuned to the transformation of the present Western nation-state system into a kind of multinational, interdependent political society.

Let us first be clear that we are talking about the amalgamation of several nation-states, including the United States, into a new kind of international society—a society in which the exercise of political power is shared to the degree necessary to serve effectively certain vital interests held in common. We shall not argue here whether this is desirable or not; for our purposes it is clear that the Atlantic nations are in midstream of such a process. Since one cannot simply halt the process of integration where it is, consolidate one's gains and expect the status quo to remain indefinitely, there are only two alternatives: to proceed with the institutionalization of the Western world or see it disintegrate. We assume here that we should proceed to build further. How can this be done effectively?

The Nature and Role of Leadership in Building Multinational Communities

Crane Brinton, in a little essay in 1949, drew from some his-

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torical cases of political integration a number of elements which he said had had to be present for union to succeed. These included a head of state or some other symbol, such as a flag; at least minimum loyalty on the part of the masses to the larger political unit; some degree of local autonomy; the absence of indigestible minorities; and

> an elite, not always an aristocratic elite in the European sense of the word, . . . commonly charged with the responsibility for administration, for setting the tone of society and education, conditioned morally as well as intellectually to the service of the integrated state, thoroughly cosmopolitan or international in outlook.[1]

Brinton's points seem plausible and substantiated by the facts as well as we can know them. His last point, the need for a cosmopolitan leadership group, is the focus of this inquiry.

Two cases are of interest, ancient Rome and the European Common Market.

The Roman Experience

Without the telegraph, the internal combustion engine, the typewriter, the mimeograph, or the technological aids which seem indispensable to the administration of modern polities, it is incredible that Rome governed effectively over the length and breadth of the then-known world for several turbulent centuries. Yet, as Henry Adams observed, "In the year 305 the [Roman] empire had solved the problems of Europe more completely than they have ever been solved since."[2]

The classes from which Rome's leadership was drawn (leadership seen as comprising all those who made or influenced important decisions in any sphere or who played major roles in carrying them out) acquired a kind of superculture that was Roman, despite their polyglot ethnic origins. Eagerness for education was widespread, and the curricula of the schools that trained the future elites in the provinces of Spain, Gaul, Asia Minor or Africa were essentially the same. "Every educated man in the West knew the names of the great writers of the East, of the leading men of science, professors, and philosophers."[3] The Roman bureaucracy spread the language, laws, manners and customs of Rome and

[1]Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 83-84.
[2]Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), p. 477.
[3]M. Rostovtseff, *A History of the Ancient World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), II, 224-225.

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"brought almost all the civilized world of that time into moral unity."[4] The empire never was, or tried to become, a worldwide state of a national type, one that subdues and forcibly assimilates other nations to itself. Rather, by its constitution, it became more and more cosmopolitan. What appears to have given it strength and cohesiveness, in spite of many radical defects in its social and political system, was Graeco-Roman culture, which all educated men shared. With a core of common ideals and philosophy, a common education and common language, the leaders and administrators of the empire could communicate without hindrance. These bonds were singularly strong and gave unity and resilience to the entire *polis,* despite the vast differences in ways of life among its many peoples.

The Common Market

Since 1951 three interrelated political institutions—Euratom, the Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community—have begun with undeniable success to bind together the economies of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The effect of this process on men's minds is no less remarkable than its effect on business activity. Even though it is by no means complete and there are doubts now as to how far it will be able to go, the achievement, at least until 1963, has been exhilarating to any thinking Western man.

What is making this historic transformation possible? It seems probable that one indispensable factor is a multinationally-oriented elite group of the type which Brinton postulated. Just as Rome depended for its cohesion on such a core of leadership, so the success of the "Six" has been in large measure the product and charge of a group of men who can project themselves culturally beyond their own borders. We speak here not simply of the Eurocrats in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, but of important functionaries in the national governments, the trade unions, the banks, the industries and the professions. A "European elite" has begun to come into existence, sharing a common frame of reference from which the contemporary world is regarded, plus a modicum of common cultural elements from historical tradition and education. This new group has exercised decisive leadership in the postwar course of Europe. If the tide of European integration now recedes, it will be partly because the new elite of Europe (and elites change constantly, influenced by

[4] *Loc. cit.*

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broader social transformations as well as the aging process) has begun to lose those common elements so recently acquired or perceived.

The European Coal and Steel Community, the wholly novel precursor of the Common Market, was created in 1951 by agreement of the governments and parliaments of the six signatories. Prior to French ratification of the treaty, a poll by the Group d'Etude de l'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles showed that of the French public only 9 per cent were able to describe essential features of the Schuman Plan and, among those informed, only 25 per cent approved. Yet the French Chamber of Deputies ratified the plan on the government's recommendation.[5] This suggests, first, that within the French political elite there was a clear consensus as to what needed to be done and that the leadership took action; second, that the French population had no major objections to this rather complex measure. Although there are distinct limits beyond which leadership cannot push or pull the people of a democratic country—rejection by the French Parliament of the EDC treaty three years later is a case in point—the role of leadership is fundamental to political change. To serious observers of the postwar birth of "Europe," the multinational character of its leadership must seem self-evident.

What produced this cosmopolitan elite in Europe? We can suggest the following factors: (1) The wartime experience forged a common bond, even between the Germans and those they vanquished; all Continental Europeans were profoundly conscious in 1945 of having "lost the war." There was widespread conviction that never again should Europeans fight brother Europeans in murderous civil conflict. (2) There exists a common philosophical and educational base among the "Six" countries; in spite of important differences, the shared elements, transmitting to each new generation the cumulative wisdom of European civilization, are very real and very strong. (3) The Soviet menace and the prostration of Europe produced a conviction among leadership in the United States that a united Europe was a necessity. Our backing gave the multinational European leaders a firm political, military and economic base for their innovations. In short, world conditions—not only European conditions—were favorable for the exercise of a new leadership.

[5]H. W. Ehrmann, "The French Trade Associations and the Ratification of the Schuman Plan," *World Politics*, July 1954.

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Multinational Atlantic Leadership

Within Europe—"little Europe" at least—we can thus see the effects of an elite consensus. There were not only men such as Spaak, Adenauer, Monnet and Schuman to exercise broad political leadership, but large cadres of "secondary leadership" (to use a military analogy, the "field grade officers") who shared goals, orientations and the capacity for communication across borders with their counterparts.

To a considerably lesser extent, there has developed since 1945 a similar "Atlantic elite." For the first fifteen postwar years, its existence was perceptible among the upper reaches of political and military leadership; but the extraordinary conditions that produced a more or less common view of the world and called for extraordinary coalition measures have passed into history, and leading Americans, particularly, are not prepared by their culture to slip neatly and automatically into a permanent harness of teamwork in Europe. Only among the military officers of the Atlantic countries has a strong Atlantic-oriented elite group cohered, through consistent service in team enterprises. If we wish to strengthen transatlantic bonds, we must make certain that a new generation of leaders for the Atlantic community is being trained on both sides of our "inland sea."

Creating New Atlantic Leadership

It is the thesis of this paper that the times require a new kind of leader, in the economy, in the governments, in the military hierarchy and in the liberal professions of the countries of the West; that if he is well-educated for his times, he will necessarily be "Atlantic-oriented"; and that we can and should consciously set about training such persons.

How can this be done? One long-term answer is that the education systems of the Atlantic countries must be revised within the context of the larger reforms that education requires today in nearly every Western country. Educational reform has begun in the United States and Britain and in a few small European countries; it is lagging seriously in the major Continental nations. A decision to renovate Western education as a whole, and wholly, would automatically over a period of years produce the raw material for a new kind of leadership in our societies. But to rely solely on the reform of the formal education system to produce

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this change would be to put all one's eggs in the long-range basket and to neglect many important short-term measures. One must seek not only to affect future leadership, but also to deal with present elites.

All Atlantic governments, and most particularly that of the United States, should ask themselves this question: How can we reorient and retrain the cadres of leadership in all our countries so that we shall have at hand the human resources necessary to shape and to operate in concert a close-knit European-Atlantic system? It would be well for all private bodies that could play a role in such a transformation to interrogate themselves likewise.

Before we discuss concrete proposals, it might be useful, first, to examine a few of the programs that have worked well in the past and, second, to review the whole American cultural and educational effort, particularly in Europe. For the determination and effort of the United States will be, in this matter as in most other Atlantic matters, of paramount importance.

Successful Programs for Developing an Atlantic Elite

During the occupation of Germany and under the Marshall Plan, many of Europe's social institutions were subjected to fresh scrutiny and to constructive American influence. With more emphasis on the "two-way street" approach, this could be done again, broadening areas of contact and cooperation beyond the present narrow political, military and economic concerns of the experts, on the one hand, and the superficial experiences of tourists, on the other. If face-to-face contacts between leaders of the professions can be increased and sustained among the Atlantic countries, important changes in attitudes can be counted on to result in most cases, and these changes in turn will change institutions themselves.

One of the most fruitful instances of this sort of activity is the large number of Franco-German leadership meetings which have been held since 1950, with the aim of fostering a common approach to common concerns. This has provided what Alfred Grosser calls an "infra-structure" of Franco-German relations:

> Independent of the existence of governments favorable or unfavorable to good Franco-German relations, there exist today—in embassies, in ministries, in the leadership of unions and of political parties of both countries —men who have known each other for some fifteen years, who have acquired the habit of working together, and who, whatever the state of

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relations between the two countries, examine the same problems in the same manner.[6]

The same comments are perhaps even more true of relations between leading Germans and Americans in the postwar years.

If we wish to search for new ways to alter the structure and content of formal education, the College of Europe in Bruges and the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University are suggestive models. Both are graduate-level institutions. The College of Europe is a truly international school for teaching young Europeans the facts of life of the new Europe. While the Johns Hopkins Center in Italy is an American institution, its student body is half European and its faculty is international. Its curriculum, too, is concentrated on the integration process in Europe, with an important element of American studies added. Both can be said to foster new kinds of thinking among students and faculty; they are important experiments taking place outside the regular framework of higher education.

One of the professors at Bologna, J.-B. Duroselle, has this to say of the experience:

> The student does not return from Bologna culturally de-nationalized. He returns with the two-fold awareness of belonging to a common western civilization as well as to an original national culture. He acquires there, on the one hand, a more lively awareness of common values and, on the other, an enrichment of his own cultural values through contact with others.[7]

Experiences such as these have been the product of private as well as governmental effort. Institutions of learning, voluntary groups of many kinds, foundations, and farsighted, energetic individuals in several Atlantic countries have all made important contributions. In some cases, they have shown the way. Because the efforts of government—and especially the U.S. government—have been and are potentially so important in this field, the pages that follow are devoted largely to what government has done, has not done, and should do. It is clear, however, that private programs, too, are indispensable. Much that is proposed could be applied to nongovernmental efforts as well.

U.S. Government Cultural and Educational Programs in Europe

At the end of World War II, the Office of War Information

[6] "The New Europe: Roots of Discord," *The Johns Hopkins Magazine*, December 1964-January 1965, p. 30.
[7] "The Bologna Center: Proving Its Worth," *ibid.*, p. 48.

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suffered a drastic attrition; it was reconstituted when American leaders, faced with the realities of the Cold War, decided that an official information agency would be a long-term necessity. In 1947 Congress passed the Fulbright Act, providing that certain funds owed the United States by foreign countries would be used to finance two-way educational exchanges. In 1948 Public Law 402 (the Smith-Mundt Act) provided for still further cultural exchanges and for the creation of a psychological arm of U.S. diplomacy which since 1953 has borne the title of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Also, some functions authorized by the Smith-Mundt Act and subsequent legislation (notably the Hays-Fulbright Act of 1961) are performed by the Department of State and some by the U.S. Office of Education. For several years, appropriations for USIA have hovered near $150 million; for cultural exchanges, around $45 million.

In the early postwar years major parts of these budgets were spent on activities in Europe. Along with the Marshall Plan went a special information program to explain its purposes and progress to Europeans. Under the OEEC European Productivity Program, a massive exchange of trade unionists, economists, financial experts, educators and businessmen took place between the United States and Europe. In Germany and Austria, the United States sought, through the work of sizeable missions of specialists in every important field of endeavor and by means of unusually large movements of Germans and Austrians to America and to other European countries for tours of observation and study, to affect substantially established patterns of culture and to bring the former enemy country and Austria fully into the Western fold. In other European countries, too, U.S. Information Service establishments were engaged in extensive programs designed to "promote the better understanding of the United States" and to "increase mutual understanding" between America and the people of other countries, as the Smith-Mundt Act had put it. They were aided substantially by the credits that made possible the Fulbright academic exchanges.

These programs had a significant effect upon the American image in Europe and upon the general disposition of Europeans for Atlantic and intra-European cooperation. There is evidence that many of those who participated in exchange visits to the United States returned with wider horizons and attitudes; in a very real way, they were "internationalized."

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Since the programs began, there has been confusion as to purposes. In 1949 the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, a statutory body, stated that the effort was not "to 'Americanize' other nations" or "to make friends for the United States." But the Commission subscribed nevertheless to the concept of inculcating a "broader understanding of the character of American civilization, its . . . purposes, and attitudes toward other peoples."[8] When the Eisenhower Administration took office, a special Committee on International Information Activities set forth its statement of goals:

> The primary and overriding purpose of the information program should be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their own aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace are supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the United States.[9]

The Kennedy Administration brought still another change:

> The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.[10]

During the formative years of the OEEC and NATO, an additional policy was pursued alongside these straightforward efforts to make the United States better understood in Europe: our representatives there attempted to foster the development of European integration and Atlantic unity. Europeans with the vision of a new united Europe and a strong U.S.-European relationship were encouraged in various ways to promote their ideas. This encouragement is much less substantial today.

In the late 1950's, the process of decolonization was accelerated and the number of new nations that required American embassies, aid missions and USIS components increased rapidly. But overall funds for information and educational exchange activities were not increased proportionately by Congress. A recent report of the Institute of International Education tells the story:

> Exchange administrators in the Department of State have been told explicitly by budget-minded members of Congress that if they needed funds

[8]Charles A. Thomson and Walter H. C. Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 82-83.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 98.

[10]Directive issued by President John F. Kennedy, January 25, 1963.

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for expanding cultural and educational exchanges in Asia and Africa they would have to spend less in Europe. . . .[11]

As of 1961, the European posts of the U.S. Information Service (which administers U.S. cultural and educational programs as well as information activities) had lost one-third of their American staffs, and nearly two-fifths of their local employees. The share of USIA funds expended in Western Europe had declined from about 20 per cent to less than 13 per cent.[12] This process has since been accelerated. To illustrate the attrition in a single European country, let us take France, which today seems to offer the greatest political difficulties for American policy in Europe. At one time there were seven U.S. cultural centers, located strategically in the French provinces. All have now been closed and in September 1965 even the U.S. Information Service Library in Paris shut its doors. Opportunities for Frenchmen to read American books, see and hear about the arts in America, and talk with knowledgeable Americans have been drastically reduced, if not eliminated. More significantly, official American contact with French leadership in important walks of life outside diplomacy has been emasculated. The same sequence of events can be recorded for every West European country; the American cultural "presence" is being systematically eliminated. And all this at a time when the need for communication between the European and American peoples is vital.

More statistics: In 1963, 7,923 European students matriculated at American colleges and universities, as compared with 7,800 in 1953. This increase is in reality a decline, for it does not match population growth during the ten-year period. Measured against the general increase in numbers of students from all parts of the world in the United States, the extent of the European decline appears in its true magnitude: In 1953, Europeans made up one-fourth of all foreign students in the United States; in 1963, only 12 per cent of the total.[13] Although private support for exchanges with Europe has increased slightly, government support has dropped materially. In 1950, 220 Fulbright grants were issued to French students; in 1963, only 130. Comparable figures for the United Kingdom are 175 in 1950, 83 in 1963. The combined flow

[11]Institute of International Education, *Educational Exchange in the Atlantic Area* (New York, 1965), p. 13.

[12]W. McNeill Lowry and Gertrude S. Hooker, "The Role of the Arts and the Humanities," in Robert Blum, editor, *Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 72.

[13]Institute of International Education, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.

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of government-sponsored students and scholars, to and from Europe, was more than 5,000 in 1953, 2,600 in 1962-1963.[14]

Exchanges of so-called opinion leaders have also been cut back. This gap has only partially been made up by the activities of a few citizens' groups and foundations, whose contributions have been considerable but not sufficient.

One reason for this decline in U.S. government programs is surely the attitude of those who control Congressional purse-strings. Implicit in their steady denial of adequate operating funds appear to be several faulty assumptions: (1) The Europeans are our allies and therefore need little more understanding of us; they are "committed." (2) The information, cultural and exchange programs were mounted in the days when Europe was economically prostrate; today she is unusually prosperous, therefore such programs are no longer required. (3) Government grants to American professors and others to teach or study in Europe are gifts rather than expenditures in the national interest. (4) In France, in particular, but in other places as well, anti-Americanism continues to flourish, despite such U.S. programs. This proves that the programs do no good, so why continue them?

But Congress is not solely to blame; the Executive Branch has been seriously at fault in permitting this situation to develop. Remiss are officials of the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, and other agencies dealing with foreign affairs, because they fail to make clear how urgently funds are needed and often assume that Congress "won't give us enough funds anyway," so why ask for enough. Further, they have not sought to develop a new rationale for cultural and educational programs in Europe, a rationale in keeping with the present situation on that continent, the present state of Atlantic affairs, and the long-range objectives of our Atlantic policies. By and large, programs in Europe are still cast in the mold of 1948 and the pattern of USIA operations is roughly the same in Europe as in every other part of the world: (1) In every embassy, there is a Public Affairs Officer, usually a Cultural Attaché and an Information Officer, with appropriate staffs. (2) These men operate libraries, produce pamphlets and administer other sorts of information-disseminating programs. They arrange for American artists to perform. They manage, sometimes indirectly, exchange of persons programs. (3) They seek primarily to explain U.S. policy to the indigenous

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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population and to give them sufficient background to understand the context within which that policy has taken shape. European integration and Atlantic partnership are still two important policies. (4) In Europe as elsewhere, while USIS officers often work with individuals and groups to put across their ideas, communication is largely "one-way." The most perceptive officers—and there are a number—are outstanding in their sensitivity to European peoples, cultures and problems, but their role is essentially that of explaining the United States and what it wants. The emphasis is heavily on projecting the United States.

The purpose here is not to suggest that such activities are unnecessary. They are important and might even be augmented considerably to good effect. But they are not enough. Present cultural, educational and information programs do little to close the serious gap in U.S. thinking about future ties with Europe. A new kind of perspective and approach is needed.

It should be evident that our relations with Europe and Canada today differ qualitatively from our ties with any other part of the world. The Atlantic system is an intricate, tightening web of interdependence whose vitality is of the gravest significance to this country.

Consider for a moment the present organization of the Office of Atlantic Affairs, in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State. Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs, there are two principal components: an office of Atlantic Political/Military Affairs and an office of Atlantic Political/Economic Affairs, both indicating the essentially "political" nature of American interests in Europe. The latter deals with such matters as the OECD, the Common Market, trade and monetary policies toward Europe, and European integration. The former concentrates on security matters affecting ourselves and the Europeans—which means primarily NATO. These offices and their subdivisions consider numerous projects in which our country is engaged in concert with the Europeans: the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, where many common plans for aid to the "third world" are worked out; scientific cooperation with the European Space Research Organization; financing and organization of Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force, a "fire department" to be used in event of trouble at NATO's extreme anchor points. In the Office of Atlantic Affairs are concentrated the raw materials, the hopes, the intentions of

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our government with respect to any further building of the Atlantic system. Other government agencies are involved, but it is the Department of State, and this office in the Department of State, which is primarily responsible.[15]

In the military sphere, the web of interdependence is particularly strong and complex. There is a common command at SHAPE and subordinate commands, manned by officers who owe their first loyalty to NATO rather than to their individual nations; an internationally owned and operated system of pipelines, airfields and other logistical installations; a common "war college"—the NATO Defense College—for officers of member countries. There are multinational air forces. As our economy becomes interlocked with Europe's, our businessmen and bankers are similarly committed in Europe. These and related matters are dealt with in the European Bureau.

However, no one office in the Department of State, in any other government agency, in any other Atlantic government, or in any international institution is concerned with the problem of *human resources for the Atlantic Community, present and future.* The fact that there is no such office betrays the nonexistence of policies or even serious thinking on this matter.

Translated into terms of organization (for it is usually by this means that we Americans come to grips with any major problem in international affairs), the goal of adequate leadership resources for the Atlantic Community might be met by creating, alongside the offices of Atlantic Political/Military and Political/Economic Affairs, an office of Atlantic Political/Manpower Affairs. Such an office would pull together the numerous threads of program and policy within the U.S. government that bear on the question of human resources. It would undoubtedly require also an interagency committee of some sort, involving USIA, the U.S. Office of Education and other agencies. The need is for reorganization with a new focus.

Recommendations

New Concepts and New Tools

Our government has sought to approach the human factor in

[15]In the Department of State a Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is, to a limited extent, concerned with the operational elements suggested by this paper. But it has no *policy* counterpart in the European Bureau, as do the economic or political-military functional components of the Department. Also, there are Undersecretaries of State for economic and political affairs, but none for educational and cultural matters.

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international politics in numerous ways: through the struggle to define the goals of our official information agency; the continuing debate over the purposes of the educational exchange program; the recent concern for educated manpower resources in developing nations; the unending discussion of "psychological warfare" and other rubrics to cover our concern for men's minds in the context of a global struggle. Yet, we have achieved little success. Perhaps part of the trouble has been a failure to recognize differences among various parts of the world. We suggest that, with respect to the Atlantic Community, the "human factor" be viewed from an entirely new perspective:

(1) We should be much more concerned with changing the "minds"—the attitudes—of Europeans than with changing their opinions.

(2) We should be equally concerned with the attitudes toward Atlantic affairs of our own people, and the Canadians.

(3) We should lay primary emphasis on the development of leadership —in every important field of human endeavor, in every country of the Atlantic area, at every important level of power or influence.[16]

(4) Far from trying to implant particular doctrines with respect to the future of the Atlantic area, we should strive simply to bring home, through various kinds of imaginative education, the essential long-term interdependence of the area as it relates to traditions and history, values and goals, interests and responsibilities.

(5) Our major effort should be aimed at improving the capacity of elites to work effectively in joint enterprises with their counterparts from other countries.

(6) Programs established to pursue these goals should be *multinational* in character, insofar as possible. Thus the very framework of organization will contribute to the ends. To seek multinational ends primarily through national means is a contradictory and probably self-defeating effort.

Apropos of the fifth point, a military figure who once held a position of considerable importance in the Atlantic world told the writer, "We Americans *talk* to the Europeans, but we don't *communicate*." And so it is when Canadians or Europeans try to communicate with us. Our schools, homes and communities turn out self-contained Americans, or Frenchmen, or Englishmen, nearly all of whom, including those who grow into positions of leadership, are essentially one-culture-oriented. Men who are

[16]What some social scientists term "the politically relevant strata."

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effective in more than one culture are rare, and usually the product of a bicultural marriage, bicultural schooling, some fairly long sojourn in another land at a tender age, or a combination of these. The factors that produce such men are subtle and elusive, yet they could be isolated and—if we chose—even reproduced. The new kind of cosmopolitan leader which the times require should be the product of multicultural educational experiences calculated to engender an empathy and a responsiveness toward cultures other than his own and a capacity for engaging in international endeavors. This set of attitudes is much more important than the acquisition of particular theories about economic, historical, strategic or political interdependence. We cannot successfully build new institutions, arching over national boundaries, unless we have new men whose minds and psyches are entirely at home in several different environments.

Policies

Despite our admonition to conceive this effort in international terms, United States initiative is nevertheless required. We must first ourselves think through goals, policies and programs before we can discuss them or plan meaningfully with our European and Canadian partners. Here are some suggested guidelines for policy:

(1) Every U.S. government agency that can make a contribution to developing Atlantic leadership resources should be brought into the effort.

(2) Every existing U.S. cultural, educational or information program in Europe that can feasibly be multilateralized should be, over a period of a few years. The object should be to conduct all such programs *with* the Europeans, not *at* them.[17]

(3) While the idea of "mutual understanding," which has underlain every piece of Congressional legislation in this field since 1938, is still valid for Europe, it is far too imprecise. *The principal object should be the development of adequate resources of internationally-minded leadership for the whole Atlantic area.*

(4) Accepted U.S. concepts of educational exchange should be revised to insure that "Atlantic" leaders or potential leaders, once identified, will have the opportunity to visit abroad not once but many times over

[17]The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 authorizes the President to enter into agreements with foreign governments and international organizations and, if he desires, to establish multinational educational and cultural foundations and commissions to cover all aspects of educational and cultural relations, not merely the kind of exchanges included in the limited Fulbright agreements of the past. The International Education Bill sent to Congress by the President in February 1966 will, if passed, greatly enlarge the scope for such initiatives and programs.

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the years in order to cultivate firm ties with their counterparts in other countries. The social sinews of a strong Atlantic community will be nourished by this kind of carefully-planned, continual cultural interpenetration.

(5) Because American ignorance, prejudices and sense of cultural superiority impede the development of an Atlantic community fully as much as do the psychological impedimenta of the Europeans, any effective program should seek to involve American leadership with Europeans on the basis of full equality and reciprocity.

(6) Private agencies equipped to assist in this effort should be encouraged and helped by government in every appropriate way.

(7) Government operations should reflect a conviction that educational and cultural affairs are equal in importance to political, military and economic affairs as a means of achieving the long-range goals of American foreign policy.

Translating Policy into Programs

To present proposals for specific programs is the task of the several government agencies which are, or ought to be, deeply involved. By way of illustration, however, a few actions which might be undertaken—especially if Congress passes the new International Education Act—are set forth below:

(1) The government should seek systematically to develop and support genuine international schools and universities that could offer training for Atlantic leadership. Two examples are the College of Europe in Bruges and the new Atlantic College in Wales. Other institutions, such as the proposed "M.I.T. for the Atlantic," should be encouraged and assisted, even though this might require new legislation. The international programs of U.S. colleges and universities, especially those in Europe, should be given more encouragement and guidance than at present, especially at the graduate level. European universities should be encouraged to set up "campuses" in the United States.

(2) The effort now underway to revitalize studies of the modern West in U.S. institutions of higher education should be supported with government funds. Ways should be sought to encourage European governments to do likewise. A firm connection between American Studies and European Studies should be established in the form of Atlantic Studies.

(3) Much greater sums should be invested in transatlantic exchange of students and scholars; at least a 200 per cent increase in Fulbright grants between the United States and Europe is in order. Also, the U.S. government currently gives almost no support to the exchange of selected secondary school students, despite considerable evidence that this is one of the most effective means of awakening lasting attitudes conducive to

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internationalism. At age 16 to 18, the well-balanced, intelligent youngster is capable of forming emotional attachments for countries other than his own that can form the basis for a truly international outlook; he is more malleable than the average college student or mature adult.

(4) The flow of "leader exchanges" among the Atlantic countries should be greatly increased. Present U.S. leader programs should be reconstituted to provide for: selection of participants on the basis of demonstrated leadership in the socially-significant professions, as well as evidence of general interest in the large questions of public and international policy; travel in international teams; and visits to the participating countries comprising (a) individual study of relevant professional practice, (b) seminar-type meetings with indigenous professionals from the same field, and (c) conferences with host-country nationals on foreign affairs, dealing especially with Atlantic developments and problems.

(5) Secluded residential facilities should be set aside throughout the Atlantic area for the long-range program of leader-seminars. The United States might take the lead by organizing an Atlantic conference center in or near its capital, programming foreign leader-grantees in groups that could meet with American counterparts to discuss common professional concerns and Atlantic affairs, and inviting other governments to do likewise. In the Washington area, for example, a facility such as Airlie House might serve this purpose, or a distinct "Atlantic House" might be set up in the city. Locations in other parts of the country might serve part-time: a new center for international education is being established at the University of New Hampshire; the Aspen, Colorado, center might point some of its activities in this direction; the Johnson Foundation center in Racine, Wisconsin, might participate. There are many potentially useful facilities in Europe.

(6) The U.S. government should set about training its key civil servants to understand and deal knowledgeably with Atlantic affairs. Only in the State Department, where a certain number of "Atlantic Affairs Specialists" are being trained, has a real effort been so directed. There are few men in government agencies intimately involved in Atlantic relations who possess an adequate understanding of the historical, economic, political, military and philosophical bases of the Atlantic relationship. This may be a fundamental reason why so little is being accomplished to advance Atlantic ties.

(7) The transformation in our cultural and educational programs suggested here would require leaving key cultural representatives at their European posts for periods of eight to ten years or more. The practice has been to transfer Foreign Service Officers frequently, ostensibly to prevent them from becoming personally attached to the host-country's interests. This reasoning may be valid as concerns officers who represent U.S. political and economic interests, but it appears highly questionable when applied to those such as Cultural Attachés who are expected to forge abiding intellectual, educational and cultural ties between this

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country and its European partners. A certain amount of *depaysation* is not harmful; it could stimulate the development of Atlantic perspectives among these officials, who should form part of the desired international elite. Such long tours might be interrupted by periods of duty and training in the United States.

(8) Primary responsibility for this new approach and for the programs that flow from it should be centered in one place in the U.S. government, probably the Office of Atlantic Affairs in the Department of State, or in the White House. Other countries should be encouraged to center responsibility and authority in like manner. An effort should be made, probably through OECD, to work out an "educated manpower resources" strategy for the Atlantic Community. A special group should devote itself to the reform of education in the West. NATO has its basic strategic document, "MC-70"; why not a similar educational plan to provide us with the trained leadership our common interests and institutions will require in future years?

This is only an initial penetration of a most complex subject. It is hoped that others will contribute to a clarification of our educational and cultural objectives in Europe and to the elaboration of a theory of "Atlantic leadership." A first step might be to establish a commission of knowledgeable U.S. citizens and civil servants (perhaps the commission's membership should be entirely private, nongovernmental) to inquire into the problem of developing Atlantic leadership and to prescribe the necessary measures. It might invite Europeans and Canadians to join in its deliberations. The commission should consider policies and programs for government, but it should also deal with the vast opportunities for greater private endeavor.

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A DESIGN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM*

by Slavko N. Bjelajac

THE war in South Vietnam has both internal and external aspects. Government and allied forces must combat not only a domestic communist revolution instigated and supported from outside, but aggression by the infiltrated armed forces of North Vietnam as well. The war is also civil in nature as it involves the country at large in conflict with a small, communist-led, belligerent minority. The result is a uniquely complicated war; it requires an unorthodox politico-military strategy to cope with it.

A still more complicated situation may be visualized should Hanoi escalate the conflict by opening a conventional front against South Vietnam along the 17th Parallel. While this is a remote possibility, its development would intensify the internal struggle, for even the smallest success on the part of Hanoi's armed forces would boost the morale of the Viet Cong and spur the insurgents to increased aggression and violence.

The war is also characterized by different phases and rapidly changing military and politico-psychological situations, so that the South Vietnamese require a flexible organizational structure capable of adjusting to the needs of the developing conflict.

In this type of warfare, where one of the main objectives is to win support from the masses, psychological operations are of paramount importance. This article will discuss some basic factors which should be taken into consideration in determining the concept for the government's psychological operations and the design of a flexible organization to carry them out in the most effective manner.

Viet Cong Penetration of the Masses

It was reported by the press at the end of 1965 that the Viet Cong's political and propaganda (*Agitprop*) forces had increased from 30,000 or 40,000 to 50,000. Thus it may be assumed that the

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official views of the U.S. Department of the Army or government.

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Viet Cong now disposes a ratio of one propaganda and political cadreman for every two of its 80,000 or more hard-core guerrillas. Or, the Viet Cong has one of these cadremen for every five of its 200,000 hard-core and part-time guerrillas counted together. But this estimate should not stop here, since it is well known that every communist underground organization in South Vietnam, even its smallest cell, has its own political and propaganda unit. Considering the size of the underground needed to support the Viet Cong guerrilla effort, it would not be an exaggeration to assume that the number of political and propaganda cadremen is triple or quadruple that reported.[1] In addition, every regiment of infiltrated North Vietnamese regulars has its own *Agitprop* organization and a number of so-called Special Mission Platoons with the responsibility of political indoctrination and keeping troop morale high; they function also as a reinforcement of the local *Agitprops* in their areas of operation.

The underground forms the indispensable base for supporting the revolutionary movement. It has its *Agitprops,* political activists, intelligence, saboteur and other type cadres, and is often referred to as the invisible part of a revolutionary structure.[2] The primary mission of *Agitprop* and activist cadres is to maintain personal contact, if possible, with each individual in their area of responsibility for purposes of political indoctrination. Their success is measured in terms of how many people they control in support of the revolutionary movement, or how many additional people they are able to enroll in the Viet Cong structure. Their efforts have resulted in Viet Cong agents distributing, even selling, communist newspapers, magazines and other propaganda material on the streets of Vietnam under the noses of Vietnamese authorities and in the vicinity of U.S. compounds and installations.

The reason for their success is that Viet Cong underground organizations were left for too long inadequately challenged or not challenged at all. They were sometimes ignored in the country's preoccupation with guerrillas, who were considered the principal enemy. In some districts, the Viet Cong operated in an exclusive propaganda arena; through distorted interpretations of government and U.S. actions and through communist indoctrina-

[1]The Viet Cong underground is known to be exceptionally well organized since 1960. It controls, among others, six major civil mass associations: the Liberation Farmers' Association, Liberation Workers' Association, Liberation Women's Association, Liberation Youth Association, High School and University Liberation Student Organization, and South Vietnam Vanguard Youth.

[2]See Bjelajac, "Principles of Counterinsurgency," ORBIS, Fall 1964, pp. 662-664.

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tion it was able to deceive and manipulate the people's minds at will. This was possible mainly because the government did not realize the importance of securing the means of communication with its people in the countryside—by radio, printed materials, messengers, personal contacts—and because subversive political activities were not countered. Further, in districts controlled by guerrillas through terror tactics it was difficult to reach the masses by conventional means. Such a combination of circumstances left the Viet Cong free to capture and retain large audiences and to establish a virtual monopoly of influence over them.

Wherever the Viet Cong controlled communications, the South Vietnamese masses had only two alternatives: to be misinformed or to remain uninformed. But in these areas even the second alternative was soon removed; there was almost no escape from being forcibly indoctrinated and molded into an obedient servant. This process could be resisted only by those who possessed the necessary inner strength and mental capability, or it could be avoided by those who managed to flee to government-controlled territory.

The Viet Cong will retain this monopoly of communication with the ability to shape the minds of the people, unless the South Vietnamese government can break it with psychological operations of its own. The following discussion contains suggestions that may find application in such a program.[3]

Concept for a Government Program

A dynamic government program of psychological operations must be flexible enough to meet the changing needs of the different phases of the conflict, and it must be integrated into the overall effort of bringing guerrilla warfare to an end. Its task is to influence the population, underground organizations, guerrillas and regular enemy forces. It must be prepared to play an even more decisive role in the period of post-guerrilla warfare, when the principal antagonist may be the Viet Cong underground, a force more difficult to root out than the guerrillas. The Viet Cong fights today with less and less hope for success against the well-equipped Vietnamese, U.S. and allied forces. When the bulk of the hard-core guerrillas and the regular forces from North Vietnam can no longer operate with advantage, the Viet Cong

[3]See the author's "Vietnam: Problem and Solution," *World Affairs*, Volume 128, No. 2 (July, August, September 1965), for a discussion of other closely related aspects of the problem.

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will surely go underground to avoid losses and save the remnants of its forces from total destruction. It may be safely assumed that its difficulties will come from a combination of the following: lack of the military supplies essential for pitched battles of a set-piece type against amply equipped forces with superior weapons; lack of adequate civilian support; and mounting casualties with the increasingly difficult problem of replacement. The Viet Cong may also switch to an underground strategy in the hope that this will increase effectiveness and boost morale, thus halting the erosion of its existing undergrounds which is already in process because of the lack of significant successes and decreasing support by the people. Revolutionary movements in history have resorted to this strategy whenever they were in trouble and sought a means for survival. Undergrounds are to guerrillas, and to a revolutionary movement in general, as roots are to a plant. A destroyed plant may grow again if the roots are preserved and the soil is maintained fertile. That is most probably what the Viet Cong leadership hopes for and what the government of South Vietnam must expect if the roots of this poisonous plant are left undestroyed.

Once the Viet Cong is obliged to change its strategy or finds a change more expedient and profitable, the emphasis will be shifted from guerrilla warfare to underground operations. Understandably, for reasons of prestige, psychological effect and practical military purposes, the Viet Cong will leave small dispersed guerrilla bands to fight classical guerrilla warfare wherever and whenever possible. Such actions will harass counterinsurgency forces, engage them in often futile guerrilla-chasing, and also force them to maintain static garrisons for the protection of lines of communications and vital military and civilian centers. Thus the role of these guerrilla bands will be to tie down as many counterinsurgency forces as possible, forcing them to disperse, to be constantly on the alert and to dissipate their resources. In case this happens, a government program must be designed to prevent the development of a Viet Cong underground "army" capable, through a coup at a critical moment, of overthrowing the provincial or Saigon government and installing communist rule over the country.

To control the communist organized and led urban masses will be a difficult and complicated problem. Because the Viet Cong already has trained underground cadres and efficient means of

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communication, the masses in the provincial capitals and in Saigon (the Viet Cong includes in the masses the student, labor and other "liberation front" groups) will be subject to manipulation by strong Viet Cong undergrounds.

How long the post-guerrilla phase may last or how many phases there may be in the future, no one can predict, but the Viet Cong has promised that it will fight until victory or total destruction, and its leadership obviously has in mind a long period of underground struggle.[4] The psychological pressure upon the people and the terrorist activities of the underground may in some instances increase; they will range from individual physical terror to the expanded use of psychological terror to subvert the masses and overthrow the government. The communists will create a political climate to encourage such Viet Cong activities. The patriotism of nationalistic elements will be exploited by the communist-controlled "liberation" fronts. Communists in foreign countries, including those in the United States, will do everything in their power to help the effort. The outcome will depend on the effectiveness of the government's political, psychological, educational, information and civic action programs in countering the Viet Cong strategy.

Rooting Out the Underground

In order to restore physical and psychological tranquility to the masses, the South Vietnam government will have to root out the underground. To accomplish this in the post-guerrilla warfare phases of the conflict, it will have to emphasize the role of the civilian rural and urban police. Since there will be fewer guerrillas to fight than before, those units of the armed forces not actively engaged may be used advantageously to augment police forces or in conjunction with police operations. Some military units could operate under the control of the police. Men from the regional and village militia, particularly, would require specialized police training to cope with the problem of exterminating the underground networks, and the police forces of the allies could give much-needed support to South Vietnam by assisting in this training and in police operations generally. The feasibility of revamping the anti-guerrilla structure of the military

[4]Ho Chi Minh is reported to have said to the British journalist Felix Greene that the Vietnamese people are determined to fight U.S. "aggression" for "10 to 20 years or longer." See "Ho Talks of Fighting Long War," *Washington Post*, December 10, 1965.

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by converting some paramilitary and military personnel into policemen and using some military units for, or in conjunction with, police work should be studied carefully now by Saigon and the provincial governments. The United States and other allies may have to contribute heavily to this program.

Target: The People

According to communist philosophy and teachings any war must be converted into a politico-revolutionary war from which the communist party and the cause of communism will profit. In recent history there have been no wars—conventional or unconventional—that the communists have not tried to utilize for their objectives. World War II was fully exploited for that purpose. Communist regimes were installed in several countries and the communist empire enlarged. In all cases the primary target was the people themselves, through whom communist parties hoped to—and in many cases did—achieve their goals. Everything possible was used to reach men's hearts and minds. This is the case in South Vietnam today. But in Vietnam both antagonists, not only the communists, realize the significance of the target and are struggling to win the masses to their side.

The masses are the target no matter where they are found or whom they support. The only question is the degree of effort that has to be directed toward influencing one group or another. Friendly groups may need only correct information to counter enemy propaganda, and encouragement or protection in order to keep them active or passive on the side of the government. Indifferent and hostile groups may need more intensive informational and re-educational programs to convince them to change their minds and hearts and join in resisting the Viet Cong. The whole spectrum of political and religious beliefs, of professions and occupations, of sexes and ages, of friendly, indifferent and hostile groups must be considered. Thus the target in South Vietnam is some fourteen million people, including the tribal and minority groups, the infiltrators from North Vietnam, even their Chinese "instructors."

This is a widespread and complex target in a country known for its range of religious, ethnic, economic, cultural and political groupings. All these peculiarities that characterize South Vietnam's society and the present conflict suggest the size and form of the psychological operations effort needed to tranquilize the

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country and enable it to cope with current and future developments. Add the target in North Vietnam—a problem that deserves special attention and treatment beyond the scope of the present discussion—and it would indeed be hard to find a more complicated situation for psychological targeting.

Furthermore, the U.S. and allied troops in South Vietnam come into the target category in view of their need for constant information and orientation to protect them from enemy propaganda harassment. These troops should also have their own organic psychological operations capability so that they can deal with local problems encountered in their operational areas. Such a capability proved extremely helpful to German army divisions in World War II, particularly the Panzer divisions.

Reaching the Target

The target cannot be reached effectively if it has no way of receiving official communications except by word of mouth, although this method, too, is desirable and will be discussed later. A communication receiving capability is particularly needed in the case of South Vietnamese groups living in remote and Viet Cong-controlled areas. Such groups should be supplied with radios, pre-tuned to receive only government broadcasts which will remain on the air day and night. This should be done in addition to supplying them with leaflets, literature and other graphic materials. Personal contacts may be the most effective means of communication in any primitive society where the villagers may be influenced only by messages received from their chief, religious leaders or trusted friends. It is important that Saigon, by all these means, report to the people, and without delay, on all events and explain to them the views, policies, intentions and measures undertaken by the government in their behalf. The government should spare no effort to inform the people and counter at every step Viet Cong propaganda and activities aimed at producing psychological effects favorable to the enemy.

Two principles emerge for the government's program of psychological operations: an uninterrupted, day and night, communication with the people so as to leave no vacuum in terms of time and substance; and prompt reaction to Viet Cong propaganda and any kind of psychological pressure and terror.

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Sampling

A special method of sampling the attitude and response of the people, suitable for the situation in South Vietnam, would be extremely useful. Without corrective, continual and representative sampling it will be difficult to measure the effects of the government program and to keep the propaganda effort from going astray.

Corrective sampling must apply basic research methods of the natural sciences and check them against all other relevant findings, as, for example, findings from the interrogation of deserters and prisoners of war. It is especially needed to evaluate developments in the provinces, where population groups have no representation and no chance of expressing their feelings and desires, and thus find themselves subject to Viet Cong control or exposed to its physical and psychological pressure and terror.

"Exfiltration" of known, respected individuals from Viet Cong-dominated areas would also be useful, so that the government could explain to them the role of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, the improvements in living conditions made by the Vietnamese and U.S. troops, and the plans for the future development of the country. Then these persons and their statements should be used for information and propaganda purposes; their revelation to the public of Viet Cong lies would be valuable.

Word-of-mouth Propaganda

In order to expand the influence of the government over more and more people a "word-of-mouth information and propaganda system" must be developed. As a first step, this can be created by instructing those who listen to the government broadcasts to pass on the news immediately to their neighbors. These citizens could also be instructed to organize, where needed, a communication network of the "underground railroad" type, using messengers who would carry the content of broadcasts to remote and Viet Cong-controlled areas, as far as they could penetrate. The second stage in developing such a system would come after selected citizens, spread throughout the country, had been given needed training and equipment. These strategically located leaders, working with a number of assistants, would then be able to organize channels and relays leading to all groups of people including those in the isolated hamlets. Unpaid civilians would have to do the bulk of work.

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A word-of-mouth communications and propaganda program requires not only organization and control but must be intensive, repetitious and capable of correcting news as necessary. If well organized, it may become the government's most effective informational and propaganda mechanism, particularly as it affects areas controlled by the Viet Cong and those where the people believe primarily in their friends and local religious or tribal leaders.

There is some risk involved with a word-of-mouth information and propaganda system. Released news or messages may backfire if there is no provision for a check-mechanism to detect and prevent distortion. This could be exploited by the communists, particularly in areas in which they have well-trained underground *Agitprops* capable of misdirecting, perverting, distorting and misusing the news.

Guidelines for the Propaganda Message

It is essential that the Government of South Vietnam make its broadcasts, and any other type of propaganda, of direct concern to the target audience. The content must have great appeal and the people must believe that it is of major consequence to them. It must also satisfy some of their urgent nonmaterial needs, especially those ignored by Hanoi and the Viet Cong or impossible of satisfaction by the communists. In order for the broadcasts to have real effect they must establish rapport with the people, so that the audience can identify its needs, feelings, sentiments, desires and interests with the communicator. The way the message is delivered and the tone of voice are equally as important as its content and form.

The program should include broadcasts in which the government can discuss, explain and put into proper perspective facts that the communists are trying to disprove, distort or suppress; broadcasts that will relieve the people's despair by giving them hope; messages that will make them feel that they are not left alone or abandoned, but are a part of the government, which has their interests at heart; and assertions that will make them look toward the future with confidence. The people must be flattered too, when needed, by giving them credit for government successes in their areas.

This need-satisfying relationship between the people and the government must be carefully assessed. What the particular needs may be, and how they will be treated, must be determined on the spot. But certain general guidelines may be suggested here:

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(1) Give the people moral support so that they will muster hope, courage and strength to resist the Viet Cong.

(2) Establish confidence in the rightness of their cause against the Viet Cong and against the international communist movement which aims at robbing them of their freedom.

(3) Reinforce or establish their belief in the values of freedom and of their own and the Free World's institutions.

(4) Inform them about current events in Vietnam and Southeast Asia; about the war effort, civic actions, and generally about the government's plans and intentions, so that they will feel themselves to be a part of the government and of the common struggle.

(5) Reveal to them the manipulation of facts and news—through tendentious commenting, distortion and lies—by Hanoi, Communist China, the Viet Cong and foreign communist propagandists.

(6) Explain not only the Sino-Soviet dispute but also China's aggression against India, enslavement of Tibet, and subversive work in Africa and Latin America. This may be of particular interest to the intellectuals whose opinions should be a major target. Every move by China and the USSR in regard to their mutual disagreement should be interpreted and publicized, making clear that their quarrel is not so much due to ideological differences as it is the result of fighting for spheres of influence and national interests, since both parties would like to dominate the world. Peking's intransigence in international affairs, recklessness in its approach to East-West relations, warmongering, aggressiveness, extremism in methods, and ultimate political goals should be made known.

(7) Warn the people of South Vietnam constantly about what to expect in case of a Viet Cong victory. They should know what has happened in other countries which have fallen prey to the communists, including the European satellites, and about the miseries the people suffer under communist regimes. The Berlin Wall should be an object lesson.

(8) Give the Vietnamese credit for their suffering under the Viet Cong and for their sacrifices and struggle to preserve freedom. The government in Saigon and in the provinces must let the people know that the counterinsurgency effort is a common matter involving both them and their government.

(9) Explain the presence of U.S. troops, especially since the buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam is branded by the communists as U.S. aggression, oppression and plunder—a piece of propaganda that may have great appeal to misinformed South Vietnamese nationalists. It must be stressed that the United States dislikes having to send troops to a foreign country even if so requested by that country, and that the presence of U.S. forces in South Vietnam is temporary, only to help friends in need. They are there to help because the United States knows that a military victory is necessary to enable the people of South Vietnam to pursue freely their ideological and religious beliefs and to solve their problems by themselves in an atmosphere of calm and peace without pressures from the Viet Cong.

Other topics which should be considered: (1) The United States is interested in the Vietnam nation as a whole, in her

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citizens in the smallest villages and hamlets as well as in cities and towns, and not only in the central government and the military forces. (2) The United States considers the people of Vietnam as equals and first-class partners, and believes that Vietnam is a country whose preservation is important to civilization, freedom and democracy. (3) The United States is an anti-colonialist power and opposes any form of colonialism, whether capitalist or communist, in South Vietnam.

Also, the reasons why the United States supported France in the Indochina War must be explained to the peoples of Southeast Asia, and the sooner the better, because distortions of the U.S. role are exploited by the communists. The strongest Viet Cong cards are charges of U.S. neo-colonialism and imperialism. One must not forget that even the staunchest anti-communist in South Vietnam considers the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu a national victory and thinks that victory was achieved under the leadership of the communist party.

Distribution of Printed Material

The saturation of an area with pamphlets, magazines, leaflets and other graphic materials is required to supplement radio propaganda. These visual means make a more lasting impression than broadcasts and do a more thorough job in correcting and refuting enemy propaganda. But saturation does not mean simply scattering printed material from the air. Wherever possible, a distribution system must be set up in order to deliver messages directly to individuals or to their homes.

Broadcasts as Instructional Vehicle

In Vietnam the people can be instructed openly by radio broadcasts how to counter enemy propaganda and how to avoid Viet Cong psychological pressure and terror. This instruction will have a twofold effect: it will give the public needed knowledge, and it will hurt the enemy for he will have to deal with a better informed and less gullible public.

Indoctrination by radio may also include advice on how to behave when approached by Viet Cong agents, *Agitprops*, political officers, terrorists, saboteurs, tax and food collectors, members of the underground and others who do the Viet Cong's work. The population can be taught how to wage a "slow down" campaign, how to avoid recruiting and forced labor duties, how to minimize

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or sabotage Viet Cong orders and how to undermine communist discipline. Enemy personnel, if they have radios, can be advised how to surrender, desert, and create dissension within Viet Cong ranks.

Conclusions

The uniquely complicated war in South Vietnam requires a special psychological operations organization capable of carrying out diversified tasks, and flexible enough to respond instantly to changes in current situations and to future phases of the war.

After the main guerrilla warfare phase is over, the Viet Cong leadership, able to call upon well-trained psychological operations cadres, will switch to an underground strategy, with small guerrilla bands continuing to fight classical guerrilla warfare. There may be several phases of merciless and dangerous underground war with the employment of all aspects of individual and mass physical and psychological terror, as well as use of riots, strikes and political pressures against the government in Saigon and its allies.

The Viet Cong will almost certainly continue fighting for years to come; thus, the South Vietnam government and its allies must be prepared for a long post-guerrilla warfare struggle, which may be very complicated and difficult, politically, psychologically and logistically.

In the post-guerrilla phases, rooting out of Viet Cong undergrounds from Saigon and other cities and towns of Vietnam may be relatively more important than fighting the remnants of guerrilla bands in the jungles, no matter how disturbing and disruptive these bands may be.

The principal target of the Viet Cong undergrounds will remain the people, and the undergrounds may continue to hold their grip on the masses by use of "liberation" front organizations and by employment of other communist tactics.

The government of South Vietnam must create a strong police force capable, in combination with military and paramilitary forces, of suppressing the Viet Cong undergrounds and preventing them from raising an "underground army" which could seize the government at a critical moment by creating chaos and manipulating the psychology of the masses.

Psychological operations are indispensable in this type of war and should be accorded a priority at least equal to that given any other weapon or technique in the Vietnamese protracted conflict.

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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

by William R. Kintner

"IN my judgment," stated Senator Robert F. Kennedy, "the question of nuclear proliferation—and of the mounting threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons—is the most vital issue now facing our nation and the world."[1]

The issue is indeed important and complex. Whether it is the most vital one facing the world is debatable. Mark Twain, when told that his obituary had appeared in the morning paper, observed that the rumor about his death had been greatly exaggerated. So, too, may be the fear of apocalyptic consequences should the nuclear powers fail to agree on a nonproliferation treaty.

I

During the course of the past year, the United States has pressed with increasing urgency for an agreement prohibiting the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The world may be a more dangerous place in which to live if more nations acquire nuclear weapons. Hence, the United States is trying to limit membership in the nuclear club to the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Communist China. No one, however, has been able to demonstrate how the signing of a nonproliferation agreement will guarantee that the nuclear club will remain at its present membership. At the same time, all agree that an inescapable result of its signing would be the further weakening, if not destruction, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has been regarded until recently as the bulwark of United States security.

President Johnson, in his annual report to Congress on the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (February 1966), asserted that nuclear weapons were within the technical grasp of a growing number of nations and that there were mounting political pressures in these nations to develop the weapons.

[1]Quoted from Senator Kennedy's Foreword to Walter C. Clemens, Jr., editor, *Toward a Strategy of Peace* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. xiv.

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In a letter transmitting the report, the President said: "We are approaching a critical period in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Many countries now have the resources, the technical ability and scientific manpower needed to build nuclear weapons systems." For this reason, the President committed the nation "to the task of persuading the nonnuclear countries that it is neither in the interests of their security, nor of world peace, to develop nuclear weapons."

The other side of the coin is to get the existing nuclear powers to agree on a treaty that would prevent them from helping any nation to acquire nuclear weapons. The President said that he had instructed the American negotiators at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva "to walk the extra mile necessary to insure that the weapons of war submit to man's need for peace."

In August 1965 the United States presented a short draft treaty to the Geneva Conference. Its principal articles placed separate obligations on nuclear and nonnuclear powers, to wit:

> Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes . . . not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons [and] not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
>
> Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons . . . not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons [and] not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance.

Finally, Article III stated that "Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities."

France and Communist China, both nuclear powers, are conspicuously absent from the Geneva Conference. The other two nuclear powers participating in the Geneva talks, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, did not submit formal draft nonproliferation treaties to the conference. Lord Chalfont, the British delegate, generally supported the U.S. draft. He observed, however, that the language of Articles I and II left open one possibility which Britain would prefer to see closed. He referred to the injunction against any "increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear

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weapons." This wording was deliberately selected by the United States because the Johnson Administration wished to keep open the option of creating a joint European nuclear deterrent. The United States representative, William C. Foster, on August 31, 1965, addressed the conference as follows:

> The treaty would not . . . preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements—such as a multilateral force within NATO—so long as such arrangements would not constitute an additional organization or entity having the power to use nuclear weapons independently of the participating nations presently possessing nuclear weapons.

Aware that the Soviets are unalterably opposed to any arrangement which would include the Federal German Republic, Foster advised Ambassador Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate to the conference:

> The NATO countries will not permit the question of their collective nuclear defense arrangements to become the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. They will, however, make a commitment to the Soviet Union that, because any defense arrangements adopted will be entirely consistent with the terms of the U.S. draft treaty if it goes into force, these arrangements will not constitute therefore nuclear proliferation.

II

If a poll were taken among the five existing members of the nuclear club concerning their willingness to sign an anti-proliferation treaty, these results would possibly emerge: the United Kingdom, emphatically *yes;* the United States, *yes,* with somewhat less enthusiasm; the Soviet Union, a conditional *no;* France, *no;* and Communist China, emphatically *no.*

American and British advocates of the treaty assume that the Soviet Union has or ought to have just as much interest in signing such a treaty as the two long-standing Western members of the nuclear club. Supposedly, we share with the Soviet Union a common fear of nuclear war which transcends every divisive issue. There is no hard evidence, however, that the Soviet Union is ready to abandon its bid to sometime, somehow, gain military supremacy over the West. Soviet investment in military forces, particularly strategic nuclear forces, is greater than it has ever been. While the United States cuts back its production of fissionable material the Soviet Union increases production. The Kremlin does not need a treaty to keep it from giving either nuclear information or weapons to other nations. It has not evinced any desire to do this anyway. The Soviets believe they stand to reap

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political benefits through continuing discussions of a treaty and would regard it a real bonanza if agreement were reached on one drawn to their specifications. The Soviets are exploiting two factors: the widespread desire in the West, particularly in Great Britain and the United States, for a nonproliferation agreement, and the divergent political interests among the Western allies. Both factors compound the crisis facing NATO.

Although recognizing the disruptive effects that the treaty would have on the NATO alliance, the British have placed a nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union ahead of any effort to re-establish the cohesion of the NATO alliance through some form of increased nuclear cooperation within the alliance.

The French attitude is ambivalent. The French will no doubt refuse to sign a nonproliferation treaty. On the other hand, the Quai d'Orsay would be happy if one were signed which forever barred West Germany's access to nuclear weapons. French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville made this point in oblique fashion in a March 1966 press conference:

> [Taking] into account the possibilities of ultimate settlement of the German problem, there is in reality only a single question that arises, and that is the nuclear question. All the French know it, and all the French also know that it is not the French Government that brought up this question and that arranged discussions on one or another form of organization—multilateral or otherwise—for nuclear affairs concerning Germany.[2]

After thus castigating U.S. efforts to find some formula for German participation in a NATO nuclear force, he stated that the French were opposed to any scheme that would—directly or indirectly—give Germany a nuclear arsenal.

The U.S. government is internally divided on the issue of an anti-proliferation treaty. It has tried to carry water on both shoulders. By advocating the multilateral force, it has sought to give its West European allies, and particularly West Germany, a greater measure of control over NATO's nuclear forces. It has also tried to convince the Soviet Union that the proposed multilateral force (MLF) was compatible with an anti-proliferation treaty, and that the MLF was the best way of preventing Germany from ever acquiring a nuclear force under its own national control. Moscow remains unconvinced. In the face of Soviet obstinacy

[2]Interview with M. Couve de Murville regarding the NATO question, *Speeches and Press Conferences* (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division), No. 241, March 17, 1966.

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and British insistence on obtaining an anti-proliferation treaty, regardless of the consequences, the U.S. government dumped the wreckage of the MLF project, in part, to facilitate negotiations with the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to ascertain which faction, pro-NATO or pro-*détente*, is in command in Washington. Spokesmen for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) assert that the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty which bar nuclear cooperation within NATO are unacceptable. Yet other important factions within and outside the Administration are willing to scuttle all efforts to accord West Germany any share in NATO's nuclear establishment. The State Department seems to place greater value on preventing the complete collapse of the Western alliance than courting the favor of the Soviet Union.

On April 27, the *New York Times* reported that the United States had asked Bonn to forgo any sharing of nuclear arms. The following day, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the United States "has made no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic Nuclear Force or any other collective approach" that would permit the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in "the management of nuclear power." Simultaneously, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson called the *New York Times* report totally false and predicted that it would cause great trouble in Bonn. The efforts to reach a nuclear accord with the Soviet Union, and the public confusion to which they gave rise, have already contributed to the increasing disarray of the Atlantic Alliance.

III

Soviet leaders must regard the American-sponsored anti-proliferation treaty as a diplomatic windfall of great magnitude and promise. For fifteen years the destruction of NATO has been the primary goal of Soviet foreign policy. The separation of West Germany from NATO has beckoned Soviet diplomacy as the most appropriate method for bringing about the collapse of the alliance and the withdrawal of U.S. power from Western Europe. Khrushchev's maneuvers against West Berlin were directed toward this goal. What the Soviets were unable to obtain by bluster and by pressure they may acquire through guile and through the euphoria engendered by the *détente* following the Cuban missile crisis. In Western Europe, it has become fashionable to say that the Soviet Union no longer presents an active military threat to

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NATO. This sanguine view does not allow for the fact that Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis Western Europe are greater in 1966 than ever. The efforts to negotiate an anti-proliferation treaty, even if they do not result in an agreement, provide Moscow with the opportunity to divide the Atlantic Alliance and make sure that no NATO nuclear force is ever created. Thus, if agreement is reached on a treaty drawn to Soviet specifications, Moscow will be able to determine the character of Western defense policies for NATO.

Since 1961, U.S. strategic doctrine has been marked by a conscious effort to de-emphasize the nuclear defense of Western Europe, to increase the conventional capabilities of the alliance, and, simultaneously, to obtain a nuclear *détente* with the Soviet Union. These policies, more than any other factor, have been responsible for President de Gaulle's efforts to obtain for France an independent nuclear force and to detach France from its binding commitments to the NATO alliance. Neither France nor Germany has shown enthusiasm for the U.S. attempt to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons and to emphasize a conventional defense posture in Europe. The Germans, however, have responded gamely, if sometimes painfully, to the changing signals hoisted by Washington. The French long ago gave up trying to keep in step with Washington.

A French plan for the future in harmony with the views of General de Gaulle was unveiled in an article published by *Politique Etrangère:*[3] The present Atlantic Alliance is to be divided into two parts. The first part would include the present NATO alliance shorn of its integrative features. The nations now in NATO would be tied together by "a simple treaty of alliance" in which every member would have full freedom of action. The other alliance system would be limited to Continental Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, but excluding the United States. Within this Continental system, West Germany would still be barred from any share in nuclear defense, but would receive a guarantee that French nuclear weapons would be committed to its defense. Thus De Gaulle would substitute a French guarantee for the far stronger and more powerful U.S. commitments to the defense of Western Europe and West Germany.

At the same time, De Gaulle made it quite clear that he no

[3]Anonymous, "Faut-il réformer l'Alliance atlantique?," No. 3, 1965.

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longer wishes to provide logistic support facilities for U.S. forces in France. By this move he may intend to force the United States to abandon its conventional strategy in Europe. Henceforth, aggression from the East could not be checked by conventional forces. Thus, while De Gaulle's policy of eliminating foreign bases in France would make it impossible for NATO to attempt a conventional defense, the anti-proliferation treaty would simultaneously reduce the Western nuclear capabilities that would be needed if the conventional approach were to be abandoned.

IV

During the early 1950's, the Western allies became convinced that the future security of Europe required the arming of West Germany. In 1954 the Federal Republic was admitted fully into the Western alliance, except that it agreed to forgo the manufacture of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons. West Germany presently makes the second largest military contribution to NATO.

West Germany joined NATO under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who was convinced that full identification with the West was the best way of providing for Germany's security and also obtaining the eventual unification of the country. Influential Americans are now telling the West Germans that these goals cannot be attained by pursuing a policy of building Western strength. For example, Walter Lippmann recently advised Bonn that

> Reunification cannot be achieved by any kind of German nuclear threat, either real or fictitious. It can be achieved only by the President's policy of building bridges, and therefore, it is incumbent upon the Germans to stop complaining and wondering about every bridge we try to build.
>
> The Germans will find, as we too shall find, that as Germany and America seek the solution of the problems of security and reunification in an . . . agreement with the Soviet Union, Gaullist France will not be our enemy and our inveterate opponent. *We shall then all be realigned together.*[4]

Twenty-one years after World War II the Germans believe that some of the discriminatory provisions imposed by their present allies should be lifted. Bonn does not have, and has not sought, national control of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Germany is the only

[4] "The Hygiene of German-American Relations," *Washington Post,* October 19, 1965. (Emphasis added.)

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nation which, by international agreement, has repudiated the production of nuclear weapons. Despite this fact, Soviet propaganda, pacing the Geneva negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty, has sought to convince the world that Germany wants national control over nuclear weapons. If an anti-proliferation treaty is interpreted as a bar to all effective nuclear cooperation in NATO, then severe restrictions would be placed on whatever future actions the United States might deem necessary to guarantee the security of Western Europe. Under these circumstances the Germans ask—and ask quite properly—just what Western interests the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty really does serve? Americans might also ask why it is necessary for the United States to make a political concession that will represent a major diplomatic triumph for the Soviet Union and impose an additional security handicap upon the United States.

Many Europeans who favor a strong Atlantic Alliance would like to replace European military dependence on the United States with a true partnership based upon the interdependence of a powerful United Europe and a powerful United States. East-West agreement on nuclear nonproliferation would render the concept of interdependence meaningless. Partnership implies the creation of a European deterrent independent of the American deterrent, yet closely connected with it. The prospects for creating a European nuclear deterrent are now slim. An anti-proliferation treaty might eliminate any future possibility of such a development. No one believes that the Soviet Union will give nuclear weapons to its satellites. Consequently, a treaty would tie the hands of the West without changing the *de facto* situation in the East.

A nonproliferation agreement would raise the problem of which German state is going to sign the treaty? The double signing procedure used for the Moscow Test Ban Treaty—which was accepted only reluctantly by the government of the Federal Republic—would negate the German Federal Republic's claim to the right of sole representation. For this reason, the West Germans might not sign the nonproliferation treaty. The Bonn government wants a voice in the planning of alliance nuclear strategy, deployment of nuclear weapons, and, particularly, selection of targets. For these purposes, a committee arrangement, as suggested by Secretary McNamara, might be a useful beginning, but it would not represent, for the Germans, real nuclear partnership. They

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want the United States to give its European partners a greater voice in the defense preparations for their own territory.

Twice within the memory of living men, the Germans have made far-reaching agreements with the Soviet Union. The first was the 1922 Rapallo Pact which contributed toward the successful consolidation of communist power inside the Soviet Union. The other was the notorious Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 that triggered the Second World War. If the West has neither the wisdom nor the understanding to pursue policies which will tie Germany closely to the West, then it is conceivable that the frustrated, energetic and proud people of Germany will once more explore the possibility of forging another alliance with the East. Ironically, the vision of East and West marching arm-in-arm together toward a universal settlement—a vision that inspires some statesmen in Paris, London and Washington—might prove attractive to many Germans if all hopes of German nuclear collaboration with the West are dashed. A new German-Soviet entente would pre-empt and render totally insignificant French, British and American efforts at bridge-building behind the Iron Curtain.

American disavowal of any plan to give West Germany a voice in the nuclear defense of Europe could clear the way for Soviet agreement to a nonproliferation treaty. The Soviets, aware of how desirable the United States deems an anti-proliferation treaty, may believe that they need only to bide their time to obtain one on their terms. Some U.S. officials are convinced that Washington has sufficient leverage over Bonn to convince the Germans that eventual reunification will follow an East-West agreement designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, the London *Times,* in reporting on October 10, 1965 a speech by Senator Robert Kennedy, commented:

> The burden of Mr. Kennedy's speech was that nonproliferation was a matter of political action on a grand scale. The Soviet Union shared the Western objective, but was opposed to the MLF. If negotiations were to be fruitful, all nations, including West Germany, must be prepared to reconsider their positions, compromise, and place an overriding priority on the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

Where is the proof that the Soviet Union really shares the Western objective? On what grounds shall we believe that Soviet policymakers share world views comparable to our own? What will motivate Communist China and France to sign an anti-proliferation treaty?

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Senator Kennedy, apparently untroubled by such questions, spoke as follows:

> We must have a program, a considered policy for reaching a firm goal. A policy of drift and inaction, of self-satisfaction, of preserving the status quo will, history has clearly shown us, be dealing a holocaust to the next generation of Europeans.[5]

In negotiations with the West on thorny issues, such as payment to the United Nations for peace-keeping operations and the number of inspection posts necessary for arms control agreements, the Soviet Union generally gets its way. The longer the West is made to wait for "next step" agreements, the greater the concessions London and Washington seem willing to make. The Soviets have constantly refused to discuss a nonproliferation agreement unless all plans for allied nuclear arrangements within NATO are dropped. Using the issue for their own political ends, the patient and persistent Soviets appear to be on the verge of torpedoing the Western alliance.

V

The advocates of the nonproliferation treaty are divided over whether Communist China should be brought into the negotiations. The "realists" do not believe that China is ready to consider a nonproliferation treaty. Conceivably, the Chinese communists might be willing to talk about such a treaty if the United States were to withdraw from Vietnam and abandon Taiwan. The Soviet Union's price for signing such a treaty might be U.S. abandonment of West Germany.

As one by-product of negotiating the anti-proliferation treaty, the United States might be forced to broaden its security commitments to defend the neighbors of major communist powers against possible nuclear attack. The more one examines the anti-proliferation treaty from the point of view of its military and political consequences to the United States, the more obvious become its disastrous implications.

Technological problems also make it difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation by the mere conclusion of a treaty. Several potential members of the nuclear weapons club have operated nuclear power reactors for years. More likely than not, they have sequestered enough of the plutonium by-product of reactor operations to build a nuclear device. India, in particular, is believed

[5] *Baltimore Sun*, January 19, 1966.

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ready to "go nuclear" if her political leaders so decide. Even if a nonproliferation treaty empowers the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect reactors for peaceful use, the possibility of evasion will remain great. Uranium, used as fuel in most power reactors, produces plutonium which can be extracted from the spent fuel and converted into weapons. A big reactor, in operation for a year, will produce enough plutonium for a significant number of nuclear bombs. For this reason alone, the nonproliferation treaty would be inadequate to the task of halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

Karl W. Deutsch argues that "we have a few years, ten or twenty at the most, during which we can stabilize a world on the basis of a very few nuclear powers. After that, and failing such stabilisation, might well come the deluge."[6]

Many authorities contend that India is the most likely candidate to become the sixth member of the nuclear club. India, which could have had a bomb long before Communist China, has played an important but ambiguous role in the Geneva anti-proliferation discussions. The Indian delegate has taken the position that nonnuclear powers should not agree to forgo nuclear weapons unless the nuclear powers scale down their stockpiles and delivery systems so as to minimize their present military advantage. Otherwise, an anti-proliferation treaty that limits nuclear weapons to the five countries now possessing them would be a discriminatory treaty. This position, adhered to by a number of nations, renders universal acceptance of a nonproliferation treaty all the more unlikely, even if the five nuclear nations somehow reached an agreement. One cannot be certain of the intention underlying the Indian position. It may be a tactic designed to delay a treaty until the Indian government decides either to build atomic weapons or to foreclose the option permanently.

In the debates over proliferation, the adverse strategic consequences of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations are often exaggerated. In the first instance, there is a significant difference between possession of a nuclear bomb and creation of a nuclear capability that can threaten the United States or any other nuclear power. Only a few nations have the economic resources to build even a fledgling nuclear force. For most of them,

[6]"The Future of World Politics," *The Political Quarterly*, January-March 1966, p. 27.

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the price tag is beyond reach and the political or security gains are marginal.[7] The commanding lead in strategic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union is unlikely to be challenged even by the other members of the present nuclear club. In sum, the proliferation issue is far more political than military in character.

VI

The only nuclear power that threatens the United States now is the Soviet Union. The only other power that is likely to threaten the United States in the future is Communist China. The leaders of both nations have professed the intention to dump the United States into the garbage can of history. A nonproliferation treaty will not decrease the threat posed by these two communist states.

On the other hand, U.S. deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, which has become technically and economically feasible, might provide a nonprovocative means of reducing the Soviet and Chinese communist threat to the United States. Yet, some urge the United States not to take decisions leading to even a token deployment of an ABM out of fear of upsetting current negotiations for a nonproliferation treaty. It is not inconceivable that, in the future, Japan, India and our NATO allies might want to build ABM defenses against Chinese communist and Soviet missile threats. By signing an anti-proliferation treaty, the United States would render itself incapable of helping them to acquire such defenses. A successful ABM system requires nuclear warheads. A nonproliferation treaty would not reduce Chinese communist or Soviet missile threats. It would only prevent threatened nations from protecting themselves.

What, then, is the logic behind the U.S. and British drive to induce the Soviet Union to sign a nonproliferation treaty as soon as possible? Simply stated, it is the belief that the Soviets have at last abandoned their goal of displacing their American adversary as the leading world power and will pursue a policy of mutual interdependence. Both nations would subordinate their hostility toward each other in a common effort to restrain Communist China.

In this scenario, Moscow and Washington would team up to police the world against nations of lesser rank. This might happen

[7]Dr. James R. Schlesinger of The RAND Corporation made this point during the Third International Arms Control Symposium, held in Philadelphia, March 31-April 3, 1966.

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if, as we are told, the Soviet Union merely pays lip service to its professed goal of creating a communist world state, and if Soviet revolutionary talk is pure rhetoric. Communist China, rather than the Soviet Union, is now proclaimed to be the major villain in the communist plot. Because of the Sino-Soviet split, the "revisionist" Soviet Union is now an object of scorn in Communist China and, although not able to admit it openly, has—or is about to—become a friend of the United States. Unfortunately, the idea that the Soviet Union—which for the past twenty years has been the principal source of world tensions—is on the verge of becoming interested in genuine coexistence rests on little more than an optimistic intuitive guess. At present, Communist China does not have the capability to harm the United States directly, while the Soviet Union poses an immense and growing military threat to Western Europe and the United States.

The avowed purpose of the nonproliferation treaty is to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The pursuit of this goal does not require a treaty. Nor would a treaty make it attainable. By signing the treaty, the Soviet Union would merely agree to do what she is doing now, namely, keep her weapons to herself.

VII

Rather than labor for a universal nonproliferation treaty, the United States should seek to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in other ways. It can take the lead in promoting a European nuclear defense force. An agreement banning nuclear proliferation might be worked out within the Atlantic Alliance. If the United States is willing to offer to France and Britain its insights and advanced technology it might induce them to pool their nuclear capabilities. Were these pooled forces subject to a combined political authority, the actual number of nuclear powers would be reduced by one. Eventually the Federal German Republic could become a partner in such a combination.

The United States should withdraw all economic aid from nations outside Europe which refuse to submit their reactors to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States has developed a revolutionary new wire tape which would help inspectors to determine whether any reactor had been operated in violation of an agreement. India, Egypt and Israel, leading candidates to join the nuclear club, are unlikely to take the risk of losing all U.S. economic help.

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A genuine understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union is the prerequisite of any effective universal system of nuclear control. But such an accord necessitates the prior abandonment by the Soviet Union of its bias against representative institutions. What the late John Strachey called the "historical monstrosity" of the party role which "still leads to crimes and disasters" and "super concentration on heavy industry" and "armaments" must be terminated before a genuine United States-Soviet agreement can develop.[8]

The archaic nationalism of France stands in the way of the creation of a European nuclear force under an effective European political authority. Continual rejection of German aspirations to participate in a European nuclear consortium will present the Soviet Union with renewed opportunities for widening Western cleavages. Under such circumstances the Germans may renounce their self-imposed ban on manufacturing nuclear weapons. In this eventuality, the United States could scarcely join the Soviet Union and France in compelling the Germans to refrain from building nuclear capabilities. But whether the United States acted with or against the West Germans, the Western alliance might be wrecked beyond repair.

Why should the United States sign a treaty that (1) is unnecessary; (2) is unenforceable unless the United States is willing to use nuclear coercion against nations acquiring nuclear weapons; (3) increases rather than decreases the worldwide security obligations of the United States; (4) provides the Soviet Union with a tool capable of wrecking NATO; and (5) opens the doors to nuclear power politics on a global scale?

To paraphrase Senator Kennedy, the present effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by the pursuit of a nonproliferation treaty with the Soviet Union is one of the most dangerous issues facing our nation and the world.

[8]"The Challenge of Democracy," in *The Great Ideas Today* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1965).

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THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS*

by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

THE impact of the 1963 test ban treaty on world politics and, more narrowly, on Sino-Soviet relations extended far beyond the immediate arms controls it provided. Looking back over the years, we see in retrospect that the issues surrounding the possibility of a ban on nuclear testing became, perhaps as early as 1956, a prime factor in the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. Whether one believes the Sino-Soviet dispute hinges on differences of national interest or ideology, or both, the prospect of a nuclear test ban has clearly been of profound substantive as well as symbolic importance to the "fraternal" regimes in Moscow and Peking.[1]

Prelude to Schism

During the years 1957-1958, the government of Mao Tse-tung moved away from the Bandung spirit to a more belligerent stance; at the same time Khrushchev's regime was expressing increasing dedication to peaceful coexistence as the main line of Soviet foreign policy. Given this context, a Soviet-U.S. agreement to ban nuclear tests could be viewed only with the gravest concern by Peking. From China's perspective, a Soviet decision to sign any major agreement with the United States suggested that Moscow was turning westward, away from alliance with Peking. Ideologically, such a turn would serve to reinforce Mao's growing belief that the Khrushchev government was abandoning world revolution to concentrate on raising to new levels the Soviet Union's *embourgeoisement*. Strategically, a Soviet accord with the West would tend to confirm the Kremlin's unwillingness to support China's external policies, particularly in the Taiwan Straits. In specific terms, a nuclear test ban treaty could threaten

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[1]For a discussion of the interplay between national interest and ideology in Sino-Soviet differences on arms control, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Sino-Soviet Dispute—Dogma and Dialectics on Disarmament," *International Affairs* (London), April 1965, pp. 215-219.

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China's security on several levels: at the least it could bring a halt to Soviet aid to Peking's nuclear program and create some legal or moral restraint upon China's future capacity to test nuclear weapons; a test ban might well lead to a U.S.-Soviet non-proliferation agreement, thus increasing the pressures against Chinese entry into the nuclear club; more ominously, a U.S.-Soviet understanding could lead to joint measures to eliminate China's incipient nuclear plant. For all these reasons, any sign of Soviet interest in a nuclear test ban tended, along with other irritants, to undermine the Peking-Moscow axis.

The revelations of the Sino-Soviet dispute point to the nuclear test ban issue as a major factor exacerbating relations between Moscow and Peking as early as the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, when Khrushchev—in Peking's apt expression—"divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament."[2] After 1956 the Soviet leaders "were wrong on certain [disarmament] issues and correct on others," according to Peking, and China "supported them in all their correct views."[3]

While one cannot take at face value these retrospective Chinese judgments, it seems likely that—for reasons outlined above—Moscow's first steps toward a nuclear test ban as a negotiable "partial measure" of disarmament did in fact cause China serious concern. The fact that Peking's declaratory policy generally supported Moscow's disarmament line until 1959 is no proof that the Chinese shared the Kremlin's reasons for making those proposals.[4] It is more likely that China toed the Soviet line only while Peking's leadership doubted that anything would come of the East-West negotiations and while China received substantial Soviet military and economic aid. The Khrushchev government, on the other hand, seems to have been interested by mid-1957 at the latest in a cessation of nuclear testing if not a formal treaty banning such tests, and appears to have been sanguine that such an arrangement could be achieved by negotiation with the West.[5] While the extent of Soviet assistance to China's nuclear program

[2]Chinese government statement of August 15, 1963, in William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 352. (Hereinafter cited as Statement of August 15, 1963.)

[3]*Loc. cit.*

[4]For a contrary interpretation, see Morton H. Halperin's argument in the forthcoming book, which he edits, tentatively entitled *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966).

[5]Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 151-157.

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was probably substantial, it came to a jarring halt in 1959-1960.[6]

From 1959 until 1962 Sino-Soviet relations continued to spiral downward, troubled by disagreement on many issues, one of them being the issue of a nuclear test ban. Did the Soviets appreciate the grave consequences for their relations with Peking that would ensue from formalization of a limited test ban? Surely the answer is affirmative. Moscow must have known that the Chinese would regard the signing of a U.S.-Soviet test ban as a step that could and probably would lead to a superpower conspiracy to keep China out of the nuclear club. According to Peking, China received word from Moscow on August 25, 1962 that the Soviet government had responded "affirmatively" to Secretary of State Rusk's proposal for a nonproliferation agreement. His proposal stipulated that (1) the nuclear powers refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to nonnuclear countries; and (2) that nonnuclear countries refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons, seeking them from nuclear powers or accepting technical information concerning their manufacture.[7]

Moscow's expression of some "affirmative" interest in a nonproliferation agreement came in private negotiations at the same time that the Kremlin was making concessions in the open negotiations in Geneva to narrow the gap separating Moscow and Washington from an agreement to end nuclear testing. (As if to prove the existence of a private understanding between Moscow and Washington on *nonproliferation,* Peking has printed the public documents recording the narrowing gap between the Soviet and U.S. *test ban* proposals.)[8] On August 27, 1962, the U.S. delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) stated his government's willingness to agree either to a comprehensive test ban involving on-site inspection or a ban excluding underground tests but without on-site inspection. The Soviet delegate replied on August 29 and again on September 3, 1962, announcing Moscow's readiness to sign a three-environment ban with a moratorium on underground testing "while continuing

[6]According to the Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, Moscow on June 20, 1959, "refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture," and unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 351.

[8]See appendices to *People of the World, Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons!* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 127-135.

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negotiations on the final prohibitions of such explosions." A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961, but with the provision that inspection over the underground test moratorium could take place only in the context of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Moscow's position of August 29-September 3, 1962 seemed no longer to be contingent upon GCD measures. But on September 5, Soviet representative Vasily V. Kuznetsov clouded the issue by reiterating Moscow's support for its stand of November 28, 1961.

In any event, the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture on principle because—after the sudden Soviet test resumption in 1961—the West would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium.[9] But the shift in Moscow's position on August 29, 1962 was described by *Pravda* on the following day as "opening the way to agreement" and was soon thereafter similarly featured by the Soviet publication *New Times*.[10] On October 1, 1962 in Ashkhabad, Khrushchev reiterated Soviet willingness to sign an agreement on a partial test ban on the terms articulated by Kuznetsov on August 29 and September 3.[11]

People's Daily charged on September 12, 1962 that the United States was obstructing the progress of the ENDC by demanding on-site inspections. But the article went on to indicate a deeper concern. The U.S.-U.K. statement on testing, said *People's Daily*, declared that the

> treaty would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. . . .
>
> The reason U.S. ruling circles are so interested in preventing what they call nuclear proliferation is not secret. . . . Washington is anxious to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons.

People's Daily went on to say that

> only a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the unconditional destruction of all existing nuclear weapons can prevent a nuclear war. . . . The discontinuance of nuclear tests . . . should under no circumstances become a means by which the United States may achieve and maintain nuclear superiority.[12]

[9]ENDC/PV. 76, August 29, 1962, pp. 14-23; ENDC/PV. 79, September 3, 1962, pp. 78-80. See also Verbatim Records of September 5, 1962.

[10](Russian edition), September 8, 1962.

[11]*Pravda,* October 2, 1962.

[12]New China News Agency (NCNA) English, Peking, September 12, 1962. (*Survey of China Mainland Press* [*SCMP*] 2820, September 18, 1962, pp. 30-31.) This policy statement crowned a series of declarations on disarmament in which nuclear test cessation was generally made dependent on the banning of nuclear weapons. See Ciro E. Zoppo, "The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotiation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1963, p. 385.

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Peking's response to the reported U.S.-Soviet understanding on nonproliferation was to send three memoranda to Moscow—on September 3, 1962, October 20, 1962, and June 6, 1963. Their substance held:

> It was a matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but that the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism, and that we would issue statements to make our position known.[13]

This "earnest counsel," Peking professed to hope, would lead the Soviet leaders to "rein in before reaching the precipice" so as not to "render matters irretrievable. Unfortunately," however, the Chinese statement goes on, Moscow "did not pay the slightest attention" to China's advice, but proceeded to conclude the limited test ban, "thereby attempting to bring pressure on China and force her into commitments."[14]

Shortly after the Kremlin's message to Peking on nonproliferation, two other events seriously affected Soviet-Chinese relations: the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese-Indian engagement in the Himalayas. From these points in time until the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty in July 1963 the tensions between Moscow and Peking seemed to escalate in three stages amounting to quantum jumps in the dispute. These stages corresponded roughly with Moscow's rejection of Peking's thrice-proffered "earnest counsel" to desist from negotiating a nonproliferation agreement. While the evidence is far from complete, it is possible that a cause and effect relationship existed between the general deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and China's mounting concern that Moscow would reach an entente with Washington on the spread of nuclear weapons.

The first stage in the escalation ran from October 1962 to April 1963 when a series of communist party congresses and front meetings provided a forum for Soviet and Chinese delegates to assail one another openly, and readers of *People's Daily* saw

[13]Statement of August 15, 1963, pp. 351-352.

[14]The Chinese statement hinted that Moscow's views had been criticized many times before 1962, at least by silence.

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Khrushchev criticized by means of attacks on Messrs. Togliatti and Thorez.[15] Second, after a relative lull in April and May 1963, Peking let loose its broadside of June 14, to which Moscow replied in kind on July 14. While this exchange added a new dimension to the dispute, particularly in "naming names" instead of using surrogates like Albania or Italy, it was qualitatively surpassed by the polemic initiated by China on July 31, commenting on the test ban initialed on July 25. In William E. Griffith's words, "Peking now opened an overt and all-out attack on Moscow: the Sino-Soviet schism had now clearly occurred."[16] Moscow's reply came quickly—on August 3—and a new chapter began in which both sides released detailed, if distorted, accounts of their hitherto secret conflicts on political, military and economic affairs. In communist parlance, not only "party" but "state" relations became an issue.[17]

If we trace the relationship in time between these stages and Peking's concern over a U.S.-Soviet nonproliferation treaty, we note that the Kremlin told Peking on August 25 that it had re-

[15]See the materials in Alexander Dallin, editor, *Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963* (New York: Columbia University, 1963), pp. 664-829. For discussion of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Italian and East German Party Congresses and the Sino-Soviet ideological exchanges of December-January and February-March, 1963, see Griffith, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-104.

[16]*Op. cit.*, p. 162.

[17]As early as February 1963, however, *People's Daily* charged that Khrushchev's unilateral abrogation (at some unspecified time) of "hundreds" of agreements and contracts concluded with China constituted an extension of "ideological differences to state relations. . . ." (*New York Times*, February 27, 1963, p. 1.)

The major exchanges over the test ban treaty were attributed to the Soviet and Chinese "governments" rather than to the respective "parties." See the Chinese statements of July 31, August 2 and August 15, and September 1, 1963. (Texts in *People of the World, Unite . . ., op. cit.*) Of course party newspapers and mass meetings in both the USSR and China reiterated the lines of their "governments."

The flavor of the controversy may be seen from the title of Peking's communication of August 15, 1963: "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government—A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3." The CPR note was characterized by the Soviet government as "slanderous and hostile." (*New York Times*, August 22, 1963, p. 15, cited in Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* [New York: Praeger, 1965], p. 80.)

In contrast to the *People of the World, Unite . . .*, cited above, two other books published by Peking's Foreign Languages Press include primarily "party" statements: *Workers of All Countries, Unite, Oppose our Common Enemy!* (1963), and *The Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (1965). The latter work gives the June 14, 1963 letter, the nine replies made by the Chinese Party to the CPSU letter of July 14, 1963, and the November 21, 1964 statement, "Why Khrushchev Fell." The Soviet Party letters of March 30 and July 14, 1963 are given as appendices. One difference between the 1965 and the 1963 documentary collections was that the former used surrogates (e.g., Italy or Yugoslavia) instead of "naming names."

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sponded "affirmatively" to the U.S. proposal and China replied privately to Moscow on September 3, 1962. In the next weeks—even while Soviet missiles were being unloaded in Cuba—the Kremlin made concessions to the Western position not only on the test ban but also on general disarmament issues.[18] The second Chinese comment on the Soviet nonproliferation message came on October 20—two days before the United States quarantine of Cuba, and almost two months before Khrushchev announced his government would accept "two to three" on-site inspections per year for the control of a comprehensive test ban treaty.[19] The third "earnest counsel" from Peking that Moscow desist from negotiating a nonproliferation agreement came on June 6—four days before President Kennedy's address at American University and one week before Peking issued its June 14 open letter. While the American University speech no doubt helped to pave the way to the Moscow Treaty, the fact is that private talks among representatives of London, Moscow and Washington had already led to a three-power agreement which enabled Kennedy to announce on June 10 that "high-level discussions will begin shortly in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a *comprehensive* test ban treaty."[20] Ten days later—on June 20—the "hot line" agree-

[18]On September 21, 1962, Foreign Minister Gromyko modified the Soviet GCD proposal (to China's disfavor) by allowing for a limited nuclear umbrella to be retained by the two superpowers in Stage I instead of insisting upon the complete destruction of all such weapons at the very outset of the disarmament process. (United Nations Document A/PV. 1127, September 25, 1962, pp. 38-40.)

Moscow's concessions in the arms control negotiations still left the Soviet Union and United States far from agreement, even on a test ban. Perhaps the concessions were to parallel other moves designed to tranquilize official Washington before it woke up to the *fait accompli* of Soviet missiles emplaced in Cuba. Alternatively, Moscow may have conceived a complementarity: compromise arms control agreements in exchange for U.S. acquiescence in a more credible parity resulting from Soviet MRBM's along the coast of Cuba. In any event we are left with this puzzling situation: Moscow chose to alienate Peking further by the message concerning nonproliferation at the very time the Kremlin most needed to bolster its alliance prior to the Cuban showdown. A partial answer may lie in internal contradictions within the Kremlin that precluded any completely logical strategy either toward the east or the west.

[19]The announcement came on December 19, 1962. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1962* [2 vols.; Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963], II, 1239-1242.) It was preceded on December 3 and 10 by Moscow's public espousal of the idea of utilizing automatic seismic stations—"two or three" on the territory of the states possessing nuclear weapons, particularly in areas prone to earthquakes. (ENDC/PV. 90, December 10, 1962, pp. 23-25.)

[20]Emphasis added. Peking may well have inferred from President Kennedy's June 10 announcement that the Soviets had decided to sign a treaty with the West. However, the Chinese claim to have been informed by Moscow "as late as June 9, 1963 . . . that the Western powers' position on the halting of nuclear tests could not yet serve as a basis for agreement, and that whether negotiations could yield any results depended entirely on the Western powers." A similar statement

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ment between Washington and Moscow was signed in Geneva.[21]

Significance of the Test Ban Issue

The precise role that the approaching test ban agreement played in the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations is probably impossible to untangle from the web of other key elements such as Soviet aid to India. But the importance of the test ban issue to the Sino-Soviet schism has been noted by Soviet and East European as well as Western commentators. China's complaint that Moscow refused her a sample bomb in 1959 led *Pravda* to declare on August 21, 1963:

> It looks as if annoyance with this policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states of not spreading nuclear weapons *explains* the attacks of the C.P.R. leaders on the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy measures aimed at lessening international tensions and consolidating peace, especially their attacks on the nuclear test-ban treaty. . . .
>
> The Chinese leaders abuse the Soviet Union in every way because it has nuclear arms, while the C.P.R. does not have them.[22]

by Khrushchev on June 15, 1963, in a press conference, is also cited in the same Chinese document, but its mention suggests that the Soviet communication of June 9 was merely intended to inform Peking before the announcement by President Kennedy of the impending negotiations, and implied no particular Soviet commitment to China. (Statement of August 15, 1963, p. 341.) While Peking later referred to the American University speech as "Kennedy's Big Conspiracy" (*Peking Review*, June 28, 1963, pp. 12-14), the first Chinese report on the address was neutral. The Peking Home Service toward the end of its bulletin on international news at 15.00 GMT, June 11, 1963, reported briefly that, according to TASS, Khrushchev, Kennedy and Macmillan had agreed to a meeting in Moscow in mid-July with representatives of their three countries to resume talks on banning nuclear tests.

For discussion of W. Averell Harriman's role in encouraging the President to make an effort toward *détente* and a test ban, see Robert F. Kennedy, "Foreword," in Walter C. Clemens, Jr., editor, *Toward a Strategy of Peace* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. xiii-xiv. For an analysis of the speech and the Soviet response, see the editor's Introduction, especially pp. 10-11. For additional background on the American University speech and U.S. policy prior to the Moscow test ban negotiations, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), pp. 889-923; and Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 719-746.

[21]But Moscow's representative had declared already on April 5 that his government agreed to this U.S. proposal "immediately without waiting for general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV. 118, April 5, 1963, p. 52.)

The Chinese reaction to the hot line agreement was not especially hostile. On June 21, 1963 NCNA at 15.30 GMT and in the Peking Home Service at 16.00 GMT both reported the agreement without any comment. (BBC FE/1282/i, June 24, 1963.)

[22]Emphasis added. Also, in *Izvestiia*, August 22, 1963. For a similar reaction by officials in Washington, see the *New York Times*, August 16, 1963, p. 1. Interviews with leading communists from Italy and Yugoslavia in 1961 and 1962 specified disarmament as a fundamental area of disagreement between Moscow and Peking. See interview with Velio Spano in *L'Unita* (Rome), December 23, 1961, quoted in William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), and interview with Marshal Tito by Drew Pearson in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), September 1962, p. 32.

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The Soviet journal *New Times* used even stronger language in 1963 and linked Chinese opposition to the "Moscow Treaty" with the Kremlin's refusal to transfer atomic weapons to Peking. It argued that "the desire to get hold of the bomb by every available means seems to be the underlying motive of Peking's attitude to the test-ban treaty and of the clamorous campaign against the Soviet Union now being conducted in the Chinese press. . . ."[23]

The possibility that the nuclear test ban talks could lead to a major change in the thrust of Soviet foreign policy was suggested by the presence of a high-level Chinese as well as Western delegation in Moscow in July 1963. The dramatic parallel with the period of June to August 1939 was striking.[24] In 1963 as in 1939 the Kremlin seemed prepared to throw its lot with one camp or the other, and received delegations from two opposing alignments. The analogy fails in that Stalin gave both delegations—the Anglo-French and the German—a hearing before he had Molotov sign with Ribbentrop. The 1963 decision, by contrast, was probably struck before the Chinese or Western diplomats arrived in Moscow, as evidenced by the tit-for-tat Soviet response on July 14 to the vitriolic Chinese letter of June 14 and by the contrast in the reception accorded the Chinese and Western delegations. The 1939 pact led to much more active collaboration between its signatories than did the 1963 Moscow Treaty, but it ended in war between the two parties. The test ban treaty, on the other hand, served as a reminder—even after the Moscow "spirit" dissipated—that its signatories feared a nuclear engagement.

If one sought to compare the importance of the nuclear test ban with other issues exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations prior to July 1963, it would be difficult to point to any other that so consistently gnawed at what both sides regarded as their vital interests, whose symbolic and material significance was so great in itself, or whose ramifications penetrated so many other areas of the dispute. The issue of a nuclear test ban—in form and substance—drove to the very heart of the political, ideological, military, and even the economic factors in the rift. Hence it was not surprising that the signing of the Moscow Treaty seemed to hurtle the two giants of world communism onto a new and qualitatively more serious plateau of controversy.

Personality differences, as between Mao and Khrushchev,

[23]September 4, 1963, p. 1.
[24]See, e.g., Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1949), I, 249-270.

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could be overlooked if broader common concerns brought the two governments together. Domestic policies—the denunciation of the personality cult in the Soviet Union and the "Great Leap Forward" in China—triggered major disagreements, but the threat each side posed to the other's internal stability remained quite remote, even when Moscow backed Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai against the central hierarchy in 1959. Territorial disputes could be shelved, as they had been for the most part since Mao's pretensions over Outer Mongolia in his 1954 meeting with Khrushchev.[25] Soviet leadership of the communist movement could be tolerated by Peking so long as China received a sufficient pay-off, e.g., nuclear and other aid. Similarly, disagreements over risk-taking in foreign affairs could usually be contained because in most instances neither Peking nor Moscow had a direct stake in the areas contested by the other. The weaker party, China, was hardly in a position to do more than complain if the Kremlin refused to give unlimited support to CPR aims in the Taiwan Straits or the Himalayas. Nor could Peking deter or effectively aid the Soviet Cuban gambit in 1962, except to denounce it after the fact as "adventurism" made worse by subsequent "capitulationism." Sino-Soviet competition for the allegiance of developing countries was fierce but offered inadequate grounds for a major break. The Soviets could live with Peking's rather left ideology and foreign policy, at least while the Chinese dragon's growl exceeded its bite. Similarly, Peking could stomach the Kremlin line on peaceful coexistence—"conflict *cum* collaboration"—so long as nothing came of U.S.-Soviet gropings toward entente.

All these and other factors severely strained the Sino-Soviet relationship, but none provided by itself either a necessary or sufficient cause for an overt schism. Taken together, however, their cumulative impact was such that a final straw could break the back of the alliance. The close connection in time between the escalation ladder of the dispute and Peking's protests against a Soviet entente with Washington regarding arms control sug-

[25]As described in the article, "Concerning Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a Group of Japanese Socialists," *Pravda*, September 2, 1964, p. 2. Conflicts along the Central Asian Frontier, though rumored earlier, were not admitted publicly by Peking or Moscow until 1963 after the Moscow Treaty signing. But already on March 7, 1963, *People's Daily* declared that Khrushchev's taunts about China's allowing "imperialists" to remain in Hong Kong and Macao were opening the subject of all the old treaties imposed upon China in the nineteenth century by Russia as well as the Western countries. Peking stated it hoped to settle these "outstanding issues" with Russia by negotiation. (*New York Times*, March 9, 1963, p. 1.)

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gested even in late 1962 and the spring of 1963 that a test ban agreement would have the gravest consequences for Chinese-Soviet relations. The violent Chinese response to the Moscow Treaty showed that its signing served at least as the occasion and perhaps also as the immediate cause—the final straw—that brought the schism into the open.

The importance of the Moscow Treaty probably went still deeper. The test ban represented symbolically Moscow's joining what Peking deemed an imperialist conspiracy, not only to try to block China's nuclear program, but to oppose her political advance in the third world. The Chinese had known since 1959 that Moscow would not continue assistance to Peking's nuclear program. As the Chinese correspondence cited earlier indicates, Peking purported to fear (perhaps in part for propaganda reasons) that even a partial test ban might lead to a nonproliferation agreement and, what was worse, to coercive measures by the USSR and the West to destroy the CPR's nuclear facilities. Finally, the Moscow Treaty confirmed for Peking that the Soviet regime had, to say the least, a quite different approach to world revolution than Mao Tse-tung.

If we seek to determine the relative weight of the Moscow Treaty in bringing on the open schism, two sets of competing hypotheses must be considered. First, did Moscow sign the test ban because the Sino-Soviet dispute had become irreparable? Or did the dispute become irreparable because the Kremlin signed the test ban? There existed, in all likelihood, a vicious circle in which Soviet moves toward a test ban aggravated relations with the Chinese, thus leading Peking to adopt policies that heightened Moscow's interest in curbing China's nuclear potential and in mending fences with the West. On balance, however, it seems that military, political and economic considerations led Moscow as early as 1957 to adopt a strategy aimed at halting nuclear testing while at the same time the Kremlin hoped to keep China in the Soviet camp.[26] On the other hand, it is also quite likely that

[26]To be sure, the cessation or prohibition of nuclear testing would have to be on terms acceptable to Moscow, with little or no on-site inspection, if only because of Khrushchev's internal opposition. See Bloomfield, Clemens, Griffiths, *op. cit.*; also Jerome B. Wiesner, *Where Science and Politics Meet* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 170-171. That Moscow broke the nuclear test moratorium in September 1961 does not contradict the foregoing argument, for that decision probably stemmed from a situation unexpected as late as 1959 or 1960, i.e., that U.S. ICBM production would far outstrip Soviet, thereby militating for Soviet tests of warheads much larger than those of the U.S. in order to offset Washington's numerical advantage. This line of thinking was reinforced by the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961.

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the worsening state of Sino-Soviet relations after September-October 1962 ranked high among the reasons why Khrushchev agreed in July 1963 to a partial test ban that Moscow had rejected in August 1962.[27]

A second set of hypotheses is a variation of the first. Did Moscow decide to sign the limited test ban treaty because it *wanted* to drive Sino-Soviet relations to the breaking point? Or did the Kremlin *dare* to go ahead with the treaty only because it believed the breaking point had already been reached? The second interpretation seems the more likely, because of the evidence at hand and also because it conforms more with what is known of coalition patterns generally.

It was in Moscow's interest, so long as it could dominate the communist movement, to have China's grudging and nominal support rather than risk a split of the entire movement, with the splintering and polycentrism it would precipitate. As in the Atlantic Community, so in the communist camp, the leading power has preferred to live with autonomy on the part of a major ally rather than lose him—and others—altogether. The vanguard power by his general weight within the alliance can usually get his way: hence his appearance of being more tolerant of diversity than the challenger to his pre-eminence. Paris (since 1958) like Peking (since 1959) seems to have become increasingly rebellious because of the reluctance of the alliance leader to ease its entry into the nuclear club or share its weapons.[28]

For Moscow, of course, much else was at stake in 1963 than the shaky and perhaps doomed alliance with China. The failure of the Cuban adventure, the increasing U.S. strategic lead, the faltering Soviet economy, along with the challenge from Peking—

[27]Among the other considerations are: the lack of any prospect after the Cuban debacle to alter radically the balance of strategic weapons; Kennedy's apparent resistance to domestic pressures to exploit further the Soviet retreat; the mounting economic troubles facing the Soviet leadership; Khrushchev's need to have a tangible victory for his coexistence line, coupled with the incapacitating illness in mid-April 1963 of one of its major opponents, Frol Kozlov.

The partial test ban treaty Moscow agreed to in July 1963 was quite similar to one of two alternative proposals the United States offered on August 27, 1962. As noted earlier, Moscow's counterproposal on August 29, 1962 called for a partial test ban with an unpoliced, indefinite moratorium on underground testing, a proviso unacceptable to the United States. It should be noted that, even though the August 29, 1962 Soviet proposal was rejected by the West, Soviet propaganda treated it as a major concession and Peking claims it was informed on August 25, 1962 of Moscow's intention to sign a nonproliferation treaty.

[28]For a comparative analysis and documents, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., editor, *World Perspectives on International Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 41-47, 57-155.

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all dictated that Moscow seek a breathing space, at least temporarily, in its political-military competition with the West. If Moscow therefore moved toward accommodation with the United States, it was more in spite of Chinese opposition than because of it. Soviet leaders would have preferred to retain China as an ally and follower, if only nominally. Since the Chinese seemed determined to challenge Soviet hegemony rather than submit to it, Moscow had little to lose and something to gain by coming to terms with Washington, rather than attempting to deal with frontal pressures from east and west simultaneously.

Once Peking openly challenged Moscow's leadership, the Soviet leadership had additional incentives to attempt to ostracize if not excommunicate China from the communist movement. That Khrushchev strove to do this in the year following the Moscow Treaty does not contradict the assertion that he would have preferred to avoid this course. Once the die was cast, both Moscow and Peking endeavored to win support—both in the communist and in the third world—by their interpretation of the war/peace issue.

This analysis of what Peking and Moscow stood to gain or lose by pushing for an open break is corroborated by their respective tactics during the six to eight months prior to the signing of the test ban treaty. During this period it was usually China rather than the Soviet Union that intensified the public polemic, e.g., by the strong criticism of the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba;[29] the thinly veiled attacks on Khrushchev through criticism of Italian and French surrogates;[30] most important, the June 14 letter three weeks before Sino-Soviet negotiations were to begin in Moscow; the open Chinese attack on the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence at the World Congress of Democratic Women which met in Moscow June 24-29, 1963 (where the Soviet delegation stressed *unity* as well as peace);[31] and the Chinese motion to "suspend" the party negotiations in Moscow on July 20, 1963.[32]

But if the Chinese were usually the first to escalate the public

[29]The Soviet action was likened to "another Munich." *Peking Review,* November 9, 1962, pp. 12-13.

[30]*Ibid.,* January 4, 1963; March 1, 1963; March 15, 1963.

[31]See articles on the congress in *Pravda,* June 24, 25, 27, 29, 30 and July 1, 2, 1963; *Izvestiia,* June 24 and 28, 1963; *Peking Review,* July 5, 19, 26, 1963.

[32]The Chinese delegation received a hero's welcome when it returned to Peking. *People's Daily* of July 22, 1963 pictured Mao Tse-tung himself at the airport, and listed the names of many other officials who attended the reception, some of them having been in semi-exile theretofore. However, the jet aircraft pictured in the background bore the conspicuous Cyrillic marking "CCCP."

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polemic, Soviet deeds often served as the catalyst. Peking's analysis of the Sino-Soviet axis naturally became darker as Khrushchev, after Cuba, not only moved toward an understanding with the Kennedy Administration, but began to supply India with more military aid than did the United States.[33] Then, at the East German Party Congress in January 1963, when the Chinese spokesman attacked Yugoslav revisionism, "his voice was drowned out by whistles, boos, shouts and feet-stamping—an insult carefully staged, one must assume, by Khrushchev, who was ostentatiously absent. . . ."[34]

The Rubicon was crossed on June 25, 1963 when the partial test ban was initialed. The last bridge, if one still existed, burned on August 5 when dignitaries from Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States formally signed the document. A photograph of Khrushchev hugging the U.S. representative the day after the initialing ceremony was printed by Peking with the explanation: "Khrushchev Embraces Harriman."[35]

For almost a decade—with the possible exception of the period from the May 1960 Summit meeting to the Cuban missile adventure—Khrushchev had staked the success of his foreign policy on a gamble. He had calculated that Moscow could reach an understanding with "sober forces" in the Western governments, particularly in Washington, that would permit both sides to compete by measures short of war. From roughly 1955 to 1959 the Soviet First Secretary seemed confident that this competition would rapidly "bury" the West, shrinking its sphere of influence by winning the third world for the Soviet camp. By 1963, however, Moscow seemed satisfied merely to stabilize the political-military situation with the West and cut losses within the international communist movement, accepting (even after Khrushchev's removal) the defection of China. Soviet acquiescence in these limited objectives stemmed from the narrowing of alternatives open to Soviet policy following the Cuban debacle. Rather than essay some other quick-fix to overcome strategic inferiority, Moscow grasped the opportunity implicit in President Kennedy's refusal to exploit aggressively the Soviet retreat. Moscow's mounting tensions with Peking and the Soviet Union's stagnating economy made it the more desirable to reach some accommodation with Washington. While the Kremlin had no prospect of overturning the military balance,

[33] *New York Times*, May 13, 1964.
[34] Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, p. 101.
[35] *People's Daily*, July 29, 1963, p. 3.

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it could nevertheless rest secure behind its minimum but adequate deterrent.

The significance of the Moscow Treaty extended on many planes far beyond the immediate purpose of prohibiting nuclear testing in three environments. (It was precisely because the three signatories' interest in such tests had declined that the ban became militarily and politically feasible.) The treaty gave a boost to efforts to reach other arms controls agreements and, as a result, created a "spirit of Moscow" that has proved less transient in East-West relations than the "Geneva spirit" eight years before. But future historians might well decide that the treaty's greatest impact was registered upon international communism. For the signing of the test ban unleashed a torrent of words and some deeds within the communist movement that left it not only divided but, at least in Europe, shattered, both in structure and strategy. The now open struggle for power between the Soviet Union and Communist China within the movement spilled over into the third world, into relations with the West, and even into overt interferences in one another's domestic politics. The net impact was to supplant what some had seen as an age of ideology with a vivid return to the classic struggle of national interests—historically unique, however, in its global scale.

The Struggle within World Communism

As Moscow sought to stabilize its western front, its left flank became increasingly vulnerable to Chinese attacks. After mid-1963 it could no longer be doubted that Peking intended to challenge the Soviet Union's vanguard position in the communist movement. Since Moscow had "sold out" to imperialism, its leadership had to be supplanted—both at home and in the revolutionary movement. The withdrawal of Soviet military and technical aid in 1959-1960 had left China with little incentive to abide Soviet policies which, given China's historical development, conflicted with her perceived interests and, probably, her genuine convictions. Despite China's opposition and to a large extent *because* of troubles with Peking, the Soviet government opted to signify dramatically its common political and military interests with the United States. The 1963 Moscow test ban treaty provided the last straw, and Peking threw down the gauntlet.

The struggle for power between the protagonists of international communism thus became more intense, dominating their

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relations with other communist parties, undermining what remained of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and eroding further the myth of communist unity. These aspects of the struggle will be considered one by one.

Intrabloc Relations: The End of Nonalignment

Numerous factors operated to wear down and break the bonds between Moscow and Peking. The role of the nuclear test ban, however, was unique. In the words of Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, the test ban will "turn out to be a landmark in the evolution of the international Communist movement."[36] Not only did it help to signal and then to produce the open schism, it also became a major point of contention around which both parties tried to rally support and to "expose" their ideological adversary's errors.

Both the Soviets and the Chinese attempted to exploit the Moscow Treaty to win support in the communist world. That the test ban agreement was even possible was hailed in Moscow as proof that the Soviet line was "correct" and Peking's "wrong." The Soviet line was that China's opposition to the treaty linked the Chinese leadership with "madmen" such as Adenauer, De Gaulle and Goldwater. Peking, of course, held that Moscow's entente with the West allied the Soviet leaders with "imperialism." The issue of the nuclear test ban forced communist parties —like governments—to be "for" or "against."

In the first six months to one year following the Moscow Treaty, the West European and North American parties remained basically pro-Soviet, although some were extremists and others moderate. While splinter groups arose siding with Peking, only in Belgium did the pro-Chinese detach a significant following. In Latin America, the struggle developed more between Havana and Moscow than between Moscow and Peking. The old guard of most Latin parties adhered to the Soviet line, but Castro declared Cuba's neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese dispute while at the same time refusing to sign the Moscow Treaty on the ground that it involved the United States. All East European parties except the Albanian sided with Moscow, but managed to gain more autonomy in the process. The Australian party lined up with the Kremlin, while New Zealand's party identified with Peking. The Malaysian, Thai and Burmese parties remained pro-Chinese extremists. Elsewhere in Asia only two parties stood

[36] *Communist China and Arms Control* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 170.

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clearly with the Soviets—the Outer Mongolian and Ceylonese, joined by part of the Indian. Four parties that had attempted neutrality—the North Korean, Vietnamese, Indonesian and Japanese—drew closer to Peking, as the test ban foreclosed the possibility of nonalignment in the Sino-Soviet rift.[37] The elimination of "neutral" parties, as Halperin and Perkins have pointed out, could make it more difficult at a later juncture to find middle men to mediate the Sino-Soviet rift.[38]

The embarrassment of having to "choose" between the USSR and China was particularly acute in Japan, where popular sentiments against nuclear testing run high. In part for that reason, a pro-Soviet faction later appeared in the Japanese party. When two of its deputies voted in the Diet for ratification of the Moscow Treaty, they were expelled by the pro-Peking majority, thus setting in motion an exchange of letters between the Soviet and Japanese communist parties exacerbating their already strained relationship.[39]

Whereas the Soviets earlier sought to maintain a facade of unity, after the summer of 1963 they sought to formalize the split in communist ranks, so as to halt if not reverse their losses within the movement.[40] In September and October 1963 they moved toward calling an international communist meeting for the purpose of excommunicating the Chinese. But even moderate, conditionally pro-Soviet parties such as the Rumanian and Italian opposed the Soviet plan, fearing a formal split would limit their own freedom of action. Soviet pressures for excommunication of China relaxed from November 1963 until the time of Suslov's speech in February 1964, which was not published until April 1964, apparently because of Hungarian opposition.[41] From April until Khrushchev's ouster in October the Kremlin sought once

[37]See Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift,* pp. 177-202. For a comprehensive listing of parties with their respective allegiances and factions as of late 1964, see "International Communism: The End of an Epoch," *Survey,* January 1965, pp. 190-196.

[38]Halperin and Perkins, *op. cit.,* pp. 269-270.

[39]The expulsion is reported in *Akahata,* May 23, 1964, translated in *Peking Review,* May 29, 1964, pp. 17-21. For the exchange of correspondence, see *Partiinaia zhizn',* No. 14, July 1964, pp. 8-9 and *Akahata,* August 8, 1964 and September 2, 1964 in *Peking Review,* September 11, 1964, pp. 27-28 and September 18, 1964, pp. 12-19. For a sample of the Japanese Communist Party's intransigent position vis-à-vis the CPSU, see Kenji Miyamoto's report to the Ninth Congress of the JPC, in *Akahata,* November 25, 1964.

[40]The following analysis draws mainly on William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965" (Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 1965, mimeo.), to be published in a revised and expanded version under the same title in 1966 by the M.I.T. Press.

[41]*Pravda,* April 3, 1964.

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again to organize a conference to expel the Chinese, though these efforts slackened somewhat after June 1964.

The Chinese were not idle. Behind the scenes they encouraged factionalism in pro-Soviet parties. Their official rationale was that no vanguard position was possible within the communist movement, since all parties are "independent and completely equal." The Soviet contention that majority rule is binding in the movement was rejected by Peking, which deemed the Soviet majority "false." An end to public polemics, advocated by Moscow from November 1963 to February 1964, was rejected.[42]

Moscow's efforts to cut its losses, however, proved to be abortive. Not only did the CPSU fail in its attempt to excommunicate the Chinese, but—partly because of this failure—Moscow lost influence over the East and West European parties as well. By April Bucharest not only had sabotaged Moscow's plan for supranational planning within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), but the Rumanian party had also issued a special statement defending its autonomous course and criticizing both Peking and Moscow for their polemics and power struggle.[43] The Italian Communist Party also grew more independent, as dramatized most strikingly by its publication of the "Togliatti Testament" on September 5, 1964, over Brezhnev's objections.[44] Togliatti's last work postulated "unity in diversity" in the communist movement through "discussions," not personalized polemics. Moreover he indicated the "slowness and resistance" of the Soviet regime in cultural and political liberalization. In William Griffith's apt phrase, the fact that Moscow republished the Togliatti Testament "and took issue with it only very indirectly, made clear to the world that Moscow was increasingly becoming a paper tiger."[45] The Kremlin's declining fortunes in the ranks of international communism, coupled with Khrushchev's determination to mount an anti-Chinese conference, may have been one reason for his removal in October 1964.[46]

[42]See Peking's seventh "Comment" entitled "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," *Peking Review*, February 6, 1964, pp. 5-21.

[43]"Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movement" (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1964).

[44]Text in the *New York Times*, September 5, 1964.

[45]"Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," p. 55.

[46]Peking's interpretation as to "Why Khrushchev Fell" cited as one of his errors his call on July 30, 1964 for an "illegal international meeting" to split the communist movement. But Peking also cautioned (and probably believed) that "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" might prevail. (Editorial, *Red Flag*, November 21, 1964.)

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End of an Alliance

Given the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet polemics, it was no surprise that both sides called into question the validity—past and present—of their alliance signed on Valentine's Day, 1950.[47] Both the content and tone of the polemics indicate that Moscow and Peking have in fact violated the formal provisions of the treaty on numerous occasions and that both sides consider it to be virtually a dead letter. In particular it appears that one or both parties have been unfaithful to the obligations stipulated by Articles I, III, IV and V.

Article I obligated the two signatories, if one were attacked by Japan or states allied with her, to render immediately "military and other assistance with all means at its disposal." The major test of Soviet backing for China against possible attack by a state allied with Japan—the United States—came in the 1958 crisis in the Taiwan Straits. Although Moscow has consistently defended its reliability as an ally at that time, the Soviet contribution has been belittled by the Chinese, as in Peking's statement of September 1, 1963.[48]

The Soviet rebuttal on September 21, 1963 defended the Kremlin's position by reminding the Chinese leaders that they had publicly thanked the Soviet government in September and October 1958 for support during the 1958 crisis. Moscow's statement then paraphrased the "cynical" Chinese view of 1963: "Well, Soviet leaders, protect us with your nuclear weapons, but we shall still criticize you." The Soviet rejoinder recalled a proverb: "Don't foul the well; you may need its water." And while

[47]"Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Moscow, February 14, 1950," in *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-1955* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 594-595. For commentary on this and other Soviet mutual assistance pacts, see Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 231-240.

[48]Peking contended that the Soviet statements of support for China on September 7 and 19, 1958, came only when "there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and no need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons." (*Peking Review*, September 6, 1963, p. 1.) The Chinese evaluation of the 1958 case came in response to a claim by *Krasnaia zvezda* on August 25, 1963, that "the nuclear might of the Soviet Union, the very country which has now been abused by the slanderers of Peking, had saved millions of Chinese from nuclear death and defended the sovereignty, security and independence of their country." For a criticism of the commonly held view by Western scholars favoring the above Chinese interpretation, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis" (tentative title), in Morton H. Halperin, editor, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, op. cit.*

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Moscow reaffirmed the "sufficiency" of the Soviet nuclear shield to defend the entire socialist camp, it posited that China's drive to obtain nuclear self-sufficiency could derive only from "special aims and interests . . . which cannot be supported by the military strength of the Socialist camp." Moscow pointedly warned that if the Chinese leaders interpreted Soviet "good will wrongly" and continued their hostile actions, slandering and factionalism, they would meet "the most vigorous rebuff . . . from the C.P.S.U. and from the Soviet people."[49]

A less qualified warning to Peking came in June 1964 when a Soviet propagandist hinted that Peking could not necessarily count on Moscow's support in any "terrible hour of trial."[50] Soviet spokesmen already had warned on several occasions, the first in August 1960, that Moscow would defend only the socialist states friendly to it.[51] And a major editorial in *Pravda* on May 6, 1965 was quite explicit:

> The Chinese leaders interpret proletarian internationalism to mean that the socialist countries and Communist Parties must support their every action, even if it is incompatible with the interests and line of the Communist movement. . . . It should be emphatically stressed that the principles of proletarian internationalism do not at all imply that the socialist countries must support every action of another socialist country.

Thus, Peking has cast doubt on whether the Soviet side has fulfilled its obligations under Article I in the past, and the Kremlin has warned that its future support is conditional upon common aims and friendly relations with the Chinese.

It would appear that Article III—prohibiting either party from taking part in an alliance, coalition or measures aimed against the other—has also been violated, at least in Chinese eyes. We have seen above how the signing of the Moscow Treaty led the Chinese to make repeated charges about a U.S.-Soviet conspiracy to dominate the world and, more specifically, to keep China from entering the atomic club. Peking has also charged that Moscow

[49]Document 12 in Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, pp. 434, 440, 460.

[50]*Partiinaia zhizn'*, No. 11, June 1964, pp. 8-20, quoted from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (*CDSP*), June 24, 1964, p. 8.

[51]In August 1960 Soviet spokesman Titarenko mentioned China directly in a statement on the economic and military vulnerability of an "isolated" socialist state. (See Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962], pp. 335-336.) Marshal Malinovsky noted in January 1962 that Soviet strength would defend "those socialist states friendly to us." (TASS, January 24, 1962.) An editorial in *Pravda*, January 7, 1963, complained that those criticizing the Soviet Union for the Cuban venture could not defend themselves without Soviet aid. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 185-186.

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has teamed up with Washington and New Delhi against China. Thus, *People's Daily* published an article on November 2, 1963 entitled "The Truth About the Alliance the Leaders of the CPSU Have Concluded Against China." Elucidating this theme, a major article in *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* charged on November 11, 1965:

> The new leaders of the CPSU are continuing and enlarging the business scraped together by the Khrushchevian firm of "Kennedy, Khrushchev & Nehru." They continue to tighten their union with Indian reaction, which is under the control of American imperialism, for the struggle against China. During Shastri's visit to the USSR the new Soviet leaders immediately promised India aid worth 900,000,000 American dollars, which exceeds the total credits Khrushchev extended to India over a nine-year period. They are intensively realizing their plan for military aid to India and they are working hand-in-hand with the U.S. in helping her expand her armaments, affording Indian reaction the opportunity to strike out with Soviet weapons against China and other neighboring countries. Recently, in the point of India's armed aggression against Pakistan, and in the point of the Indo-Chinese border, the new leaders of the CPSU fully revealed the abominable physiognomy of their alliance with the U.S. and India in their aggression against China.[52]

Article IV of the 1950 treaty provided for mutual consultation "in regard to all important problems" affecting one another. It is not clear to what extent the two sides consulted over their respective moves, e.g., in the 1958 crisis in the Formosan Straits. But on a number of other important issues (such as Soviet behavior in the Cuban missile crisis and the moves by Peking against New Delhi from 1959 through 1965) it appears that *if* there were consultation, no accord was reached and each side went its own way. We have the Chinese account of Sino-Soviet

[52]On the basis of talks with government officials, Stewart Alsop wrote in early 1966 that the Chinese appeared to expect a tri-pronged attack in the next six to nine months: a U.S. attack on South China; a Soviet move into Sinkiang; and an Indian invasion of Tibet. He contended further that Peking had been preoccupied with this idea since late 1962. ("The Mind of Mao," *Saturday Evening Post,* January 15, 1966, p. 14.) The difficulty in separating real expectations from propaganda on such questions was manifested as Foreign Minister Chen Yi held a four-hour press conference in Peking on September 29, 1965. He invited an attack on China by U.S. "aggression," Indian "reaction," British "imperialism" and Japanese "militarism." He added: "Let the modern revisionists act in coordination with them from the north. We will still win in the end. The great Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will not allow their leaders to take such a criminal action." Chen Yi went on to say that Peking had been awaiting a U.S. attack for 16 years; that he might not have the "luck" to see it; but that his children might, and they would be ready. (Text from NCNA in *Survival,* December 1965, pp. 326-327.)

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communication in 1962-1963 over Moscow's plan to enter into a nonproliferation agreement with Washington; but that exchange seemed to consist more of warnings than of consultation. We also have Peking's word that the Chinese were told by the Kremlin on June 9, 1963—one day before President Kennedy announced that test ban negotiations would begin soon in Moscow—that "the Western powers' position on the halting of nuclear tests could not yet serve as a basis for agreement, and that whether negotiations could yield any results depended entirely on the Western powers."[53] Whether Moscow in fact was attempting to conceal its real intentions from Peking, the Chinese imply that this was the case.

Article V of the alliance stipulated "mutual respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs" of the other party; it also committed the signatories "to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other every possible economic assistance, and to carry out the necessary economic cooperation." But the polemics that unfolded in 1963-1964 told of events that contradicted all of these provisions. The Chinese charged (and Moscow admitted) that the Soviets had given unsolicited "advice" against China's "Great Leap Forward" endeavor. Peking also claimed (and Moscow did not deny) that the Soviets sought "military control" of China in 1958 and had conspired with Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai in 1959.[54]

The Chinese themselves have not been passive. From the summer of 1963 until Khrushchev's fall in October 1964, the Chinese openly attacked the Soviet party leader, calling him an enemy of the Soviet people and appealing to the CPSU and the Soviet armed forces to overthrow him.[55] The Suslov speech of February 14, 1964, explicitly accused the Chinese of scheming "to isolate

[53]Statement of August 15, 1963, p. 341.

[54]Chinese statement of September 6, 1963, in Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift,* pp. 388-420, especially p. 399; also, "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," *loc. cit.*

[55]See the interview with Foreign Minister Chen-Yi reported in the *New York Times,* October 29, 1963; see also *People's Daily,* November 19, 1963; also "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," *loc. cit.* At the end of May 1964 Albanian communist leader Hoxha added that Khrushchev and his associates were criminals who had conspired to kill Stalin, and that "terror, murder, imprisonment, and concentration camps prevail in the Soviet Union." (*Zëri i Popullit,* May 27, 1964.)

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Comrade Khrushchev from the Central Committee. . . ."[56] In return, Soviet statements in the first half of 1964 explicitly attacked Mao's personality cult, comparing it with Stalin's. Moscow also denounced the Chinese party's violation of its own statutes and its lack of a party program.[57]

The territorial integrity of the Soviet Union was directly challenged in Mao Tse-tung's interview with a group of Japanese socialists on June 10, 1964, when he challenged the validity of Russia's territorial acquisitions under the Tsars as well as since World War II.[58] Appealing to German, Japanese and East European irredentism and warning that China "had not presented its bill," Mao criticized Moscow's landgrabbing in Poland, East Germany (to compensate Poland), Finland, Rumania, the Kurile Islands, as well as Soviet control over Outer Mongolia and aggressive intentions along the Sinkiang and Amur River frontiers. Moscow's reply indicated its sensitivities on such questions, but rejected the Chinese position as likely to "generate insoluble conflicts among countries of Europe and Asia. . . ."[59] Khrushchev himself replied, threatening to exploit nationalist feelings in Sinkiang (from whence refugees had been fleeing into Soviet Central Asia for several years).[60]

As for the economic cooperation provided by the treaty's Article V, it had been clear since 1959-1960, when Soviet technicians withdrew from China, taking many blueprints with them, that Moscow was unwilling to go the limit in helping to accelerate China's economic growth. Soviet-Chinese trade continued on a businesslike basis, but on a scale far smaller than in the peak year 1959.

The Sino-Soviet alliance was shaken at another point when, on

[56]Published in *Pravda* only on April 3, 1964. The fact that Chou En-lai promptly came to Moscow after Khrushchev's fall, apparently with high hopes of major Soviet concessions to Peking, again suggested the large role the Chinese attributed to Nikita Sergeivich, though Peking's expectations were also buoyed no doubt by China's recent atomic test. By Marxist logic, however, all this attention to one man seemed misplaced, for Chinese statements attributed Khrushchev's revisionism to the "lush growth of the bourgeois elements in the Soviet Union." ("The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," *loc. cit.*)

[57]See the Suslov speech, *Pravda,* April 3, 1964; *Kommunist,* No. 7, May 1964; *Pravda,* April 28 and 29, May 10, 11 and 12, 1964.

[58]For documents and analysis, see Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1965).

[59]On September 2, 1964, *Pravda* reprinted Mao's interview, which had previously appeared only in Japan, appending a vigorous Soviet rebuttal.

[60]*Ibid.,* September 20, 1964. The Chinese statement of September 6, 1963, accused the Soviets of carrying out "large-scale subversion" in Sinkiang in 1962 to entice and coerce "several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union." Document 10 in Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift,* p. 410.

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January 15, 1966, Moscow renewed its mutual defense arrangements with Outer Mongolia in terms that were on balance unfavorable to Chinese interests.[61] Earlier Soviet treaties with Ulan Bator had been directed first against the threat of Japanese aggression and second against Nationalist China.[62] The 1966 accord, like one signed by Outer Mongolia in 1960 with Communist China, aimed at the "maintenance of Asian and world peace." But Ulan Bator's new treaty with the Soviet Union also set itself the task of "constantly strengthening the defensive might of the socialist community." It also affirmed both parties' intention to cooperate through the Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, a body to which China does not belong. And Article 6 of the new treaty pledged both signatories to strive for an ideal presently anathema to Peking—"the achievement of general and complete disarmament"—as well as the liquidation of colonialism and (according to Article 7) the "prevention and elimination of the threat of imperialist aggression in this part of the globe."

Defense Minister Malinovsky as well as party chief Brezhnev journeyed to Ulan Bator to sign the new pact with Outer Mongolia. Within a month, according to stories circulating in Moscow, large numbers of Soviet troops and armored units were moving into Outer Mongolia to take up positions along the Chinese frontier just 600 miles from Peking. Provision for the troop movements was believed to have been made in secret clauses of the January 1966 treaty. Estimates regarding the size of the Soviet forces varied from 2,000 to 10,000 or more, but the move appears to have been the first occasion when the Kremlin shifted its military forces in a show of strength obviously aimed at Peking.[63]

[61]Text of the January 15 treaty transmitted by Moscow Radio on January 16, 1966, International Service in English. For commentary, see Paul Wohl in *The Christian Science Monitor,* January 20, 1966, p. 4. Ulan Bator's relations with China had been relatively comfortable until April 1964 when the Mongolian government ordered about 6,000 Chinese workers to leave the country and accused Peking of "interference in internal affairs" of Mongolia. Three months later Mao Tse-tung charged that the Soviets had "placed Mongolia under their domination." In January 1965 Soviet sources reported that the Mongolian party was purging pro-Chinese elements. Throughout 1965 there were reports of infiltration and agitation by Peking agents along the Sino-Mongolian border. (*New York Times,* March 16, 1966, pp. 1, 10.)

[62]The Soviet friendship pact with Outer Mongolia concluded on November 5, 1921, was modified by a defense protocol on March 12, 1936, and converted into a more elaborate ten-year, mutual assistance treaty on February 27, 1946. It could have been renewed automatically in 1966 as it had been in 1956.

[63]*New York Times,* March 16, 1966, pp. 1, 10. Many of the reports were traced to the CPR Embassy in Moscow.

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"Not by accident," a Russian might say, Soviet and East European party and government officials and radio broadcasts spoke in increasingly disparaging tones of border incidents allegedly provoked by China—over 150 reported in 1965—and of Chinese efforts to involve the Soviet Union in a European "second front" against the United States.[64]

The "whole course of events" (apparently from 1959 to 1963) as viewed from Peking would seem to have violated the essential provisions of the 1950 alliance. The Chinese assert:

> First the Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry favor with U.S. imperialism by discontinuing assistance to China. Then it put forward all sorts of untenable arguments in an attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand. Failing in all this, it has brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China.[65]

From Moscow's perspective, on the other hand, it appeared that China had sought to provoke a U.S.-Soviet conflict from which Peking would be the main beneficiary. Otto Kuusinen charged in August 1963:

> Inasmuch as China herself is not strong enough to fight the great imperialist powers, the Soviet Union, who is strong enough, is obligated, according to the Chinese leaders, to war against American imperialism and its allies if the Soviet Union does not want to gain the reputation of being "revisionist"—and China in the meantime would be able to achieve a decision regarding her own goals.[66]

Thus, for all practical purposes, the foundation of the alliance had become fragile and rickety by 1965. Peking probably stated the conviction of both sides in saying: "We and the Khrushchevian revisionists occupy diametrically opposed positions on the fundamental questions of our time."[67] On the other hand there were still a number of overlapping concerns based on ideology and national interest that could work to reactivate the alliance under altered circumstances. The unresolved outcome of the Vietnamese war left many issues in doubt. The Soviets were showing increasing concern over their revolutionary image, at the same time that their conflict with Peking grew more intense. Would they welcome, tolerate or resist a U.S. attack upon China?

[64] *Ibid.*, February 1, 1966, p. 14. The text of a long report circulated in Soviet party circles was reproduced in *Die Welt*, March 21, 1966, and then in the *New York Times*, March 24, 1966, p. 14.

[65] Statement of August 15, 1963, pp. 351-352.

[66] "To the People—Happiness, To the Worshippers of War—Disappointment," *Pravda*, August 12, 1963. The same accusation was reiterated in the CPSU report cited above in footnote 64.

[67] *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, November 11, 1965.

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Many Western analysts believed the Soviet leaders would not passively watch the replacement of a communist regime in China by one allied with the West (assuming such a contingency were at all possible). But what would be the Soviet response to a more limited action directed against Chinese territory? One that might include a pre-emptive strike against China's nuclear plants? Only speculation was possible, but it seemed reasonable to believe that Moscow's behavior in the late 1960's would be guided by a calculation of Soviet interest, and not by any obligation deriving from the 1950 alliance or by abstract considerations of ideological fraternity.

The role of the nuclear issue in the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance was suggested by a Chinese statement in November 1965 charging that "the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain was an important landmark in Khrushchev's alliance with the United States against China." The new Soviet leadership that succeeded Khrushchev was accused not only of having accepted his legacy, but of plotting new deals with the United States for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and other so-called disarmament measures to perpetuate the U.S.-Soviet nuclear monopoly "against China and all other independent countries."[68]

End of a Myth: The Withering of Ideology

No matter which side gained or lost prestige and power in the international arena, the open schism that followed the Moscow Treaty hurt both the Chinese and Soviet regimes by demolishing, probably for all time, the myth of communist unity and the universal validity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. True, communists had disagreed before, as witnessed by the history of the First, Second and Third Internationals, the Stalin-Tito split, polycentrist movements in Eastern Europe, and the Sino-Soviet maneuvers at communist meetings from 1957 to 1963. But since 1917 the myth had persisted that there was a final repository of truth and wisdom, both for the direction of the Soviet state and for the communist movement as a whole. For many Soviet communists this myth was shattered by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin.[69]

[68]Editorial in *ibid.*, translated in *Peking Review*, November 12, 1965, pp. 13-14.
[69]School children had been taught to believe in Stalin's omnipotence and some began to question all they had been taught. Grown men who had dedicated their lives to the communist cause became disillusioned, some becoming alcoholics.

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But as late as 1958-1959 many Soviet intellectuals derided forecasts of an eventual power struggle with China on the ground that there was no "class basis" for such conflict, and because it was precluded by ideological solidarity. Those directly associated with Chinese affairs, such as the technicians withdrawn from China in 1960, knew differently.[70] Those familiar with the border incidents along the Central Asian and Siberian frontiers also knew differently. But the average Soviet citizen must have been profoundly shocked by the dropping of the veil from Soviet charges about "some Comrades"—directed for a time against Albania—that occurred with the publication of the July 14, 1963 open letter in reply to the Chinese missive of June 14, and by the still more bitter and open exchanges that followed the Moscow Treaty. By their very vehemence, the indignant letters and public protests that poured from Soviet citizens about Chinese "ingratitude" suggested the depth of nationalist feeling that had been smothered by a blanket of doctrinaire unity. It would be surprising, too, if these same citizens did not harbor some resentment against their own government, which had so long kept from them the facts made public only in 1963. Readers of the Soviet press must again have been taken aback by *Pravda's* publication of Togliatti's charges about the shortcomings of Soviet internal liberalization—a suggestion that even a West European party had the right to criticize CPSU policy.[71] Then, in October 1964, the man who had won public favor by reducing the excesses of Stalinist rule was suddenly removed for "hare-brained" subjectivism.

On another level, the Soviet leaders had long adjusted ideology for the sake of expediency. They usually denied that Marxist-Leninist doctrine had been changed. However, in replying to Peking's ideological challenge in 1960, Khrushchev stated frankly: "We must not now repeat mechanically what Vladimir Il'ich Lenin said about imperialism many decades back, and again and again reiterate that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism has won all over the world."[72] The July 14, 1963 open letter went another giant step toward the relativization of ideology. It proclaimed, again in response to Chinese criticism, that "the nuclear

[70]See Mikhail A. Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China* (New York: Praeger, 1964). Some specialists on Chinese affairs gave up writing on that field as early as 1958 and turned to other research.

[71]September 10, 1964.

[72]*Pravda,* June 22, 1960.

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bomb does not adhere to the class principle." Granted this exception to the class principle, were there not others?[73]

The competition between the Soviet Union and China in the third world led to still more desperate steps by both sides to broaden their definitions of acceptable allies. For example, whereas the November 1960 Moscow Declaration specified that "national democracy" required legalization of communist parties, Khrushchev stated in December 1963 that Marxist-Leninists would prefer to work with "national democratic" states, but that this "does not preclude other forms of development. . . ." Only one condition was prescribed: "Socialism cannot be built on positions of anti-communism, opposing the countries in which socialism has won the victory and persecuting the Communists. . . ."[74] In William Griffith's words, this meant that

> to "build socialism" (and get Soviet support) a radical nationalist regime must ally itself with the Soviet Union and, although it may ban the existence of a Communist party, it must not imprison or persecute individual Communists, but rather allow them to participate in the ruling elite.[75]

The test ban was hailed by Soviet propaganda as proof of the validity of the peaceful coexistence line. It served as a kind of proof that it was possible to deal with "sober forces" in the West. Cooperation as well as collaboration was dictated "by life itself." True, "ideological coexistence" remained taboo, and Moscow rejected any suggestion of "convergence" of the Soviet system and Western capitalism.[76] But *Pravda* on April 12, 1964 published a hitherto unknown letter by Lenin urging Soviet diplomats at the 1922 Genoa Economic Conference to isolate and flatter the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie and

> to declare permissible and . . . desirable an agreement with them—not only on trade but also on policy (as one of the few chances for the *peaceful evolution* of capitalism to a new structure, [an event] that we, as Communists have little faith in, but are willing to help test and consider it

[73]See also Raymond Aron, "Coexistence and the Class Struggle," *The New Republic,* September 28, 1963, pp. 10-11.

[74]*Pravda* and *Izvestiia,* December 22, 1963.

[75]"Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," pp. 18-19.

[76]See, for example, G. Frantsov, "What Lies Behind the Slogan 'Ideological Disarmament,'" *Kommunist,* No. 13 (September 1962), pp. 110-119; also Ven. Motylev, "The Prevention of War and Contemporary Reformism," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia,* No. 12 (1963), pp. 127-139. The Motylev article explicitly criticizes John Strachey's *On the Prevention of War* (London, 1962) for offering as an ideological justification for disarmament the convergence of capitalism and socialism.

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our duty to do so, as representatives of one power confronting others in a hostile majority).[77]

While Khrushchev's government sought legitimation for its moves toward coexistence with the "class" adversary, Moscow's deteriorating relationship with Peking made the concept of a "fraternal bond" based on common ideology vacuous and sterile.[78]

As for the Chinese, they had long been insinuating that Mao Tse-tung belonged in a trinity with Marx and Lenin. Since the summer of 1963 they had been seeking to take over or strengthen pro-Chinese factions in parties sympathetic to Moscow. They also sought to set up rival Asian-African organizations to parallel the front movements controlled by Moscow, while simultaneously taking part in the Soviet-dominated groups. In October 1963 a speech by the deputy head of Chinese agitprop provided the ideological basis not only for factionalism but for the virtual inevitability of ideological and political bifurcations:

> Everything tends to divide itself in two. Theories are no exception, and they also tend to divide. Wherever there is a revolutionary, scientific doctrine, its antithesis, a counter-revolutionary, antiscientific doctrine, is bound to arise in the course of the development of that doctrine. . . .[79]

A subsequent article reiterated this formulation and held that true Marxist-Leninists must struggle against revisionists, even if the latter are in a "temporary" majority. But the guilt lay in Moscow—not Peking: "The leaders of the C.P.S.U. headed by Khrushchev have become the chief representatives of modern revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the international Communist movement. . . ."[80]

After Khrushchev's fall, Peking recalled that other "personages" such as Bakunin, Bernstein, Kautsky and Trotsky had also been "relegated to the garbage-heap of history." It warned that Khrushchev's supporters—"the U.S. imperialists, the reactionaries, and

[77]See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament," *Slavic Review*, September 1964, p. 512. (Emphasis added.) The "pacifist wing," according to Lenin, consisted of "petty bourgeois, pacifist and semipacifist democracy, of the type of the Second International or the Two-and-one half International, and then of the Keynes type, and so on. . . ."

[78]Even for domestic audiences Soviet propagandists portrayed Chinese strategy as a kind of yellow peril menacing all civilization. Cf. Radio Moscow's Domestic Service, August 2, 1963; also the TASS statement broadcast in English to Europe on August 5, 1963, reporting on the Sino-Soviet disputations in Hiroshima at the Ninth International Conference for Outlawing Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons.

[79]Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," *People's Daily*, December 27, 1963, quoted in *Peking Review*, January 3, 1964, pp. 10-27 at p. 12.

[80]"The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," *loc. cit.*

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the modern revisionists"—would try to resurrect "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev." But history would nevertheless progress "in accordance with the laws discovered by Marxism-Leninism. . . ."[81]

This same article conceded that the "great Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the great Soviet people . . . are fully capable of making new contributions in safeguarding the great socialist achievements. . . ."[82] But it seemed more likely that Peking had different expectations from those expressed. From the Chinese communist standpoint—one not unaffected by the tradition of the Middle Kingdom, by power over the world's most populous nation, by victory in long years of civil war and, more recently, by mastery of the atom—Peking probably saw itself as the successor to Moscow in the realm of orthodox Marxism. Moscow had become the "third Rome" in the fifteenth century, after Constantinople fell to the Turks, and Soviet Russia the "socialist fatherland" in 1917. But Peking now seemed to claim the vanguard position—even while Moscow enjoyed a "false majority"—after the Kremlin fell to revisionism, as demonstrated most clearly when it signed the Moscow Treaty with the Western powers.

Whatever the expectations of Moscow or Peking, it seemed more likely than not that the concept of one truth, one movement, devoid of basic internal conflicts, had itself been "relegated to the garbage-heap of history."

If so, the role played by the Moscow Treaty or even by the more general schism within communism would not have been decisive, for Soviet and perhaps also Chinese society had been wrestling, even before 1963, with the challenges to ideology that seem to rise from the very process of modernization. From another perspective, that of *Realpolitik,* it was probably just a question of time before the two neighboring countries, each at different stages of development and with many historical controversies left unsettled, came to blows, at least verbally. But if the test ban treaty had not directly produced an erosion of ideology (at least in the Soviet Union), it is probably safe to say, paraphrasing the poet Maiakovskii, that it had "hurried old history's horse."[83]

[81]"Why Khrushchev Fell," *Red Flag,* November 21, 1964, in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op. cit.,* pp. 490-492.
[82]*Ibid.,* p. 492.
[83]Daniel Bell has argued that ideology is losing its coercive and persuasive power in the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe. To that extent, an "end of ideology" in the communist world is in sight. Not only the specific formulations

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The Future

The record of China's diplomacy and propaganda since her first nuclear test in October 1964 suggests that the Moscow Treaty remains a major irritant in Sino-Soviet relations. But the substance of the treaty may in time be less important to Peking than its symbolic meaning. As China's nuclear program advances, the threat of Soviet and/or U.S. moves to destroy the Chinese plant probably diminishes. Even in 1964-1965 the political cost to China of testing in contempt of the Moscow Treaty was not onerous. With each Chinese test—as with each increase in Chinese strength generally—fewer criticisms of Peking's experiments will be heard, although Japan and India may provide vigorous exceptions to this tendency. If other states "go nuclear," the criticism of China's atomic program would become still thinner. But Peking all the while can continue to exploit the propaganda theme that the Moscow Treaty represents a U.S.-Soviet attempt to perpetuate their atomic hegemony. And if one of the other signatories should repudiate the treaty, that would only serve to strengthen China's claim to political prescience.

Should either the United States or the Soviet Union denounce the Moscow Treaty—an event that now seems quite unlikely—there would be more room for some *rapprochement* between Moscow and Peking. But if the partial ban were made comprehensive by U.S.-Soviet agreement, the ties between those two countries would become firmer, and the charge that they were free to carry on advanced testing underground would be negated.

Even the partial test ban provides some barrier to proliferation of atomic weapons, since signatories such as Israel, Sweden, Japan

of communist theory are questioned, but the very claim of the party to direct all fields of activity. (Daniel Bell, "Marxism-Leninism: A Doctrine on the Defensive; The 'End of Ideology' in the Soviet Union?," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, editor, *The Appeals and Paradoxes of Contemporary Marxism* [New York: Praeger, for the Hoover Institution, 1966].) Robert C. Tucker and Richard Lowenthal, among others, have also argued that the changes in Soviet doctrine may be of a long-term rather than temporary, tactical character. Tucker has suggested studying the deradicalization of the German Social Democratic movement at the end of the nineteenth century in order to develop criteria to evaluate such trends. And Lowenthal has concluded, after Khrushchev's fall, that: "The formal continuity of the party regime remains unbroken, but the erosion of its ideological dynamism is far advanced. The new men are objectively and subjectively unable to continue the revolution; they will have to be content with administering its results. . . . As the revolution withers away, its heirs are reduced to the conservative role of stabilizing its institutions and defending their oligarchic privileges." ("The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1965.) For a critique of the decline-of-ideology persuasion and a persuasive rebuttal, see the articles by Joseph LaPalombara and S. M. Lipset in the *American Political Science Review,* March 1966, pp. 5-18, 110-111; and Garthoff, *Soviet, Military Policy, op. cit.,* pp. 95-96.

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and India would have to withdraw from the Moscow Treaty in order to test without violating the agreement—unless they should test underground only. Should China decide to oppose nuclear spread to additional countries, Peking might want to support a test ban, whether partial or comprehensive. But without a larger package deal of interest to China, her support for any version of the Moscow Treaty would entail high political costs. This is so not only because of Peking's past criticism of the treaty, but also because Peking still seeks to utilize the Moscow Treaty for anti-Soviet, anti-imperialist propaganda.

It may be argued that China's "objective" interests call for her to pay this cost in order to foreclose the prospect of Indian or Japanese membership in the atomic club. Furthermore, while the third world may not protest loudly against Peking's atomic tests, it seems likely that China would be more influential among the established governments of Asia and Africa if her image were less militant and her propaganda thrust aimed more toward promises of peace and prosperity. The essential consideration would be that China stands to lose from allowing further nations to "go nuclear." At best she is likely to run a treadmill, attempting to stay ahead of India and Japan while trying to create a force that will penetrate U.S. and Soviet defenses.[84]

Should Peking come to reason along these lines, however, it might have to decide upon strategic as well as propaganda sacrifices. For to shut the door to India and other potential nuclear powers may require agreement in the near future on nonproliferation. The timing could be inopportune for China, since she would not yet have become a nuclear power except in name. India's maximum condition for such a pact could include a freeze or reduction of nuclear armaments by the five existing nuclear powers. At a minimum, New Delhi would probably demand security guarantees from the United States and the Soviet Union that would seem to hang a Damocles' sword above China indefinitely—with little prospect that Peking could develop a first- or second-strike force capable of directly threatening the nuclear superpowers.

For all these reasons, material and symbolic, the test ban issue promises to remain an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations and in U.S. policy toward the two countries.

[84]The assumption is that Moscow and Washington will be increasingly resigned to China's membership in the atomic club, for which they may try to compensate by developing an ABM system or by other measures. However, there may be a period of several years before China weds nuclear tips to MRBM's when the temptation to pre-empt this capability will be high, especially if tensions in Southeast Asia increase.

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LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING

by John R. Thomas

SINCE there has not been to date a conflict involving the bilateral use of nuclear weapons, Soviet views on such a possibility have been shaped partly in a vacuum and partly by extrapolations from and projections of World War II and the Korean conflict. As these recede in time and appear inapplicable to the current military context, they may become less influential in molding future Soviet views on the possibility of limited nuclear war.

Currently, however, both of these past conflicts continue to influence Soviet thinking along with the more recent nuclear missile and political developments. In brief, the Soviets seriously question whether *any* conflict involving a direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces can be prevented from escalating into general war. They believe such escalation would undoubtedly occur in any war that broke out in Europe; the use of nuclear weapons would only reinforce the certainty of such a catastrophe. Soviet doubts about the feasibility of limited nuclear war, however, should not be misinterpreted as indicating that the Soviets would not be prepared to accept limitations if this route were open and advantageous to them. Indeed, they would prefer limitations, both to spare their homeland from cataclysmic devastation (which would undoubtedly far exceed the impact of World War II that at one time put the survival of the Soviet system in question) and to give them a chance to seize a viable Western Europe in order to add its capability to their own. This latter development would make it possible for the Soviets to engage the United States in a protracted conflict if general nuclear war with instantaneous catastrophe were averted. However, the Soviets are pessimistic that events would develop in a way permitting such limitations to operate. This suggests that the United States should be prepared—by a flexible posture before, and restrained action during, any conflict—to demonstrate that the limitation route is open to the Soviets if they choose to use it.

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In the interim, the Soviets, in questioning the feasibility of a limited nuclear war, have raised several major problems which must be examined carefully before we can determine whether the declaratory position of the Soviets represents real views which would govern their conduct in the event of an actual conflict. One such consideration involves a question of political logic posed by the Soviets: If "the rules of limited war" cannot be defined and agreed on before the event and in the absence of a crisis atmosphere, how realistic is it to expect a meeting of the minds in the midst of a conflict that would impose severe time constraints, impair communications, and create a psychological climate against agreement?

The second point raised by the Soviets relates to an equally important factual consideration. While Soviet words cannot be taken at face value and while a gap may exist between what the Soviets say they would do and might actually do, this gap is narrowed if the Soviets are in a position to carry out their declaratory policy. Currently, Soviet "words" regarding the impossibility of limited war in Europe and of nuclear restraint, once the threshold has been crossed, can be matched by "deeds" in terms of Soviet capability to carry out their declarations. Unlike the extravagant claims about their military prowess in the global context, the Soviets are in a better position "to make good" in Europe than elsewhere. They seem to believe that they have sufficient ground forces to overrun Europe—assuming they are willing to run the risk of triggering U.S. strategic forces against the Soviet homeland.

The broad scope of Soviet objectives in the event of a European conflict and the current Soviet military posture (organization, equipment and doctrine) increase the likelihood that a European conflict would escalate in terms of geography and intensity. Unless they drastically modify their military posture and their doctrine for employment of forces and narrow their political objectives, we must take seriously the Soviets' stated disbelief in the feasibility of a European limited war. It must at least be given equal weight with any Western skepticism about this view of Soviet intentions.

For the purposes of this discussion, a conflict in Europe is defined as one that would involve publicly acknowledged organized forces of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe,

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west of Soviet borders.[1] Moreover, since this paper examines escalation in a nuclear context, its analysis focuses only on factors that would tend to inhibit or accelerate escalation once the use of nuclear weapons had been initiated.

We must also define what is meant by "the Soviet view." Is there a unified Soviet view? If not, how representative are the views to be cited? It is, of course, impossible to speak of *the* Soviet view. Just as there is no single U.S. view, there is similarly no single Soviet view. To be sure, there are differences between the U.S. and the Soviet context. Thus, in Stalin's days one could speak of the Soviet view. Since 1953, uniformity of views within the ruling elite has been increasingly diluted; today there are important divergencies in that group. Even at the height of Khrushchev's power, dissent from his views was noticeable, particularly among the military. Similarly, unanimity has been lacking even *within* Soviet military circles.[2]

It is important to define this dissent in order to identify the areas of consensus. The differences between the military and political leadership have centered on the amount of resources the Soviet Union can afford to divert to meet its multiple defense requirements; the dissent has been less on the kinds of weapons needed. For example, when Khrushchev derided the role of bombers and surface ships in favor of missiles, this should not have been interpreted as his judgment that these weapons were already obsolete; conversely, when the Soviet military took exception to Khrushchev's view on this subject, they were not claiming that these weapons would not be obsolete at some future time. In the same vein, the dissent within the Soviet military has not been concerned with the superiority of one weapons system or service over another, for all of the Soviet military leadership has been brought up in the tradition of combined and balanced arms in which all services have an appropriate role to play. Instead, the differences within the military have centered on which major components of the armed forces—e.g., the ground forces, the stragetic rocket and air defense forces—should get higher priority,

[1]This paper does not deal with the possible Soviet use of "volunteers" as a subterfuge for avoiding open involvement. It should be recognized, however, that the Soviets have either used or threatened to use this ruse in the past and might do so again in the future, even in the context of a European conflict. But, while this might work in a conventional war (though even this is unlikely), it is inconceivable that the Soviets would expect to get away with "volunteer" nuclear forces.

[2]For a description of the substance of dissent on the Soviet politico-military scene, see John R. Thomas, "The Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy," *Military Review,* May 1964.

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given the inability of the Soviet economy to meet the requirements of all the services simultaneously.

At the same time, it should be noted that a broad consensus on the nature of the military threat to the Soviet Union from the United States has accompanied the dissent. This provides the context for analyzing Soviet views on limited nuclear war and escalation.

Relation Between General War and Limited Conflict

Because of their ideology, the Soviets view major aspects of human life in highly political terms. This applies with particular force to human conflict. Hence, in the Soviet view, a conflict in Europe—given the area's critical importance—cannot be viewed in a solely military framework. They believe that any conflict between communist bloc and NATO forces in Europe would entail such broad political and strategic considerations as to make a limited engagement meaningless; the use of nuclear weapons would only make the highly probable more certain, particularly since it would automatically ensure direct U.S. and USSR involvement. (The Soviets are unlikely to turn over nuclear warheads—and longer-range missiles in particular—to their satellites; and no U.S. ally on the Continent in the near future is likely to have a missile or nuclear capability matching that of the United States or the USSR.) Because this point is crucial to Soviet thinking, a broader look at the Soviet attitude on the relationship of limited war to general conflict is required before examining other relevant factors. This relationship, in the Soviets' view, fuels the escalation process.

The Soviets, with their determinist view of history, believe that mankind is going through stages from feudalism and capitalism to socialism and communism, the highest stage of social development. To date, each stage has been attained only after a violent conflict between antagonistic classes. Therefore any social conflict, however small, is related directly or indirectly to the general class struggle. In this context the many smaller conflicts that preceded the two world wars were steppingstones to the subsequent general conflict, which was seen as altering the relationship between the capitalist and noncapitalist classes. The scattered incidents of violence cumulatively broke down the balance of forces, which until then had prevented general war from flaring up. Before the Soviet Union achieved major-power status, the

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balance of forces, in their view, applied to the capitalist world. Since their nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile breakthroughs in the 1950's, the Soviets view the balance of power as involving primarily the forces of socialism and capitalism, with the balance having swung heavily in the Soviet direction.

However, before this change in the strategic scene occurred, the Soviets believed the numerous conflicts preceding World War I were symptomatic of the uneven development of the capitalist system as reflected in the rivalry of the major imperialist powers for colonial markets. In the same vein, such events as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, and the Spanish civil war constituted a prelude to World War II. This chain of events, according to the Soviets, demonstrated that, when the most aggressive of the capitalist competitors in Europe and Asia met with little or no resistance in carrying out their imperialist designs, the balance of power shifted in their favor. The Soviets discreetly ignore their own role in unbalancing the equilibrium by such actions as the attack on Finland and the pact with Hitler, which gave him a free hand to act in the West before turning on the USSR.

Using the same reasoning and again ignoring their own responsibility, the Soviets claim that such postwar events as the Korean conflict and the numerous crises elsewhere have created a pattern of violence that could culminate in a third world war. They further declare that a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation in battle would be the spark to set off a nuclear holocaust. Although they have not yet become disturbed enough to desist from instigating or supporting "national liberation" struggles designed to weaken the West's position or to produce a direct communist takeover, the thermonuclear environment has forced them to back away from their once-held thesis of the inevitability of war. The measure of their concern is reflected in the sizeable political price they have been willing to pay for this ideological *volte-face,* one of the root causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Translated into policy terms, it has provided the rationale for the cautious Soviet behavior that in Chinese eyes has slowed down the communist drive for world hegemony.[3]

[3]For a significant example of how Soviet caution operates in practice and tends to support Chinese charges, see John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," ORBIS, Spring 1962. On that occasion the Soviets put the Chinese directly, and others indirectly, on notice that the Soviet Union would not pull anyone else's chestnuts out of the fire.

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The determinist Soviet view, which sees every conflict as a possible prelude to a third world war, is reinforced by the logic of Soviet action. Since the Soviets consider it their historical duty as the bearers of communism to involve themselves directly or indirectly in every conflict from Yemen to the Congo, they have forced the United States, in order to resist USSR encroachment, to redefine its interests in worldwide terms in contrast to its relatively isolationist outlook before 1941. This has increased the risks of a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation and could validate the Soviet prophecy that a minor conflict could set off a world cataclysm.

Therefore, the Soviets exclude by definition the possibility of a limited conflict between the United States and the USSR. They use the Korean conflict to prove the rule: in their view it remained limited only because they were not directly involved. The Soviets believe that had they entered the conflict a third world war would have resulted. And, they add, if this were true in the days when the United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly, how much more valid is the point today, given Soviet advances in nuclear-missile technology.

Additional ideological considerations have reinforced Soviet views. Before Stalin's death the Soviets acted on the notion that differences within the capitalist world were stronger than those between the communist and the capitalist camps, which meant that a war between the capitalist states was more likely than one between the Soviet Union and the nonsocialist states. In such a war the Soviets could remain on the sidelines. (This line of reasoning, of course, ignored Stalin's miscalculation, which led to Soviet involvement in World War II.) After his death Stalin's thesis was found to be invalid: postwar growth of Soviet power has pushed it to the fore and created a new situation in which the differences between the socialist and capitalist worlds are now stronger than those within the capitalist camp. In turn this has increased the risks of a clash between the two systems and ensures that it will be to the death, i.e., the political objective of eliminating the rival system will be overriding.[4]

The new formulation has posed a dilemma for the Soviets. To stress that the conflicts between the socialist and the capitalist

[4]The Soviet military view, as articulated by Marshal Sokolovsky, restates this as the basis of Soviet military doctrine in Sokolovsky, editor, *Voennaya Strategia* (*Military Strategy*) (Second edition; Moscow: USSR Defense Ministry Publishing House, 1963).

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worlds are stronger than those within the capitalist camp is to imply that a clash, with the danger of nuclear extinction, is inevitable. To avoid the logical consequence of the new formulation, Khrushchev modified Lenin's thesis in 1956 by declaring that war was not inevitable. And to be doubly safe he declared in 1959 that communism could triumph even if islands of capitalism still dotted the globe. Khrushchev further suggested that this triumph would be achieved through the power of example rather than the use of force. Khrushchev's successors have not repudiated his postulations. Indeed, they have reaffirmed the validity of his peaceful coexistence policy; to date they have charged him only with poor "working style" in executing this policy.

Thus the Soviets have downgraded the inevitability of a showdown between socialist and capitalist forces because of Soviet deterrent capabilities, but they have nevertheless insisted that if it comes it will be all the more difficult to limit because of entangling alliances on both sides. If, in addition, the United States and the USSR should be driven to a direct armed conflict, it would be all the more violent because of their key roles as the main opposing bastions of power. As historical proof for their thesis on the scope and violence of a conflict involving the major powers the Soviets cite World War II, where unconditional surrender was posed as the ultimate objective even though the struggle—the Soviet role aside—was between capitalist competitors, i.e., those with similar ideologies distinguished only by relative degrees of rapaciousness. How much worse, ask the Soviets, would the conflict be if it occurs between the USSR and the United States, opponents with radically differing ideologies? In the Soviet view, such a conflict would be converted into a war to make the world safe for capitalism or communism.

Limited Nuclear War in Europe

The foregoing section enumerated some of the historical and ideological factors underpinning the Soviet belief that any conflict involving Soviet and U.S. forces would escalate to general war. Beyond general considerations, the Soviets also believe that specific factors would undermine any efforts to limit a U.S.-USSR conflict either to conventional arms, or, if it passed the nuclear threshold, to "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear weapons.[5]

[5]The problem of semantics should be mentioned here. The Soviets do not necessarily accept the U.S. concept of tactical or battlefield weapons. (See, e.g., General A. Nevsky, "Newest Military Technology and Problems of Strategy," in

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The Soviets rule out a war in Western Europe primarily because it would bring into play all vital elements making for escalation —nuclear weapons, alliance ties and vital national interests—as no other conflict could, short of U.S. and USSR assaults on each other's homelands. Soviet reaction to U.S. commentary on the feasibility of limited war provides a basis for understanding Soviet thinking.[6]

Above all else the Soviets do not believe the two major powers could agree on limited political and military objectives in any European conflict that became grave enough to involve the use of nuclear weapons. They ask implicitly whether Washington would regard a Soviet drive across Western Europe toward the Atlantic (in a "justified" response, of course, to U.S. or German "aggression") as a limited objective. The Kremlin might so consider it, since it would not threaten the U.S. homeland, but successive U.S. administrations appear to have answered the question negatively. The Soviets have noted past indications of the American view that the national security of the United States would be gravely endangered if Western Europe were allowed to fall into Soviet hands; therefore the Americans would presumably use all means at their command—including nuclear weapons at any level necessary—to forestall such an eventuality. The Soviets infer this from such declarations as former U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's assertions in 1961 that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Berlin.[7] In Moscow's view this is cause for concern; if the Americans threaten to go to that length over Berlin, how much more likely would they be to react even more strongly over a larger objective, e.g., West Germany?

The Soviets question the feasibility of territorial limitations. They concede these might be imposed on conflicts in under-

Problemy Mira I Sotsializma [*Problems of Peace and Socialism*], No. 3, 1963, p. 33.) Some Americans consider the USSR 700-mile missiles to be tactical weapons because they could not be used against the continental United States, but only within the European theater. For the Soviets, however, these weapons have strategic significance: in American hands, they could strike Soviet soil; in Soviet hands, they could attain what the Soviets (and the Europeans, as well) see as strategic objectives.

[6]See Sokolovsky, editor, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-96, for an outline of major Soviet objections to the concept that a limited nuclear war is feasible. The book is the first compilation of Soviet strategic views since 1926 and presumably presents a reasoned and authoritative view; moreover, the task of compiling it was assigned to Sokolovsky, a prominent military spokesman and former Soviet Chief of Staff. The views are not final or eternal, but they are certainly representative of an influential military group, for the book was reissued despite unfavorable comments by some Soviet reviewers.

[7]*New York Times,* September 25, 1961.

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developed areas outside Europe or in those with clear-cut geographical boundaries, e.g., islands, but not in a highly developed and densely populated area such as Europe. The last instance gives rise to the complex question of how the warring sides could attack strictly tactical military targets without simultaneously destroying large populated centers and strategic targets. In the Soviet view it is difficult, both in practice and theory, to distinguish between military and nonmilitary objectives. The Soviets also question whether tactical and strategic targets can be separated.[8] Even if such distinctions could be made, however, would they be adhered to by both sides?[9] Implicitly, the Soviets raise the question of the observance of "open city" declarations; they do not believe the experiences of Guernica and Rotterdam in the 1930's and 1940's justify any confidence on this score. In any event, because of politico-military considerations involved in countercenter strategy (to be discussed later), it is doubtful that the Soviets would tie their hands by an open city policy.

The Soviets also doubt that even strictly military problems can be resolved so as to enable both sides to "fight" a limited nuclear war. Thus they deny that weapons yields can be identified to permit observation and enforcement of any limitation on this score. However, the Soviets apparently are trying to solve this problem: they have developed a device that allegedly will enable their forces in the field to determine the size of nuclear weapons used against them.[10] According to Western observers, this device is crudely imprecise and probably could differentiate only, for example, between 20 and 200 kilotons. This is certainly not accurate enough for a tightly controlled limited war.

The Soviets also deny that nuclear weapons can be properly defined as "tactical" or "strategic." This points up the problem of semantics that must be hurdled before substantive issues can be discussed. From the U.S. viewpoint the problem is compounded by the fact that USSR doctrine for employment of forces has a concept called "operational" that falls somewhere between strategic and tactical. Roughly speaking, this concept applies to the employment of Soviet Front forces (equal to a U.S. Army Group); however, the concept is not clear-cut and has defied even Soviet

[8]Nevsky, *loc. cit.*
[9]*Ibid.*
[10]*Voenny Vestnik* (*Military Herald*), No. 12, 1963, p. 107.

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efforts to give it precision.[11] Its employment under nuclear conditions might pose an insurmountable obstacle in a conflict already likely to be plagued by other political and military ambiguities.

Finally, a major military problem of tactical nuclear warfare that defies solution in Soviet eyes relates to delivery systems. In a nutshell, the Soviets question whether rules can be devised to govern nuclear salvos delivered into the battle area from outside the war zone.

The foregoing outlines the Soviet case against the feasibility of limited nuclear war. A dissenting view is held by some Soviet military leaders, who probably constitute a small minority. Without flatly contradicting the prevalent view, they maintain ambiguously that not every conflict will escalate into general war.[12] However, in the European context limited war is considered to be possible only in its conventional form because the use of any nuclear weapons, it is believed, would bring on a general war. Some Soviet strategists (e.g., Colonel General N. A. Lomov,[13] a Soviet military figure who has played a leading role in articulating the rationale of Soviet strategy) have spoken of local wars involving the use of nuclear weapons without asserting that such a war would inevitably be transformed into world war. Some extremists among Soviet military strategists claim unqualifiedly that the Soviet armed forces are ready to fight nuclear war even at the local war level.[14]

However, even those in the Soviet military who seem to advocate the feasibility of limited nuclear war envision that it can be prevented from escalating to general war only if it is terminated

[11]One Soviet military spokesman attempted to discuss this concept in the late 1950's; see Major General V. A. Semenov, *Kratkii Otcherk Razvitiya Sovetskogo Operativnogo Iskusstva* (*Short Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational Art*) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960). His effort was criticized by Soviet military reviewers for its failure to help Soviet commanders to distinguish between strategic and operational aspects.

[12]For example, Marshal A. I. Yeremenko asserted this in a commentary denying the strategic importance of foreign bases. See his "Modern Strategy in Border Conflicts," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* No. 3, 1964, p. 8.

[13]*Sovetskaya Voennaya Doktrina* (*Soviet Military Doctrine*) (Moscow: USSR Publishing House Znaniye, 1963).

[14]This position was taken by Marshal of Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov in *Moscow News,* May 11, 1963. (I am indebted to Thomas Wolfe for making this reference available to me.) *Moscow News* is a Soviet English-language publication put out primarily for foreign consumption. But no Soviet strategist, including Rotmistrov, has thus far made this assertion explicitly in any Russian-language organ intended for domestic consumption, either popular or military.

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by a swift victory.[15] This suggests a possible Soviet belief that if one side, in pursuit of limited objectives, achieves a *fait accompli*, the other may fear to recoup its losses at the risk of general war.

The Soviet proponents of the feasibility of limited nuclear war seem to have made little headway. Indeed, on balance, it appears that the skeptics in the Soviet ranks outweigh those who view nuclear war as "thinkable." Such a reaction has been conditioned by the devastating experience of the Soviets in World War II. In civilian circles the skepticism is reflected by the difficulties the regime has encountered in selling civil defense to the Soviet population. Despite their best efforts, the civil defense instructors have been unable to prevent hopelessness or pessimism from developing among the Soviet people. The situation apparently is serious enough to force such high-ranking figures as Marshal V. Chuikov, the Soviet civil defense and ground forces commander, to note in the chief civil defense organ that civil defense instructors must be more convincing in the performance of their duties.[16]

The pessimism of civilian officials extends even to the military, the one group that might be expected to view the use of nuclear weapons as feasible. Many military officers, having been called on to explore the feasibility of such a war, apparently find nuclear war incredible. They have often been taken to task for not "correctly" understanding the qualitative changes wrought by nuclear-missile weapons. Some have been criticized for focusing attention on conventional arms during military exercises simulating the employment of new weapons instead of "creatively" exploiting the opportunities offered by nuclear strikes. Such disregard of the "benefits" of nuclear weapons seems to reflect disbelief within the Soviet military that these weapons can be used to advantage in conflict.[17]

Escalation and Soviet Military Posture and Doctrine

The negative reaction of the Soviets to the feasibility of limited war in Europe also appears to stem from their military organization, equipment and doctrine. Present Soviet military posture and thinking reduce the possibility of a flexible reaction in a

[15]See Colonel General Lomov, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), January 10, 1964.
[16]*Voenniye Znaniya* (*Military Studies*), No. 1, 1964.
[17]Criticism of the military group on this score has appeared in the Soviet military organ with the largest circulation; see, e.g., Lt. Colonel V. Alekseyev, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* January 28, 1964. The emphasis given to such a shortcoming indicates that the problem must be sufficiently widespread to require dealing with it in the open.

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European conflict; if anything, they would tend to escalate such a war.

According to doctrine, the Soviet ground forces in the event of war are charged with (a) defeating enemy troops deployed in the theater of operations, (b) destroying enemy operational and tactical nuclear weapons, (c) capturing vitally important enemy territory, and (d) preventing invasion of Soviet bloc territory.[18] To carry out these missions, the Soviet armed forces, as in World War II, would be grouped into Fronts, the basic wartime fighting units. These units would be so large—in World War II they approached one-half million men—and would receive such overwhelming air and nuclear-missile support that the Soviet forces could be counted on to seize ground in Europe at the minimum rate of sixty kilometers a day.[19]

The forces of a Front would, in a future war, receive support not only from the aircraft of their Air Army and from their own short-range nuclear-missile forces but from the longer-range missiles nominally not an integral part of the Front forces. (Marshal Chuikov implies that these would be missiles with ranges exceeding 500 kilometers.)[20]

Countercenter Strategy

Current Soviet strategic thinking, which affects Soviet views on the use of weapons at all levels, is dominated by what may be called "countercenter strategy," as opposed to the countercity and counterforce concepts discussed in the West. According to strategic doctrine, the Soviet armed forces must either seize the enemy's territory or devastate his "rear" (in Soviet terminology, a nation's political and economic foundations) in order to destroy his will to fight or cripple him, thus hindering him or even preventing him from carrying on a protracted war.

Because of the differences in the geographical positions of the United States and the other major NATO allies, Soviet strategy has had to consider the two in separate contexts. Since the United States is out of reach of the Soviet ground forces—except for possible scattered paratroop landings—the option of occupying U.S. territory is closed to the USSR. Consequently the Soviets believe

[18]Sokolovsky, editor, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

[19]According to one Soviet military spokesman, there is no reason why ground forces so aided cannot considerably exceed this rate of gain, which was achieved by the Soviet Army in World War II. See Colonel V. Glazov, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 3, 1964.

[20]Chuikov, "Modern Ground Forces," *Izvestia*, December 22, 1963.

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that in the event of general war they would have to destroy American political and economic centers. In this context, Soviet strategy might be called a "countercenter" strategy, stemming from the Soviet belief that to bring the enemy nation to its knees it is not necessary to wipe it out but only to damage or sever the command and control cords of the body politic. This would be akin to using karate tactics against the opponent's nerve centers rather than administering massive blows against the entity, as implied in countercity or counterforce strategies. Hence the USSR may not be interested in "killing" U.S. cities or population as such, even though at present the countercenter strategy may be similar to a highly selective countercity strategy because a few key U.S. cities now contain such nerve centers. One may envision a triangle of key cities—Washington, New York and Chicago—as the target of a Soviet countercenter attack. Any future separation of the political and economic nerve centers from these cities would make clear the distinction between the Soviet countercenter strategy on the one hand and counterforce or countercity strategies on the other.[21]

Employment of Nuclear Weapons

The USSR's strategic thinking about the United States has influenced its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe as well. Thus the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons, even in the narrower context of a potential foe on the same continent, should be used not only against enemy troops but also against nonmilitary targets, if required. Two Soviet military writers have expressed it this way:

> As distinguished from conventional weapons designed mainly for inflicting blows on the armed forces on contact, the new types of armaments are directed *above all* against the rear of states. Nuclear-missile weapons will not know the difference between front and rear, between soldiers and civilians. . . .[22]

This indicates that the use of nuclear weapons against political control centers in Europe would not be excluded.

The Soviets have said nothing directly about the command and control structure that would govern the employment of their nu-

[21]A more detailed consideration of the Soviet countercenter strategy appears in John R. Thomas, "Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy," in the forthcoming book, John Erickson, editor, *Nuclear Technology—A World Dilemma* (New York: Praeger).

[22]Major General N. Sushko and Major A. Kondratkov, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 2, 1964, p. 21. (Emphasis added.)

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clear weapons, but they have hinted that their field commanders will have full authority to take appropriate action against the enemy. Thus they have said that, because of time constraints, "A particularly rapid, literally instantaneous, and *completely independent* reaction is required from commanders upon receiving information on the enemy's nuclear weapons."[23] This clearly implies missile blows, since even the use of supersonic aircraft would not enable a Soviet commander to react "literally instantaneously," particularly if enemy targets have, as is likely, high mobility. Indeed, Soviet field commanders will be expected to make pre-emptive strikes by "delivering the first blow."[24]

Soviet doctrine, as applied to Europe, would call for advancing forces to have the fire support not only of their own shorter-range missiles but also of the 700- and 1,100-mile weapons, if required. Moreover, all of the launchers would be placed as far back of the war zone as possible to avoid destruction by retaliatory blows. The 700- and 1,100-mile missiles would be within Soviet borders. It can be assumed that most of the longer-range missiles trained on Western Europe are positioned along the western borders of the USSR. It is unlikely that these missiles would be moved outside Soviet borders, since this would both increase their vulnerability to U.S. strikes and decrease their fire-support efficiency. On the latter score the Soviets have cited the advantage of nuclear missiles over conventional artillery: missiles can be placed far enough behind the battle lines to eliminate the need of frequent repositioning inherent in shorter-range conventional artillery.[25] Soviet 700-mile missiles can be kept on Soviet soil, require little or no repositioning, and can still reach targets in most of Western Europe.

Soviet View of Escalation

How would the Soviet military posture, doctrine and views on limited war affect the problem of escalation? Before turning to this question, we should clarify the general Soviet position on it. The Soviets have not yet discussed the mechanics of escalation in

[23] *Krasnaya Zvezda,* February 12, 1964. (Emphasis added.)

[24] See *Voenny Vestnik,* No. 8, August 1963, pp. 8-9. On other occasions Soviet military strategists have stated that Soviet forces must be prepared to achieve surprise at all levels—strategic, operational and tactical. And, Marshal Malinovsky, Soviet Defense Minister, in his speech at the Twenty-first Party Congress in October 1961, called on Soviet forces to stand ready to "nip in the bud" any "aggressive designs" against the Soviet Union. His remarks strongly implied pre-emption as a possible contingency for Soviet forces.

[25] See *Soviet Military Review,* No. 12, December 1965, p. 26.

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any detailed or organized manner. The little attention they have given the subject reflects their belief that escalation is a meaningless concept in the European context; to date they have discussed a European war only in the context of a world war, assuming that all Western Europe will be a battleground. However, on the few occasions that they have tried to deal with the nature of escalation, Soviet strategists have dismissed the exercise as impractical because of such factors as population densities, the difficulty of pinning down mobile targets because of poor reconnaissance and intelligence, and problems of coordinating troops in the field. In their view these factors make it impossible to fight a pure counterforce war, as envisioned by some Western strategists.

Paradoxically, the U.S. position in Europe may contribute to the Soviet belief that escalation cannot be controlled in the European context. Soviet leaders seem to believe that the current weaknesses of NATO's military posture on the European continent would require the United States either to escalate a conflict drastically or surrender its position in Europe. In view of the strong U.S. reaction in Korea the Soviets do not expect Washington to abandon the even more vital area of Europe. At the same time, U.S. vulnerabilities in Europe (e.g., in lines of communication) would, in the Soviet view, all but ensure that the Americans would quickly be forced to escalate, even if the Soviets were disposed to exercise restraint and their own posture was structured—which is not the case—to inhibit escalation.[26] However, the Soviets could hardly be expected to abstain from exploiting such vulnerabilities.

The apparent lack of Soviet interest in exploring the problem of escalation, reinforced by the Soviet posture, has a number of implications for the development of a conflict in Europe. The basic point inherent in Soviet military posture and doctrine is that, if the Soviets act according to plan, they will "go nuclear" at a very high level. The Front's mission and the firepower sup-

[26]The Soviets' derogation of U.S. airlift capability (e.g., of operation "Big Lift" in the fall of 1963) and Soviet commentary on U.S. dependence on the sea lanes in the event of a European war mark Soviet recognition of U.S. vulnerability; one can be sure that the Soviets also are not ignorant of other U.S. vulnerabilities, e.g., the limited number of ports and airfields available to them in Western Europe. As fas back as 1957 the Soviets noted that these facilities are concentrated in small areas. (Colonel Kravtsov, "The Role of Air Force in Plans of NATO," *Vestnik Vozduzhnogo Flota*, No. 12, 1957, p. 80.) Obviously, this would present an enticing incentive for a Soviet attack; such an attack, however, might escalate a conflict to a point close to general war.

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port it is to receive from tactical air and missile forces guarantee a U.S. response that would make the entire European continent a battleground; in effect, territorial limitations on escalation would be removed and the weapons level would be only steps short of an ICBM exchange.

With regard to tactical aircraft, the Soviets have demonstrated in the past how much they value close air support of ground forces, even at the expense of strategic air capabilities. Thus, in World War II, the Soviets, after an initial unsuccessful raid on Berlin, never attempted any long-range bombing. Carried into today's context, the Soviet stress on tactical air support of ground forces is manifest by the fact that, unlike his U.S. counterpart, a USSR ground commander has direct command of the tactical air units. Given the sizeable range of their tactical aircraft, the Soviets are justified in expecting the employment of these planes to make for geographical escalation in any European conflict involving their major ground force units. (That they intend to use their tactical air forces for nuclear strikes in support of their ground forces has been articulated in major Soviet military pronouncements.) [27] The expansion would come in the form of Soviet attack missions—far-ranging when considered in the cramped confines of Europe—behind the enemy lines and expected retaliatory blows on the Soviet air bases by the enemy's tactical aircraft following the Soviet attack missions.

Asymmetry in U.S. and USSR Postures

Another major factor contributing to escalation would be the relative asymmetry between the U.S. and USSR tactical nuclear-missile postures. At present the USSR apparently lacks the low-yield weapons that U.S. forces have, but at the same time the USSR seems to have tactical delivery systems of greater range and numbers than the United States possesses. In a word, the postures are asymmetrical in both the range and numbers of delivery vehicles and in the yields of nuclear weapons. In a war this means that one side would have to stop at a yield or range level below that of the other—a questionable proposition in the heat of battle.[28]

Moreover, lagging Soviet missile technology may be responsible

[27] See, for example, Sokolovsky, editor, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

[28] This seems to underlie Marshal Sokolovsky's warning that, in the event of a nuclear conflict, each side would respond with greater force. *Ibid.*, p. 94. Also, see Nevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

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for the asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet nuclear-missile postures. The Soviets implicitly admit that their shorter-range missiles are less accurate than their intercontinental missiles.[29] Hence, the Soviets may be unable to pursue a damage-limiting counterforce strategy in Europe because of technological and other considerations. This may explain Soviet claims that one cannot distinguish military from civilian and tactical from strategic targets. At the tactical level the Soviets apparently cannot carry out pinpoint strikes against exclusively military targets.

Perhaps the only way to correct the weapons asymmetry would be, in the manner of duels in the past when both sides used identical pistols, to standardize yields and missile ranges on both sides—obviously a politico-military impossibility now or in the future. In a word, if both sides are to play by the same rules, they must have the same equipment. Until then, if the Americans, because of possible conventional force inferiority stemming from the rapid mobilization capabilities of the Soviets, initiated the use of nuclear weapons at the lowest levels, the Soviets would have to respond almost automatically at a higher level because they may not possess matching yields at the lower level.

Soviet posture and doctrine pose another problem: Would the Americans accede to the inherent sanctuary concept in the event the Soviets used the 700-mile missiles to back up their ground forces? It is clear that if the USSR missile forces provided the firepower support required by their doctrine, the United States would be confronted with the problem of striking some launchers positioned close to or within the Soviet Union. But if the U.S. forces took such retaliatory action, they would have to do so with 1,100-mile Polaris missiles because at present the United States has no intermediate weapons between the Polaris and the 300-mile Pershing rockets. Any such action would, in the current Soviet view, expand the war into attacks against population and industrial centers, since the Soviets—according to Major General N. Talensky, a prominent military commentator—believe the Polaris cannot be used for point targets and, indeed, is useful only for area strikes.[30]

Moreover, the Polaris could not be used without risking Soviet

[29]Marshal Malinovsky has declared on several occasions that all Soviet ICBM tests accomplished their objectives "excellently," whereas the other rockets received performance marks of either "excellent" or "good." See, for example, *Voenniye Znaniye,* No. 2, 1964, p. 35.

[30]Talensky, "A NATO Nuclear Force Is a Dangerous Venture," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* May 1963, pp. 22-26.

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counterretaliation at a still higher weapons level. For example, the Soviets might respond to a Polaris strike by firing their 1,100-mile missiles on Polaris bases in Britain and Western Europe. Such a development would be far removed from the limited war confined to the immediate battle area that some strategists envision. But even if U.S. leaders refrained initially from ordering retaliation against longer-range missiles being fired on battlefield forces from the sanctuary of Soviet soil, how long could they resist domestic political pressure not to respect such sanctuary? It is even conceivable (assuming the scenario is plausible in the first place) that some Europeans, for example, West German leaders or French President de Gaulle, might demand that Washington do something about USSR missiles wreaking havoc on their lands and forces. It can be inferred from Soviet reading of American behavior that the Kremlin does not believe the Americans could or would resist such pressure. The possibility of this sequence of retaliation seems to motivate Soviet disbelief that, once the nuclear threshold was crossed, events could be kept from spiraling out of control.

Soviet Political Considerations

Yet despite these risks the Soviets apparently intend to wage war in the manner described: as a combined-arms operation with all the appropriate nuclear-missile support called for by their doctrine. This scale of effort is required by the Soviet view of what a European war would involve and what would be required to "win" it. For the Soviets, any conflict is more than a military problem. It involves a mix of economic, political, psychological and military factors that must be evaluated to determine the proper course for employment of force.[31] But in the final analysis political considerations override military considerations. It is this, in the Soviet view, that makes it impossible to treat the military elements of a potential conflict situation in isolation from the political context.

The best illustration of this point may be found in the Soviet reaction to the 1958 Technical Conference on Surprise Attack. When the West first proposed the meeting, the Soviets were unable to understand what the West had in mind, since the question spanned vital political and economic as well as military considerations. The West, in turn, was dismayed when the Soviet delega-

[31] *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 2, 1964, p. 19.

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tion showed up with a high-powered political team for what the West expected to be a technical conference. For the Soviets this was a normal approach to any vital problem and it should not have surprised anyone familiar with their outlook.

The supremacy of politics over strategy in the Soviet Union affects the Soviet view of the relation of policy to military targeting in a nuclear conflict.[32] This would apply also in a tactical nuclear war. Western planners, on the other hand, might consider targeting solely a military function, particularly at the tactical level. The Soviet view on the relation of political considerations to military factors undoubtedly dictates that in the event of even a tactical nuclear war, Soviet nonstrategic nuclear-missile forces would have missions other than rendering direct support to combat troops and destroying troop concentrations in the rear.[33] Such missions, the Soviets have hinted, would include the option to fight a noncounterforce war. As they put it:

> Only the appearance of nuclear weapons and such means of delivery to the target as rockets has created a condition under which the destruction of vital centers and also of an entire country has become a reality. From here on, the ancient characteristic of armed conflict—the clash of armed forces of hostile sides—has ceased to be the only or main method of conducting war. This is an objective reality which does not depend on theoretical aspects and desires.[34]

With the foregoing in mind, it can be inferred that a primary mission of the Soviet missile forces would be to enhance the political negotiating posture of the Soviet leadership: in the context of a European war this would mean a standby capability for actual or threatened nuclear-missile destruction of vital industrial, political and administrative centers as a means of tearing apart the political fabric of the NATO alliance. The objective would be to force the withdrawal of the NATO members from the alliance and thus exert pressure on the United States to end the conflict on terms favorable to the USSR.[35] If this were the course of events, i.e., if the NATO allies were unwilling to fight in defense of their home soil, then, in Soviet eyes, the Americans

[32] *Loc. cit.*

[33] *Krasnaya Zvezda,* February 12, 1964.

[34] Colonel G. A. Federov, editor, *Marksizm-Leninizm O Voine I Armii* (*Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*) (Third edition; Moscow, 1962), pp. 316-317.

[35] As has been noted, the countercenter strategy would also apply, in the Soviet view, in a broader context of a U.S.-USSR general war. In this connection the Soviets have noted that the use of force against an enemy's political and administrative centers might compel him to halt a war even if his military forces are undefeated. See, for example, Sokolovsky, editor, *op. cit.,* p. 28.

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could not expect to carry on a war against the opposition of their allies. (In this connection the Soviets have taken due note of American statements that they cannot continue their support of South Vietnam if the Vietnamese themselves are unwilling to fight for their own cause.) The Soviets apparently have this strategy in mind in warning that their nuclear capabilities should give pause to any NATO ally which continues its close association with the United States in the event of a European war. They have cited specifically the number of weapons it would take to remove some of the allies from a war in Europe. For example, Khrushchev, in a statement to West German editors in May 1959, declared that eight three- to five-megaton bombs on West Germany would be sufficient "to render it ineffective."[36] He did not claim that West Germany would be obliterated but implied only that the country would be unable to continue the war. The Soviets have also made five hydrogen weapon threats against Britain. Other NATO countries have been threatened proportionately: Turkey and Greece have been warned by the Soviet Navy Chief that the nuclear-missile power of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet alone could reduce them to waste.[37]

The Fait Accompli *Approach*

As an alternative to the less-preferred course, i.e., total nuclear devastation of Western Europe, Soviet leaders have imposed a requirement on their military to be ready to "win" a European war by other means. To this end, Soviet military doctrine has worked out a *fait accompli* approach designed to enable the Soviets to seize Europe instead of destroying it. As with other parts of Soviet doctrine, this has obvious implications for escalation. The Soviets' calculations on this score may be inferred from their belief that local war will not escalate to general war if it can be ended with a quick victory, which implies that if the objectives can be attained quickly, the enemy will hesitate to recoup his losses at the risk of general war. In the European theater this could be brought about by a quick Soviet thrust to the English Channel. The Soviets have noted that Western Europe in particular lends itself to this strategy of "quick victory" because any military action there would range over an area of relatively shallow operational depth.

Soviet calculations would seem to be well founded if the abil-

[36] *Pravda,* May 5, 1959.
[37] Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, *ibid.,* February 2, 1962.

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ity of NATO forces to stop a possible Soviet advance at the Rhine is in question. Even a superficial glance at the map makes it evident that if the Soviets were to approach their expressed goal of advancing at a minimum rate of sixty kilometers a day, they would be at the Channel in less than a week—long before the U.S. government would have a chance to react by landing additional forces on the Continent. (This is apart from the question of whether NATO could even make the necessary political decisions in that time.) In the event Soviet forces reached the Channel and the United States refused to accept the results of the *fait accompli,* the latter would face the alternative of expanding the war to Soviet soil and risking a retaliatory Soviet blow on American soil or of devastating Western Europe, and thus alienating the survivors, in trying to get at the conquering Soviet forces. Obviously neither alternative would be attractive.

The grave danger, of course, is that the Soviets could miscalculate their ability to overwhelm Western defenses in Europe. In the event of failure the ensuing "bleeding" war could, as the Soviets freely concede, lead to general war as each side applied force at successively higher levels to restore the balance in its favor.

Soviet Evaluation of U.S. Reactions

Finally, USSR evaluation of U.S. behavior also has implications for possible escalation of a European conflict to general war. Currently the United States has strategic superiority—a sizeable lead in long-range bombers and missiles—to back up its tactical nuclear capabilities. The Soviets believe the Americans would not hesitate to use their strategic forces if a Soviet attack threatened to overrun Europe. Soviet thinking on this score has been influenced by their view of American reaction in Korea: after having written off the area as not important enough to warrant direct commitment, the United States "overreacted" to the North Korean attack by drastically jumping its military budget from 15 to 40 billion dollars and by returning sizeable military forces to the Korean peninsula. More than that, the U.S. government converted the Korean conflict from the originally stated purpose of denying the enemy the "fruits" of aggression, i.e., seizure of South Korea, to unifying the country by marching to the Yalu River.

Much more than space permits here could and should be said about the Kremlin's view of U.S. behavior, since it has a vital

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bearing on Soviet estimates of U.S. reaction to a European conflict. But, in summary, the Soviets' view of the Americans can be described as ambivalent. They are impressed by the fact that the Americans, despite their actual and potential power—at one time graced by nuclear monopoly—tolerate considerable pressure before they react. Thus it took a Pearl Harbor to galvanize the United States into action against the threat posed by the Axis powers. This high tolerance threshold has shaped the postwar USSR strategy of chipping away at U.S. interests without confronting the United States with a massive challenge. The Soviets are also impressed by American actions once they are aroused. Indeed, the Soviets are apprehensive over their reading that Americans overreact by adopting a narrowly "military" approach to war, tending to stress military action at the expense of political considerations or consequences—as reflected, for example, in the "unconditional surrender" policy of World War II. In that case the Soviets benefited by American single-mindedness in so pursuing the war against Germany as to permit a power vacuum to develop in Central Europe; the USSR was only too happy to fill it, to the detriment of U.S. interests.

But the Soviets do not count on such a bonus again. It is precisely because the Americans could apply an overwhelming military solution against them, similar to the unrestrained war carried on against Germany and Japan, that the Soviets fear any future conflict would not remain limited. Compounding their concern is the strategic superiority that the United States could bring into play if it should begin losing the war at the tactical level in Europe. The USSR's concern exists despite its ability to inflict damage on the United States, an ability Germany did not have in World War II. For an integral part of the Soviet image of the United States is its view that despite the rationality and the coolheadedness of individual leaders, the U.S. government has often reacted viscerally. The U.S. reaction to the attempted USSR missile emplacement in Cuba was the most recent confirmation of this view. The Soviets were taken aback because in their view their action had not created any situation that they themselves had not lived with for a long time, namely, surrounded by U.S. missile bases. Even worse, the Soviets, in their view, have had to live with this situation in a perennial state of strategic inferiority, something the Americans have not yet faced.

The Soviets' fear of American overreaction could trigger their

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own overreaction in the form of pre-emptive blows; this, in turn, could lead to swift escalation of a European war. Ironically, the cause of such pre-emption might be a U.S. counterforce strategy designed to limit a European conflict. Since 1961 the Soviet leaders have talked, in a general nuclear war context, of the possibility of pre-emption to meet possible U.S. "aggression." This is a possibility they examined once before, in 1954-1955, when they were on the short strategic end with regard to intercontinental-range bombers. The latest examination of pre-emption has undoubtedly been spurred both by the U.S. ICBM lead and its talk of using a counterforce strategy against the USSR. In the eyes of the Soviets, such a strategy, in view of their ICBM inferiority, puts a premium on their launching their missile force at the first sign of a possible strike. This fear may lessen with time if the Soviets are successful in developing hardened sites; but even then they may be unwilling to take the risk that forces sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage could survive an American strike.

Soviet views on pre-emption in a European conflict are based on the same logic, even though U.S.—and not Soviet—military inferiority in Europe may be involved. For even though they may have a numerical lead in medium-range missiles, the Soviets seem to believe that these could be taken out in a first strike by enemy missiles and tactical aircraft. This belief is probably responsible for the USSR view that U.S. bases in Europe are militarily useless except for first-strike purposes, since otherwise they can be rendered ineffective by the USSR's superiority in medium-range ballistic missiles. Such a Soviet view could lead to a pre-emptive blow against the bases in the event of a European conflict.[38] In fact, the Soviets state that in a future war their commanders must determine, after receiving their assignments, which enemy groupings are to be destroyed by nuclear weapons and then proceed to destroy the enemy's firepower capabilities before he can open fire. As the Soviets put it: "One must always anticipate the enemy . . . strike the first blow, and not merely return the fire."[39] Although in this case they were talking of pre-emptive tactical strikes, they do not exclude a similar reaction at other levels. In fact, as far back as 1954-1955, the Soviets discussed in *Voennaya Mysl,* a ma-

[38]For the Soviet view on the vulnerability of U.S. bases and the implications of this for Soviet strategy, see Marshal Yeremenko in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* October 1960 and March 1963.

[39]See *Voenny Vestnik,* No. 8, August 1963, pp. 8-9.

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jor military organ, the need to be prepared to deal the enemy a forestalling blow at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Soviet Germanophobia

Any current Soviet inclinations toward pre-emption in a European conflict might be exacerbated in the future if the Germans acquire their own nuclear-missile weapons. The latter is a distinct possibility, in the Soviet view, however remote it may appear to the West. The Soviets find substantiation for their apprehension in the recent disclosure that West Germany has been making so-called meteorological rockets. As might be expected, the Soviets view this as a euphemism for West German tooling up for military rocketry.[40] Having employed their share of captured German scientists in the early stages of their own postwar missile development, the Soviets do not take lightly West Germany's ability to acquire its own missiles. In that event the Soviets expect West Germany, in case of war, to initiate the use of nuclear-missile weapons even if they become persuaded of American intentions to exercise restraint. The Soviets have interpreted German military commentary as indicating Germany's intentions of "going nuclear first." They have noted German discussion of the possibility that West Germany may be unable to match the USSR in missile power and therefore might be forced, in the future, to launch its smaller force first to save it against devastation by overwhelming Soviet capabilities.[41] To forestall such a pre-emptive attack by the Germans, the Soviets might launch one of their own.

The question of Soviet Germanophobia has vital relevance to the problem of escalation. Though Soviet views on Germany cannot be treated at length here, they cannot be ignored in evaluating the factors that would influence Soviet reaction to a war in Europe. In sum, the Soviet view of the Germans is a complex combination of rational calculation and unreasoning fear, in proportions that are difficult for a Western observer to quantify. But its existence is, beyond dispute, an operative political factor that extends to the very top echelons of the Soviet hierarchy, both past and present. Khrushchev, for example, lost his son during the German assault on Russia; this could not but color his reaction to any German role in a European conflict. Brezhnev served on the Ukrainian front—the scene of the greatest Soviet defeat at the

[40]See the Soviet note to West Germany protesting its manufacture of missiles. *Pravda*, February 4, 1964.
[41]*Ibid.*, "The Plot against Peace," May 29, 1964.

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hands of the Germans—during World War II, and this undoubtedly has influenced his view of the German threat. The current Soviet view is mixed: the Germans are viewed as a direct threat in themselves and a possible agency for drawing U.S. power onto Soviet soil.

Soviet fears have been intensified in recent years by the specter of German nuclear acquisition. The specific Soviet concern, however exaggerated it may appear to the West, is that the Germans may be ignorant of or oblivious to the qualitative changes wrought by nuclear technology. Thus the Soviets have accused the Germans—primarily those following the lead of former Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss—of viewing nuclear-missile weapons as no more than an extension of artillery.[42] Although it can be assumed that the Soviets in this case are trying to score major propaganda points, their fears of possible German "misuse" of future nuclear capabilities cannot be discounted entirely.

These fears are certain to continue as a factor in Soviet thinking, even if the United States and the USSR should devise, tacitly or otherwise, rules for limiting nuclear conflict. However, any such arrangement is, in the Soviet view, likely to be weakened by trends the Soviets claim to discern in Western Europe today. Thus, in the Soviet view, the United States, confronted by an alliance in disarray, will increasingly be pushed toward greater reliance on the Germans to maintain its "control" in Europe.[43] Bonn thereby is seen as securing increased leverage over Washington. This development, if accompanied by German nuclear acquisition, portends in the Soviet view a future wherein the United States will have less and less of the political and military control necessary to limit a European conflict. The Soviets are viscerally certain that in such a situation Germany would not observe any limitations even if the Americans could be trusted to exercise restraint. Soviet concern in the future might be mitigated by such actions as President Johnson's urging that the Germans take into account Soviet Germanophobia in their policy toward the USSR.[44]

[42]See, for example, the Soviet note to France in *ibid.*, February 8, 1964.

[43]This is the Soviet interpretation of the developments relating to the multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Because the latter aroused, relatively, the greatest enthusiasm from the West Germans, the Soviets believe NATO may dissolve into a bilateral American-German alliance. This view is reinforced for them by the prospect that Germany would play a leading role in any MLF-like arrangement, since it would undoubtedly make a large contribution of funds to such a force.

[44]*New York Times*, April 29, 1964. In determining how far to go toward

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Factors Working for De-escalation

Though the preponderance of the evidence, in the Soviet view, is against the likelihood of a limited war, particularly if nuclear weapons are employed, some factors would work for de-escalation, i.e., either prevent the conflict from breaking out in the first instance, if the Soviets had any say in the matter, or restrain indiscriminate use of nuclear-missile weapons at all levels.

One of the major factors for limitation may be the fierce desire of the Kremlin to keep any war away from Soviet soil in order to avoid testing the loyalty of Soviet peoples under fire. The Soviet regime almost collapsed during the first few weeks of the Nazi attack and was saved only by Hitler's shortsighted anti-Slav policy. Undoubtedly the Soviet leaders would not want to subject themselves again to a similar traumatic experience. Indeed, they have been concerned about not only the loyalty of the people but also the loyalty of the armed forces in a possible nuclear war. And with good reason. During the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, a significant number of Soviet military personnel defected or, after capture, joined German-sponsored Russian units fighting the Soviet regime. This included such high-ranking officers as Lt. General Vlasov, one of the heroes of the defense of Moscow in the winter of 1941. The regime's concern that this experience might be repeated is reflected in several aspects of Soviet thinking.

Soviet military commentators have noted that the use of nuclear weapons might lead to the collapse of those states whose "resistance potential" is low because of their poor social and economic organization or unfavorable geographical position.[45] In more specific terms, Soviet concern has been demonstrated by constant exhortations in the military press about the need to strengthen the political consciousness and morale of the troops in order to meet the exigencies of nuclear war. The Soviets openly concede that such a calamity would subject both the country and the armed forces to their gravest test to date. They seem to fear that both might fail the test, with such grave results as to put the viability of the Soviet system in question. Some Soviet military

assuaging Soviet apprehensions, Washington should measure these carefully against the USSR's past record of attempting to advance its cause by exerting pressure on the West in Germany and elsewhere.

[45]Marshal Rotmistrov, "On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War," *Voennaya Mysl,* February 1955, pp. 14-26.

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commentators have even talked in terms of the need to be prepared for panic in the event of a nuclear conflict.[46]

The foregoing permits the inference that if the Soviets could be "insured" against the territorial escalation of a nuclear conflict in Europe to Soviet soil they might be interested in observing any rules that may be devised, explicitly or implicitly, to limit a conflict in Europe. It is questionable whether such rules can be developed. But even if this were possible, the United States would have to examine the implications of such a policy for its national interest. For, among other factors, the certainty that the United States can inflict such damage on the USSR as to put in question the latter's political stability—not to speak of its physical survival—has served as a deterrent to Soviet aggression in the past and probably will serve to restrain it in the future. Hence, if a conflict in Europe were accompanied by a Soviet drive toward the English Channel, an announcement by the Americans that they might be forced to attack Soviet soil could induce a Soviet pause more readily than a futile effort to stem the attack in the battle area.[47]

Nothing more than speculation is possible about the result of such a U.S. threat, but it is instructive to note that similar warnings in the past have had a sobering effect. Thus, during the Syrian crisis in the fall of 1957, the Soviets threatened to attack Turkey if the latter undertook armed action against a newly installed anti-Western regime in Damascus. At that point, John Foster Dulles, then U.S. Secretary of State, issued the first explicit warning ever given the Soviets that their soil would not remain inviolate if they carried out their threat against Turkey. This warning quickly led to an abatement of the Soviet threat campaign; in fact, they promptly shifted their efforts by taking the crisis to the United Nations.

The Soviets behaved much the same way in the 1962 Cuban crisis. The late President Kennedy warned the USSR then that it would suffer a retaliatory attack if any missiles hit the United States. Again, this warning of a direct attack on Soviet soil undoubtedly played a major role in Moscow's decision to remove

[46]See Glazov, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[47]This is not to be interpreted as indicating that the West can rely on the threat of massive retaliation as a substitute for local capabilities to stop a Soviet attack in Europe; on the contrary, such a threat ideally should back up those capabilities in the event they fail to contain a possible Soviet attack.

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the missiles and dump the crisis in the UN's lap. Although the past may not necessarily be a precise guide to the future, it does provide lessons worth examining for their relevance to future situations. Of the two examples cited, the Syrian crisis comes closer to paralleling a possible European conflict, since it involved a threat by the USSR against a U.S. ally rather than against the United States itself.

One other point might be made about possible Soviet acceptance of the feasibility of limited war. Were the Soviets given a guarantee that a war in Europe would not spill over onto their soil, they might derive some confidence in their own ability to fight a limited war due to their close control over the armed forces. Insofar as such a conflict required a tight rein on the field commanders, the Soviets undoubtedly would consider themselves better prepared on this score than the Americans. This is reflected in their doubts about the ability of the American political leadership to control its military in the event of a limited war. The Soviet popular press has consistently harped on the theme that the American military has been close to controlling, if not in actual control of, past decisions making for war. For example, the Soviets expressed the belief that the late General Douglas MacArthur was really responsible for the decision to cross the 38th Parallel, which brought Communist China into the Korean conflict. This theme, as advanced in the Soviet press intended for mass consumption, can be dismissed as sheer propaganda. The relevant commentary contained in the Soviet military journals, however, bears closer examination. In this medium, less propagandistic because it has a more limited circulation than the regular Soviet press and is addressed to a professional audience, the Soviets express concern that in a crisis situation American commanders, because of time pressures or flaws in communication, might take unauthorized action in a combat situation.

They suggest implicitly that such a development on their side would be prevented by the party's control over the Soviet Army. Indeed, the Americans do not have the equivalent of the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration; this political network is embedded in the Soviet armed forces to ensure that a political adviser sits at the elbow of every Soviet commander down to company level, so that the orders of the political leadership will be obeyed. Men like Khrushchev and Brezhnev made their marks as political advisers, acting as Stalin's "eyes and ears" at such major

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battles as Stalingrad. In this connection, Khrushchev recalled that in the Soviet debacle at Kiev in the fall of 1941 he tried frantically to get through to Stalin (to get permission for the troops to fall back across the Dnieper River), only to be denied access to Stalin by Malenkov. Lacking permission, the Soviet troops, pinned against the river, had to stay in place; as a result, the Soviets lost close to a million men. By this example, Khrushchev —whatever the accuracy of his description of his own role and that of Malenkov—unintentionally illustrated how well Soviet political control can work: even in the midst of a critical situation, no move could be made without orders from Moscow. On the basis of such experience, one may infer a Soviet belief that they would have the necessary control over the military to carry on a limited war.

Conclusions

The broad political and strategic considerations that have influenced Soviet thinking on the feasibility of limited nuclear war, particularly in Western Europe, and the specific factors in Soviet attitude and posture that would govern Soviet behavior in the event of such a war, suggest the overall conclusion that any such conflict between the forces of the United States and the USSR would escalate far beyond the confines of the immediate area of confrontation. Indeed, it might not only encompass the entire European continent but also trigger a strategic nuclear exchange—particularly if nuclear weapons were introduced into the limited engagement.

The widely-discussed Western notion that the escalation process might resemble a neat military ladder on which the warring sides could go up or down appears irrelevant in Soviet eyes. Since their thinking and behavior are conditioned by such broad-gauged factors as overriding political objectives, ideological bias, and the emotion of past history, it may be difficult to force the Soviets to narrow their view to "technical" rules of limitation and restraint based on geographical restrictions and the use or nonuse of certain weapons.

The difficulty could be compounded if it seemed to the Soviets that the rules were designed for the convenience of the West, especially to prevent the Soviets from exploiting Western vulnerabilities in the event of a European conflict. All of these factors must be taken into account, since it would take two sides to fight a limited war.

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CORRECTING THE IMBALANCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS

by Alfred E. Davidson

FOR the first time in the memory of the European peoples, the United States has been cast, because of its continuing foreign exchange deficits, in the new and slightly unbelievable role of a country which is overreaching its economic resources. This is difficult enough for an American to believe at a time when his country's economic growth indicators are breaking all records, but it is even more baffling for Europeans. The latter are fully aware that it was U.S. monetary and industrial strength which turned the tide in World Wars I and II, and that it was U.S. economic strength which later helped to rebuild Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and other programs.

To compound European confusion, the United States has been incurring its payments deficit over the past years while simultaneously rolling up enormous trade surpluses. This situation causes surprise because in Europe trade deficits are almost the only known cause of payments deficits, apart from the sometimes large capital transfers by short-term investors and speculators. These transfers are warning signals reflecting basic economic conditions and multiply the problems of money managers in all countries as holders of foreign exchange shift their investments from country to country.

For these reasons Europeans are watching with curiosity the effect of the restrictive measures instituted by the U.S. government to control foreign expenditure and bring its international payments into balance. Tourists were urged to stay at home (they did not stay); would-be investors were urged to curtail their investments abroad (the banks did, but many of the big corporations did not); military expenditures in foreign countries were cut back (except in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic); and foreign aid was virtually limited to U.S. goods and services.

Most of these actions are at odds with the U.S. liberal economic tradition, but they are being taken because monetary experts at home and abroad seem to agree that U.S. gold stocks—after more than seven years of continuous decline—are reaching a level where, if the drain persists much longer, other nations may lose

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confidence in the financial integrity and strength of the United States and its dollar.

These measures have been only partially effective. To the extent they have been successful in helping to achieve a balance, they have at the same time curtailed many desirable international transactions, thereby lowering the level of international investment. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler has emphasized that these restrictions cannot be relaxed and, indeed, must be supplemented, because a small deficit still persists and an adverse trend might well recur. The United States therefore faces a continuing problem unless some new and longer-term policies are developed.

I

It is the contention of this article that, although the United States may have little in the way of an alternative to this policy as matters presently stand, nations accumulating more dollars than they need would serve their own interests and those of the United States by adopting a policy which, in simple terms, would call for greater dollar expenditure to speed their own economic plans. The effect of such a policy would be to bring dollar-earnings and dollar-outgo into balance at a higher rather than lower level of international transaction, thereby enabling the United States to forgo a restrictive policy.

The balance of payments problem is quite a different question from the related liquidity problem that makes so many headlines and occupies the attention of so many monetary experts, i.e., whether or not there is sufficient foreign exchange in the world to finance the increasingly high level of international transactions. In the latter case, the argument revolves around whether the price of gold should be increased, whether the so-called reserve currencies—dollars and sterling—represent a sufficient supplement to the gold reserves, and whether other or new reserve currencies should be created. However, a continuing imbalance in U.S. international payments clearly involves considerations other than the size of international monetary reserves, because the underlying trend in international payments is not affected by the mere size of the reserves. Even if the price of gold were doubled—as M. Rueff, one of President de Gaulle's advisers, suggests—and the evil day of reckoning postponed, the basic question of how to rectify a continuing imbalance would still have to be faced some day.

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A look at the gold and foreign exchange reserve figures over the past eight years demonstrates that, if the trend over this period were to continue very much longer, the United States might be in serious difficulties. In some ways this trend represents the achievement—not the failure—of our postwar goals. Lend-Lease, UNRRA, the Marshall Plan, and other foreign aid programs were needed during and after the war because of the virtual gold and dollar bankruptcy of other nations. In a sense, by the year 1965 the balance had been roughly restored; in the case of some countries, the restoration had gone too far. Now the problem is to arrest, if not necessarily to reverse, the overall trend and try to achieve something approaching an equilibrium in those countries whose reserves are clearly adequate.

A glance at Table I should give rise to few surprises. The most obvious fact is that the principal European countries have increased their gold reserves by approximately the amount U.S. gold reserves have declined in this period. In addition, countries all over the world have greatly increased their dollar holdings, posing an additional threat (which France, in particular, has made a reality) to the diminished gold reserves of the United States. The general and continuing accumulation abroad of dollars, however, shows that there is no lack of confidence in their value. (The conversion by France of dollars into gold seems to represent more of a political than a monetary policy.) On the contrary, dollars held abroad are being loaned long- as well as short-term, and they represent almost the only long-term funds available to countries seeking foreign funds.

II

The reasons why countries with adequate reserves have continued to accumulate dollars rather than spend them have not been sufficiently examined. This question in turn depends largely upon the level of reserves that is regarded as "adequate" for a particular country. There is no neat slide rule formula for fixing the proper ratio between the size of foreign exchange reserves and, for example, the swings in the foreign trade account. Italy's foreign trade is in the same order of magnitude as Canada's, Belgium's and the Netherlands', but its reserves are 30 to 40 per cent greater. Japan's level of trade ranks fifth among all countries, but its reserves are nearly half those of Italy, which has less foreign trade. There simply is no objective explanation why Por-

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TABLE I

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND LEVELS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES*

(Expressed in millions of dollars)

	Foreign Exchange Reserves											
	1958			*1959*			*1960*			*1961*		
Country	*Gold*	*Conv. Currency*	*Total*	*Gold*	*Conv. Currency*	*Total*	*Gold*	*Conv. Currency*	*Total*	*Gold*	*Conv. Currency*	*Total*
Australia	162	958	1,128	154	1,072	1,273	147	696	915	162	1,186	1,348
Belgium	1,270	227	1,553	1,134	88	1,306	1,170	252	1,506	1,248	409	1,813
Canada	1,078	870	2,038	960	917	2,029	885	951	1,989	946	1,118	2,276
France	750	300	1,050	1,290	430	1,736	1,641	429	2,272	2,121	818	3,365
W. Germany	2,639	3,093	5,879	2,637	1,885	4,790	2,971	3,753	7,032	3,664	2,862	7,163
Great Britain	2,807	298	3,105	2,514	222	2,801	2,801	430	3,719	2,267	1,051	3,318
Italy	1,086	1,053	2,184	1,749	1,234	3,056	2,203	980	3,251	2,225	1,332	3,799
Japan	54	946	1,062	244	1,077	1,447	247	1,577	1,949	287	1,199	1,666
Netherlands	1,050	420	1,539	1,132	207	1,442	1,451	291	1,863	1,581	134	1,958
Portugal	493	283	776	548	261	808	552	242	794	443	249	691
Spain	58	8	66	68	141	209	178	369	547	317	555	894
Switzerland	1,925	138	2,063	1,934	129	2,063	2,185	139	2,324	2,560	199	2,759
United States	20,582	...	22,540	19,507	...	21,504	17,804	...	19,359	16,947	116	18,753

	Foreign Exchange Reserves												Level of Foreign Trade	
	1962			1963			1964			1965			1965	
	Gold	Conv. Currency	Total	Gold	Conv. Currency	Total	Gold	Conv. Currency	Total	Gold	Conv. Currency	Total	Imports	Exports
Australia	190	1,123	1,387	208	1,572	1,880	226	1,621	1,947	232n	1,233n	1,600n	3,634	3,047
Belgium	1,365	257	1,753	1,371	431	1,940	1,451	540	2,192	1,558	437	2,304	6,045s	6,726
Canada	708	1,838	2,547	817	1,786	2,603	1,026	1,658	2,881	1,151	1,523	3,027	8,574s	8,613s
France	2,587	1,023	4,049	3,175	1,282	4,908	3,729	1,376	5,724	4,706	753	6,343	11,340	10,696
W. Germany	3,679	2,760	6,956	3,843	3,255	7,650	4,248	2,721	7,882	4,410	1,942	7,428	18,757	19,619
Great Britain	2,581	225	3,308	2,484	173	3,147	2,136	179	2,316	2,139s	616s	3,004	16,568	14,550
Italy	2,243	1,372	3,818	2,343	837	3,406	2,107	1,571	3,823	2,403n	1,192n	4,414	7,225	7,171s
Japan	289	1,553	2,022	289	1,589	2,058	304	1,495	2,019	327s	1,432s	2,152	8,152	9,204
Netherlands	1,581	162	1,946	1,601	298	2,102	1,688	396	2,349	1,756	302	2,614	7,809	6,902
Portugal	471	321	807	497	330	842	523	416	954	572n	399n	989n	931	675
Spain	446	571	1,055	573	525	1,152	616	796	1,518	810	458	1,409	3,265	1,055
Switzerland	2,667	204	2,872	2,820	258	3,078	2,725	398	3,123	3,042	202	3,247	3,814	3,308
United States	16,057	99	17,220	15,596	212	16,843	15,471	432	16,672	14,066	777	15,447	25,834	29,751

*Source: *International Financial Statistics, August 1965,* published by International Monetary Fund. There is no explanation as to why there are small variations which result in total reserves that are not exactly the sum of gold and foreign exchange holdings.

Key: n, as of the end of November
s, as of the end of the third quarter

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tugal, with one-tenth the foreign trade of Australia, has foreign exchange reserves that are more than half as great. This is a question not of relative wealth but of government management of national resources.

Foreign trade is not, of course, the sole measure by which to judge the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves, but even when "invisibles" like tourism are taken into account, the overall situation is not substantially altered. Swings in foreign exchange accounts have shown no great variations requiring larger reserves. Under these circumstances, it would seem that the reserves of some countries could easily be regarded as ample, if not actually out of proportion to their present needs.

The more one looks at the foreign exchange reserve position of certain countries in relation to their internal economic problems, the less reasonable any further accumulations would appear. In a relatively underdeveloped country, such as Spain, there is a vast area for investment. Until 1965 Spain had been steadily increasing reserves to the point where they were more than adequate to meet unforeseen contingencies in trade, particularly in view of its large income from tourism. During 1965 Spain increased its dollar expenditures because the accumulation of further reserves was secondary to the need to modernize antiquated industrial and communications systems, especially when its labor force is to a large degree underemployed, if not unemployed. Early in 1966 the government announced that it is planning a large road-building program which could involve the import from the United States of road-building equipment to improve the poor road system, an expenditure that in itself would be likely to increase tourism and foreign exchange income.

Internal economic conditions are quite different in such highly developed countries as Germany, whose ample foreign exchange reserves were somewhat reduced in 1965. Yet, these countries, too, might be well advised to put additional reserves to work instead of continuing to accumulate them. In Germany, unlike Spain, there is overemployment, and many more jobs are seeking people than there are workers available to fill them. This situation exists also in the Scandinavian countries, France, Switzerland and England (where reserves are, of course, too low). In these countries, investment in the public sector—in roads, hospitals, schools—is severely rationed because physical and manpower resources are being stretched to the limit. In the future, countries continuing

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to accumulate unneeded reserves could further accelerate their development while easing this strain on resources by purchasing greater amounts of capital, if not consumer, goods in the United States. Fortunately, U.S. manpower and productive capacity is available for the provision of an enormous range of needed additional goods and services which are entirely competitive in world markets, both from the point of view of quality and of price.

For the West European countries suffering from labor shortages, there are dramatic possibilities in many fields to save manpower. It would be possible, for instance, to reduce by 80 per cent or more the manpower requirements for building a bridge if sections were manufactured abroad and imported. In France, for example, expenditure might be usefully made abroad for telephone equipment; road-building equipment might also have a high priority. The French Economic Plan foresees the completion of the highway to Marseilles only by 1970, although it is urgently needed right now.

Reserves continue to accumulate in a number of countries despite the continuing and largely successful efforts of U.S. exporters to increase the greatly rising level of U.S. exports. The U.S. government has supplemented these efforts by encouraging countries with ample reserves to increase their dollar aid to developing countries, which presumably would spend their dollars in the United States. This is a policy that Washington has been vigorously urging on other countries for some years, but the figures make it clear that this approach by itself will not resolve the U.S. payments problem.

There appear to be two principal reasons why governments which are accumulating foreign exchange reserves continue to let them pile up. Perhaps the major reason is a sense of insecurity. They seem to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the present trend toward accumulation is bound to be reversed, and that it is only prudent to hoard foreign exchange while it can be readily acquired. They do not have the confidence that they can control foreign exchange and trade transactions to the same degree as the domestic business cycle. Because the former problem is more complex and often beyond the control of individual countries, their caution is understandable.

Another reason for hoarding may have its roots in the tendency of noncommunist governments to leave imports to private enterprise. These governments have no specific mechanism at hand for

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initiating the purchase of imports that could be fed easily into the domestic economic stream. Some critics would object to the creation of special mechanisms for this purpose on the grounds that they would change the structure of the political and economic institutions in the countries concerned. However, most observers would probably expect these countries to exhibit sufficient ingenuity to develop a variety of structural and procedural forms that would minimize the impact on existing institutions.

III

The foregoing examination of the U.S. payments problem reveals the importance of encouraging countries that are accumulating more than ample dollar and gold reserves to increase their dollar expenditures. In theoretical terms, it would appear that these nations do not pursue in the international sphere the same policies that in comparable circumstances they apply in the domestic sphere. They apply Keynes' theories at home, but not abroad.

This analogy may be somewhat loose, but it illustrates the nature of the problem: During the depression in the United States, for example, large corporations and financial institutions were hoarding their resources and failing to invest, which, together with other factors, led to a contraction of economic activity. President Herbert Hoover, following the economic theories of that time, attempted to balance the economy at a lower level by restricting government expenditure and balancing the budget. Today, the remedial measures would be quite different. As Keynesian economics are now generally accepted, governments increase public expenditures when there is a short-fall in private expenditure, and adopt specific measures designed to stimulate an increase in private expenditure. The criteria of economic balance would be the full utilization of the physical and manpower resources of a country, not the balance of tax receipts and expenditures.

Governments, however, do not apply the same economic principles to the international sphere. The figures clearly show that unneeded foreign-held dollars are not being spent. Yet governments have not initiated affirmative measures such as they would take in domestic affairs either to stimulate still larger private expenditures of dollars for imports or to make greater dollar expenditures themselves. So long as they fail to act, they will unnecessarily curtail their own economic development and force

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upon the United States a restrictive policy of foreign expenditure that will tend further to retard their economic expansion.

In view of the internal needs of countries with such widely different economic conditions as Spain and Germany, countries with ample reserves should review their foreign exchange policies, for these policies may no longer be in keeping with greatly increased financial possibilities. Unless governments change their policies, the United States will be compelled to continue restrictive measures, and international economic activity will proceed at a lower level than is actually required. The effect of holding on to reserves, whether of dollars or gold, beyond reasonable reserve requirements represents, in fact, a policy of hoarding—the fact notwithstanding that every government seeks to combat hoarding in its domestic economy.

IV

The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Group of Ten concern themselves with the minimum levels of foreign exchange reserves required by countries to tide them over temporary imbalances. Yet there is, also, a need to agree upon reasonable upper levels of foreign exchange reserves and not simply to avoid imbalances such as the United States has been facing, but to insure the best utilization of resources to develop the various national economies. Such a policy would provide a way out of the U.S. balance of payments difficulties. The United States might nudge other countries in this direction, both bilaterally and through consultation in a variety of existing international organizations concerned with foreign exchange problems. One should not be too optimistic about the prospects of persuading governments to change their long-standing policies, even in their own interest; yet, in the short- as well as the long-run, what is good for the United States will be good for nations that no longer need to increase their foreign exchange reserves.

It might be argued that this analysis applies just as much to other countries, such as the United Kingdom, as to the United States. However, there are at least two crucial differences in their underlying positions. First, other nations are not consistently accumulating sterling and, second, the range of available competitive and useful U.K. goods is not so great.

The policy advocated above would not cure all foreign exchange difficulties of all countries, but it would meet the unique U.S.

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reserve problem and place its present difficulties in a realistic framework. It would also provide nations earning and accumulating U.S. dollars and gold benefits greater than those they now derive from a policy of hoarding dollars and gold. Finally, there might be the consequential benefit that action to implement such policies could clarify the path which nations should then follow to deal with the question of whether the world's foreign exchange resources are commensurate with the increasingly high volume of international transactions.

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GERMANY, NATO AND EUROPE

by Diane A. Kressler

GERMANY searches today, twenty years after her defeat in the Second World War, for a new role in the world. There is dissatisfaction in the Federal Republic over the division of the country as well as growing impatience with Bonn's treatment by its NATO allies as a "second-class" partner. Echoing this sentiment, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, in setting forth his government's program in the Bundestag on November 10, 1965, declared that the postwar period was at an end, and that Germany must now enter upon a "new era."[1] The Federal Republic, he suggested, would seek to enhance its position as a leading European power in NATO, and would not abandon its efforts to attain eventual German reunification.

The foreign policy of the Federal Republic has included the following political objectives: (1) maintenance and strengthening of NATO; (2) preservation of the freedom of West Berlin; (3) achievement of German reunification; (4) support for European integration; (5) Franco-German *rapprochement;* (6) promotion of closer ties to Eastern Europe. While all these goals may be worthy of pursuit, German leaders must choose which objectives deserve primary consideration. Should the maintenance and strengthening of NATO be placed ahead of the endeavor to promote German reunification? Is the latter objective dependent upon the fulfillment of the former or might reunification be pursued independently of the strengthening of NATO? Should Germany's leaders give priority to close U.S.-German ties or should they seek their objectives through closer ties with France? The choices made among these alternatives will influence German attitudes and policies toward NATO and European integration in the next decade. It is the purpose of this article to examine basic trends in the policies of the German government under Chancellor Erhard toward NATO, Franco-German relations, and the expansion of contacts with Eastern Europe, and

[1]Erhard stated that "The Federal Government knows that the end of the postwar period confronts the Federal Republic of Germany with new tasks within and without, and imposes new duties on it; that a new situation must be mastered with new means; that a period of sober contemplation lies ahead." *The Bulletin,* a weekly survey of German affairs issued by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, November 16, 1965, p. 5.

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to assess the views of its major critics within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—the followers of Franz-Josef Strauss.

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance

Since the founding of the Federal Republic, successive German governments have operated on the assumption that the strengthening of Bonn's ties with the West, through membership in NATO and the European Communities, offered the best prospect for eventual German reunification. A unified West, which included the Federal Republic, held out promise of achieving the power necessary to bargain successfully with the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany.

Of all U.S. allies, the German Federal Republic has been the most responsive to U.S. policy in NATO. Germany remained a firm supporter of the U.S. proposal for the creation of the multilateral force (MLF). Following the German election in September 1965, however, there appeared to be growing disagreement among German politicians concerning both its feasibility and wisdom. Opposition to the MLF proposal was not limited to members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).[2] Members of Chancellor Erhard's Christian Democratic coalition, particularly the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), did not favor the U.S. proposal for nuclear sharing. Since it appeared unlikely that the MLF proposal or a variation would gain the acceptance of other NATO members, the Federal Republic as well as other European nations searched for new means by which they might gain a greater voice in NATO strategy.

Setting forth his government's program in his speech in the Bundestag on November 10, Chancellor Erhard discussed the question of participation by the Federal Republic in the command and control of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic Alliance:

> The German Government believes that it is necessary for NATO to adjust itself to new political and military conditions. It is, in particular, necessary to solve such problems as result from the fact that some members of the alliance now have nuclear weapons while others have not.
>
> All allies should, however, be given a share in the nuclear defense, which should be in keeping with the extent of the danger which threatens them and with the extent of the burdens they bear. We are thinking in terms

[2]Helmut Schmidt, an SPD defense expert, argued that to press for the MLF would only isolate Bonn from its allies, given their opposition to this concept. However, the SPD has stressed Germany's right to equality with other Western nations in planning within NATO for nuclear strategy. See *Christian Science Monitor,* December 3, 1965.

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of a joint nuclear organization. We have repeatedly made known that we do not desire national control of any nuclear weapons. We should, however, not be kept out of any nuclear participation simply because we are a divided country.[3]

Although the Federal Republic has disclaimed officially any interest in the acquisition of a national nuclear force, the necessity for changes in arrangements within the Atlantic Alliance has become increasingly urgent in German minds in recent years.

Because all German military forces are assigned and integrated into the NATO structure, German security is completely dependent upon the ability of the Atlantic Alliance to meet Bonn's security requirements. In particular, Germans have been concerned lest the concept of flexible response in Europe render the Federal Republic the major battlefield in a European conventional war. Thus, Bonn has supported the strategy of a forward defense along the Iron Curtain and has argued that atomic demolition mines, nuclear air defense weapons and possibly nuclear battlefield weapons must be available for early use in response to an attack upon Western Europe in order to deter an enemy from miscalculating the West's ability to oppose a ground attack. The German Minister of Defense, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, has stated that

> The concept of flexible response in Europe—both political and military—must not be interpreted to mean that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised unduly high, without reference to political considerations. Apart from the fact that this would lead the potential aggressor to think that he could calculate his risk, it would create a situation in which he could seize pawns for future negotiations.[4]

While supporting the concept of a "forward defense" in Europe, German leaders have criticized the French proposal that the allies should threaten to respond immediately with nuclear weapons in case of any attack.

Some Germans found the MLF attractive because it would serve to give Germany a greater voice in nuclear strategy and targeting. Moreover, it was believed that a sea-based MRBM system such as the MLF could be created more easily than could a land-based one. Von Hassel envisaged the MLF as a primarily European component of an Atlantic deterrent which, under a

[3] *News from the German Embassy,* November 15, 1965. Mayor Willy Brandt, in a speech to the WEU Assembly on June 3, 1965, stated his belief that the Federal Republic should not seek to build a national nuclear force. See *News from Germany,* published by the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, June 1965.

[4] Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1965, p. 211.

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European command, i.e., SACEUR, would be tied into the overall nuclear potential of the United States through the Strategic Air Command. He also expressed the belief that the MLF would demonstrate to European allies the determination of the United States to consider European interests while attempting to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[5] But because of British and French objections to the plan, Germany was placed in the position of being the only major NATO ally of the United States to consider the MLF seriously. The MLF raised the fear in Britain and France that the United States and the Federal Republic might enter into a bilateral arrangement which would give the Germans eventual control over nuclear weapons. The Germans, it was noted, would contribute the major part of the European share of funds for the construction of the MLF.

German leaders, however, disclaimed any intention of participating in such a bilateral arrangement and sought instead to assure their NATO partners that Germany had no aspirations toward the acquisition of a "national" nuclear force. Thus, Von Hassel wrote that

> the MLF, as its name implies, must be a multilateral force, and not a bilateral one. It also has to be an Atlantic force, not a European one, since a European nuclear force could have a disintegrative effect on the Atlantic Alliance and would be bound to whittle down the United States engagement in Europe, to Europe's disadvantage. The necessary basis for a European nuclear force would be a politically united Europe; and even when such unity has been achieved, Europe must not allow herself to be isolated by the fact of possessing her own nuclear force, but must rather strengthen her standing by playing an active part in the strategy and in the nuclear weapons systems of the Atlantic Community.[6]

Since the MLF was apparently shelved in 1965, the German government, in all likelihood, will concentrate on efforts to assure a greater place for Bonn in NATO nuclear planning. The joint communiqué of December 21, 1965, issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard, stated that "arrangements could be worked out to assure members of the alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate share in nuclear defense. The President and Chancellor agreed that discussion of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies."[7] Bonn spokesmen argue that Germany's twelve-division contribution to NATO defense, together with her economic

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] Text in *New York Times*, December 22, 1965.

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strength, does not receive adequate recognition under existing arrangements for the control of nuclear strategy. Thus, Bonn may seek the same right enjoyed by other NATO partners in the veto of the use of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on their territory.[8]

The Federal Republic gained membership on November 27, 1965 on a new NATO subcommittee on nuclear planning. Although pleased with this achievement, the Germans regard it as but a first step toward greater recognition of German interests in the determination and conduct of nuclear strategy within the alliance. Indeed, both the Federal Republic and Italy have informed the United States that the nuclear planning committee cannot serve as a suitable substitute for the creation of an allied nuclear force. While satisfied that the planning committee might represent an important first step toward acquiring a greater voice in nuclear strategy, Bonn apparently wishes to forestall the possibility that any nonproliferation treaty might preclude the creation of an allied nuclear force.[9] In an interview on March 6, 1966, Defense Minister von Hassel set forth the German official position regarding the need to participate in nuclear planning at all stages: "These are the criteria: whether [nuclear] weapons are to be used, against whom they are to be used, and with what carriers [delivery systems] they are to be used." Moreover, he asserted that

> By cooperative physical ownership, we mean that a joint weapons system for the Atlantic Alliance would be set up under joint financing, joint responsibility, joint ownership of the alliance, joint agreement on its joint principles, with—no doubt about this—American participation and with the veto and the final decision remaining in the hands of the American president.[10]

In the event that NATO were to be dissolved without being replaced by another multilateral alliance, the Federal Republic would probably seek bilateral pacts with other European powers and with the United States. Even given the continuation of NATO, or the creation of a successor alliance system, the possibility of bilateral "special relationships" between the United States and certain European countries, such as Britain and the Federal Republic, could not be excluded. In fact, following Presi-

[8]For the SPD view, see Fritz Erler's comments on Chancellor Erhard's policy declaration of November 10, 1965, in which he appealed for a German right to veto the use of nuclear weapons either stationed on German soil or directed against German targets. *News from Germany*, November-December 1965.

[9]*New York Times*, February 23, 1966.

[10]*Christian Science Monitor*, March 8, 1966.

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dent de Gaulle's February 21, 1966 announcement that French forces would be removed from the integrated command structure of NATO, Washington apparently began seriously to consider the possibility of a NATO based upon an inner core composed of the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic. Institutionally, such an arrangement might include the establishment of three-power coordinating committees dealing with specialized areas.[11] On balance, however, a special relationship between Washington and Bonn might be unwise, since it might increase distrust of Germany in other NATO countries.

The withdrawal of France from integrated NATO commands and the removal of NATO installations from French territory will give Germany an added importance in the alliance. More than ever, the United States will be forced to rely upon Bonn as the principal U.S. ally on the Continent. As a consequence of French action, the German contribution, and hence the German voice, in NATO can be expected to increase. Moreover, any effort by France to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union for a European settlement might weaken Franco-German ties and strengthen links between Bonn and Washington.

Certainly, De Gaulle's decision poses difficult military and political problems for Bonn. Chancellor Erhard summarized the German reaction at a press conference on February 25: "The idea that NATO integration should be confined only to German territory is inadmissible."[12] Having announced in his November Bundestag address that the postwar era was at an end, the Chancellor could hardly be expected to view favorably the prospect that the Federal Republic might return to a position which could be construed as that of an occupied state.

De Gaulle's pronouncement that all armed forces on French territory must be placed under French command by April 4, 1969, raises the issue as to the future control of the West German forces. Are they to remain under NATO control or would they revert to national control? Not only would Germany's neighbors view with disfavor such a prospect but the German political leaders themselves find unwelcome the prospect of a German national army. However, German political leaders also view unfavorably the possibility that Germany will become the only NATO member subject to integration. That French forces in

[11] *New York Times,* March 14, 1966.
[12] *Christian Science Monitor,* February 28, 1966.

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Germany should be under French command while all foreign forces stationed in France must also be under French command cannot but appear, to the Germans, to be a discriminatory policy.[13]

France or the United States?

In the German general election of September 1965, Chancellor Erhard and the Christian Democratic Union received a mandate to govern the Federal Republic for another four years. While the CDU and the CSU won 49.3 per cent of the total vote and 245 seats in the Bundestag, this total still falls short of an absolute majority in the 498-seat chamber. Thus, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), while winning only 49 seats and 9.5 per cent of the electoral vote, a loss from its 1961 position when it won 67 seats and 12.8 per cent of the total vote, remains in a position to influence both the shape of the cabinet and its policies. Chancellor Erhard was able to retain Gerhard Schroeder as Foreign Minister and Eric Mende (FDP) as Minister of All-German Affairs, but not without dissension in the governing coalition.

To a considerable degree, the difficulty which Erhard experienced in achieving agreement on a cabinet reflected a more fundamental problem of special importance to the Atlantic Alliance: to what extent should the Federal Republic attach priority to its relations with France or the United States? The Christian Social Union has urged the Bonn government to give increased importance to its links with France. While apparently they are willing to accept France's claim to leadership in Europe, followers of Strauss have found fault with Foreign Minister Schroeder's policy because it has allegedly turned the Federal Republic into an American satellite. Moreover, the CSU has expressed its disapproval of Eric Mende's proposal for a policy of "gradualism"—i.e., increasing economic and cultural contacts—toward

[13]In a West German legal brief, the government has implied that France is legally bound to deal with all signatories of the 1952 and 1954 agreements which approved the stationing of foreign troops in the Federal Republic before the status of these forces may be changed. *Ibid.*, March 10 and 15, 1966.

As of this writing, there exists the possibility that France and the Federal Republic might conclude a bilateral agreement concerning the maintenance of French forces on German territory. For such an accord to gain the approval of the German government, however, France will probably be asked for assurances that French troops in Germany will be available immediately and unconditionally for West German defense as well as the defense of West Berlin. Thus far, Bonn has limited its reply to De Gaulle's announcements to an affirmation of its support for the principle of NATO integration.

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Eastern Europe. Yet the Bonn government is not prepared to go quite so far as is President de Gaulle in "building bridges" to Eastern Europe.

While many of the CSU critics of the foreign policy of the Erhard government oppose unwarranted concessions to the communist states, they cannot agree on the policy which the Federal Republic should pursue in its relations with France. For cultural and historic reasons, many of the "Gaullists" among the CSU find a close affinity with France. Many of these Gaullists, who come from South Germany and the Rhineland, share a common Catholic heritage with France. Indeed, one of the primary causes of dissension within the CDU appears to stem from rivalry between Catholic and Protestant politicians for political leadership. Catholic members of the CDU have complained, at times, of discrimination within the party against members of the Catholic faith and against southern Germans excluded from the party's inner circles.

The recent course of French foreign policy is likely to place the German Gaullists in an increasingly uncomfortable position. At once pro-French and anti-communist, the German Gaullists found difficulty in accounting for the French President's recognition of Communist China in early 1964 as well as his efforts to develop closer relations with the communist world. Initially, they attempted to rationalize De Gaulle's course of action as the result of allegedly tactless American rebuffs of his call in 1958 for a tripartite directorate in NATO and Chancellor Erhard's disapproval of French plans for a loose European confederation.

The German Gaullists have always maintained that the Federal Republic need not make a specific choice between Paris and Washington, and that there is nothing incompatible between the Franco-German alliance, European unification and NATO. They have argued that they are the most loyal German friends of NATO, as well as the originators and chief proponents of German alignment and friendship with France. Thus, they consider themselves to be in the best position to lead De Gaulle toward a *modus vivendi* which would permit both the preservation of NATO and progress toward European integration. In short, their purpose is to unite Europe and North America within NATO.

Yet President de Gaulle's call for the reorganization of the Atlantic Alliance together with his demands for a reduction in

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supranational features in the European Community and a solution of EEC agricultural problems satisfactory to France, may force the German Gaullists to make the very choice they have sought to avoid between Paris and Washington. In the past, the pro-French faction in the Federal Republic has played down official French disagreements with the United States. French policies toward the Common Market, especially on agriculture, have created a dilemma for some German political leaders. Both the CDU and CSU are dependent to a considerable degree upon the support of the farm vote. Major concessions to France on EEC agricultural policy could produce electoral reverses for pro-French CDU or CSU Bundestag members.

It is not entirely appropriate to affix the label "Gaullist" to all opponents of Erhard and Schroeder. For at the root of their disagreement with the German government's policy is the belief that Washington and Bonn, in giving priority to the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union without having removed any of the causes of such tensions, contribute to an atmosphere of false *détente*. This, in turn, is said to prolong the status quo of divided Germany. Thus, it is not unlikely that many so-called German Gaullists deplore the efforts of President de Gaulle to promote closer relations between France and Eastern Europe and to seek a purely "European" solution to the German problem. Should De Gaulle seek a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union which serves to perpetuate the status quo in Central Europe, the position of the German Gaullists might be weakened. These critics of Erhard's policy regret that the West has failed to press for political concessions from the Soviet Union in return for goods and equipment which the Soviets and other communist countries have purchased in order to ease their pressing economic problems. They contend that the Soviet Union, so long as it can receive Western assistance without being forced to make political concessions, will have little incentive to agree to German reunification. Thus, former Chancellor Adenauer, in criticizing the U.S. wheat deal with the Soviet Union, asserted that the West had lost an important opportunity to use its economic superiority to gain political concessions from Moscow.

Not a few Germans have expressed disagreement with the almost exclusive reliance by the Federal Republic upon the U.S. guarantee for German security. Doubt concerning the credibility of U.S. strategy has led many critics of German official defense

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policy to espouse changes similar to those put forward by President de Gaulle on matters of European security.

CDU opponents of existing NATO strategic concepts have postulated that the Soviet Union or another member of the Warsaw Pact might launch a conventional attack against Germany in pursuit of a limited objective, such as the seizure of West Berlin. An attack might be initiated in the hope that the United States would be deterred from a nuclear response by the threat of Soviet retaliation against U.S. territory. The Soviet Union might conclude that the United States would not resort to a nuclear response. Instead, Washington would attempt to rely, initially at least, upon a conventional strategy designed to minimize the likelihood that strategic nuclear capabilities would be used. These CDU dissidents and other German critics argue that, by raising the threshold of nuclear conflict, the United States may have weakened, in the minds of the Soviets, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to come to the assistance of Germany. By removing the certainty of a nuclear response to an incursion from the East, the United States is said to have given cause for miscalculation about U.S. intentions.

These CDU critics argue that the continued German reliance almost exclusively upon the U.S. nuclear capability renders the Federal Republic, and Western Europe, increasingly susceptible to the vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics. The United States, having tired of its commitment to Europe, might one day withdraw its forces and remove the protection of its nuclear umbrella. Moreover, increasing U.S. interests outside the North Atlantic area might cause the United States to relegate European problems to a position of less importance than they currently occupy in U.S. policy.

As an alternative to existing alliance arrangements, the idea of the creation of a European nuclear force finds adherents among some CDU critics of NATO.[14] Such a nuclear force would be independent of, yet closely linked to, the U.S. deterrent. They suggest that any German commitment to such plans as the MLF, the ANF (Atlantic nuclear force), or an anti-proliferation treaty would only contribute to strengthening the U.S. and British nuclear position in the Atlantic Alliance and would perpetuate Continental European subservience to Anglo-American interests.

[14]See, for example, the views of Franz-Josef Strauss in the *New York Times*, October 24 and 30, 1965. Strauss has set forth his position in his book entitled *The Grand Design* (New York: Praeger, 1965.)

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German participation in the MLF, for example, would only delay the creation of a European deterrent by providing evidence to France of Germany's "Atlantic," rather than "European," orientation. Nor would bilateral German agreements with the United States, in this view, serve the long-term interests of the Federal Republic. NATO might only be replaced by a series of agreements in which Western Europe would remain dependent upon the United States.

The Federal Republic believes that the U.S. quest for a treaty to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons diminishes the prospects for obtaining for Bonn an increased voice in NATO nuclear strategy. Thus, future trends in U.S.-German relations are likely to reflect, to a considerable extent, the relative importance which the United States attaches to NATO and to the desire to conclude an anti-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union. Should the principle of NATO nuclear sharing be subordinated to the principle of nonproliferation, it is likely that German dissatisfaction with NATO will rise.

Several arguments against a nonproliferation treaty have been raised in the Federal Republic: (1) there exists little possibility that the Soviet Union, in any case, would give control of nuclear weapons to its East European allies; (2) the Federal Republic has already renounced the right, under the Western European Union, to produce ABC weapons; (3) Bonn, in signing a nonproliferation treaty without any commensurate concession from the Soviet Union, would give up one of its most effective bargaining levers; and (4) a nonproliferation treaty would raise once again the problem of the recognition of two German states. The repetition of the signing procedure used in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—which was open to all states for signature—would do violence to Bonn's principle of "sole representation" of the German Federal Republic in international negotiations. Moreover, the West Germans warn that their signature on such a treaty must not be the price exacted for German participation on a NATO "select committee" responsible for nuclear strategy. Such a committee is regarded as but one desirable step to promote the growth of real partnership between Europe and the United States.

In his November 10, 1965 address to the Bundestag, Chancellor Erhard set forth his views concerning disarmament. While he made no mention of the proposed anti-proliferation treaty and

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affirmed that the Federal Republic "regarded general and controlled disarmament as one of its principal objectives," Erhard warned that:

> The German Government will make energetic efforts to ensure that no system of disarmament, relaxation or security measures is established on the concept of a divided Germany, thus aggravating the partition of our country.
>
> I would recall at this juncture that the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 voluntarily renounced the production of ABC weapons on its territory. We would welcome it if as many countries as possible were to follow that German example. With this pledge we fulfilled, eleven years ago, the essential element of any treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.[15]

The renunciation by the Federal Republic of the production of atomic weapons on its territory would not necessarily preclude German participation in an Atlantic or European nuclear force. A similar declaration by other nations, Erhard may have reasoned, might reduce the apprehensions of those who fear the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. Facilities for the production of nuclear weapons might remain in the hands of existing nuclear powers, while nonnuclear powers such as the Federal Republic might gain a greater measure of command and control over nuclear strategy through one scheme or another for an Atlantic or European force.

Former Chancellor Adenauer expressed dissatisfaction late in 1965 with the prospect that Germany's NATO allies, Great Britain and the United States, as part of a "select club" of nuclear powers, might negotiate at Geneva an agreement deleterious to German interests. This prospect led Adenauer to announce he could not commit himself "forever" to German nonacquisition of nuclear weapons.[16] Similarly, Franz-Josef Strauss has warned that "a new Fuhrer-type" who "would promise and probably also acquire nuclear weapons" might emerge if Germany were subjected to continued nuclear discrimination within the Atlantic Alliance.[17]

[15] *News from the German Embassy,* November 15, 1965. The SPD entertains similar views toward disarmament. In resolutions adopted at the Karlsruhe Conference in November 1964, the SPD warned against the conclusion of disarmament accords "which are based on the continuance of Germany's division." The Congress called for the creation of a disarmament department within the Federal government so that Germany might participate more effectively at international disarmament conferences. *News from Germany,* January 1965.

[16] *New York Times,* October 15, 1965.

[17] *Ibid.,* August 27, 1965.

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Relations with the East

If Germany's European and U.S. allies fail to take account of her economic and social development during the past decade and her rising political influence on the European continent, Bonn's allegiance to NATO is likely to waver. Feeling that its past contributions to Western defense have gone unappreciated, the German government could be led to embark upon a more independent course of action. A Germany convinced that membership in the alliance offers little assistance toward achieving eventual reunification might seek to achieve this goal by other policies. Conceivably, some Germans might find attractive the prospect of a neutral and demilitarized Germany under some scheme of disengagement in Central Europe, although this alternative as yet has found few adherents in the Federal Republic.

If Germany chose not to follow a policy of neutrality or demilitarization in the wake of disillusionment with the Atlantic Alliance, it might seek its objective through a policy of increasing cooperation with East European countries. This latter possibility has gained, in recent years, a growing number of adherents in the Federal Republic. Indeed, since 1961, closer cooperation with Eastern Europe has become a stated objective of German foreign policy. On June 14, 1961 the Bundestag adopted unanimously a resolution which stated:

> The Federal Government is called upon to pursue with its allies an Eastern policy aiming at the restoration of a free and all-German state that maintains friendly and prosperous relations with the Soviet Union and all East European countries. To this end, the Federal Government should grasp every opportunity to bring about a normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and the East European countries without abandoning vital German interests.[18]

During the coming decade, the Federal Republic may seek greater access to the markets of Eastern Europe. Yet an examination of recent trade figures yields evidence that the proportion of the Federal Republic's trade with the Eastern bloc has not differed substantially from that of other OECD members. Such trade still amounts to less than 4 per cent of Germany's total foreign transactions. The success which German trade missions have enjoyed in Eastern capitals has been limited.[19] Disagreement

[18]Quoted in Gerhard Schroeder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1965, p. 16.

[19]See "East Bloc Traders Seek Common Credit Policy," *German International,* July 1965, pp. 9-11, for figures on German trade with Soviet bloc countries.

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over the "Berlin clause" in trade accords is also likely to limit the scope for a major expansion in trade.[20] Bonn is wary lest increased trade lead to political concessions which would be detrimental to the achievement of reunification. Nevertheless, German businessmen emphasize that East European countries represent a natural outlet for German goods. Germany enjoys convenient transportation ties with her neighbors to the East. Finally, the Eastern bloc economies are in need of industrial goods which the Federal Republic is capable of supplying.

Some German businessmen have become critical of the restrictions which the Hallstein Doctrine has imposed upon their efforts to increase trade with East European countries.[21] While the Federal Republic has not yet gone so far as Britain and France in granting long-term credits to promote trade with communist states, a considerable number of businessmen as well as some influential politicians view the broadening of economic ties with Eastern Europe as one means by which the prospects for German reunification might be enhanced. For example, Krupp agreed in 1965 to help Poland build a $10 million factory near Warsaw to produce machines and machine tools. This agreement may provide a pattern for future collaboration between private enterprises in the Federal Republic and other West European countries, on the one hand, and state-controlled economies in Eastern Europe on the other. Moreover, West German firms have undertaken negotiations with the Soviet Union for the building of a petrochemical complex on the Volga River.[22] Evidently this consortium of firms was authorized to offer credits up to eight years on the $450 million agreement. Industrialists in the Federal Republic may intensify their efforts to expand trade with Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Chancellor Erhard has expressed concern that the inability of the West to develop a common policy toward Eastern Europe may result in concessions to the communist world without the Federal Republic having gained any of its objectives regarding German reunification.

The German government has sought to strengthen its position to negotiate unilaterally on Berlin. Trade negotiations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia

[20]Bonn has insisted that any trade agreements it concludes with East European countries must include a clause which recognizes the authority of the Federal Republic to include West Berlin under its jurisdiction.

[21]According to the Hallstein Doctrine, the Federal Republic threatens all states recognizing the East German regime with the break of diplomatic relations.

[22]*Christian Science Monitor,* September 27, 1965.

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have been stalled over the refusal of these governments to accept Bonn's authority to make agreements on behalf of West Berlin. In July 1965, the government of the Federal Republic proposed to make a general declaration that all treaties and international agreements concluded by Bonn applied automatically to West Berlin unless the former capital were specifically excepted. In effect, the three Western occupying powers would renounce their privilege of reviewing and approving the application to West Berlin of each international agreement concluded by Bonn.[23] However, the Paris Agreement of 1954 stated that "The Three Powers reserve the rights and responsibilities previously exercised or reserved by them concerning Berlin and matters involving all Germany, including the reunification of Germany and a final peace treaty."

Thus, the German Federal Republic has begun to seek greater contacts with the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Such a policy finds support among members of the SPD and the CDU. Indeed, the major parties disagree only about the extent to which Bonn should take initiatives to improve relations with Eastern Europe. While the Social Democratic Party, as well as the Free Democratic Party, might be more willing to take initiatives beyond those taken by the Erhard government on the movement of citizens between East and West Germany and the release of political prisoners in East Germany, neither party is willing for the moment to agree to the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent eastern frontier of a reunified Germany. Hence the issue of the eastern boundaries of Germany is likely to continue to have a dampening effect upon German efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe.

The extreme sensitivity of the expellee groups on this issue was demonstrated in October 1965, following the release of an official memorandum of the Protestant Church Council in the Federal Republic.[24] Evidently intended to help prepare the ground psychologically for an eventual settlement with Eastern Europe, the memorandum resulted instead in an attack by the

[23] *New York Times*, July 9, 1965.

[24] The report stated that (1) the enforced mass deportation of Germans living in the eastern territories was not in accordance with international law; (2) Poland is not yet legally entitled to govern the German eastern territories; (3) a complete reconstruction of the former situation "would not serve justice"; (4) Germany should in the future "respect the Polish people's right to live and allow them the space they held for their development"; (5) Germany should hesitate before laying claims to territories which have become an economic necessity for Poland.

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expellee groups on the Protestant Church for its alleged misuse of religious authority and unwarranted interference in political affairs. This particular example illustrates the necessity for any German government to take into account the refugees who inhabit the Federal Republic before embarking upon any major initiative with respect to the eastern boundaries of Germany. This constraint may continue to operate upon German political leaders so long as the refugees continue to exert an important influence in the political parties and at the polls.[25]

The possibility of an alliance between the German expellee groups and the German Gaullist leaders provides another reason for official caution in pursuing any policy toward Eastern Europe which might infringe upon expellee interests. It should be recognized, however, that the leaders of the refugee movement control the votes of only a small minority of their sizeable membership. Moreover, the refugees do not have a united, nonpartisan leadership which could hold the political balance of power in Germany; the expellee leaders are not free to throw the votes of their members to the party that promises them the most. In general, the expellees have favored anti-communist policies. Most of them voted for Chancellor Adenauer despite the fact that many of their leaders were Social Democrats. However, unlike Adenauer and even the German Gaullists, the expellees represent potential German ultra-nationalists. Most of them lived either in Slavic countries as German minorities or in the borderlands and disputed territories. Emotionally and traditionally they are anti-Polish and anti-Czech, rather than anti-communist, though they presently identify the one with the other. Moreover, they are not pro-French, still less pro-De Gaulle, especially since the French President expressed his approval of the Oder-Neisse line in 1959. Nevertheless, because of their anti-communist views, they are actual or potential political allies of the CSU. Many of the expellees live in Bavaria and, though they are not Catholic, vote for the CSU because of its foreign policy platform.

While there remains a hard-core group of expellees emotionally charged with the desire to return to their former homelands, many expellees have been assimilated into German society. In particular, the younger generation is less concerned than its elders

[25]See *The German Tribune,* October 30, 1965, p. 5. According to the Ministry of Expellees and Refugees in Bonn, a total of 10.6 million expellees lived in the Federal Republic at the end of 1965. This constituted 17.9 per cent of the population. *Ibid.,* February 5, 1966, p. 5.

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with injustices suffered in countries now under communist domination. As the older generation disappears from the scene and the younger generation becomes integrated into West German society and loses its interest in the East, the strength of the expellees as a pressure group will diminish.

Conclusions

The future course of German foreign policy is likely to be influenced to a considerable extent by the degree of importance attached by the United States to the restructuring of NATO. Discussions on foreign policy in Bonn will continue to be focused on the question of which objectives should be accorded priority: the restructuring of NATO, German reunification, or the expansion of contacts with communist states to the East? Should the Germans become convinced that NATO no longer provides adequately for their security or does not contribute to eventual attainment of reunification, the Atlantic Alliance may lose adherents in Germany. Thus far, however, the Federal Republic has remained among the most loyal of U.S. allies in NATO, as well as a leading proponent of the creation of a United Europe which might join North America in an Atlantic Partnership. The foreign policy of the Federal Republic is not likely to undergo a fundamental reorientation in the period ahead if Germany can be accorded a place in NATO commensurate with its prominent international position, achieved by its first postwar generation of leaders.

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GERMANY AND A "EUROPEAN EUROPE"*

by Klaus Bloemer

GERMANS are still influenced by the trauma of their modern history, namely, the late, painful and incomplete realization of their national unity. Even today, the idealism of the last century inspires their will to reunification: the nostalgia for the "whole Germany." This nostalgia, however, tends to prevent them from adapting to the political realities and laws of the present. It is actually standing in the way of the vital interests of the German people.

A latecomer among the great European nation-states, the German Reich had participated only to a limited extent in the brilliant period of the last century. Soon after Germany was finally united, it became involved in both "civil wars" of the European state system which initiated the downfall of the Continental nation-state in this century. The German people had hardly become conscious and proud of its national unity, when its existence was jeopardized by the convulsions of World War I and subsequently shattered by the intervention of extra-European powers in World War II.

Naturally, the partition of Europe by the victorious world powers, the United States and the USSR, into spheres of influence affected most severely Germany, whose destiny has always been determined by its central European location. Germany's dismemberment was accomplished at the very time when all of Europe became divided. It would border on metaphysics for one to try to interpret this process as a kind of penalty for German guilt for the war. To be sure, such an interpretation of their national fate corresponds perfectly to the German romantic-sentimental tendency. It offers Germans the opportunity to place themselves at the center of political events by presenting their national misfortune as an isolated incident. Only a few are capable of looking at the changed German situation in the light of a new era which has, in the meantime, begun to dawn for civilized mankind. This new era is marked by the transformation of the political map of the world, now dominated by superpowers of continental dimensions.

In fact, the scientific revolution, which had been triggered by

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World War II and has since developed in geometric progression, has greatly broadened the dimensions of our world and should set the standards for our thoughts and actions on the national and international levels. To what extent and how soon we succeed in incorporating these facts into our political consciousness—this alone will determine the future of the German people.

I

The reunification of our people and the granting of self-determination is indeed a legitimate goal and human concern. However, if we make the restoration of German national unity the sole and final objective of our entire political program, we condemn ourselves to a highly dangerous passivity. By emphasizing this goal and assigning the highest priority to its attainment—for the sake of the German national consciousness—we render ourselves impotent for the accomplishment of the great tasks of this era.

The anachronistic slogan of the "indivisible Germany" conceals a critical mixture of false guilt, unrealistic thinking and unfitness for life. On the street corners of our cities we find posters featuring a map of the Germany of 1937 with the following text: "Tripartite? Never!" Today, the German Reich of 1937 is divided into five or six parts. All those champions of national restoration who speak so glibly and in patriotic slogans about the "whole Germany," ignore first of all the fact that the German city of Königsberg is today the Russian Kaliningrad. They simply ignore the reality that there exists, apart from the "German Eastern provinces under Polish administration," also a part of Eastern Prussia which is—although not legally—under Soviet control. In any case, there is hardly any mention in public of such a "fourth part of Germany."

The Soviets speak of a three-part Germany (the German territory comprising the original four occupation zones). Yet, in reality the divided former capital of Germany constitutes a fifth and also a sixth fragment of the former German Reich. The western sectors of Berlin do not belong to the Soviet zone in Germany; they are placed under a special Allied status which prevents them from being an equal *Land* of the Federal Republic. Nominally, East Berlin is the capital of the Soviet zone, but Allied restrictions still apply also to this partial city. Consequently, several additional borders should be marked on the German map of 1937 and the more accurate text should read: "Divided into six? Never!" It fol-

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lows that political thinking based on the German map leads into a host of absurdities.

For our purposes it can be assumed that a large number of those who talk glowingly or angrily about German reunification really mean only the union of those Germans who live at the present time in the area of the four occupation zones set up by the victorious powers. Many desire so strongly to terminate the division of the German people that they are ready to legalize the current eastern borders that have been created by the expulsion of the German population from German territory—an act contrary to international law. These proponents of reunification actually quarrel over the question whether the renunciation of two German territories—the loss of the larger one to Poland and of a smaller one to the Soviet Union—should be enacted today by the "sole representative," the Federal Republic, or at a later date by the government of a reunified state, composed of the former four occupation zones, and incorporated in a peace treaty.

Unfortunately, this German sense of sacrifice is appreciated only rarely by foreigners. This fact became particularly clear in a statement made recently by the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, before the Fabian Society. He proposed to consolidate the German-Polish frontier at the Oder and Neisse "legally" by consulting the Polish population which has been settled—in violation of international law—in the East German provinces. Furthermore, he stressed explicitly that the Germans, who had been expelled contrary to international law, should be excluded from such a consultation. In the face of such an interpretation and application of the right of self-determination for the population of Central and Eastern Europe—hardly distinguishable in its cynicism from the Soviet thesis—one can understand that there exists on the German side a feeling of resignation or of perplexity which turns into reactionary protests. How long will it take, Germans often ask themselves, until the Western allies will also accept a 99.8 per cent "vote" for the communist regime of the DDR as the expression of the popular will for the establishment of a second German state?

The German issue becomes more and more bogged down, the more the German people and others deal with it as an isolated problem. The idea that we are capable of inducing Moscow, Washington or the capitals of neighboring states to solve our national problem by persistently reminding them of our plight, merely shows our political naiveté. Nor can we impose our will

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for national reunification on the world powers and on our large and small neighbors by means of our well-intentioned warning—which is concealed behind such affirmations—that the division of Germany constitutes a cause of tension and consequently a menace to world peace. That way we can evoke merely negative reactions of two different kinds: Either the advocates of the neutralization of the Federal Republic gain ground and the Soviets come closer to their goal, namely, the dissolution of the Western alliance and of the European union movement, or the rest of the world feels induced to create rapidly a *fait accompli* by recognizing the DDR as a second German state. In this way we would in fact close every possible approach to the reunification of our people.

German national unity—even within the borders of the four occupation zones—appears to all states directly interested in this question as an extremely dangerous solution. The Soviet Union, too, prefers undoubtedly the status quo to a reunified Germany, no matter what status it would obtain or what its social system would be. The key to national reunification lies neither in Moscow nor in Paris. If we are serious about the reunification of the German people, we should not talk about this heartfelt desire. Let us learn from the spirit of a phrase coined by the French in 1871, for the return of Alsace-Lorraine: "Always think about it—never talk about it." Why not adapt this thesis to our present political situation to read: "Think about it constantly, talk about it rarely, and create something new instead."

II

The Soviet and the American world powers, whose spheres of influence still meet at the Elbe, today ignore our national problem of division. For both powers the problem presents itself in the context of the European balance of power. However, Europe constitutes only one of the several areas of interest for the two nuclear giants. Moreover, at this time Moscow and Washington are seeking a political armistice in Europe. This policy of status quo permits neither power to restore the national unity of Germany or to bring about the reunification of the German people. Both world powers realize that the maintenance of the status quo in Europe is guaranteed only as long as each of them is capable of retaining its political and military influence in Western and Eastern Europe respectively. Of course, the status quo presupposes not only that the European frontiers between East and

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West remain unchanged but also that the European balance of power remains nearly constant.

Therefore, the United States is trying to ward off Soviet attempts to neutralize the Federal Republic and consequently to weaken Western Europe's potential. The Soviet Union, in turn, considers any trend toward a concentration of power in Western Europe as a threat to the status quo. Thus, each world power seeks to force the other into a politically defensive posture in Europe. The consolidation of the status quo, which is unthinkable without the continuation of the division of Germany and Europe and without the preservation of the present balance of forces and interests on both sides of the Elbe, is currently considered a policy of *détente* in Washington and Moscow.

Both the Soviet-sponsored nonproliferation treaty and the American conception of a multilateral nuclear force belong to this policy design. In the "spirit of Geneva" the Soviets want to isolate the German potential in order to prevent a further increase in German power and its integration into the Western community. The Americans, in turn, regard the MLF as an instrument for keeping the Federal Republic—and hence Western Europe—in their political and military sphere of influence.

The emergence of an autonomous European power—even if only in the western part of the Continent for the time being—is incompatible with the present designs of the two world powers. Therefore, as long as Europe's destiny lies exclusively in the hands of the two world powers, there is little chance to alter the political-strategic situation on the Continent, overcome its division and reunify the German people. Hence, Europeans face the task of devising and carrying out a plan for strengthening Europe and protecting its interests.

Unfortunately, they will have to reckon with opposition rather than support from Washington—and a fortiori from Moscow. First of all, West Europeans have to prevent the two world powers from confronting them with *faits accomplis* which would remove any basis for an autonomous European policy. At the same time, West Europeans have to take the initiative in a persistent and cooperative effort to pool their resources and concentrate their power. This undertaking makes sense only if it is from the outset designed to create a "European Europe" with the status of a world power which can aspire to full partnership with the United States and can be recognized by the Soviet Union as an equal power. Such a project can be fully realized only through a fed-

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erally integrated "Europe of peoples." However, Europeans can promote political integration only after they have clearly decided to create a "European Europe" with a common foreign and defense policy.

Germans, who like to indulge in *Weltanschauung* and ideals, sink back into a state of deep depression and pessimism as soon as they recognize that others approach certain problems in a more pragmatic way than they do. When, therefore, the French President, who at least in the present state of European development opposes supranational institutions, wishes to establish a political community on the basis of a union of sovereign states, some German voices immediately call the "European idea" a failure. The deeper causes for such an unwise reaction might well be a widespread German feeling of helplessness and a search for a comfortable way out of their national dilemma which a supranational organization would offer. Germans are prisoners of their own notion according to which the Federal Republic constitutes merely a provisional nation-state. This state, so it is said, is neither capable of, nor entitled to, sovereign decisions since its security is dependent exclusively on others and since it lacks any device of its own to restore Germany's national unity. In fact, there has developed a national "dependence complex" from which the Germans will have first to liberate themselves if they want to create the necessary basis for a political partnership, and later a confederation, with other nation-states.

Isolated, the Federal Republic derives no advantage whatsoever from the self-proclaimed "right of sole representation"—still recognized by the noncommunist world. The claim for self-determination of the German people, which is linked to this right, is gradually being reduced to an empty phrase. The Federal Republic will only gain its national independence and full political sovereignty if it abandons the demand for the creation of a larger national German entity in favor of promoting the reunification of the German people *within the process of European integration.* To be sure, this step can only be taken at the moment when the Federal Republic becomes a founding member of a European confederation which takes over the claim for the reunification of the German people. A West European political community would consider the whole German people as one of its integral parts. Thenceforth, the right of the German state, represented in the confederation, to speak for all Germans would be based upon a stronger, broader and safer basis. Only such a political commu-

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*nity—with German participation—could take the realistic initia*tives required for a successful "Eastern" policy. A West European confederation would have every right in law and ethics to state and to pursue its purpose, namely, to end the division of Europe and to create a European community extending from the Atlantic to the present borders of the Soviet Union.

III

The building of a confederation may be termed the "Europeanization of the German question." It is quite probable that a federal organization, restricted to the western part of the Continent —and possibly Great Britain—would develop out of a confederation of several West European states, including France and Germany. Such a new center of strength would produce a new balance of power; it would, in the words of Henry Kissinger, have a magnetic effect on East European countries. Faced with such a changed constellation, the Soviet Union would probably seek an arrangement with this second Western world power.

It goes without saying that a West European confederation, or later federation, would not have to treat East Germany as a state but only as a relic originating from the arbitrary division of Europe by the act of postwar occupation. Moreover, the German-Polish border question would become totally irrelevant. Since an end to Europe's division is conceivable only within the framework of a pan-European confederation, national borders would disappear once a united German people again became a neighbor of the Polish people. Then European borders would play such an unimportant role that they would no longer constitute a problem in international law. Also, the *Heimatrecht* of the Germans would be no longer a matter of debate since every citizen of the United States of Europe would be assured the free choice of his domicile and place of work.

At the present time West Berlin belongs to the territory of the European Economic Community and will therefore be included in a West European confederation. Furthermore, West Berlin will not be deprived of American protection because the presence of U.S. military units on the rest of the territory of the West European confederation will remain necessary for a long time.

This design aims at a constructive European solution of the "German problem." Ideas and efforts to restore the *status quo ante* should be replaced by a formula which can guarantee the future of the whole German people in a larger community under law.

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THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

by Jon W. Fuller

THE existence of weapons of massive destruction poses a threat to civilization on our planet. Although nuclear weapons are potentially the most destructive, and therefore have been the subject of the most rigorous studies by strategists and scientists, other weapons of mass destruction in the world's arsenals, in particular chemical and biological weapons, should receive increasing attention for they possess characteristics that pose special threats to world order and human survival. They are easily and cheaply produced; their dissemination does not require a heavy bomber or a missile (though these delivery systems are easily adapted to chemical and biological agents); and their effects, in many cases, cannot be predicted or controlled by the user.

All major military powers are developing and refining, in deep secrecy, techniques of chemical and biological warfare. Yet we know that, in recent years, American research has been accelerated, from an annual budget of about $8 million in 1945 to $50 million in 1960 and $114 million in 1964.[1] This research includes work on psychochemicals, nerve gases and biological weapons.[2] The Soviet program to prepare for chemical and biological warfare, about which even less information is available, may be even larger than the U.S. effort.

This paper will discuss the nature of chemical and biological weapons, to make clear the magnitude of their threat to world order; describe the development and present application of international law to such weapons; and suggest conclusions and policy recommendations concerning them.

I

Chemical warfare has been defined by the U.S. Army as the "tactics and technique of conducting warfare by use of toxic chemical agents."[3] Other official statements have included as

[1]William Beecher in the *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1963.
[2]See testimony by Dr. Per Frolich, Deputy Chief Chemical Officer for Scientific Activities, Army Chemical Corps, before the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, June 1959.
[3]Department of the Army, *Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms* (AR 320-5, 1958).

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chemical warfare agents some nontoxic substances used for smoke, flame and incendiary devices, gases used in training and riot control (such as tear gas), and—a potentially important new field—psychochemicals or incapacitants.

Biological warfare has been officially described as:

> [T]he military use of living organisms or their toxic products to cause death, disability, or damage to man, his domestic animals, or crops. . . . It includes the employment not only of bacteria but also of other microorganisms and higher forms of life, such as insects and other pests. . . . While certain chemical anticrop compounds are not truly biological warfare agents, they are so considered as a matter of convenience.[4]

Some of the characteristics that make chemical and biological weapons increasingly significant are the "search" effect, which enables them to reach personnel who would be protected from other weapons, including nuclear weapons; the range of effects available, from highly lethal to mildly incapacitating; and the minimal damage they would do to physical facilities (factories and cities) while producing mass casualties among the people occupying them. The relative cheapness and ease of manufacture of certain agents puts the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction within the reach of virtually all countries. Further, many chemical and biological agents cannot be detected readily by any of the senses, and their presence may be known only by their effects—when it is too late for adequate defense against them.

These weapons are widely regarded with horror and fear, largely because of the extremely effective anti-gas propaganda campaign conducted by the Allies during World War I, as well as man's simple fear of the unknown. Yet the effect of most chemical or biological agents is no worse than that of other weapons which do not share this odium. In fact, some B/C agents offer hope that war could at least be more humane, if it cannot be eliminated entirely. The use of psychochemicals, which temporarily incapacitate a man physically or mentally without doing any permanent damage, or even an attack on a nation's food supply, would certainly minimize destruction and suffering in war. The irrationality of this special horror of chemical and biological warfare has been vividly demonstrated by one of the most articulate proponents of the development of these weapons: "Why is it that we accept methods of war which will burn a man to death, or blast

[4]Department of the Army, *Military Biology and Biological Warfare Agents* (TM 3-216, 1956).

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off his limbs or part of his face, and leave him blind or mindless, yet say that gas or bacteriological warfare is unacceptable?"[5]

II

The use of chemical and biological agents in warfare is not new. Recourse to poisons and efforts to spread plague in besieged cities marked warfare even in ancient times. When it was found that the American Indians were particularly susceptible to smallpox—having never been exposed to the disease before the advent of the white man, and hence having built up no immunity—there were instances of its intentional introduction to groups of Indians by the whites.[6] But a growing opinion condemned the use of poison against food or water supplies, or the use of poisoned weapons. This reaction was based on the rules of chivalry against killing by treachery and on pleas by writers like Grotius to make war more humane. During the nineteenth century, humanitarian sentiment made itself increasingly felt in a series of conferences aimed at laying down rules for the conduct of warfare.

The first of these conferences met in St. Petersburg in 1868. The resulting declaration stated

> That the only legitimate object that States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy; . . . this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; . . . the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.[7]

The main effect of the declaration was the elimination of the use of certain minor weapons, such as the dum-dum bullet.[8] At a later date the principles of the St. Petersburg Declaration were cited in condemnation of gas warfare.

After the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the movement for codification of the laws of war gained further impetus. A conference held in Brussels in 1874, at the invitation of the Russian Czar, issued an "International Declaration Concerning the Laws

[5]J. H. Rothschild, *Tomorrow's Weapons* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). Before his retirement, General Rothschild was Commanding General, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command.

[6]In 1763, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in America, sent as a gift to two Indian chiefs blankets from a smallpox hospital. A smallpox epidemic soon broke out among their tribes. See *ibid.*, p. 19.

[7]The Netherland Government, *Documents Relating to the Program of The First Hague Peace Conference* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921), pp. 30-31.

[8]As Julius Stone points out, this "was in part attributable to the small military importance of the dum-dum bullet." *Legal Controls of International Conflict* (New York: Rinehart, 1954), p. 552.

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and Customs of War," which included a prohibition of the use of poison or poisoned weapons. Although this declaration was never ratified, it provided the starting point for the Hague Peace Conferences, held in 1899 and 1907.

The first Hague Conference, which met at the instance of the Czar, discussed a wide variety of weapons, but reached general agreement on only one ban: "The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." Thus the Hague Gas Declaration was the first example of an attempt to outlaw specifically a form of chemical warfare. The conference also agreed to a prohibition of poison or poisoned weapons, similar to the one agreed to at Brussels twenty-five years before.[9] These decisions were binding on the contracting powers in regard to war between them only—the entry into the war of a power not a party to the agreement removed the obligations from the signatory powers. The contractual form of the agreements weakens any claim that they were declaratory of customary international law.

The second conference met at the Hague in 1907, this time at the instigation of President Theodore Roosevelt. In addition to other matters, it agreed to Hague Convention IV, a codification of rules of land warfare. This was intended to be a declaration of the customary rules of international law on the subject, and has been generally accepted as such. Article 23 (a), a prohibition of the use of poison and poisoned weapons, has been cited subsequently to condemn chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons.[10]

Hague Convention IV summarized the pre-World War I developments in the international law of war. As Stone has remarked, "By 1907 the proportion of the law of war embodied in general convention far exceeded, and still exceeds to this day, that of the law of peace."[11]

These codification efforts, so far as gas warfare was concerned, had little effect on the conduct of hostilities in World War I. Gas was first used at Ypres on April 22, 1915, when the Germans

[9]The United States accepted the general anti-poison provision, but rejected the ban on gas because "no shell emitting gas is as yet in practical use," and therefore the relevant facts about such weapons were not known. This is typical of the general American policy on such agreements, as we shall see later.

[10]"Article 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is especially forbidden: a. To employ poison or poisoned weapons." Quoted in James B. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), Volume II (Documents), p. 387.

[11]Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

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released chlorine gas from cylinders.[12] The attack was remarkably successful, creating a four-mile gap in the front, but the Germans had apparently not foreseen how effective gas would be, for they were not prepared to exploit their advantage. By the summer of 1915 the Allies had made their first use of gas, and thereafter it became a standard weapon in the war.[13]

Although they used gas freely after 1915, the Allies stressed the use of gas by the Germans in their anti-German propaganda campaign, portraying it as another "Hun atrocity." During and after the war, Allied writers on international law claimed that the use of gas by the Germans had been illegal, and they justified its use by the Allies as a "reprisal." This strange, but subsequently influential, version of the doctrine of reprisal involved a "breach of contract" approach to the laws of war wherein the first use of gas, by the Germans, made legal restrictions on the use of gas no longer binding on any state for the remainder of the war.[14] The Allied anti-gas propaganda campaign, and its writers' interpretation of international law, have had a tremendous effect on both popular and academic thinking about chemical and biological warfare. These writings, produced for a partisan wartime purpose, are the source of most of the confusion about the nature of chemical and biological warfare and about its legal status.

The peace treaties naturally reflected the burgeoning anti-gas sentiment. The Versailles Treaty, for example, provided: "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices *being prohibited,* their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany."[15] The treaties with the other Central Powers, and the Treaty of Berlin

[12]Technically, this attack did not violate the Hague Gas Declaration of 1899, since it did not use projectiles. The Allies made no immediate protest after the Ypres attack.

[13]The effectiveness of gas as a weapon can be seen from the casualty statistics of the American Expeditionary Force, which entered the fighting after the use of gas had become commonplace on the Western Front. Gas accounted for 26.8 per cent of the American casualties. But of these, only 2 per cent died, and 4 per cent were permanently disabled. This compares with 25 per cent fatalities and 25 per cent permanent disability among casualties produced by other weapons. These statistics are a powerful demonstration of the argument that gas warfare is actually more humane than other forms of war. See Rothschild, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[14]The doctrine of reprisal is of central importance to the development of international law regarding chemical and biological warfare, and will be discussed later in this paper.

[15]Article 171, *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law,* Volume 3 (1919), Official Documents, p. 230. (Emphasis added.) It is unclear when such devices were supposed to have been prohibited, and what effect such prohibition had had on use of gas by the Allies.

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in 1921 which ended hostilities between the United States and Germany, contained similar provisions.

III

The Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, held in Washington in 1921-1922, resulted in a series of treaties. The Five Power Treaty, signed by the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan, was concerned mostly with limitations on naval weapons and ships, but also contained this provision:

> The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
>
> The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.[16]

This treaty is important for a number of reasons. First, reference is made to "treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties" condemning gas warfare. The Hague Gas Declaration of 1899, as noted above, was restricted by its application only to projectiles, was cast in a contractual form, and had been rejected by the United States. The Hague Convention IV, agreed to in 1907, had much broader application, but the only possibly relevant passages referred very generally to poison and poisoned arms. Thus, the Washington Treaty seems to overstate the case about previous condemnations of gas warfare.[17] Such overstatement is common on this subject.

The Washington Treaty is also interesting because it is the only treaty containing limitations on chemical warfare ever ratified by the United States Senate. The Conference had been called by the United States, and the American delegates were favorably disposed to a limitation on chemical warfare as a result of several reports prepared for them before the meetings. One group, chaired by General Pershing, had recommended that "chemical warfare should be abolished among nations as abhorrent to civilization." The General Board of the Navy concurred in a separate

[16]Article V. See Manley O. Hudson, *International Legislation* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931), Volume II, p. 797.
[17]See Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 555n.

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report, stating that it was "sound policy to prohibit gas warfare in every form and against every objective."[18]

Finally, the provisions of Article V exemplify the total rejection of all forms of gas warfare which characterizes efforts at limitation in this field. There has been no effort to distinguish between lethal and nonlethal agents.

Two later conferences of American states held in 1923 reached similar agreements to prohibit gas warfare. The first of these, the Conference on Central American Affairs, produced a Convention on the Limitation of Armaments, signed by five Central American republics. Although the conference had been called by the United States, was held in Washington, and was chaired by the American Secretary of State, the United States did not sign the treaty, which contained an article almost identical to that in the Five Power Treaty.[19] However, the United States did sign a resolution passed by the Fifth International Conference of American States held in Santiago, Chile. This resolution, also signed by sixteen other American states, recommended "that the Governments reiterate the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, such as are indicated in the Treaty of Washington dated February 6, 1922."[20]

The Washington Treaty also served as the basis for the most important interwar agreement concerning chemical and biological warfare, the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The subject arose during the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War which met in Geneva that spring. Since it was felt that detailed consideration of chemical and biological warfare would be out of order in light of the formal purpose of the conference, the U.S. delegate suggested that a protocol be prepared, based on the Washington Treaty, which could then be submitted to the nations for general adherence. The result was the Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. It was signed on June 17, 1925 by the repre-

[18]Both reports are quoted by L. P. Brophy and G. J. B. Fisher, *The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), p. 20.

[19]For the text of the Convention, see Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 945.

[20]U.S. Department of State, *Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Fifth International Conference of American States* (1924), p. 196, quoted by William V. O'Brien in "Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War," *Georgetown Law Review*, Volume 51, p. 26.

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sentatives of twenty-nine countries, including the United States. It declared:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.[21]

Almost all major, and most minor, military powers have ratified the Protocol, with the important exceptions of the United States and Japan.[22] The ratification of several states was subject to reservations. The British reservation states:

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those Powers and States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol, or have finally acceded thereto.

(2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibition laid down in the Protocol.[23]

The reservation of the Soviet government was similar:

(1) The said Protocol only binds the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in relation to the States which have signed and ratified or which have definitely acceded to the Protocol.

(2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to all enemy States

[21] *League of Nations Treaty Series,* Volume 94 (1929), pp. 67-69.

[22] Both the United States and Japan had ratified the Washington Treaty, upon whose Article V the Protocol was based. In the United States, Senate ratification of the Washington Treaty had come just one week before the signing of the Protocol in Geneva. But by the time the Protocol was presented for Senate consideration, there had been a change in American opinion, compounded of growing isolationism and suspicion of Europe, and a more general reserve about treaties without inspection or enforcement provisions. It has been on this latter ground that the United States has continued to refuse to ratify the Protocol, formally declining again as recently as 1952.

[23] *League of Nations Treaty Series, op. cit.,* p. 69. The Dominions submitted similar reservations with their separate ratifications.

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whose armed forces or whose Allies *de jure* or in fact do not respect the restrictions which are the object of this Protocol.[24]

The French government stated:

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the French Republic as regards states which have signed or ratified it or which may accede to it.

(2) The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the Government of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.[25]

These reservations all emphasized the contractual nature of the Protocol, and adopted in advance a "breach of contract" view of the right of reprisal, i.e., use of the prohibited weapons would be justified once they had been used by any other power. A more appropriate form of reservation, as a rationale for the right of reprisal, would have been to emphasize the right of a state to use these otherwise prohibited weapons in applying sanctions sufficient to cause an offending state to cease its violations. The contractual interpretation of the Protocol weakens its force as a statement of general international law. As Stone observes about the Protocol, "its compulsiveness *as law* seems difficult to distinguish from the *factual* compulsion arising from the mere threat of retaliation. And this view is confirmed by the fact that none of the military powers have relaxed their preparations for chemical warfare."[26]

But there is an important line of argument which holds that the Geneva Protocol is declaratory of customary international law, and that its provisions are therefore binding upon all states, whether or not they have formally adhered to them. This is the opinion of Schwarzenberger, who says that

the prohibitions of chemical and bacteriological warfare contained in the Protocol must be taken to be merely declaratory of international customary law and equally binding on all States. It, then, becomes irrelevant whether any particular State is a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[27]

Greenspan has gone even further, claiming that

other declarations, although by their terms binding only between contracting powers, are so universally recognized that, like the Hague Regulations, 1907, they must be regarded as binding the community of nations

[24]*Ibid.*, p. 71. Rumania made an identical reservation.
[25]*Ibid.*, p. 67. Belgium submitted the same reservation.
[26]Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 556. (Italics in the original.)
[27]Georg Schwarzenberger, *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958), p. 38.

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independently of treaty obligation. The four declarations are the Declaration of Saint Petersburg, 1868, the Hague Declaration Respecting Expanding Bullets, 1899, the Hague Declaration Respecting Asphyxiating Gases, 1899, and the Geneva Gas Protocol, 1925.[28]

William V. O'Brien disagrees. He emphasizes the contractual language of the Protocol, and although he concedes, after reading the proceedings of the conference, that the delegates believed a customary rule against chemical and biological weapons already existed, he calls this opinion "quite simply erroneous."[29] Since the Protocol is not declaratory of customary international law, and therefore binds only those states which have formally adhered to it, O'Brien argues that the United States (and presumably Japan, although he does not mention it specifically) is not bound by the provisions of the Geneva Gas Protocol.

O'Brien acknowledges that there is a customary rule, based on international practice, against the *first use* of chemical weapons, but since the Geneva Protocol is the first and so far the only agreement in this field to mention specifically biological weapons, he contends that the ban on these weapons applies only to states who have become parties to it.[30] Stone concurs, saying:

> The very text of this Protocol, purporting as it does to "extend" the gas warfare prohibition to bacteriological warfare, seems to admit that no such restriction was to be found in customary international law; a fact in any case clear from the comparatively modern development of the science of bacteriology. Nor is there as yet a sufficient line of treaty undertakings to suggest the growth of any such rule. Its scope therefore must be limited to those states who are parties to the Gas Protocol, within the limits of reciprocity and the like there laid down.[31]

There is one strong piece of evidence to support those who say that the Geneva Protocol was declaratory of customary international law—and therefore binding on states whether they had formally adhered or not—and that its prohibition extends to bacteriological as well as chemical weapons. In 1949 several Japanese were tried and convicted by a Soviet Military Tribunal at Khabarovsk for the use of biological weapons against the Mongolian People's Republic. They were charged with spreading plague and typhus. Their conviction can only be based on a claim that the

[28]Morris Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 354.

[29]O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 56. He adds, however, that "no amount of legal hair-splitting can obscure the strength of the conviction held throughout the world that BC [bacteriological and chemical] warfare ought to be banned."

[31]Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

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ban on biological warfare applies to *all* nations, whether or not they have formally adhered to the Geneva Protocol, since Japan has not ratified this, the only formal prohibition of biological warfare on record. A court, acting in an international capacity, has so interpreted the Protocol, and there have been no protests of its action.[32]

Since the Geneva Protocol of 1925, there has been no general treaty concerning chemical or biological warfare. The subject was discussed as part of the larger disarmament efforts sponsored by the League of Nations between 1925 and 1933, but nothing specific resulted from this series of conferences.[33]

The Ethiopians protested that the Italians had used gas against them in the conquest of their country in 1936. While there has never been a formal investigation of these charges, they are probably true.[34] Nevertheless, no war crime charges were pressed after the war as a result of these alleged incidents. The Chinese also charged that the Japanese used gas against them. This charge was included in the indictment at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, but it was never discussed and was not mentioned in the final judgment.[35]

When hostilities began in Europe in 1939, Britain and France made a joint declaration that they would observe the Geneva Gas Protocol on a basis of reciprocity, and this was answered by a similar declaration from Germany.[36] American policy was explained by President Roosevelt when he promised, on June 8, 1943, "that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies."[37] Chem-

[32]See L. Oppenheim, *International Law,* Volume II: *Disputes, War and Neutrality,* Seventh Edition (edited by H. Lauterpacht) (London: Longmans, 1952), p. 343n.

[33]The Draft Convention, prepared for the Disarmament Conference which finally took no action on it, provided in Article 39:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

"They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare."

Quoted in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament and Security Since Locarno* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 371.

[34]See G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 417.

[35]See O'Brien, *op. cit.,* note 90 on p. 34. The Chinese charged that the Japanese had made over a thousand gas attacks in China between 1939 and 1942. See *The Inter-Allied Review,* Volume II (1942), pp. 124-125.

[36]*Ibid.,* p. 35.

[37]*Department of State Bulletin,* Volume 18 (1943), p. 507.

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ical and biological weapons played no important role in World War II, although every major power stood ready to retaliate against any first use of such weapons.[38]

Despite the fact that no general peace settlement followed the war, Germany was subject to a series of special restrictions which included prohibitions concerning chemical and biological weapons. An agreement among the United States, France and the United Kingdom, signed April 13, 1949, regulated industries that might be used for war purposes in Germany, including plants capable of producing chemical and biological warfare agents. Further, when Germany joined the Western European Union in 1954, she specifically agreed not to manufacture any chemical or biological weapons. When Austria regained her sovereignty in 1955, she agreed not to possess, construct or experiment with chemical or biological weapons. The Peace Treaty with Japan, signed September 8, 1951, contained no mention of weapons limitation, but Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution forbids armed forces and renounces war as an instrument of national policy.

Since 1945, thinking about weapons regulation has naturally been dominated by the atomic, and later the hydrogen, bomb. Chemical and biological agents have been included, however, in discussions which have centered on the broader category of "weapons of mass destruction."[39]

IV

The most significant postwar developments in the legal position of chemical and biological weapons concerned the Soviet charges that the United States had used germ warfare in Korea. The charges were baseless, but the fact that they were made, and the reaction to them, reveals a great deal about general opinion

[38]The Germans, who had developed a nerve gas, probably had an advantage over the Allies, but did not realize it. Their intelligence service carefully examined American and British scientific journals, looking for references to toxic agents. When they found no references to nerve gases, they concluded that this must be the result of censorship, which would indicate important developments in this field. Ironically, the lack of references was because these substances and their special properties were completely unknown to Allied scientists. See Rothschild, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

[39]In 1948, the UN Security Council resolved that "weapons of mass-destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, [and] lethal chemical and biological weapons. . . ." This definition would seem to exclude nonlethal, "humane" chemical or biological agents.

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concerning the morality and legality of chemical and biological weapons.[40]

The charges were formally presented by the Soviet delegate to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In coordination with the formal charges there was a massive, worldwide propaganda campaign. "Germ warfare" was the main theme of communist propaganda throughout 1952 and into 1953. Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative, accused the United States of using bacterial weapons against Korea and China with the intention of mass annihilation of the civilian population. At the second meeting of the Disarmament Commission, on March 14, 1952, he called for consideration, without delay, of the

> question of the violation of the prohibition of bacterial warfare—a shameful and dishonourable method of warfare, intolerable to the conscience of honourable people and civilized nations—so as to prevent further use of the bacterial weapon and bring to account those who had violated the prohibition of bacterial warfare.[41]

The communists presented, in support of their charges, six "confessions" from American pilots, stating that they had dropped germs over North Korea. Later, on October 8, 1952, they presented a lengthy report to the United Nations from their "International Scientific Commission for the investigation of the Facts concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China."

These germ warfare charges took up most of the time of the Disarmament Commission during 1952. The American representative, Ambassador Cohen, charged:

> Beginning with the very first meeting of the Disarmament Commission in New York, the Soviet Union sought to poison the atmosphere of the Commission and obscure the clear and unequivocal position of the United States on this subject by making false and sensational charges that U.S. troops were conducting germ warfare in Korea and China. The

[40]Neither side used chemical or biological weapons during the Korean conflict. Napalm, or jellied gasoline, was used extensively by the United Nations forces, but, although this is supplied by the Chemical Corps and is certainly one of the most horrible weapons in the modern arsenal, it has never been included in the general category of chemical weapons.

The United States was extremely cautious about using any chemical agents in Korea. Some front-line commanders requested permission to use tear gas against Chinese bunkers and fortifications, but this was refused. It was considered less likely to offend world opinion if the occupants were blown to bits or burned to death, rather than subjected to any form of gas attack. In fact, American forces were even reluctant to use tear gas to subdue the prisoner-of-war riots, although this agent is commonly used by domestic police forces in comparable situations. See Rothschild, *op. cit.*, for detailed background and argument on these points.

[41]United Nations Disarmament Commission, *Official Records*, March 14, 1952, p. 22.

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Soviet Union sought to leave the false impression that the United States was opposing any effort in the United Nations to devise ways and means of eliminating bacteriological weapons as part of a disarmament program.[42]

The Soviet campaign had two major purposes. The first was simply to discredit the United States and the United Nations effort in Korea; charges of germ warfare were well suited to achieve this objective, for few prospects are viewed with such worldwide repugnance and horror. The second Soviet purpose was far more subtle. The Soviet line on disarmament favored general renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, but rejected Western insistence on inspection and enforcement. The Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare was a model of the type of agreement the Soviets favored for all weapons of mass destruction. Malik therefore constantly tried to associate the germ warfare charges with the refusal of the United States to ratify the Protocol. The implication was that the U.S. refusal to ratify was based upon its intention to use chemical and biological weapons, that the Americans were using them in Korea, and that states which had ratified the Protocol were more inhibited about the use of such weapons. The Soviet delegates sought to secure resolutions from various United Nations committees, calling on all states to ratify the Geneva Protocol if they had not already done so. This served both to reinforce the germ warfare charges and to bring pressure on the United States to ratify the Protocol—which would have given the Soviets a tactical advantage in the disarmament negotiations at that time.

The U.S. defense against the pressure for Protocol ratification was twofold. The American delegates explained over and over that the United States considered the Protocol weak because it lacked provisions for enforcement or inspection, which they insisted were essential to any workable program of disarmament or arms control. Secondly, a specific program to deal with chemical and biological aspects of the disarmament question was included in American proposals, and it has continued to be included in all subsequent American proposals.

On October 20, 1952, the United States requested that the General Assembly place on its agenda an item calling for an impartial investigation by the United Nations of the germ warfare

[42]Quoted by Bernard Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 195.

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charges. This was acted upon in April 1953, when the General Assembly created an "impartial investigatory commission"[43] and requested that it be given "the right to travel freely throughout such areas of North and South Korea, the Chinese Mainland and Japan as it deemed necessary to perform its tasks and with full freedom of access to persons, places and relevant documents."[44] The commission was never able to function because of the refusal of the Chinese and North Korean governments to allow its members access to their territories.

In October 1953, after the fliers who had signed the much publicized "germ warfare confessions" had been repatriated in the prisoner-of-war exchange, and had both denied these statements and described the pressures used to induce them to sign, the United States made a full refutation of the communist charges before the General Assembly. The American case was presented by Dr. Charles Mayo, the noted surgeon, who had been appointed as an alternate representative to that session of the General Assembly. During his detailed presentation, Dr. Mayo described the germ warfare allegations as "a vicious slander which Communist imperialism has cast upon our national honor, upon the dignity of our soldiers, and upon the very concept of truth."[45]

The tone of Dr. Mayo's indignant defense was not unusual. In both World War II and the Korean War, parties accused of using chemical or biological weapons regarded such charges as slanders, to be hotly refuted. This reaction to allegations of the use of such weapons in combat is itself a significant commentary on the general opinion concerning the legality and morality of chemical and biological warfare.

V

The approach to all of these problems raised by the Korean War was typical of the general American attitude toward war, and toward the laws of war. The use of force is widely considered to be governed by clear, simple and universally valid moral and legal principles. The key factor in determining whether the use of force is justified is whether it is a first-use of force, or an act of self-defense (or collective defense). Self-defense is always a just use of force, and it is the only just use of force. No provoca-

[43]The members were Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay.
[44]Quoted by Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
[45]*Department of State Bulletin,* Volume 29, (1953), p. 647.

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tion justifies the initiation of war.[46] American policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, for example, can be understood in light of this simple standard of judgment. But, once war has been initiated by an aggressor, unlimited war for unconditional surrender has been the traditional American policy. While viewing any initiation of force as unjust, Americans historically have employed force to attain total national objectives—once an aggressor has initiated conflict.[47]

Although the legitimate aims of conflict may be unlimited, American spokesmen have traditionally agreed that there ought to be restraints on the manner of employing force. Yet, when faced with the reality of war, the United States has readily adopted a breach of contract approach which nullifies many of these restraints. Lack of restraint in the conduct of war—fire bombing and atomic bombing in World War II and the use of napalm in Korea are examples—is usually associated with and explained by the feeling of indignation and anger toward the aggressor who initially resorted to force and so brought the horror of war upon the world. U.S. leaders have felt little compulsion to make war any less hellish by renouncing unilaterally any weapon which might bring advantage, however horrible it might be.

The American attitude toward specific proposals for weapons regulation has been generally consistent throughout the series of international conferences on this subject. When he instructed the American delegates to the Hague Conference in 1899, Secretary of State John Hay warned:

> The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense is by no means clear, and, considering the temptations to which men and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement to this end would prove effective. The dissent of a single powerful nation might render it altogether nugatory. The delegates are, therefore, enjoined not

[46]This leads to incredible logical complications. For a perceptive discussion of the whole American doctrine, see Robert Tucker, *The Just War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960). For a forceful argument against this single-factor approach, see Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 106-120.

[47]The Korean conflict may have marked a turning point in American thinking about wartime objectives. In the first six months of the war, before the Chinese intervention, the goal was reunification, not a return to the *status quo ante*. But later, the restraints of the doctrine of limited war began to be accepted, and the final truce line left Korea divided roughly as it had been before June 1950. The tensions felt in adopting this new way of thinking about the nature and limits of war were publicly displayed in the MacArthur dismissal and the subsequent domestic controversy.

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to give the weight of their influence to the promotion of projects the realization of which is so uncertain.[48]

Consequently, the U.S. delegation refused to sign the Hague Gas Declaration which was produced by the conference. In explaining this position, one of the delegates, Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, stated:

> The objection that a machine of war is barbarous has always been raised against new weapons, which were, nevertheless, finally adopted. In the Middle Ages it was firearms which were denounced as cruel. Later, shells, and more recently torpedoes have been denounced. It seems to me that it cannot be proved that shells with asphyxiating gases are inhumane or unnecessarily cruel machines of war, and that they cannot produce decisive results.
>
> I represent a people that is animated by a lively desire to make warfare humane but which nevertheless may find itself forced to wage war; therefore it is a question of not depriving itself through hastily adopted resolutions of means which it could later avail itself with good results.[49]

The Rules of Land Warfare contained in Hague Convention IV, adopted in 1907, were either very general or otherwise unobjectionable to the United States, and they continue to be recognized by the U.S. government as declaratory of international law on the regulation of warfare.[50] Of course, the 1907 Hague Conference had met at the urging of President Roosevelt—although the regulation of warfare was not its main purpose.

For a few years after World War I, American policy deviated from its usual pattern. This resulted in U.S. acceptance of Article V of the Washington Treaty and the adoption, under U.S. leadership, of limitations on gas warfare in the treaties signed among the Central American states and at the Conference at Santiago in 1923. An important factor in this policy deviation was the Allied propaganda campaign condemning Germany for using gas, which was widely accepted and believed by American leaders and citizens alike. Moreover, the cavalry generals who commanded the U.S. Army (and most other armies at the time) had strongly disliked trench warfare in general, and gas warfare in particular. Thus there was no military lobby to argue against restrictions on gas warfare. As a result of this hostility to chemical warfare among U.S. generals the army's Chemical Warfare Service was almost

[48]Quoted in Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences, op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
[49]Quoted in Rothschild, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
[50]See FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1956), p. 6.

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abolished; for several years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, its work was severely restricted.[51]

American rejection of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was probably the result of isolationism more than anything else. Nevertheless, the Senate's debate on the Protocol produced the old arguments against rejecting a weapons system not yet developed, as well as new points, which have been an important part of recent American policy, emphasizing the absence of any enforcement provisions.[52] Policy concerning chemical warfare research and development changed, too. By 1934 the official position was described in these words:

> The United States will make all necessary preparations for the use of chemical warfare from the outbreak of war. The use of chemical warfare, including the use of toxic agents, from the inception of hostilities, is authorized, subject to such restrictions or prohibitions as may be contained in any duly ratified international convention or conventions, which at that time may be binding upon the United States and the enemy's state or states.[53]

American policy in World War II was more restrictive, largely because of the attitude of President Roosevelt toward gas warfare. In his hatred of this form of combat, he joined the other interwar Presidents, Harding and Coolidge and especially Hoover. Roosevelt clearly expressed his own attitude when he vetoed a bill to designate the Chemical Warfare Service the Chemical Corps, in 1937:

> It has been and is the policy of this Government to do everything in its power to outlaw the use of chemicals in warfare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to what modern civilization should stand for.
>
> I am doing everything in my power to discourage the use of gases and other chemicals in any war between nations. While, unfortunately, the defensive necessities of the United States call for study of the use of chemicals in warfare, I do not want the Government of the United States to do anything to aggrandize or make permanent any special bureau of the Army or the Navy engaged in these studies. I hope the time will come when the Chemical Warfare Service can be entirely abolished. To dignify this Service by calling it the "Chemical Corps" is, in my judgment, contrary to a sound public policy.[54]

After the United States entered World War II, Secretary of State Hull suggested that the U.S. government unilaterally declare

[51]See Brophy and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-24.
[52]See *Congressional Record*, Volume 68 (1926), pp. 141-154.
[53]A joint Army-Navy memorandum, quoted in Brophy and Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[54]*Ibid.*, p. 22.

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its intention to observe the terms of the Geneva Protocol on a reciprocal basis, similar to the declarations which had been issued by Britain, France and Germany. This was opposed by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who emphasized that the only effective deterrent to gas warfare would be enemy fear of American retaliation—regardless of any declarations or treaty obligations.[55] U.S. policy throughout the war emphasized the maintenance of a chemical warfare capacity adequate to make the threat of retaliation credible. The basic U.S. policy was contained in the 1943 statement by President Roosevelt: "Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. . . . I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies."[56]

Following the defeat of Germany, there was a serious re-examination of American policy with regard to gas warfare. The high casualty rate suffered by U.S. forces on Iwo Jima and Okinawa indicated that a dramatic new weapon was needed which would end the war quickly. It was argued that meteorological conditions in Japan favored the use of gas against large area targets. The ability of gas to penetrate into fortifications seemed especially important after the stubborn resistance that had been met on the Pacific islands. Finally, it was argued that since the United States had primary responsibility for the war in the Pacific, a decision could be made without giving much weight to more skeptical British opinion regarding the effectiveness of gas warfare. In the end, however, American officials feared that the reaction of world opinion to the use of gas would be too hostile, especially in light of President Roosevelt's strong statement against such weaponry.[57] A decisive weapon *was* found which was not ruled out by public opinion: the atomic bomb.

American policy on chemical and biological warfare since the end of World War II has been characterized by a reluctance to discuss the subject or its implications, although during the past four or five years the research and development program on these weapons has been greatly accelerated. Government spokesmen are permitted to speak only about defensive measures in chemical and biological warfare; offensive tactics may not be discussed in

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
[56] *Department of State Bulletin*, Volume 18 (1943), p. 507.
[57] See Brophy and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-87.

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public.[58] This does not mean that chemical or biological weapons might be used in some future conflict. Army policy merely emphasizes that the use of such weapons must be authorized at the highest levels.[59]

The question of chemical and biological warfare is subsumed under the more general question about any use of force. In a statement before the United Nations Disarmament Commission on May 27, 1952, Ambassador Cohen said:

> The United States as a member of the United Nations has committed itself, as have all other members, to refrain from not only the use of poisonous gas and the use of germ warfare but the use of force of any kind contrary to the law of the Charter. . . . [W]e must approach the problem of disarmament from the point of view of preventing war and not from the point of view of regulating the armaments to be used in war. . . . But we do not intend, before such measures and safeguards have been agreed upon, to invite aggression by . . . committing ourselves to would-be aggressors and Charter-breakers that we will not use certain weapons to suppress aggression. To do so in exchange for mere paper promises would be to give would-be aggressors their own choice of weapons.[60]

VI

The official Soviet position places great emphasis on the efficacy of treaty agreements in preventing and regulating the use of chemical and biological weapons. One Soviet expert on international law, Kozhevnikov, has written:

> The Soviet government attributes great significance to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This document, signed by 49 states, although not yet ratified by all these states, constituted a serious restraining factor in the second world war. In this war chemical and bacteriological weapons were not employed. The states of the anti-Hitler coalition took a firm position on the basis of the indicated inter-national prohibitions, i.e., to give a destructive rebuff to any adversary attempting to apply the above prohibited weapons in the war.[61]

This represents a traditional Russian—not just Soviet—attitude. It will be recalled that the first three international conventions aimed at regulating arms all met at the invitation of the Russian Czar.[62] Nevertheless, the Soviet military establishment includes

[58]A recent example of this was a story in the *New York Times* of November 22, 1964 which emphasized the extreme reluctance of officials to discuss any aspect of chemical and biological weapons' development.

[59]See O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[60]U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 1527, August 12, 1952, "Statement by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen, Deputy U.S. Representative in the Disarmament Commission, on the Elimination of Germ Warfare," pp. 4-5.

[61]See O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[62]At St. Petersburg in 1868, Brussels in 1874, and the Hague in 1899.

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a substantial chemical and biological warfare potential. Official Soviet military doctrine anticipates that "a future war, should it be unleashed, will be characterized by the massive use of air forces, various rocket weapons, and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons."[63]

In postwar disarmament discussions, the Soviet argument has emphasized the effectiveness of general declaratory treaties like the Geneva Protocol, without the need for inspection or enforcement provisions. In a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on November 8, 1961, the Soviet representative, Tsarapkin, repeated the general argument:

I could recall that some time ago many countries stated that gas and bacteriological weapons should not be used. This international agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, known as the Geneva Convention, has proved its worth in practice. In World War I when there was no such agreement, chemical weapons were resorted to and great human losses resulted. The conclusion of such an agreement by a large number of states indubitably has greatly contributed to the fact that during World War II millions of people—children, women, and old people—were freed from the terrible death that would have been imparted by poison gas, although states were at that time in possession of chemical and poisonous substances. If mankind was able to defend itself against such a barbarous kind of warfare, there is no reason to believe that the same thing could not be done with another and even more barbarous and monstrous weapon. Our ardent desire is to prevent a rocket and nuclear war falling on mankind.[64]

In a letter to a conference of scientists considering the problems of chemical and biological warfare,[65] Premier Khrushchev wrote:

We share the concern of scientists, who justly point out that the use of these weapons may have no less horrible a consequence than the use of atomic or hydrogen weapons. Not by chance were chemical and bacteriological weapons condemned by mankind, and their military use prohibited by international agreement through the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As is well known the Soviet Union strongly supports the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass annihilation, including nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons. We hold that their use runs counter to humane principles, the rules of international law, and the conscience of all peoples.[66]

[63]Marshal Zhukov, addressing the Party Congress in 1956, quoted in Rothschild, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

[64]United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1961* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 577-578.

[65]The Pugwash Conference, meeting at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, August 24-29, 1959.

[66]Quoted in *Congressional Record*, Volume 106, Part I, January 18, 1960, p. 710.

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VII

The conference to which Khrushchev addressed his remarks found during its discussions that control of any ban on chemical and biological weapons would present problems even more difficult than in the case of nuclear weapons. Chemical or biological weapons can be produced in ordinary laboratories, along with many peaceful chemical and microbiological products. Were all present stocks of toxic materials to be destroyed, it would still be comparatively easy for any state or even a private group to build up a decisive quantity of some lethal material in complete secrecy. And if war should come, peacetime facilities could be quickly converted to the production of chemical or biological weapons, even if none existed at the outbreak of hostilities. Thus while it is possible to postulate enforcement procedures adequate to afford reasonable confidence that states were adhering to a ban on nuclear weapons, similar confidence with regard to a ban on chemical or biological agents might be impossible to attain under any circumstances.[67]

The restraint that has characterized the conduct of the superpowers in using their own nuclear, chemical and biological potential reflects their general sense of responsibility for world order and the survival of the human race. But responsible leadership is less assured in the smaller, poorer and newer states, where internal pressures, the result of the inevitable turmoil produced by rapid change, are likely to dictate irrational or irresponsible conduct in external relations with other states. A world which numbered Guinea or Egypt or Indonesia among the nuclear powers would be an insecure place indeed.

Chemical, and especially biological, weapons can be produced cheaply and easily enough to raise a very real possibility that any country, so desiring, might acquire these weapons of mass destruction. Because the ultimate effects of biological weapons are so unpredictable, and potentially so destructive, even greater restraint is required of any nation that possesses them. Yet states whose capacity for restraint does not inspire confidence may soon

[67]An imaginative solution to the problems of arms control, which would be especially suited to the problems of chemical and biological weapons, is the pledging of national legitimacy symbols to secure the agreed disarmament: the frequent and public commitment of the authority and honor of the state to the goal of full arms control, emphasizing a patriotic duty of citizens to report any attempted violations of the agreement to international inspectors, who would be appointed and readily available. See Karl Deutsch, "The Commitment of National Legitimacy Symbols as a Verification Technique," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 7, No. 3, pp. 360-369.

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possess such weapons. (Indeed, they might easily come into the hands of dissident and irresponsible private groups.) Thus, it is in the interest of the great powers to minimize the possibility of such proliferation. But so long as they continue extensive development programs in chemical and biological weaponry, they make proliferation all the more likely. Moreover, so long as the policies of the great powers anticipate that under certain circumstances chemical and biological weapons might be used in future conflict, the chances grow that smaller powers may feel free to use such weapons. While the existence of any weapons of mass destruction threatens world order, this threat is at least minimized if these weapons are confined to types that are expensive and complicated to obtain and use.

One reason why the great powers have insisted on maintaining a chemical and biological warfare potential is to threaten retaliation against any use of such weapons by an enemy. In view of the difficulty of ever being sure that these weapons had been eliminated in accordance with an international agreement banning them, the argument for keeping some in the hands of every great power for use as a retaliatory sanction is persuasive. Soviet and American policymakers are in accord in condemning a first use of chemical or biological weapons. While no fully binding prohibition exists, there are on record numerous statements from authoritative spokesmen of both states to the effect that such warfare is generally and properly condemned by world opinion. But it is a fundamental principle of the law of war that if one state employs a means of warfare generally prohibited, the victim state may use the same normally prohibited weapon in exercising its right of reprisal.

However, the right of reprisal is not the right of subsequently unlimited use of weapons or means of warfare formerly acknowledged to be illegal. The purpose of reprisal is to allow the use of proportional and appropriate force to cause the offending state to cease its violation of the laws of war. Unfortunately, the precedents and agreements suggest a "blank check" interpretation of the rule of reprisal. This was the Allies' justification for their frequent use of gas once it had been initiated by the enemy in the First World War.[68] The same interpretation can be applied

[68]Actually, the Germans claimed their own first use of gas at Ypres to be a reprisal against alleged use of gas by the British a week before. See O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 23n.

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to the detailed provisions of the Geneva Protocol and to the later unilateral wartime declarations by Britain, France, Germany and the United States that they would refrain from any first use of chemical weapons. As Stone has observed: "Such instances require us to recognize that retaliation, which can be an effective sanction of the law of war, may also serve as a powerful instrument for *undermining* or *changing* the law of war."[69]

VIII

The law of war is like all law: there are sets of complementary norms, and each case must be judged by finding a balance between them. All of the formal treaties and declarations concerning chemical and biological weapons have taken a limited contractual form, rather than an absolute prohibition. Although all parties refrained from using chemical weapons during World War II, they were prepared to use such weapons in an unlimited way if any state made a first use of them. Nevertheless, the legal and moral status of chemical and biological weapons is affected each time they are condemned at an international conference, in a statement by a responsible government official, by a conference of scientists, in a book on international law, or in an article in the popular press. One of the ways international law is formed and reinforced is by the widespread and repeated denunciation of some course of action as contrary to its provisions.[70] But the legal status of chemical and biological warfare is still uncertain, for efforts are still made to have it declared illegal in a treaty or resolution.

In making a future decision about using chemical or biological weapons, the statesman or the general will have to balance the opprobrium attached to their use with the probable advantages to be derived. If it is thought that such weapons will be decisive, they will almost certainly be used.[71] The history of wars is written

[69]Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 355. (Italics in original.)

[70]"[M]uch can now be said for the view that the accumulation of preambulatory declarations, imperfectly operative provisions, to which most (but not all) of the military Powers are parties, supported by analogies of customary law, and appeals to principles of humanity, has now rendered the prohibition of the use of all poisonous, asphyxiating or other gases legally binding upon practically all States." *Ibid.*, p. 556.

[71]"From the attempt of the Second Lateran Council to outlaw the crossbow in 1139 to the efforts after World War I virtually to prohibit effective aerial bombardment and submarine warfare, no *decisive* means of war has been successfully regulated, much less outlawed." William V. O'Brien, "Nuclear Warfare and the Law of Nations," in William J. Nagle, *Morality and Modern Warfare* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960), p. 130. (Italics in original.)

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by the victors. Even if there is doubt about a weapon's effectiveness, it will almost always be used. The German generals at Ypres were obviously not sure that gas would be decisive, for they were not ready to take advantage of its effects. But, if the use of a particular weapon or technique of warfare produces a strongly adverse public reaction, then its use will be at least inhibited.

The existence of weapons of mass destruction without any assurance that war can be eliminated from international relations creates a precarious situation. The influence and rhetoric of international law must be mobilized to support some control over the range of violence in war. If men must fight wars, it is essential that they be fought without threatening the entire fabric of human society.

By agreement, precedent and opinion, the world seems closer to a prohibition on chemical and biological weapons than on any other agents of mass destruction. But, paradoxically, it may be precisely in this category of weapons, which we are closest to outlawing altogether, that a means may exist for carrying on conflict with minimum destruction of lives, property and values. Some chemical agents, the incapacitants, or psychochemicals, may make it possible to wage war effectively with almost no loss of life or damage to man's environment.[72] The most useful and persuasive claim which can be made to exempt such agents from a more general ban on chemical warfare—in addition to the claims of logic and humanitarianism—is that these weapons were developed after agreements banning ordinary gas warfare had been signed, and that such agreements can apply only to means of war as they were known at the time.[73]

Such weapons should certainly be excluded from any prohibition of chemical and biological warfare. They could combine high effectiveness in accomplishing military objectives with a minimal

[72]Even ordinary toxic gases are probably more humane and at least as effective as conventional explosives. This was indicated by the World War I casualty figures discussed earlier. During that war both sides claimed that gas was actually quite humane and legal, but their contradictory claims that gas warfare constituted an atrocity received wider dissemination and were far more effective.

[73]The status of tear and nausea gases, forms of which were known at the time of the Geneva Protocol, is more difficult to determine. Recent claims by the U.S. State Department notwithstanding, the language of the Protocol, prohibiting asphyxiating "or other gases," appears to include these nonlethal types. It can still be claimed, however, that the Protocol does not apply in the Vietnam situation, since none of the powers involved there is party to the agreement, which is contractual in form. The law of war is ambiguous at this point. But those who would defend the legality of such nonlethal weapons must produce clear arguments for their position.

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destruction of human values. An international police force, for example, equipped with such weapons, could be militarily effective without becoming an ordinary army whose object would be to destroy lives and property.

The distinction between nonlethal agents and the toxic chemical and biological weapons, about which so much justified fear exists, is possible. Unfortunately, because all chemical and biological weapons have been cloaked in such dark secrecy, this distinction has been blurred; even these least horrible of weapons bear an odium not applied to more traditional and much more destructive weapons. This need not be so. There is no prohibition in international law against them, for they have all been developed too recently. Further, their effects are fully in consonance with the purpose of all previous international agreements about the limitation of armaments: to limit suffering and destruction.

The exemption of nonlethal weapons does not weaken the argument for complete prohibition of toxic gases and biological agents. The lethal weapons share two special characteristics which make this a desirable goal. The first of these is the uncertainty of their effects. Meteorological and related factors have such a crucial and complicated effect on the use of chemicals and biological agents in a mass attack that the results and limits of their use are virtually unpredictable. The use of a lethal and highly unpredictable weapon is logically and morally irresponsible. This is especially true in the case of biological warfare. Once an epidemic of some disease is started, its development cannot be predicted with reasonable accuracy and the means of bringing it under control cannot be guaranteed. Too many variables which remain unknown to the potential user are important in determining the final outcome.

The other undesirable characteristic of toxic gases and biological weapons is their low cost and ease of acquisition, compared to other weapons of mass destruction. This problem of proliferation was discussed earlier. Suffice it to state here that a world in which this kind of power was available to virtually any state or group that wanted to use it would be unthinkable.

Therefore, it should be the policy of the United States and of all other responsible powers to seek general agreement that toxic chemicals and biological agents are not permissible weapons of war.

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No conceivable military advantage is sufficient to outweigh the dangers inherent in the continued existence and development of such weapons. In arguing for their prohibition, the major powers should cite the many expressions of unfavorable public opinion and moral condemnation concerning them and the cumulative store of declarations, agreements, treaties and precedents which speak against their use.

In any general disarmament agreement, all weapons of mass destruction must be dealt with together. This is widely recognized and has been the procedure of all disarmament proposals since World War II.[74] But there is little prospect of general and complete disarmament in the near future. Until global antagonisms subside to permit verifiable disarmament, sound policy must support any form of inhibition to the development and use of toxic chemical and biological weapons. A world which contains weapons capable of massive destruction is a dangerously unstable world, to say the least. Until all such weapons can be eliminated or controlled, it is safer that they be held by as few nations as possible. Any weakening of the inhibitions against toxic chemical and biological weapons will exacerbate an already dangerous situation. This cannot be justified, even to provide an additional retaliatory threat against nuclear attack.

On the other hand, nontoxic agents would be an ideal retaliatory weapon for either an international force or for an individual nation acting in self-defense. They are potentially capable of doing all that is desirable in retaliation—eliminating the aggressor's capacity for further violation of world order—without an associated unacceptable destruction of values, property and lives. Thus these weapons offer real hope for a saner world. Their development and use must be freed from inhibitions arising from misunderstanding and false analogy to the toxic forms of chemical and biological weaponry.

The vagueness of international law is usually cited as a weakness. But in this case, it provides an opportunity for beneficial manipulation. It is still possible, through argument and further agreements, to structure the international law on chemical and biological warfare in a way that will better serve the fundamental goals of world order and human survival.

[74]The special problems of disarmament and weapons of mass destruction were recognized even in the interwar period. For an interesting and perceptive early treatment of these, see V. Lefebure, "Chemical Warfare: The Possibility of Its Control," *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, Volume 7 (1921), pp. 153-166.

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Reviews

The Dominican Experiment with Bosch*

by Henry Wells

In *The Unfinished Experiment* Juan Bosch assumes the role of social psychologist in order to explain why he lasted only seven months as president of the Dominican Republic. His main thesis is that "intrinsic weaknesses" in Dominican society, and especially in the attitudes of its social classes, made his overthrow inevitable. Since he never once suggests that errors of judgment or unwise courses of action on his part might have contributed to his downfall, the clear implication of his argument is that he was in no way to blame for what occurred. One gathers, indeed, that in his view his management of public affairs was impeccable from the standpoint of democratic leadership. As he explains the situation (and as he claims to have recognized from the outset), the forces of good were simply no match for the forces of evil, given the class orientations that prevailed in the Dominican Republic when he took office.

Although Bosch admits that "the Republic has no reliable statistics" (p. 59), he offers "an educated guess" concerning the class composition of Dominican society. At the top of the social pyramid, he says, is a small upper class of so-called first families, most of whom lack an economic base consistent with their elite status. Next come the upper, middle and lower strata of the middle class, which he estimates at 20 to 30 per cent of the total population. The remainder he calls "the masses—workers, farmers, and the unemployed." (p. 55.)

According to Bosch, the distinctive psychology of each of these classes and subclasses determined its political role in the post-Trujillo period. "The first families," he says, "had learned a lesson from Trujillo: once in power, it is easy to become as rich as the country's industry and finance allow." (p. 26.) Soon after the assassination, Bosch argues, this group organized the National Civic Union (UCN) for the purpose of gaining political power and thereby acquiring the wealth they so avidly desired. In founding the UCN they joined forces with "part of the commercial, professional, and landholding upper stratum of the middle class," who sought political power in order to acquire Trujillo's vast industrial and other enterprises and thus become "the national bourgeoisie." (p. 56.)

The upper middle class "has no concept of democracy," says Bosch, because "this group does its thinking not with its brains but with its bank accounts." The middle stratum of the middle class—most of the professional people, small businessmen, and civil servants—likewise has no concept of democracy, but for another reason: its emotional instability. "The innumer-

**The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic.* By Juan Bosch. New York: Praeger, 1965. 239 pp. $5.95.

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able complexes created by its false social values have stifled its intelligence. These people do not think with dollars; they are governed by unbridled passions, resentments, and frustrations." (p. 230.) Equally bitter, frustrated and insecure, he says, are those members of the lower middle class who aspire to middle-stratum status. Lacking the economic means to elevate themselves, they "go through life looking for financial opportunity that will support their desires and their social positions." (p. 60.)

According to Bosch, middle-class Dominicans are "at odds with themselves. They have no pride or self-respect. They either hate the country in which they were born or now live, or they do not know how to love it. . . . With few exceptions, businessmen, professionals, soldiers, priests, journalists, and men and women lack the dignity of patriotism because they lack that stabilizing element called love—love for one's own, for one's country, history, destiny." (pp. 61-62.) Since they hate the common people, says Bosch, they bitterly attacked his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), which championed the people's rights during the 1962 campaign. Lusting after power and wealth, the middle classes supported the presidential candidate of the UCN, Dr. Viriato Fiallo. Bosch claims that they never forgave him for defeating Fiallo and that from the moment of his election they conspired with the upper ranks of the military and the Church to overthrow him.

Bosch's indictment of the Dominican middle classes spares only the students and young professionals who formed or later supported the 14th of June Movement (1J4)—an intensely nationalistic, anti-American, pro-Castro organization which had been founded in 1959 on the model of Castro's own 26th of July Movement and later became the largest of the three communist groups in the republic. But even the radical 1J4 youths do not entirely escape Bosch's scorn. Their privileged origins, he says, prevented them from understanding the psychology of the masses.

Bosch understood that psychology, he claims, because he was "born into the lower stratum of the middle class, very close to masses." (p. 82.) His discussion of "the great popular masses" is so idealized, however, as to suggest that his contact with them was never very close. "Here, intact," he says, "are the national virtues: love of their compatriots, their land, their music, their food; loyal to friends and party, and to certain simple but generous ideas." (p. 63.) In a still more romantic passage he tells us that "the thinking of the masses is clear, sometimes unexpectedly profound. It is not deformed by complexes, because the masses are true to themselves. . . . The Dominican masses are blessed with an intelligence, a natural decency, and a goodness that impress the most critical observer." (p. 231.)

It must be recalled that the man who wrote these encomia in 1964 had been in exile for at least twenty-four of the preceding twenty-six years. During his less than

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two years in the Dominican Republic after his return in October 1961, he had spent precious little time reacquainting himself with the virtues of the masses. For the most part he remained closeted in his house in Santo Domingo, even during the height of the campaign. He seldom strayed far from his desk or from the "mike" through which he made his daily radio broadcasts to the electorate. One seven-week trip to South America during the spring of 1962 and another to the United States and Europe following his election in December 1962 reduced still further the opportunities that Bosch might have had to learn what the Dominican people were really like. After assuming the presidency on February 27, 1963, he was too busy to spend much time outside the National Palace, and by the end of September 1963 he was again in exile.

In short, it is most unlikely that Juan Bosch is a reliable source of information on any of the Dominican classes, least of all the one for which he purports to be the spokesman. Scholarly accounts of both the urban poor and the rural masses of the Dominican Republic are quite at variance with the idyllic picture that Bosch paints. An empirical study of Santo Domingo slum dwellers by a sociologist at the University of Santo Domingo gives evidence of (a) a significant degree of family instability and "more generally of anomie," (b) behavior patterns reflecting attitudes of alienation and passivity on the part of most adults, and (c) a striking atomization of social life in the various *barrios* (neighborhoods) of the capital. The lower class *barrios* of Santo Domingo, unlike those of such equally slum-ridden cities as Bogotá, Lima and Santiago, manifest an almost total lack of *barrio* organizations and even of persons recognized by the inhabitants as *barrio* leaders.[1]

Evidence from the countryside points to a similar psycho-social malaise within the peasantry. A cultural anthropologist's report on field work undertaken in Bosch's own native province of La Vega during 1963 indicates that interpersonal suspicions and hostilities are common among Dominican peasants, particularly among those not related to one another by extended-family ties. "The Dominican views non-family as always having interests at least potentially in direct opposition to his own," and he acts accordingly. Bosch to the contrary notwithstanding, the researcher found that most of the farmers interviewed had difficulty listing even two other persons whom they would class as friends. He also noted evidence of "a strong 'something for nothing' attitude among the rural class."[2]

Bosch's division of Dominican society into the good guys and the

[1]André Corten, "Cómo vive la otra mitad de Santo Domingo: estudio de dualismo estructural," *Caribbean Studies,* January 1965, pp. 3-19.

[2]John T. Westbrook, "Social and Economic Factors in Individual Family Success and Failure in an Agrarian Reform Project: Caracol, R.D.," p. 9. Paper presented at Second Conference of Caribbean Scholars, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, April 15-19, 1964. Mimeo.

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bad guys—the wise, virtuous but oppressed masses on the one hand and the corrupt and domineering upper and middle classes on the other—would seem to have been a gross oversimplification, especially with respect to the masses. The point is, however, that Bosch based his strategy as a candidate and his style as president on that simplistic dichotomy. The campaign strategy paid off: he won 60 per cent of the popular vote. But the style of action he adopted as president led straight to disaster.

During the months after Trujillo's assassination in 1961 and throughout the 1962 campaign, Bosch and the PRD addressed their appeals exclusively to the urban and rural poor. Their aim was to provoke popular resentment against the more privileged strata of Dominican society. They attempted, in other words, to generate a kind of overt class antagonism that had not existed before Bosch came on the political scene. "There were social divisions," he says, "and I had brought them out into the open. I showed them to the people; I said they were unjust and the source of injustice. It was my duty to do so for the benefit of the great bulk of the Dominican population and for the nation." (p. 87.)

Bosch proudly relates the fact that he resurrected *tutumpote,* an old smear word signifying "fat cat" or "big shot" that had nearly gone out of use, and fashioned it into a cudgel with which to beat the privileged classes. His favorite victims were of course the leaders and candidates of the UCN, whom he never tired of calling *tutumpotes.* By the end of the campaign, he says, the masses "knew who, in truth, were their enemies and where they were lurking. . . . And they learned, too, that between a thug and a *tutumpote,* their real enemy was the latter." He glories in having thus stirred up class animosities. "By teaching the people this much, I am sure, I have performed a labor of public benefit, and I am proud of it, whatever my adversaries may have to say about it." (p. 87.)

The use of such tactics by presidential candidates is not uncommon in the political campaigns of democratic states. It is part of the democratic tradition, however, that the man elected to the highest office will regard himself as president of all the people. Putting the rancors of the campaign behind him, he tries to bind up the nation's wounds and unite all its members, groups and classes under his leadership. Such an approach was surely indicated for the Dominican Republic in 1963. After thirty-one years of repression and a further twenty months of turmoil, it was a sick society from top to bottom. Its greatest need was a commitment to reconciliation, recuperation and reconstruction on the part of its newly elected president.

Juan Bosch was incapable of the kind of leadership that the situation required. Essentially an agitator, not a statesman, he could not shift gears once the election had been won. He remained compulsively on the attack, unable to concede the possibility of honest op-

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position or to recognize the need for a reduction of tensions if his administration was to achieve its purposes. Prisoner of his own abstractions concerning Dominican society and of his campaign slogans, he persisted in regarding as the enemy, i.e., as *tutumpotes,* all those who had not supported him during the campaign. In so doing he added force to Harold D. Lasswell's observation that "the agitator easily infers that he who disagrees with him is in league with the devil."[3]

Bosch set the tone of his presidency even before he took office. In a long speech delivered ten days before the inauguration, he time and again lashed out against those who had lost the election, referring to them as *tutumpotes* and at one point as "an overly malicious enemy." Although his inaugural address was more conciliatory, his real attitude was doubtless revealed in the fact that the members of the outgoing Council of State were not invited to the presidential reception that followed the ceremony. The Council had governed the country since January 1962 and had made the policy decisions that resulted in an election so honestly and impartially conducted that Bosch's own victory could not possibly be challenged. But the members of the Council belonged to the upper and upper-middle classes, and some of them had helped to organize the UCN—reasons enough, by Bosch's lights, for the affront he dealt them.

It was Bosch's style as president constantly to agitate for revolutionary change, thus keeping the nation in a state of uncertainty; but his specific reform proposals (barely mentioned in *The Unfinished Experiment*) were not in fact very radical. He only made them seem so by his verbal blasts against those who questioned any part of them. Such proposals as were enacted into law were never implemented, partly because of Bosch's pronounced inadequacies as an executive and partly because of a severe shortage of planners, economists, statisticians, engineers, agronomists and other experts. Even the few Dominicans who had the requisite skills were in the main unavailable to Bosch, for they belonged to the *tutumpote* group he so frequently reviled. His chapter on the Inter-American Center for Social Studies (CIDES), one of the few chapters of *The Unfinished Experiment* that deal with the period of his presidency, tells of its recruitment of technical experts from other countries of the hemisphere "to fill the gap created by the lack of Dominican technicians." (p. 175.) But their help was not sufficient to enable the Bosch administration to produce results, and as a consequence Bosch began to lose the support of the masses to whom he had promised so much during the campaign.

A facet of his style even more relevant to his downfall was his anti-anti-communism. In his book Bosch condemns Fiallo, the Do-

[3]Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York: Viking Press Compass Book, 1960), p. 78.

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minican bishops, and other conservatives for hurling the accusation of communist at anyone who would advocate even the slightest change in the status quo, but nowhere in the volume does he refer to his own policy toward the three acknowledged communist groups that were active in the republic during his presidency. This is an interesting omission, for it was his permissive attitude toward the real communists that, more than anything else, precipitated his overthrow.

As president, Bosch held to the view that only the upper and middle classes were enemies of Dominican democracy. He did not so regard the Dominican communists, as is evident from the fact that he permitted those who had been exiled by earlier governments to return to the republic and resume their political activities. Possibly because they too attacked the middle and upper classes, Bosch made no attempt to curb the ever-increasing flow of communist propaganda on radio and television and in the press. And he turned a deaf ear to warnings that communists and communist sympathizers were gaining important posts in his government.

Bosch must have known that this line of policy would ultimately become intolerable to the conservative leaders of the business community, the armed forces and the Church, over whom he had no effective control. Since they had obviously regarded his election as the triumph of King Mob and had not been reassured by anything he had done or said after assuming the presidency, their reaction to his policy toward communists was only too predictable. The question then arises why Bosch so openly provoked them to rise against him.

The Unfinished Experiment provides two clues to an answer. One is the remark Bosch made at the conclusion of his famous debate with Father Láutico García on the very eve of the election. (The debate took place after Bosch had suddenly withdrawn his candidacy in protest against the priest's charge that he was a Marxist-Leninist—an accusation that the priest retracted during the debate.) When asked by the moderator whether he still intended not to run, Bosch answered: "I do not wish to be a candidate because I know the PRD will win the elections, and if it does, the government I head will not be able to rule. It will be overthrown in a short time on the pretext that it is Communist." (p. 123.) As we know, he changed his mind ("I had to bow to mass pressure"), re-entered the race, and won. "If I regret anything in my life," he says, "it is my agreement to go into that election while knowing beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt that the government I was to head would be toppled." (p. 124.) Predicting his own overthrow (no doubt even counting on it, for Bosch would rather be a martyr than a hero), he proceeded to make his prophecy come true by his provocations of the rightist elements.

The other clue is his comment to the effect that the cause of the democratic left is hopeless in Latin

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America and that the communists are bound to take over. His position is that Fidel Castro, "who had been the leader of a fervently popular democratic revolution," spoiled everything for the leaders of such revolutions elsewhere by falsely announcing that he had always been a communist. "After his declaration," says Bosch, "it became virtually and even totally impossible to make a democratic revolution in this part of the world" because anyone who tried it would be branded a communist. "The Latin American revolution, which is inevitable," he concludes, "even if it takes fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years, should not be Communist, but the fear of the democratic revolution will make it sooner or later fall into the pattern of a Communist revolution." (p. 142.) If Bosch is imbued with this brand of fatalism, his passive response to the rising tempo of communist operations in the Dominican Republic during his regime is not to be wondered at.

The plain truth is that Juan Bosch lacks the will to rule. He is deeply ambivalent about power. His vanity drives him toward it, but fear of responsibility (perhaps even physical cowardice as well) causes him to shy away from power if it is within his reach and to let it slip through his fingers when it is thrust upon him. No explanation of Bosch's overthrow can therefore be complete unless it takes into account his own failures of leadership and, above all, the flaws of character that made those failures inevitable. The real lesson of *The Unfinished Experiment* is that the Dominican people, who have surely suffered enough already, will only let themselves in for further miseries if they elect to resume the experiment under the man who started it.

National Security and a Demilitarized World*

by Harland B. Moulton

In a nuclear age still characterized by unrelenting technological change, Cold War tensions and conflict, and arms competition of ever greater sophistication and scope, it is essential that U.S. military strategy remain flexible and responsive to unforeseen future threats, to force structure and deployment changes required by new and qualitatively improved weapons systems, and to inevitable shifts in existing power balances and alliance systems. At the same time, the nation should not become so preoccupied with the preservation of its security by military power alone that formal arms control and arms reduction agreements, designed to stabilize or safely reduce existing levels of armed forces, are rejected as unsuitable alternatives to the risks of continued arms competition. Henry E. Eccles and Walter Millis, rising to this challenge in their books, *Military Concept and Philosophy* and *An End to Arms,* inquire respectively into the possibility of developing a comprehen-

**Military Concept and Philosophy.* By Henry E. Eccles, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965. 399 pp. $9.00.

An End to Arms. By Walter Millis. New York: Atheneum, 1965. 301 pp. $5.95.

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sive and coherent theory of modern conflict, and the practical means of bringing into existence a demilitarized world based on a supranational government having limited police powers and facilitated by an act of general disarmament.

The Cuban missile crisis, seen in perspective, looms increasingly as an important watershed in our relations with the Soviet Union. This U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the most serious crisis since the end of World War II, was a case study in crisis management, conducted coolly and purposefully by both adversaries. A shooting war was averted, the dangers of escalation avoided, and options were always available to the Soviets permitting a graceful retreat with a minimum loss of face. Future historians may well evaluate the Cuban crisis as marking a decisive transition by the United States, and probably also the Soviet Union, away from a doctrinaire strategy of "massive retaliation" toward acceptance of a strategy of flexible response based on the discreet use of force by nuclear powers to attain strictly limited objectives. During their post-crisis policy reappraisal, the Soviets seemed to realize that their own interests would best be served in the long run by showing greater interest in arms control agreements such as the partial nuclear test ban, the hot line, and the UN resolution prohibiting the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

Following the Cuban confrontation, both major powers seemed to recognize the increasing inutility of "supergiant weaponry" as a means of attaining political objectives or resolving differences. For a time after 1962 the Soviets chose not to risk increasing the pace of the arms competition, and the United States responded by exercising restraint and discretion in deploying additional weapons systems of its own. Growing evidence of an irrevocable Sino-Soviet split appeared to open new possibilities for further *détente* between the Soviet Union and the West, leading perhaps to agreement on such measures as a nonproliferation treaty, a comprehensive test ban, or a freeze on the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However, escalation of the Vietnam conflict and the continuing impasse over the issue of NATO nuclear sharing and the role of West Germany in such an arrangement have combined to dim prospects for early agreement on any arms limitation and reduction measures.

Both Eccles and Millis examine the issues of technological change and its complicating effects on maintaining a rational and adequate national military strategy, growing restraints on the use of force to achieve political objectives, and the role that arms control and disarmament might play in coming decades. Admiral Eccles' approach is eclectic; he has selected what in his judgment are the important contributions by military and civilian authorities and has used them liberally in preparing his own comprehensive and systematic theory of modern conflict. Walter Millis, on the other hand, is searching primarily for the necessary precon-

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ditions making possible the eventual transformation of the world from the existing system of national states into a supranational government possessing specific but limited legal and police powers. Once such a state comes into being, Millis contends, a general act of disarmament would inevitably follow, thus ushering in a demilitarized world. He feels that the necessary seeds for the creation of his grand design already exist and require only water and modest care to ensure their flowering.

Eccles' book is based on a series of lectures presented over a decade at prominent service schools, and various articles published and working papers prepared during that period. It contains new ideas pertaining to concepts of logistics about which he has written extensively elsewhere, but it is essentially a good synthesis of the literature, examining in detail eight fundamental concepts: history and theory, conflict, strategy, logistics, organization, command, decision-making, and civil-military relations. Arms control and limitation are considered separately.

Eccles is undoubtedly a strong admirer of the semanticist, S. I. Hayakawa, and his book is commendable for its precision, clarity, logical consistency and lucid definitions. Because of its specialized appeal, it is more valuable to the military intellectual than to the nonspecialist, and would serve usefully as a text or reference work at those service schools stressing management, economic planning and program development. The book, for example, would have been instructive reading for Walter Millis in helping him to avoid serious biases toward military strategy and warfare. Eccles' book suffers somewhat from the lavish use of long quotations; as a result the author too often simply endorses the views of others rather than offering his own considered judgments and conclusions.

Admiral Eccles is critical of what he believes is a growing tendency of political authorities to limit more and more the powers and initiative of military commanders, beginning with the Lebanon and Quemoy crises and culminating in the Cuban crisis. Eccles thinks it is essential to check present trends within the Defense Department toward greater centralization of authority at the highest civilian level, lest the United States risk breeding mediocrity in its military professionals. He acknowledges that modern technology has increased our dependence on technicians and technical studies, but he feels the influence of scientists and scholars on major defense decisions has been incommensurate with their knowledge of military affairs. To assist in restoring a proper balance, he urges a re-examination of basic military concepts and theories of modern conflict in an effort to clarify military thinking and achieve harmony between military and civilian defense intellectuals.

Eccles opposes a counterforce-oriented strategy on grounds similar to those which prompted his warning against the notorious logis-

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tic snowball,[1] namely, that it poses unlimited military requirements generated by the attempt to match the real or supposed enemy forces, weapon for weapon. He implies that it is possible to determine with precision the relatively small number of nuclear weapons that can be employed usefully in general war. He seems to prefer a pure countercity strategy, thus rejecting the validity of the McNamara damage-limiting concept. Eccles does, however, applaud the efforts since 1961 to achieve balanced, flexible military forces, as well as the exercise of restraint and discretion by the Defense Department in deploying new offensive or defense weapons systems—especially those which cannot be usefully employed or which might unnecessarily provoke further arms competition.

Eccles is a serious student of arms control and limitation, emerging clearly on the side of the arms controllers and opposing those who espouse the chimera of general and complete disarmament. He supports such partial measures as the limited nuclear test ban, and characterizes himself as a gradualist in seeking agreements with our adversaries. He belongs to the school which believes that political settlements must precede significant arms limitations, and feels that any agreements we may achieve in the future will reflect our and the Soviet's self-interests. Above all, Eccles stresses that "The real problem we face is not to limit or to outlaw war per se, but rather to keep the violence, brutality, and destruction caused by human conflict within tolerable limits." (p. 225.)

To assess the Millis book in this brief space is a formidable task. Millis' basic position may be paraphrased thusly: By about 1980 it may be possible to convene a political and technical global conference, to meet simultaneously in, let us say, Washington and Moscow, for the purpose of drafting a constitution for a demilitarized world. Such optimism is based on Millis' contention that not only has the nuclear arms race failed so far to produce a world catastrophe, but it is not unreasonable to predict that the nuclear stalemate will continue indefinitely. Accordingly, there are already positive signs that "the regimented scientist-technicians are not frantically looking for new 'breakthroughs' in more sophisticated and lethal weaponry." (p. 252.) Thus organized war among great and even lesser armed powers will become an increasingly unlikely possibility.

In Millis' own words, "what this situation must imply is that the military establishment will progressively decline into forces policing, through their defensive roles, a more or less established world order, while international politics advances to the generally non-violent regulation and adjustment of the power struggles that will continue to take place in it." (p. 226.) Also, "a few years hence people will be

[1]This principle states that all logistic activities naturally tend to grow to inordinate size, and unless positive control is maintained this growth continues until, like a ball of wet snow, a huge accumulation of slush obscures the hard core of essential combat support and the mass becomes unmanageable.

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talking much more about demilitarization than about disarmament and will be seeing demilitarization as a constitutional problem rather than as the technical problem now apparently subsumed under the heading of disarmament." (p. 228.)

The constitution for supranational governmental institutions would, Millis believes, stand a good chance of receiving near unanimous approval by all of the great military states, since all nations would have a powerful desire to escape the appalling threat and burden of great weaponry, and to trust their future to a more orderly system. The new constitution would codify only those elements of law, order and organization already available and acceptable around the world. No federal system of government would be necessary or possible. To enforce the agreed upon minimum laws, an international police force would be organized and given responsibility for resolving international power struggles by nonviolent means. An effective police force presupposes that a general act of disarmament takes place concurrently with the coming into force of the world constitution. Presumably, too, there would be little or no difficulty in maintaining a military balance throughout the disarmament process, little concern over the need for adequate verification of steps and stages, and no genuine fear that one or more parties would fail to disarm according to the terms of the general act of disarmament.

Millis is presumably dead serious about the realism of his proposal for a demilitarized world. In fact, however, he seems to have designed for himself another of the "myth systems" which he avers all men must inevitably live by. (p. 104.) One must ask Millis: Does it really appear inevitable that the technological arms race will cease out of futility; that the Nth power problem will result in nuclear stability; that resurgent nationalism among mature and emergent nations will be transformed into an early drive for collective security; that the major powers will suddenly perceive the superior wisdom of supranational government; that abiding trust will replace deeply rooted suspicion, permitting general disarmament to take place without stringently enforced rules and safeguards; that nations will permit the emergence of an international police force possessed of sufficient power to prevent armed violence by nation against nation; and, finally, that sharply opposing ideologies characterizing our world will evaporate in favor of universally held principles and values? To believe in the eventuality of all or even some of these probabilities demands not so much an aptitude for sound analysis as it does an enormous act of faith. Unfortunately, Millis' prophetic vision belies a kind of neo-positivism which is all too often espoused by liberal idealists who insist upon forecasting the future in technicolor. Consequently, for those whose idealism is not so overpowering, the Millis demilitarized world seems more like a vivid excursion into science fiction, a conclusion, by the way, suggested by the author himself in his final chapter.

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Apart from the central thesis of the Millis book, there are a number of background chapters that ostensibly lay the foundation upon which to build "A World Policed." His chapter on the Cold War, which interprets political and military events since World War II, must be characterized as "revisionism," for standard works on the period do not agree with many of Millis' interpretations. In a chapter on law and order Millis argues, on the one hand, that we have sold our souls to the devil of hypertrophied military power and can expect an appalling day of reckoning. Yet, in the same chapter he suggests optimistically that no system of law and order can exist until we have translated to the global setting the essential constitutional arrangements of Western democracy. The probability of either condition occurring augurs poorly for an early coming of a demilitarized world. In sum, therefore, the Millis book can best serve as a reference work in a college course on political theory. It is unlikely that it will prove serviceable as a realistic blueprint for the world of the next fifteen to twenty years.

Mathematical Concepts and the Social Studies*

by David Williams

Strategy and Conscience, by Professor Anatol Rapoport, is a highly imaginative book. It contains many insights into contemporary strategic theory. Written by one of the most articulate commentators on the social sciences today, it examines many of the ethical implications of "hard-nosed" strategic analysis.

Unhappily, it has two major shortcomings. The first is the pious manner in which Dr. Rapoport tries, and finds wanting, most contemporary strategic thought. In the process he presents an extraordinary series of misunderstandings about strategy. He extends his indictment to the strategists themselves as well. His summary verdict will disconcert not a few of his readers, as it did this reviewer. As this aspect of the book is amply treated in the excellent review by D. G. Brennan which appeared, along with a reply by Dr. Rapoport, in the December 1965 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* its further treatment here would be superfluous.

Accordingly, the following remarks will be addressed to the second flaw in Dr. Rapoport's effort, the mathematical errors which mar this much controverted book. This is particularly surprising in view of Rapoport's reputation for mathematical competence, at least among political scientists.

Confusion concerning basic mathematical concepts is first evident between pages 26 and 30. In this section, designed to illustrate a basic "paradox" of strategic thinking, Rapoport analyzes a simple card game, in which each of two players is dealt two cards from a deck consisting of four aces and four deuces. Two aces will beat an ace and a deuce, which in turn will beat two deuces. Suits do not count. The first player looks at his

**Strategy and Conscience.* By Anatol Rapoport. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 323 pp. $6.95.

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two cards and offers odds to the second player, which the second player must then accept or reject before the cards are turned up. The second player wins in case of a tie. He assumes that we (the readers) are the first player, holding an ace of diamonds and a deuce of clubs, and that we have a spy who is able to give us partial information about the opponent's hand. From an analysis of this situation, Rapoport comes up with the curious conclusion that if the spy tells us that one of the opponent's cards is a deuce (without knowing the suit) the probability of a win would be different than if he tells us it is a deuce of spades. This reasoning leads to the remarkable corollary that "irrelevant knowledge" can affect the probability of an event.

Luckily, the confusion does not exist within probability theory. In a diagram printed on page 27, Rapoport simply forgets that if one knows that there is one deuce in a two-card hand, the likelihood of two particular deuces is twice as high as the likelihood of one given ace and one given deuce. The probability of a win, of course, is 2/5ths under either circumstance in the example above. The interested reader is directed to any elementary text on probability for a more complete explanation of the calculation of conditional probabilities.

This analytical confusion is followed by no less than three pages of rhetoric on "the selective principle," purporting to clear up a muddle which exists, if at all, only in Rapoport's mind. Apparently he takes his own explanation seriously. He refers to the card game again on page 99 to show that "this difference of probabilities reflects nothing but our state of mind." Presumably he is speaking subjectively.

Mathematical confusion is rife in other portions of the book as well. On pages 88 and 89, Rapoport discusses Western man's psychological difficulty in accepting certain death, while death meted out randomly by an unseen hand is accepted with some equanimity. He cites traffic deaths and dangerous vaccines, and further illustrates his point by the following hypothetical example: "In World War II at a certain bomber base in the South Pacific a flier's chances of surviving his quota of thirty missions were rated at 25 per cent. The young men lived the life of the doomed. Then a way was found to improve the situation. It was calculated that if the bombers carried bigger payloads, that is, more bombs per plane, the missions could be accomplished at the same rate with half the number of planes. The only way to increase the payload of the planes was to reduce the amount of gasoline carried. This could be done if the planes went on *one-way missions*. In other words, if the fliers agreed to sacrifice their lives with certainty instead of accepting one chance in four for survival, only half of them would need to perish instead of three-quarters. The new procedure would require a flier to draw lots with a 50 per cent chance of success. If from a box containing two balls, he drew a white ball, he

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would be rotated to the States, if a black ball, he would have to go on a one-way mission. This arrangement would give each flier twice as large a chance to survive as the previous one." (p. 88.)

Quite true, as long as we restrict the definition of "flier" to those pilots who are scheduled to fly on the next mission. But Rapoport goes on to say in the following page that "clearly lives could have been saved if it were adopted." It may not be quite that clear. In fact, it can be statistically shown that the expected number of deaths after thirty "normal" two-way missions, at 100 bombers per mission, would have been 135 or 136, assuming replacements for killed pilots were available. After thirty one-way missions, at fifty bombers per mission, the adoption of the author's hypothetical policy would have resulted in the death of exactly 1,500 pilots—hardly a case of lives being saved. Although Rapoport is entitled to illustrate his points as he chooses, and the quaint mathematics of the example did not significantly affect its pertinence to the problem under discussion, his case would have been strengthened by the use of statistically valid assertions.

Game theory presents Rapoport with further opportunities to demonstrate his level of analytic rigor. Between pages 112 and 115, he attempts to associate strategic principles with the cooperative solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma. This dilemma can be illustrated by the following example. Two men are arrested for the crime of murder. Although both are guilty, the D.A. does not have the evidence to convict them. They are held separately, and each is given the opportunity to confess. They are told that if both confess, they will be given life sentences. If neither confesses, they will both be given two-year terms for burglary (for which the D.A. has ample evidence). If one confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses will be freed, while the other will be sentenced to death. The structural paradox of this dilemma lies in the fact that each prisoner gains by confessing, no matter what the other prisoner does. In the absence of such moral scruples as "honor among thieves" or sanctions against "squealing," both prisoners will almost inevitably be drawn toward the "uncooperative" solution resulting in two-year terms. The dilemma has been extended by many analysts to national decisions regarding level of armaments, and disarmament advocates find it convenient to show that there are rational grounds for the cooperative solution.

In order to associate the cooperative solution with strategic principles, Rapoport introduces the notion of a "prominent" solution to a game. This is the intuitively "obvious" action which players tend to choose but which cannot be justified mathematically. It is a well-authenticated strategic criterion which has been used by many Cold War analysts. He then presents a series of three game matrices. The first is a matrix which has such a prominent solu-

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tion. He changes four of the nine payoffs to obtain a second game matrix, asserts that the new matrix still has a prominent solution (it does, although he incorrectly identifies it) and finally demonstrates that this matrix contains the Prisoner's Dilemma in four of its nine cells. Unhappily, he fails to show any structural relationships between the matrices. Just because two game matrices share in common most of their numbers means nothing; after all, only one cell of the Prisoner's Dilemma matrix needs to be changed to make it a trivial game. In point of fact, there is no structural relationship whatever between the three matrices given in the text. In the absence of such a relationship all the arguments adduced in explanation of the matrices are irrelevant. Although Rapoport never quite makes it clear whether his aim is to justify strategically the cooperative solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma or to discredit the prominence principle, his line of reasoning, used to support either interpretation, is unconvincing.

An interesting relapse into rigorous induction is evident in Rapoport's summary of the results of his own well-designed experiments on the Prisoner's Dilemma. The most amusing result of these experiments is their apparent vindication of much of the strategic thinking which the author criticizes throughout so much of his book. For example, unilateral initiatives in the form of "martyr runs" by one player or the other were disregarded by the opposing player over 70 per cent of the time, leading to high losses on the part of the initiating player. Yet Rapoport, so assertive throughout the rest of the book, suddenly becomes very cautious about generalizing from his data. As he puts it, "should one look to results of the experiments just described for information about human nature or the nature of international relations, one will be disappointed or else deluded. . . ." (pp. 158 and 159.) Although one could emphatically agree with the thought, though not necessarily the peculiar wording of this statement, it is surprising that it is introduced into the discussion only when the data do not fit the preconceived notions of the unilateral disarmers.

It is somewhat disconcerting to be lectured by Rapoport on the virtues of mathematical rigor. For example, at one point he speaks of tossing a die, saying that "the fraction of time the 4 will turn up does *not* approach 1/6 as a limit *in the mathematical sense*." (p. 24, italics in the original.) This little lesson in the nature of mathematics was rather startling. In point of fact, this generalization, like so many others throughout the book, is wrong. The concept of "limit" is never uniquely defined mathematically, and sweeping statements of the type above are meaningless. Rapoport might profitably consult William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,* which presents some basic theorems about limits which do not conform to his dictum.

The book is marked by a disdain for proofreading which is consistent

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with Rapoport's prior works. His previous book, *Fights, Games, and Debates,* included a table illustrating a test of Richardson's arms race hypotheses in which no less than three of six columns were incorrectly added. In this more recent effort, a table illustrating the strategies available for the Prisoner's Dilemma, on which much of the book is based, contains no less than seven incorrect entries. (p. 53.) Similar proofreading errors, some of them so obvious that they stop the reader in his tracks, abound throughout.

In spite of such shortcomings, the book has many merits. Rapoport, for all his faults, is one of the most creative thinkers writing in the social sciences today, and his book is not without useful insights. Unfortunately, like Nietzsche in philosophy, whenever Rapoport attempts to systematize his prejudices, he ends up in a muddle. As a result, the book becomes a fascinating mishmash of *ad hominem* argument, both substantively and mathematically inaccurate. One can only wish that in a book on such an important subject, Professor Rapoport could have lived up to his reputation.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Balance of Power. Edited by Paul Seabury. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965. 219 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A collection of writings presenting a wide spectrum of important views on the nature of the balance of power in international relations and how, in various eras, it has operated successfully or has failed to work. Those whose works have been selected include Kautilya, Demosthenes, Hume, Burke, Hitler, Cobden, Trotsky, Nehru and John F. Kennedy.

Bread From Stones: Fifty Years of Technical Assistance. Edited by John S. Badeau and Georgiana G. Stevens. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 133 pp. $3.00 ($1.50, paper).

In the preceding half-century, the Near East Foundation has conducted programs of technical assistance and rural development in twenty-four countries on three continents. This book tells the story of its accomplishments, including case studies from Greece, Iran, Jordan and Lebanon, and shows how the work of a voluntary agency fits into the framework of government aid to developing countries.

Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective. (Second edition.) Edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: The Free Press, 1966. 677 pp. $9.95.

The editors have compiled a collection of more than seventy essays about theories of class structure, power and status relations, social mobility, and other topics. Emphasis is placed on comparative sociological studies in both Western and non-Western settings. The selections are representative of past and contemporary writings, as well as the research of American and foreign scholars in sociology.

Elites and Society. By T. B. Bottomore. New York: Basic Books, 1964. 154 pp. $4.50.

The author examines the principal theories about elites, from Mosca and Pareto to Mills and Aron. The study includes an assessment of the role of major elite groups—bureaucrats, intellectuals and managers—in advanced countries of the West and in less developed areas.

Explorations in Communication: An Anthology. Edited by Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 208 pp. $1.95 (paper).

In this collection of essays, the authors examine a variety of forms of communication, historic and contemporary, and assess the impact of modern tech-

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nology upon communications. The volume includes essays by Lawrence K. Frank, Northrop Frye, Robert Graves, Dorothy Lee and David Riesman.

The Glass House: The United Nations in Action. By James J. Wadsworth. New York: Praeger, 1966. 224 pp. $4.95.

After eight years (1953-1961) in the United Nations representing the United States in various capacities, Ambassador Wadsworth is well qualified to describe the operations of the international organization. He examines "the reaction patterns of the various members and member groups, in the hope that once we understand the patterns, some of the exasperation with the United Nations that most of us have felt at one time or another may be put into more nearly logical perspective." He discusses "national versus international interests, bloc power-politics, the political implications of economic and military pressures, the myths that have grown up, and the propaganda that has helped them grow," and he emphasizes, above all, the impressive economic and social projects that actually comprise 80 per cent of the UN's activities.

History. By John Higham, with Leonard Krieger and Felix Gilbert. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 402 pp. $8.95.

In this volume of the series "Humanistic Scholarship in America," commissioned by the Council of the Humanities of Princeton University, three American historians report on the development of historical scholarship in the United States. They give primary emphasis to an examination of the American professional historian, his social background, institutional situation, concepts of history, characteristics as a scholar, and contributions to historical literature, especially in American and modern European history.

Men of Peace. By Bradford Smith. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964. 359 pp. $6.50.

The late Bradford Smith, a Quaker who taught at Columbia University and Bennington College, examines the personal philosophies, visions and actions of the world's great peacemakers, including Ikhnaton, Buddha, Asoka, Jesus Christ, Saint Augustine, Saint Francis, William Penn, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Nobel, Carnegie, Wilson, Gandhi and Dag Hammarskjöld.

The Modern World, A History of Our Time. Volume I: From Early European Expansion to the Outbreak of World War II. By Gordon Greenwood. New York: Praeger, 1965. 791 pp. $12.50.

In this comprehensive history of the globe since the mid-19th century, intended for the general reader as well as students, Professor Greenwood examines and interprets the major forces—especially political ones—which have created the post-World War II world. The author, Professor of History and Political Science at the University of Queensland, Australia, emphasizes developments within and among the major nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, China and India.

Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques. By Gerard Curzon. New York: Praeger, 1966. 367 pp. $12.50.

In the first comprehensive analytical and descriptive study of GATT, the author examines such examples of multilateral commercial diplomacy as the Havana Conference, the "Dillon Round," the "Kennedy Round," and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Considerable emphasis is

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placed on the organizational structure of GATT, the operation of the most-favored-nation clause, tariff stabilization, economic regionalism, and problems of quantitative restrictions on trade.

The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914. By Barbara Tuchman. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 528 pp. $7.95.

The author chooses for detailed examination many of the personalities whose actions shaped the world on the eve of World War I. Special consideration is given to such figures as "Czar" Reed, Richard Strauss, Igor Stravinsky and Admiral Mahan, as well as such events as the Dreyfus Affair, the two Hague peace conferences, and principal political movements, including socialism, anarchism and liberalism. The volume includes a treatment of social and political history in England, the United States, France and Germany.

Social Science: An Introduction to the Study of Society. (Third edition.) By Elgin F. Hunt. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 876 pp. $8.95.

This third edition of the Hunt textbook has been largely rewritten to account for recent shifts in emphasis and points of view in dealing with such topics as race relations, economic growth, employment and international relations, but its general objective is the same: to offer the student a clear understanding of our society and its problems. Tables, graphs and factual information have been brought up to date.

The State in International Relations. Edited by Richard H. Cox. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965. 262 pp. $1.95 (paper).

This volume of readings treats of the attributes, purposes and forms of states. The editor provides essays on independence, sovereignty, the case for and against sovereignty, and the trend toward integration and larger sovereign units. In the section on purposes, he presents the classical theories of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke and Von Treitschke, as well as the works of modern proponents of constitutional democracy, communism and fascism. The last, brief section contains an excerpt from Thucydides on Athens versus Sparta as an ancient Greek conflict of forms; discussions of monarchical, republican and democratic forms; and essays on the French revolutionary wars, the depreciation of forms, and democracy and foreign policy.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: A Case Study in U.N. Diplomacy. By Kamal M. Hagras. New York: Praeger, 1965. 171 pp. $15.00.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which brought representatives of 119 nations to Geneva in the spring of 1964, is evaluated as an instrument of UN diplomacy against the background of traditional diplomacy, the role of international organization in world affairs and the economic problems of developing countries.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Arms, Money and Politics. By Julius Duscha. New York: Ives Washburn, 1965. 210 pp. $4.50.

A *Washington Post* reporter examines the economic and political problems which are an integral part of the U.S. defense program. He looks at the military, the defense contractors, Congress, the Department of Defense and NASA, and he calls

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for Presidential planning to permit a transition to lower levels of defense spending in case armaments competition should level off.

First Steps to Disarmament: A New Approach to the Problems of Arms Reductions. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Basic Books, 1965. 277 pp. $6.95.

A collection of twelve essays by Neville Brown, E. L. M. Burns, Morton Halperin, Malcolm Mackintosh, Thomas Schelling, Sir John Slessor, Wayland Young, the editor and others, all of whom for purposes of this volume eschew grandiose plans for "general and complete disarmament" in favor of more limited arms measures such as a nonproliferation agreement, air inspection, observation posts, inspection zones, military liaison missions and selected arms reductions.

Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. By Abdul Haris Nasution. New York: Praeger, 1965. 324 pp. $5.50.

The former Indonesian Defense Minister, who was responsible in large part for the severe repression of Indonesian communists after the abortive September 30, 1965 coup and who is now a Deputy Premier, wrote this important thesis on guerrilla warfare in 1953. Nasution emphasizes the "science of war" which he says "consists not only of the knowledge of tactics, strategy, and logistics, but also embraces political science, propaganda, economics, and sociology. It embraces, in fact, all facets of the art of turning the population against the enemy. The guerrilla often has an advantage over his opponents because he is trained in, and has as a rule mastered, this art."

The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 244 pp. $4.95.

Proceeding from the thesis that "democracy faces its most severe test in preserving its traditions in an age of scientific revolution," Lapp calls attention to such issues as the enormous influence which scientific experts now wield in the realm of public policy; the knowledge gap between the scientist on one side and the layman and politician on the other; the problems of the "think factory" and the dilemmas of university scientists; the role of the government in research; and the possibilities of technology versus the demands of conscience.

Security in Disarmament. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Richard J. Barnet. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 440 pp. $10.00.

A compendium of eighteen essays, some of which are updated versions of working papers originally prepared for the Woods Hole Summer Study of 1962, commissioned by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Contributors include, besides the editors, Lincoln Bloomfield, Louis Henkin, Louis B. Sohn, Roger Fisher, Walter Millis, Hans Morgenthau, Arthur I. Waskow, Klaus Knorr and Hans Linde. Among the subjects covered are verification and inspection of specific measures, the administration of disarmament agreements, response to violations, and the role of international police forces.

III. United States and Canada

American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945. By Gaddis Smith. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965. 194 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper).

An Associate Professor of History at Yale University probes the major diplomatic events of the war years, as viewed from Washington, including the uncon-

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ditional surrender policy, the attempt to prevent a resurgence of European imperialism after the war, the future of Germany, the fate of Poland, and the atomic bomb. The narrative focuses on the thesis that Roosevelt and his principal advisers believed the Soviet Union was a greatly maligned and misunderstood giant which would respond to sympathetic treatment, while Britain was regarded as a friend whose imperial behavior had to be changed for the good of the world.

Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor. By Gerald Clark. New York: David McKay, 1965. 433 pp. $6.50.

The associate editor of the *Montreal Star* surveys political, economic and cultural developments within Canada, including the movement for separatism in the French-speaking region, against the backdrop of Canada's dual quest for a viable relationship with her powerful North American neighbor and an independent national identity of her own.

The Corrupted Land: The Social Morality of Modern America. By Fred J. Cook. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 352 pp. $5.95.

A journalist, who has attacked other aspects of American society in previous books, here asserts that modern American life—the age of mass society, "in which man has lost himself, in which he has surrendered his inner identity and honor to the organization, the group"—is unmanageable since it rests on the structure of an 18th-century private-profit ethic. His biting account of American practices covers such subjects as the "only profit counts" motif of big business, the TV quiz shows, college-cheating rackets, and the rise of white-collar crime. Separate chapters are devoted to Billie Sol Estes and Bobby Baker as adventurers in larceny.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1964. Edited by Jules Davids with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 460 pp. $7.50.

This is another in the series of annual documentary volumes published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, with cross-references to the narrative discussion in the companion volume, *The United States in World Affairs, 1964.*

The Fulbright Program: A History. By Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. 380 pp. $8.50.

The Fulbright Program for educational and scholarly exchange, conceived by a freshman member of the Senate in 1945, begun under the Fulbright Act of 1946 and endorsed by Congress as a permanent feature of U.S. foreign policy in the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, represents the United States' first major commitment to international cultural relations on a worldwide scale. The largest single program of its kind, its beneficiaries between 1949 and 1962 totaled 55,681. This detailed account of its development, written by two "charter" members of the program, has an American perspective, although it describes reciprocal activities in certain other countries.

Issues in American Diplomacy. Two volumes. Edited by Armin Rappaport. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 394 and 412 pp. $3.95 each (paper).

In this source book for courses in the history of U.S. diplomacy, the editor presents two conflicting views on each of thirty important issues in U.S. foreign policy. The first volume, covering the period up to 1895, contains readings on such topics as realism and morality in American policy, Jay's Treaty, Jefferson's embargo, the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and British neutrality in the Civil

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War. Volume II takes up such matters as the war with Spain, the Open Door policy, intervention in the Caribbean, the Siberian intervention, the Good Neighbor policy, the Yalta agreements and the communist victory in China.

The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level. Edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson. New York: Praeger, 1965. 311 pp. $5.95.

A compilation of reports, testimony and memoranda of the Senate Subcommittee on Government Operations, this volume provides a digest of the first major review of the policymaking machinery established by the National Security Act of 1947. In addition to the analysis and findings of the Jackson Subcommittee, the study contains the testimony of such persons as Robert A. Lovett, Robert Cutler, Christian A. Herter, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Nelson A. Rockefeller, Robert S. McNamara, Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy.

Party Politics in Puerto Rico. By Robert W. Anderson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. 269 pp. $6.75.

Professor Anderson, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Puerto Rico, treats the political structure of Puerto Rico from 1940 through the 1964 elections. Following a survey of the unique social and economic context in which the island's internal politics must be understood—Puerto Rico's semi-colonial status as a unit of the North American federal system—he discusses the three principal parties of the period with special reference to party style, leadership, ideology and organization.

Poverty as a Public Issue. Edited by Ben B. Seligman. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 359 pp. $5.95.

Fourteen experts consider aspects of poverty and the anti-poverty program in the United States. In his introduction Professor Seligman reviews the developing interest in alleviating this social ill, analyzes its depth and complexity, and explains why poverty tends to be self-perpetuating. Individual chapters examine the dimensions of poverty, its relation to consumption and work standards, its incidence among the young, the aged and racial minorities; poverty in relation to the law, politics and the legislative process, to job opportunities and the criteria for public expenditures. There is a case study of the employed poor, and specific attention is given to the Administration's War on Poverty and the environment of Appalachia.

The Road to the White House: The Story of the 1964 Election by the Staff of the New York Times. Edited by Harold Faber. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 305 pp. $6.95.

A record of the 1964 Presidential election beginning on November 22, 1963 and concluding on January 20, 1965, prepared by staff writers of the *New York Times* who have drawn liberally from the columns written for the *Times* during that fourteen-month period.

When the Guns Roared: World Aspects of the American Civil War. By Philip Van Doren Stern. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 385 pp. $6.50.

In this study of the effects of the American Civil War on foreign countries and the policies of these countries, in turn, toward the conflict, Mr. Stern casts new light on such matters as Union and Confederate secret-service activities abroad, secret arrangements made in foreign chancellories, attempts to influence public opinion abroad, the escape of the Confederate commerce-raider *Alabama* from Liverpool, the efforts of Union diplomats to halt the construction in foreign yards

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of ships for the South, the vicissitudes of British official attitudes and public opinion, and French ambitions in America.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

British Defense Policy and Nuclear War. By Emanuel J. de Kadt. New York: Humanities Press, 1966. 135 pp. $3.75.

This volume contains an examination of the development of nuclear weapons in Britain, the debate about the utility of an independent British nuclear force, problems of civil defense, British strategic doctrine, and the author's evaluation of British defense policy over the last decade.

Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815. By Hans Rosenberg. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 237 pp. $1.95 (paper).

In a case study of the emergence of the modern state bureaucracy, the author examines the personnel structure, the nature of governmental executives as a professional and aristocratic group, procedures for civil service recruitment, and the status and outlook of Prussian bureaucrats. The study includes an evaluation of the implications of the Prussian behavioral patterns for modern Germany.

A Concise History of Italy. By Eric Whelpton. New York: Roy Publishers, 1964. 240 pp. $4.95.

In this informative and entertaining account of Italian history, the author traces the development of the Italian peninsula from the period of Etruscan civilization to the creation of the Republic at the close of World War II. The author weaves into his story accounts of Italian archaeological remains, historical buildings and works of art.

Confessions of a European Intellectual. By Franz Schoenberner. New York: Collier Books, 1965. 338 pp. $2.95 (paper).

Mr. Schoenberner, as editor of the famous politico-satirical magazine *Simplicissimus,* had the opportunity to know some of Germany's greatest writers, artists and thinkers in the post-World War I period. He depicts the intellectual climate of Germany during this era as well as the reactions of German writers to Hitler's rise to power.

Europe and the Dollar. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. 297 pp. $7.50.

In this anthology of writings by the author over the last two decades, the following topics are considered: balance of payments problems, flexible exchange rates, European integration and the development of a single financial center for long-term capital, the prospects for the French economy, international cyclical models, monetary stabilization, speculation and forward exchange, international liquidity, and the role of the United States in the European economy.

Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-American Alliance. By Philip Goodhart. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 267 pp. $4.95.

A comprehensive account of the negotiations that led to the destroyers-for-bases deal and marked the foundation of the present Anglo-American alliance. The author, who was elected a Conservative MP in March 1957, and has been a

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member of the Council of Europe and a British delegate at the UN General Assembly, portrays the role of the statesmen involved in the vital decisions, records the history of the bases transferred to the United States, and traces the performance with the British Navy of the rusty, top-heavy destroyers that Churchill reckoned were "more precious than rubies."

France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1963. By F. Roy Willis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. 397 pp. $8.75.

A detailed history and analysis of the Franco-German *rapprochement* since World War II. The author traces the foundations of this reconciliation to the educational policy of the French military government, and follows its course through the establishment of the ECSC and the Common Market to the Franco-German treaty of 1963. He discusses the events of 1964 in an epilogue.

The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Reunification. By Franz-Josef Strauss. New York: Praeger, 1965. 105 pp. $3.95.

The former Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democratic Party, sets forth his views on solving the problem of German reunification. For Strauss, the issue must be decided as part of a long-term plan to establish a United States of Europe, including the nations of Eastern Europe. He also stresses the need for a reorganized NATO in which a united Europe becomes an equal of the United States.

Italy. By Massimo Salvadori. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 184 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper).

Believing that an understanding of 20th century Italy can be obtained only by a clarification of the relationship of the Italian past and present, the author re-examines the Roman heritage, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Risorgimento and shows their impact upon the contemporary Italian scene. Other chapters describe Italy's role in world affairs and her economic, intellectual and political environment.

Italy: A Journey Through Time. By John A. Crow. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 400 pp. $5.95.

In this all-encompassing interpretive history of Italy, the author treats Roman beginnings, the transition from republic to empire, the early golden age, the period of the barbarians, the Dark Ages, the Renaissance, unification, the First and Second World Wars, and modern, democratic Italy.

Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War. By Charles Foley. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 187 pp. $.95 (paper).

First published as *Island in Revolt* in 1962, this is a revised account of the Cyprus emergency by a newspaperman who was perilously involved in the conflict as he ran the *Times of Cyprus.* He holds that self-determination is the solution for the island: that while the Turks must have their safeguards, the Greek majority must also have its rights.

Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization. By Koppel S. Pinson, with a final chapter on the Bonn Republic by Klaus Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 682 pp. $8.95.

Utilizing German source materials, including those captured by the allies during the closing days of World War II, as well as major secondary sources, the author

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traces German constitutional, intellectual and social history from the 18th century to the Bonn Republic. The volume contains a detailed assessment of the impact of liberalism, nationalism and militarism on the German political system during the Hitler era, together with an evaluation of the prospects for enduring representative government in Germany.

Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. By D. C. Watt. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. 276 pp. $6.00.

This study represents an attempt to identify that portion of the political elite responsible for the formulation of British foreign policy over the last fifty years. Several historical examples are examined in depth to illustrate the process. In his investigation, the author treats such topics as Anglo-American relations, appeasement, the Munich crisis, and the organization of British defense in the interwar period.

The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Edited by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. Columbus: Ohio State University Press (for the Social Science Division of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security), 1965. 182 pp. $4.75.

From their addresses to weekly colloquia in the 1964-1965 series on the Western Alliance at the Mershon Center, Professor Furniss, director of the Center's Social Science Program, has compiled the views of eight distinguished men of affairs on NATO, to which he adds his personal evaluation of the alliance. Dirk Stikker writes on the role of the Secretary General; General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, on military defense; Richard Goold-Adams, on political cooperation. Others cover the relationships of France, Germany, Britain and the small powers. Frederick E. Nolting looks to the future, suggesting that "the cement of fear" be replaced with "the cement of a compelling common philosophy" in building a "broader, worldwide organization of like-minded states," not only to defend but to promote the principles of freedom.

V. Communist Bloc

The Birth of Communist China. By C. P. Fitzgerald. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. 288 pp. $1.25 (paper).

In this revised edition of his book of the early 1950's, *Revolution in China,* C. P. Fitzgerald, Professor of Far Eastern History at Canberra University, develops the theme that modern China is but a logical development of its immensely long past. After sketching in the background of China's history, with emphasis on her evolving social structure, he begins his main account with the events of 1911 and examines the aftermath of the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the early republic, Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and the triumph of communism. The final chapters are devoted to such topics as Christianity in the Chinese Revolution, the "New Democracy," the communist revolution's impact on the Western powers and the Far East, and the possible development of Chinese communism.

Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Compiled and edited by Stewart Fraser. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965. 542 pp. $10.00.

Dr. Fraser, who sets the stage by discoursing on Education, Indoctrination and Ideology in Communist China, 1950-1960, has compiled this volume of readings

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for those interested in both the comparative and political aspects of contemporary Chinese education. Speeches, articles and official documents from China's leaders outline the plans and ideals for all levels of education as a means of reshaping China into a modern communist state. The book points up the goals, not only of indoctrinating the youth of the country, but also of changing the patterns of thought of intellectuals and scholars trained in the tradition of a contemplative society.

The Communist International and Its Front Organizations: A Research Guide and Checklist of Holdings in American and European Libraries. By Witold S. Sworakowski. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series: XXI), 1965. 493 pp. $10.00.

This is a first attempt to list all books and pamphlets published by and on the Comintern and its six principal front organizations from the time of its founding in March 1919 to its dissolution in May 1943, as they are available in 48 major libraries of the United States and Western Europe. Professor Sworakowski, Assistant Director of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, lists the holdings of 44 American libraries and four European libraries: International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam; Feltrinelli Institute, Milan; Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris; and Slavic Institute of the University of Stockholm.

Economic Integration in the Soviet Bloc, with an East German Case Study. By Heinz Köhler. New York: Praeger, 1965. 402 pp. $15.00.

Because of "an almost unbelievable similarity in the type and timing of economic changes in all satellite countries," the East German case is taken as an example of efforts at economic integration in the Soviet bloc. The Soviet reparations policy is discussed in detail, as are foreign trade relations, the goals and operations of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, and international trade theory in the Soviet bloc. There is also an attempt to measure East Germany's economic integration and to estimate her balance of payments and calculate terms of trade from 1950 to 1963.

The Economics of a Socialist Enterprise: A Case Study of the Polish Firm. By George R. Feiwel. New York: Praeger, 1965. 398 pp. $17.50.

Through an assessment of the Polish experience in the management of industry, the author explores the economics and *modus operandi* of a socialist industrial enterprise within the institutional framework of a centrally planned economy. It is his contention that the inner workings of a Soviet-type economy may be better understood by scrutinizing the constraints imposed on, and the performance of, the basic cell of the economy—the state-owned enterprise.

The Foreign Trade of Communist China: Its Impact on the Free World. By Pauline Lewin. New York: Praeger, 1964. 128 pp. $15.00.

The findings set forth in this book suggest that, with the Chinese economy moving forward again after the disastrous Great Leap, and on a better balance between its agricultural and industrial sectors, a new pattern of Chinese trade is emerging. Its exchanges are trending away from primarily ideological direction, and the Western world and Japan will have a much larger part in them. Thus world markets in individual products could be severely jolted by Chinese actions —e.g., the massive Chinese purchases of grain from Canada and Australia. The Economist Intelligence Unit, which prepared this study, attempts to indicate ways

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in which Chinese trade may develop, and to suggest factors that may influence China's attitude and policy toward international economic relations. Tables and charts support the text, and there is a statistical appendix.

Marxism and Psycho-Analysis. By Reuben Osborn. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1965. 160 pp. 21s.

This work, which was a controversial book in the 1930's, now rewritten, attempts to draw a connection between two scientific-ideological approaches to reality which were long thought to be completely antithetical and incompatible. In his Introduction, John Strachey states that Osborn has shown that "psycho-analysis has, all unknown to itself, provided overwhelming evidence of the validity of the main principles of dialectical materialism." The author concludes that Marxism and Freudianism have much to learn from each other, and provide important correctives to each other.

The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy. By David Woodward. New York: Praeger, 1965. 254 pp. $6.95.

An account of the growth of the Russian Navy—and the quality of its personnel and ships—from the time of Peter the Great to the present. Of particular interest is the last chapter which describes the rapid development of the post-World War II Soviet Navy, its mission, roles and structure.

Soviet Institutions and Policies: Inside Views. Edited by William G. Andrews with the assistance of Franz D. Scholz. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966. 411 pp. $4.50 (paper).

Fifty-six articles from 33 original and widely varied Soviet sources have been selected by Professor Andrews to convey to the American college student the style and atmosphere of Soviet politics. The result is not "a bookful of Soviet ideological excelsior" to smother him, but a story in Soviet words of the application of Marxist doctrine to the tasks of government. While emphasis is on the current situation, historical materials and basic introductory notes provide perspective by indicating the evolution of political and cultural thought. Articles range from Khrushchev's classic secret speech on Stalin's sins at the 20th Party Congress to Kosygin's address to the Supreme Soviet on "The Tasks of Soviet Foreign Policy." The book is a Comparative Government Reader in the Van Nostrand Political Science Series.

Under Pressure. The Writer in Society: Eastern Europe and the U.S.A. By A. Alvarez. Baltimore: Penguin Books (A Pelican Original), 1966. 189 pp. $.95 (paper).

Based on a series of radio broadcasts on the B.B.C. Third Programme between 1961 and 1964, this is a book about intellectuals and their nations, and the present sense of trouble that pervades them both. The author, by means of his visits and taped interviews, gives, first, an outsider's impression of the conditions under which artists and intellectuals work in communist countries of Eastern Europe, and then examines the position of the intellectual in American society. He throws light on the pressures that society and tradition impose on the creative mind.

Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience. By Jiri Kolaja. New York: Praeger, 1965. 84 pp. $4.50.

A short, methodical description of the function of Yugoslavia's workers' councils in the operation of factories. The author, using two factories as case studies, discusses the role of organizations such as the League of Communists, the trade unions and youth organizations, and points out some problems pertaining to factory operation and the methods used to resolve them.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

VI. Middle East and Africa

The African Nettle: Dilemmas of an Emerging Continent. Edited by Frank S. Meyer. New York: John Day, 1965. 253 pp. $5.00.

Gilbert Comte, P. T. Bauer and Elspeth Huxley provide the overview in this collection of essays by analyzing the psychological realities of Africa, its political economy, and the process of disengagement of the European powers. W. H. Hutt and Paul Giniewski address themselves to the problem of racial justice in South Africa, and Pieter Lessing, Mugur D. Valahu and James Burnham discuss the role of the United Nations as it affects the solution of African dilemmas. Other essays are provided by K. A. Busia of Ghana, Sir Roy Welensky of Southern Rhodesia and Thomas Molnar.

The Clash of Cultures: Early Race Relations in Central Africa. By H. Alan C. Cairns. New York: Praeger, 1965. 330 pp. $10.00.

A social history of early culture contact in the half century preceding imperial control of Central Africa, when the British were the largest intruding element, living and traveling in African societies under the limitations imposed by non-white power, yet were not content simply to admire the achievements of an alien culture or to leave the African in his tribal condition. The author, Assistant Professor in Government and Politics at the University of British Columbia, collected much of his material during a prolonged visit to Africa in 1958.

And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: The Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt's Narrative. By Jacob Robinson. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 406 pp. $6.95.

Dr. Robinson's purpose is to set straight the Arendt record of the Eichmann trial, her *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* published in 1963. He seeks "to give the reader accurate information—about Adolf Eichmann and his work as SS officer in charge of Nazi activities against the Jews; about the trial in the light of international criminal law; about the court's high standards of justice; and about conditions that prevailed among the Jews of Europe and the way they faced disaster. . . . [Miss Arendt's] errors demand correction." A specialist on international law and contemporary Jewish history, Dr. Robinson was legal adviser to the Israeli delegation to the United Nations from 1948 to 1957, and advised Israelis on questions of documentation and law in respect to the Eichmann case.

The Establishment of Manufacturing in Nigeria. By Alan Sokolski. New York: Praeger, 1965. 373 pp. n.p.

Dr. Sokolski's aim is to ascertain the nature and extent of modern manufacturing industry in Nigeria and to assess its prospects in terms of obstacles and opportunities indigenous to that newly independent country. He studies resources, infrastructure, markets and finances, and examines the rationality of current industrial development, the position of manufacturing in the economy, and the efforts of the Nigerian government to promote industry.

A Life of Azikiwe. By K. A. B. Jones-Quartey. Baltimore: Penguin Books (Penguin African Series), 1966. 272 pp. $1.25 (paper).

In this biography of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, President of Nigeria, the author gives special attention to the President's part in the government's acquisition of the African Continental Bank and seeks the reasons for his decision to become Head of State rather than Prime Minister on his country's independence.

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The Modern History of Lebanon. By K. S. Salibi. New York: Praeger, 1965. 228 pp. $6.50.

An historical account, from the time of the Shihab Emirate in the 17th century, of a country whose "politics of compromise," based on the balance of Christian and Moslem interests, has proved to be one of the most interesting phenomena in the Middle East in a period of rising Arab nationalism. The first half is useful for its account of the role played in history by the little-known Druzes. The latter half deals with the period since World War I.

Modern Iran. By Peter Avery. New York: Praeger, 1965. 527 pp. $11.00.

In this illuminating history of 20th century Iran, the author examines this strategically located country's earlier experiences with Western and Eastern imperialism and their effects on Iran's social, economic and political structures and outlook. Peter Avery, University Lecturer in Persian at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of King's College, is optimistic about the future of Iran and its relations with the West, but warns of the tensions between modernism and traditionalism which may yet lead to a Turkey-style revolution.

Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race—The Politics of Independence. By Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 316 pp. $10.00.

Based on firsthand observations of the political problems of governing Africa's most populous and ethnically divided nation, this book blends narrative and historical, political and cultural analysis in evaluating the results of the first four years of independence. Mr. Schwarz, who spent a year in Nigeria (1961-1962) working for the Northern Nigerian government in the Attorney-General's office as Assistant Commissioner for Law Revision, stresses two major problems: those of creating a nation out of a group of tribes brought together by Britain's colonial rule and of operating a multiparty democracy in a divided and underdeveloped country. Both foreign policy and domestic issues are studied in detail.

Pan-Africanism and East African Integration. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 307 pp. $7.50.

The author, a Research Associate at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, examines the concept of Pan-Africanism as it affected the unsuccessful attempt of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika to form an East African federation in 1963. He contrasts this ideology of continental unity with the European experience in which ideology has a minimal role; discusses the social, political and economic conditions of the three African countries; shows how the problem of reconciling ideology with national interests—mostly Uganda's sensitivities to the threatened loss of identity —led to a new concept of "Pan-African nationalism"; and concludes that there remains a potential for eventual regional integration in Africa if only for security reasons.

Politics in West Africa. By W. Arthur Lewis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 90 pp. $3.50.

In these Whidden Lectures for 1965, delivered at McMaster University, Professor Lewis focuses on the single-party system in West Africa, which he describes as "a sickness from which West Africa deserves to recover." He sees that recovery possible through stable coalition government, which "could be the beginning of the democratic road."

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Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East. By George M. Haddad. New York: Robert Speller, 1965. 251 pp. $6.00.

A Syrian scholar who now teaches Middle Eastern history at the University of California provides an historical analysis of the role of the military in four "Northern Tier" countries—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Emphasis is placed upon the relationship between military rule and revolution, reform and democratic development.

Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran. By Jahangir Amuzegar. New York: Praeger, 1966. 275 pp. $15.00.

A critical analysis of the United States' bilateral technical assistance program in Iran during 1950-1965. The case is studied from three aspects: Iran's need for assistance and her preparedness for receiving such aid from the United States; America's supply of technical assistants and her ability to meet Iranian requirements; and the Point IV program's effort to implement a rational transfer of U.S. techniques to the Iranian economy.

Zambia. By Richard Hall. New York: Praeger, 1966. 357 pp. $8.50.

Zambia, part of the great African plateau, came into being as a state in October 1964 under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, following its 20-year status as the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and its 10-year experience as a member of the unsuccessful Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The editor of the *Times of Zambia* here sets forth its history from the Stone Age to the present, its importance in the political development of southern Africa because of the mineral resources of the Copperbelt, its economic prospects, and the philosophies of its post-independence leaders.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

American Aid and India's Economic Development. By S. Chandrasekhar. New York: Praeger, 1965. 243 pp. $6.50.

A distinguished Indian social scientist and economist appraises the changes American aid has wrought in India. Dr. Chandrasekhar, member of the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, details the genesis and growth of American aid —from an emergency grant of food grains in 1951 to the prompt supply of military equipment when the Chinese attacked India in 1962—and the improvements that more than $5 billion in American aid have fostered in agriculture, industry, public health, education, communications and transportation, as well as its contribution to the nation's political stability and military defense. Beyond this, he explores the impact of American capital and technical assistance on underdeveloped economies around the world.

Asia in the Making of Europe. Volume I: The Century of Discovery. By Donald F. Lach. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. 965 pp. $20.00.

This monumental scholarly work traces the changing image which Europeans had of individual Asian countries, and the impact of this knowledge on European institutions, arts, crafts and ideas, from 1500 to 1800. In this first volume, which is divided into two separate books, Dr. Lach, Professor of Modern History at the University of Chicago, briefly summarizes the growth of Europe's knowledge of Asia from the ancient Greeks to the early voyages of discovery around the Cape

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of Good Hope. Then he surveys the literature from Latin, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, German and English sources to show how the European view of Asia evolved during the 16th century.

Buddhism or Communism: Which Holds the Future of Asia? By Ernst Benz; translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 234 pp. $4.50.

The thesis of this book is that Buddhism "is once again becoming a significant factor in the spiritual outlook and the future destinies of Asia." Ernst Benz, Professor of Church and Dogmatic History and Director of the Ecumenical Institute at the University of Marburg, Germany, examines the "ecumenical movement" which seeks to overcome the traditional hostility between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism; the revival and strengthening of Buddhism from Ceylon to Japan; the status of Buddhism in the Soviet Union and Communist China; and the efforts of the communists to use Buddhism to promote their aims in Asia. He concludes that "perhaps the most significant development of all is that present-day Buddhism is displaying a distinct sense of political mission, as against the western world. As modern Buddhism sees it, the Buddhist nations of Asia have the special task of achieving the Buddhist conception of peace."

Ceylon. By S. Arasaratnam. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Book, 1964. 182 pp. $1.95 (paper).

In this survey of modern Ceylon, Dr. Arasaratnam, a Western-educated Ceylonese scholar, spends most of his time examining this island nation's most perplexing contemporary problem: the presence of three major communal groups, the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. His introductory chapter treats of Ceylon since independence and the final chapter contains an evaluation of the contributions of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial rule to the total legacy of Ceylon.

The Communist Party of Indonesia. By Justus M. van der Kroef. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Publications Centre, 1965. 347 pp. n.p.

This study of communism in Indonesia offers a brief history of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to 1960; a thorough examination of the PKI's theoretical foundations and its organizational structure, program and front groups; and an account of its rise to prominence from 1960 to 1964.

Growth of International Law and Pakistan: A Collection of Essays. By Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri. Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965. 140 pp. Rs. 10.00 (equivalent $4.00).

The concluding essay, from which the book takes its title, was written to show that international law is in a state of transition and that Pakistan should take an active part in framing the new and revised rules required for the world community. Other topics are "The Southeast Asia Defence Treaty and the United Nations," "Sovereignty in the Commonwealth (1840 to 1930)," "The Soviet Concept of State," and "The Contributions of Judges McNair and Read to International Law through the International Court of Justice."

India's Ex-Untouchables. By Harold R. Isaacs. New York: John Day, 1964. 188 pp. $4.50.

Mr. Isaacs reports on his conversations with some fifty individuals in India who have been going through the experience of becoming "ex-Untouchables."

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He interviewed students, teachers, civil servants, politicians and professional people who have "come up through the openings in Indian society created by the new educational opportunities" in recent years.

An Introduction to Asia. By Jean Herbert; translated by Manu Banerji. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 410 pp. $7.50.

The author, who teaches Asian religious philosophies and mythologies at the University of Geneva, discusses the endless variety of the customs and beliefs of the inhabitants of the Asian continent as well as the deep-lying traits that characterize practically all of them. Some of the topics treated are the Asian view of the universe, life, death and mankind; religious beliefs and syncretism; the individual and his environment, family, morals, and social relationships; economics, law, education, science, and art and literature.

The New Face of War. By Malcolm W. Browne. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. 284 pp. $5.00.

Malcolm Browne, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the Vietnam crisis, provides a firsthand account of the kind of conflict that he fears will have to be fought in many places around the globe. His story is in the nature of a warning about communist intentions and strategy.

Religion and Politics in Burma. By Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 350 pp. $7.50.

In this treatment of Buddhism and politics in Burma, the author, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, examines the evolution of Burmese Buddhism; the religious policies of British colonial rule; the relationships between Buddhism and Burmese nationalism, socialism and economic development plans; state promotion of Buddhism; the interaction of sangha and state; and the extent to which Buddhism provides an ideological barrier against communism.

South-East Asia in Turmoil. By Brian Crozier. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. 206 pp. $.95 (paper).

A survey of Southeast Asian affairs since World War II, in which the author seeks to untangle for the general reader the threads of Asian nationalisms, communist ambitions and intrigue, and Western intervention.

The United States and Japan. (Third edition.) By Edwin O. Reischauer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 396 pp. $6.50.

Originally published in 1950, this volume in The American Foreign Policy Library is concerned with American-Japanese relations in the prewar years, the occupation period, and the years 1951-1964. Professor Reischauer, currently U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, also examines the physical setting of Japan, especially agriculture and industrialization, and the Japanese character. The appendices include the present Japanese constitution, the Treaty of Peace, and the Security Treaty of 1960 between the United States and Japan.

The Urbanization of Japanese Labor 1868-1955. By Thomas O. Wilkinson. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1965. 243 pp. $6.00.

Dr. Wilkinson examines urban industrialism in Japan as it is rooted in the previous peasant-agrarian social system and draws from the paradox of Japan's modernization a series of comparisons with Western urban experience. His demo-

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graphic study of Japanese urban growth and industrial labor force development includes numerous tables and figures, appendices on the population of Japan and of Japanese cities during the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), a functional classification of Japanese cities, and an extensive bibliography.

VIII. Latin America

Fortress Cuba: Russia's American Base. By Jay Mallin. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. 192 pp. $.75 (paper).

"Proud, troubled, striving for improvement, the free lands of Latin America are the target which Castro-Communism seeks to conquer by subversion." With this focus, the *Time* correspondent who covered Havana from 1952 to his expulsion in 1962, details the story of Castro's takeover of Cuba and the significance of the revolution, even beyond the continent to its designs on Africa (e.g., the Sino-Cuban coup in Zanzibar).

Latin America: Politics, Economics, and Hemispheric Security. Edited by Norman A. Bailey. New York: Praeger (for the Center for Strategic Studies), 1966. 289 pp. $9.00.

These eleven study papers were compiled as a contribution to research seeking to clarify the thinking of North and South Americans on accepted values, economic problems and political and security interests. The subjects explored include the revolutions in Brazil (Paulo Ayres Filho) and Mexico (Frank R. Brandenburg), investment (J. Peter Grace), the interoceanic canal problem (Donald M. Dozer), ideology (Eudocio Ravines), neoliberalism (the editor), and the roles of the military (Edward Bernard Glick) and the government (Fernando Guillén Martínez). Professor Dozer also writes on the contemporary significance of the Monroe Doctrine.

Problems of Tax Administration in Latin America. Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Development Bank, and Economic Commission for Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press (for the Joint Tax Program), 1965. 574 pp. $10.00.

Papers and proceedings of a conference held in Buenos Aires in October 1961, at which 53 participants, attending in a private capacity, pooled information and experience with respect to tax problems in Latin America. The discussion ranged from common obstacles to effective tax administration to the use of modern electronic methods; from trends in management technique to criteria for choosing the type of tax appropriate to a given fiscal situation.

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